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General Introduction 
By looking through the lens of a global entrepreneur, this dissertation provides insight 
into a crucial period in world history: the First Global Economy (1870-1914). To tackle the 
broader issue of the opportunities and limitations in a paradoxical world of economic 
globalization and political fragmentation, I take an actor-centered approach. The history 
of the business empire of the Belgian Edouard Empain (1852-1929) is also the story of a 
complex era characterized by globalization and nation-state formation. By focusing on 
an entrepreneur originating from a small country but transcending boundaries, the 
possibilities and risks for international business in this period can be studied. 
The expansion of the Empain group perfectly coincides with the peak of globalization 
before the First World War. Starting in 1880, the business group of Edouard Empain 
developed into one of the largest in Belgium and became a global player active in various 
markets on four continents. The Empain group mainly invested in public utilities 
providing services to citizens and companies in Western Europe, Russia, the Middle East, 
Latin America, Central Africa and China. The core activities included rail transport in both 
rural and urban areas, electricity production and distribution as well as manufacturing 
equipment necessary for the construction and operation of these utilities. 
Within this broader context, Empain’s Belgian origins lead us to the following 
operational question: What strategies1 did a multinational enterprise from a small 
country adopt to develop a business empire against the background of both economic 
integration and geopolitical rivalry at a global scale? In other words, how did Empain 
seize the opportunities and handle the risks of a highly competitive world market? This 
research analyzes the tensions inherent to the period before WW1 and investigates 
strategies that have contributed to the successful expansion of the Empain group. 
 
                                                     
1 I use ‘strategy’ in the same way as Dunning: It is “a deliberate choice taken by the entrepreneurs or managers 
of firms to organize the resources and capabilities within their control (…) to achieve an objective or set of 
objectives, over a specified time period, that extends beyond the day-to-day operations of the firm.” John H. 
Dunning and Sarianna M. Lundan, Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy, 2nd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2008), 202. 
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In the following sections, I argue that the history of the Empain group intertwines with 
the history of the world before the First World War in several ways. The first section 
explores the creation of the global economy in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
It discusses the value of the explanatory framework of foreign direct investment for 
historical research. Then, it turns to the political processes of state- and empire-building 
that show the paradoxical nature of the First Global Economy. The second section adds 
the perspective of smaller states to the globalization debate, using the unique position of 
Belgium to illustrate their particular position in the international sphere. I show that 
global studies of Belgian foreign direct investment in general and of the history of the 
Empain group in particular are lacking. However, they are a perfect way to study the 
business opportunities and risks arising from the frictions in the First Global Economy. 
In the third section, I present the contributions of this dissertation, before moving to 
a discussion of the sources, methods and outline. I have three arguments to make. First, I 
will demonstrate the mixture of rational and erratic investment behavior typical of the 
nineteenth-century entrepreneur. I suggest that the Second Industrial Revolution had a 
decisive impact on Empain’s businesses. Secondly, this historical research joins in with 
the reappraisal of business groups as a valuable corporate structure. I argue that the 
business group form had many advantages making it an efficient device for investments 
in the First Global Economy. Thirdly, I introduce the idea that public utility companies 
did have to reckon with political risk before the First World War. However, they could 
design strategies to avoid political risk and seize opportunities related to nationalist 
opposition. Taken together, this threefold argument sheds new light on the strategies of 
Empain in particular and on the dynamics of international business in the First Global 
Economy in general. 
Setting the scene: The First Global Economy as an era of 
economic integration and political fragmentation 
The following pages describe the second half of the long nineteenth century (c. 1870-
1914) as an era of transformation in business and society. Economic globalization, the 
Second Industrial Revolution and the rise of modern nation-states all had a deep impact 
on the world. Let us first consider the period from an economic angle. Economic 
historians generally label it as a highpoint of worldwide economic integration. From the 
standpoint of the present globalized world, many contemporary authors refer to the 
period before 1914 as the “First Global Economy,” the “first era of globalization” or the 
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“golden age of global capitalism.”2 Only when viewing this period in a longer timeframe, 
these labels become meaningful. While examining the last two centuries, most 
economists distinguish a period of globalization, of deglobalization and of 
reglobalization. This is reflected in U-shape graphs such as Figure 1. The process of 
economic integration accelerated in the last decades of the nineteenth century, but was 
halted by the outbreak of the First World War. The interwar years were a period of 
protectionism and relative decline, especially during the Great Depression. After the 
Second World War, international economic relations intensified leading to the “Second 
Global Economy”. This view has been criticized, e.g. for omitting the recovery of the world 
economy during the 1920s and some have questioned the legitimacy of the “first” in First 
Global Economy.3 In addition, even before the First World War imperialism and 
nationalism set barriers to unbridled economic freedom. Nevertheless, the general trends 
remain uncontested: before 1914, commodity, labor and capital markets reached a level 
of integration unprecedented in history and paralleled only after 1970.4 
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4 Michael D. Bordo, Alan M. Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., Globalization in historical perspective, National 
Bureau of Economic Research conference report (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
General Introduction 
4 
 
Figure 1 Foreign capital stocks (1870-2000)5 
Global interconnection was the consequence of several factors. Improvements in 
communication and transportation technology accelerated the process of worldwide 
economic integration. Innovations such as the telegraph, railways and steam shipping 
allowed people, goods, capital and information to circulate faster and cheaper.6 The 
convergence of commodity and labor prices in different world regions points to the birth 
of a world market.7 Besides the considerable reduction in transport costs, the overall 
political climate favored intense international economic relations. The world’s largest 
military powers (Great Britain, France, Germany and the US) refrained from large armed 
conflicts. Polanyi even speaks of the “hundred years’ peace” between 1815 and 1914, only 
interrupted by the Crimean and Franco-Prussian war.8 Despite consecutive waves of 
protectionism, the global free trade regime with low tariffs championed by Great Britain 
encouraged large-scale international trade. The widespread adoption of the Gold 
Standard also reduced the risks of financial instability in the international monetary 
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system. These factors led to an ever-better match of global demand and supply, resulting 
in a steep rise in world trade. As a proportion of GDP, the total value of imports and 
exports nearly doubled between 1870 and the First World War to a degree (nearly 30%) 
that has only been reached again in 1974.9 
Closely linked to the increasing world trade, the international flow of capital also 
culminated in the years before 1914, only being surpassed in the 1990s. Never before, 
investments across borders in all forms (government loans, corporate bonds, equity) had 
flourished to such an extent. International financial integration, expressed in foreign 
investment assets relative to world GDP, reached a level between 20% and 30% (see also 
Fig. 1).10 These capital flows consisted of about two thirds portfolio investment and one 
third foreign direct investment (FDI). As a result, in 1913, total stocks of FDI amounted to 
more than 10% of world GDP.11 Whereas portfolio investment mainly concerns securities 
such as government, corporate bonds or small blocks of shares with the mere intention 
of getting a good financial return, FDI implies a certain degree of managerial control over 
the invested capital. Scholars usually speak of FDI as soon as the foreign investment in a 
firm’s equity surpasses the threshold of 10%.12 Another sign of capital market integration 
was the convergence of the price of capital. Between 1870 and 1914, bond spreads dropped 
from 5% to 1%. What explains this integration? As said before, the relative peace between 
the key lending countries created an atmosphere of trust. By removing exchange rate risk 
and promoting prudent fiscal policies, the gold standard decisively contributed to the 
stability of the international system. However, the most important was the rising demand 
for products, especially natural resources and food, in the European markets. Investments 
flowed into countries where resources could be extracted and transported to other parts 
of the world.13 
Although Great Britain dominated the nineteenth-century world, the economic 
balance of powers shifted in the last decades of the century, which in turn had an impact 
on international relations. From that period onwards, countries started to closely 
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compare the size of their economy and industry to get an idea of their position in 
international politics. Of course, Great Britain remained the most important player in the 
global economy, thanks to its large colonial possessions and the centrality of London in 
worldwide financial services and trade. Nevertheless, the ‘Pax Britannica’ was challenged 
by two newcomers, who were quickly catching up with Great Britain in terms of economic 
output. Especially in the industry, the United States and Germany were growing much 
faster, overhauling Britain at the turn of the century. After the end of the Civil War (1865), 
the US developed a very productive economy thanks to its enormous internal market 
opened up by a dense railroad network. The unification of Germany in 1870 had a similar 
effect. Large manufacturing companies became the driving forces of the US and German 
economies. Whereas early industrializers such as Great Britain clung to the traditional 
industries of coal, iron and textile, both Germany and the US rapidly shifted to the 
technological innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution. Large corporations 
emerged in new sectors: steel (U.S. Steel, Krupp, Thyssen), chemicals (DuPont, BASF, Bayer) 
and electricity (General Electric, Siemens, AEG).14 
The diversity of international business 
Due to their vast scale, business historians commonly gather these enterprises under the 
category of big business. It has become a field of study on its own, because big business 
grew into a significant force in the modern world economy. In some countries, large firms 
have come to dominate entire industries and exert considerable influence on society and 
politics.15 Not only in manufacturing, but also in the first and tertiary sectors, businesses 
expanded rapidly. As a utility operator and manufacturer, the Empain group in its 
entirety was big business too. Scholars have called it “without doubt the most important 
[private banking group]” in Belgium.16 Even when considering it on a European scale, I 
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find that the Empain group as of 1913 belonged to the top 50 largest firms.17 On the eve of 
WW1, the Empain brothers owned, either directly or via the main holding companies, 
assets totaling £9 million (or 230 million francs).18 At that moment, the Empain group 
employed a staff of at least 22,000 persons worldwide.19 Of course, measured by assets, the 
Empain group remained a lot smaller than the large railway companies of Europe and 
many big banks such as the Société Générale de Belgique. The industrial giants of AEG (£23 
million of assets), Siemens (£25 million), Deutsch-Ueberseeische Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (£15 
million) and Koninklijke/Shell (£30 million) were significantly larger. It was also outclassed 
by, for instance, the “Very Big” UK companies Sir W.G. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. and 
Vickers (both transport equipment), and Lever Brothers (oil and chemicals). Each of them 
had assets worth between £11 and £14 million.20 In contrast, the Empain group surpassed 
all of its (in)direct competitors in France, the Netherlands and Belgium. These include the 
French Cie de Chemins de fer départementaux (£6 million), Thomson-Houston (£5 million), the 
Dutch Philips (£0.6 million) and the main Belgian utility holding companies Société générale 
des Chemins de fer économiques (£2 million), Cie Mutuelle de tramways, Société générale belge 
d’entreprises électriques and Sofina (all below £2 million).21 
Most of the above-mentioned firms massively engaged in FDI in the First Global 
Economy. These firms were not passive vehicles of capital transfers. Business historians 
increasingly acknowledge the active role of firms, next to states, as drivers of 
globalization. Internationally active firms fueled economic integration and the spread of 
capitalism by transferring goods, capital, knowledge and people all over the world.22 But 
why and how did these firms engage in international investment? Since the 1960s 
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International Business theory has tried to develop several explanations on why firms 
internationalize and why they are successful.23 This comes with a significant caveat, for 
the discipline has mainly focused on developments after 1945. 
Generally, foreign investment is the result of wealthy savers in one country looking 
for opportunities to invest their money in markets where returns are higher. In addition, 
financiers spreading their investments over more than one country reduce the overall 
risk of their financial portfolio. However, a significant part of these capital flows is FDI 
involving some kind of control. Hence, scholars believe that entrepreneurs have 
capabilities to make their investment more productive than financial intermediaries 
would do through passive portfolio investment. Firms engaging in this type of cross-
border investment involving managerial control are called multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in business history literature. Firms must have strong incentives to become 
multinationals. If manufacturing firms want to start producing abroad instead of 
exporting, they need specific advantages that allow them to overcome the ‘liability of 
foreignness.’ This concept refers to the costs of doing business at a distance, caused by 
poor knowledge of the local market, politics and cultural context among others.24 
The most commonly used theory, the eclectic paradigm (OLI) developed by Dunning 
and others, distinguishes three categories of advantages a firm could have. These are 
ownership (superior skills and efficiency), locational (avoid trade barriers and exploit 
price gaps) as well as internalization advantages (reducing transaction costs).25 
However, the main theories on multinational enterprise have a severe limitation, for 
they are based on manufacturing companies. From the 1980s onwards, scholars of 
international business have started to question the explanatory power of the eclectic 
paradigm for firms active in the service sector. Service firms very often produce non-
tradable goods and therefore cannot export them. Many services offered, e.g. hotel 
accommodation, repair services, energy, communication and transportation, are 
location-bound. The firms’ only option is FDI, because the production is inseparable from 
and simultaneous with the consumption of the service. Therefore, they have to be close 
to their consumers and choose densely populated markets/areas.26 The study of their 
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internationalization motives corresponds better to the reality of the Empain group than 
the OLI framework. However, up to now historical analysis is largely absent in the 
business literature on service multinationals. 
Fortunately, business historians have expanded the scope of the theory of 
multinationals to the nineteenth century. Their studies do more justice to the chaotic 
historical reality than International Business scholarship.27 The modus operandi of many 
firms in the First Global Economy contrasts with the OLI framework and the theories 
about contemporary service multinationals. The latter theories start from the idea that a 
firm first builds up experience at home, constituting an advantage in the 
internationalization process afterward. In addition, the Uppsala paradigm states that the 
classic MNE expands incrementally. In its internationalization process, it gradually moves 
from neighboring to more distant markets, almost as if it followed a pattern of concentric 
circles.28 In contrast, many investments in the First Global Economy were not even based 
on previous operations in the home country. They were ‘born global,’ having cross-border 
operations from the start.29 A very important manifestation of this phenomenon is the 
‘free-standing company’ (FSC). This concept, coined by Wilkins, has been crucial for our 
thinking on FDI in history. It refers to a firm that is owned and controlled in one country, 
but that operates in another country. This corporate form was frequently used to exploit 
a specific business opportunity in a particular region, especially in services and resource 
extraction.30 Although Wilkins initially perceived it as an exclusively British 
phenomenon, additional research has shown that capitalists from countries such as the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Canada frequently used it as an investment vehicle. 
Dutch entrepreneurs, for instance, founded hundreds of FSCs before the First World War, 
mainly for colonial resource extraction in the Dutch East Indies.31 The FSC especially 
served to raise capital on European financial markets. The Western nationality of the 
company functioned as a screen, as it inspired more confidence in investors than an 
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exotic firm. The literature regards these firms as isolated units, merely supported by the 
favorable business environment of the large financial centers of London, Paris, 
Amsterdam or Brussels. 
The historically grounded concept of the FSC can produce useful insights for the 
Empain group. The other theories are insufficient to explain its internationalization. This 
dissertation shows that Empain’s first operation was across the French border, before 
starting in Belgium one year later. Later, Empain established other companies to operate 
specific utilities in foreign cities. It is therefore understandable that Hennart has written 
that Empain “created a large number of free-standing firms.”32 Although true, this 
statement is largely incomplete. Empain set up far more than a couple of isolated FSCs. I 
will argue that they were all integrated into a large diversified business group (see below). 
Introducing the globalization paradox 
The analysis of the economic history and MNE literature has produced a view of the global 
economy of the late nineteenth century as a golden age for international business. On the 
surface, it might have looked like a perfectly integrated global market. However, by 
considering the non-market forces too, historians of the long nineteenth century (1789-
1914) have refuted this view. Dejung and Petersson argue that there are power relations 
in every market. Therefore, political factors should be part and parcel of every analysis 
of the First Global Economy. The structural inequalities between Western and developing 
countries inevitably distorted the ‘free market.’ As a result, although the above-
mentioned figures on trade and investment might suggest otherwise, the free global 
market did not provide a level-playing field for every economic actor.33 
What were the causes of this drawback? In fact, the last decades before the First World 
War witnessed the development of not one, but two fundamental processes. It was not 
only “a period of globalization but also one of ‘territorialization,’ meaning the effort to 
tie social relations to specifically demarcated political-territorial spaces, usually nation-
states.”34 This territorialization was the consequence of the formation of nation-states 
and empires. Driven by the strong political forces of imperialism and nationalism, states 
pursued an agenda of territorial expansion and consolidation. They exploited their 
military and economic power to subject large parts of the world population. Besides 
creating formal colonies overseas, Western states also tried to enlarge their economic 
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influence abroad by other means such as gunboat diplomacy and financial imperialism. 
This informal empire was perhaps less visible, but a very effective way to bend the 
economic and political ‘rules of the game’ to their advantage.35 
The political objective of establishing colonial power all over the world was often more 
a matter of prestige than hard economic logic. Nevertheless, imperialist governments 
actively promoted and protected investments in the colonial and semi-colonial 
periphery. A well-known manifestation of a government supporting foreign investment 
is the British one in the late nineteenth century. Cain and Hopkins have famously argued 
that Britain’s imperialist foreign policy was strongly influenced by the financial interests 
of the City. Great Britain willingly made “incursions into the sovereignty of independent 
states” for the sake of “gentlemanly capitalism,” resulting in an “informal empire of 
finance” in China and Latin America especially.36 According to Fitzgerald, Great Powers in 
general provided plenty of opportunities to MNEs by enforcing a business environment 
that favored enterprises from the imperial country over local or other foreign firms. In 
extreme cases, states used military interventions to guarantee the rights and 
opportunities of their nationals abroad. However, in most cases diplomatic persuasion 
sufficed to protect the national interests in otherwise unstable investment contexts.37 The 
political and economic oppression of Western imperialism unavoidably caused a reaction 
in other parts of the world. Both in the colonies and states that had resisted or chased the 
colonizers, a nationalist awareness awakened among the local elite. This resulted in anti-
imperialist and anti-colonial movements such as the boycott of foreign products in China 
and India.38 
Not only in the developing world, but also in Europe nationalism was very present. 
Under the influence of this rising force, nation-states and empires began to consider each 
other as competitors on the world stage.39 In particular, the overseas expansion of large 
Western powers inevitably led to tensions among Great Powers. More in general, 
“reflection of current affairs was predominantly cast in terms of global rivalries between 
armed forces, nation-states, national economies, or even entire civilizations.”40 
Territorial states saw no other option than having recourse to power politics to win the 
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perceived Darwinian struggle for life. By overtly favoring domestic interests in global 
interactions, emerging nation-states could also legitimize their existence internally. 
In a sense, the wave of imperialism was the external manifestation of a more 
fundamental phenomenon: economic nationalism. Interestingly, this ideology spurred 
investments abroad, while countering the consequences of globalization domestically. On 
the one hand, states adopted a tough foreign policy to come to grips with the uncertain 
international situation. On the other hand, the large Western economies turned back to 
protectionism (except for Great Britain). In the wake of the economic crisis of the 1870s, 
they not only wanted to promote their industries abroad, but also protect them from 
foreign competition at home.41 
In summary, the four decades leading up to the First World War witnessed two 
simultaneous and intertwined processes: economic globalization as well as state- and 
empire-building. This concurrence constituted a paradox: Connections opened 
opportunities, but also caused international frictions. The more spaces got 
interconnected globally, the more states tried to intervene and control them. Despite a 
global openness for investment and trade, imperialist and nationalist forces drew visible 
and invisible borders. We have to further explore this paradox and its implications, 
because understanding it is essential to gain insights into the dynamics, risks and 
opportunities of the First Global Economy. To move forward, let us now turn to the role 
of small states in this apparently paradoxical world, as they can provide a fresh 
perspective. 
Small countries in a complex world 
As the large states set the tone in the globalized world before 1914, they have received 
the bulk of the attention of economic and political historians. However, we need to take 
the world view of smaller countries more often, as will be demonstrated. A few works of 
political scientists and economic historians have produced some valuable insights on the 
relation of small countries to the world. They introduced the idea that small powers in 
past and present have different interests to defend and therefore behave differently in 
the international system. The present dissertation builds on this research and wants to 
historicize it further. I argue that, especially in the context of the First Global Economy, 
small states offer a unique perspective on the functioning of the international political 
and economic system. Especially small European countries fall between two categories in 
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the late nineteenth century. They are neither the Western hegemonic powers 
themselves, nor the peripheral weak states subject to (informal) imperialism. It is 
therefore worth analyzing if they follow the power politics of the Great Powers or play a 
different game. 
Trying to move away from ‘Great Powers’ history,’ a growing body of literature has 
studied the position of small states in global politics.42 Although many definitions 
circulate, most political scientists agree that smallness is a relative category. Small states 
are small compared to other countries in their world region.43 In general, small states are 
those states that are not capable of defending themselves and need to rely on other states 
for their security. Moreover, small states are aware of their vulnerability and lack of 
power on the international scene. The main conclusion of this strand of research is that 
in history, the foreign policy of small countries was always informed by the need to 
preserve their territorial integrity. Therefore, small states tried to forge alliances to have 
more impact. In other cases, weak states preferred to remain neutral. This neutrality, for 
the Belgian case, was imposed by its powerful neighbors. As Belgium did not have a large 
army, its neutrality depended on the goodwill of its guarantors, most importantly Great 
Britain.44  
From an economic point of view, “there is much to be learned from the small 
economies” according to Joel Mokyr.45 Not only large states such as Germany and the US, 
but also smaller states performed quite well in the First Global Economy, although they 
did not have the same advantages related to size. Small open economies in Western 
Europe were more than other countries embedded in the global economic system. In 
other words, as the defining features of First Global Economy manifested themselves 
more vividly in these smaller states, they offer a clear research perspective. 
 The reason small early industrializing countries could still achieve high growth rates 
is that they opened their economy to the outside world. More than their large neighbors, 
they needed foreign markets as a source of supply for their population and industries. 
Not only import, but also export was crucial for small countries. Due to their small 
population and surface, this type of country could often only specialize in a limited 
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number of sectors. These industries suffered from diseconomies of scale as they operated 
in a small domestic market. To reach an optimum scale of production, firms needed to 
export to foreign markets to sell their surplus. As a result, the economies of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark and to a lesser extent Sweden were very 
keen to trade in the decades leading up to the First World War. In terms of openness, as 
measured by the value of trade (exports plus imports) relative to GDP, Belgium ranked 
second after trade champion the Netherlands. This also holds true when only considering 
exports. In general, the comparison with the world average is striking. By 1913, Belgian 
imports and exports amounted to more than 100% of its GDP, as opposed to 30% 
worldwide.46 The downside for small economies was that they were surrendered to the 
fluctuations of the global market and thus vulnerable to external shocks. Moreover, small 
economies did not have the economic power to substantially influence the prices of vital 
import and export commodities.47 
Considering this vulnerability, an edited volume has tentatively historicized the 
reaction of small European states towards changing economic regimes. Starting in the 
global economy of the late nineteenth century, the authors analyze the strategies that 
governments and firms could adopt within a changing international system. However, 
they focus on economic policy and export-related issues, omitting economic diplomacy 
and foreign direct investment.48 Only scarce literature tackles the issue of cross-border 
investments originating from small countries. One work focused on the post-World War 
II era. It seems to suggest that multinational entrepreneurs from small powers had certain 
disadvantages as well as opportunities. Generally, small states had less influence on 
geopolitical issues and did not have the size to engage in the imperialist power play to 
“protect or extend their investments” in peripheral countries.49 Harm Schröter is the only 
one who has covered the period before the First World War. Although he only looked at 
manufacturing MNEs outside colonial territories, his insights are extremely valuable. 
Schröter demonstrates that numerous firms in Europe simultaneously invested at home 
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and abroad. These MNEs were smaller, more flexible and took more risk. Schröter 
confirms the older insight that they were more vulnerable in the international sphere. 
However, he argues, MNEs from small countries could distance their products from those 
of producers from larger countries and use this as a selling point.50 
In summary, we are only at the start of understanding what role small countries and 
their firms played in the First Global Economy, but it looks like they had opportunities to 
act in their own way. In this regard, this dissertation deepens our knowledge about 
Belgium at least. Historian Carl Strikwerda claims that the country “provides one of the 
crucial keys to understanding the history of globalization.”51 However, surprisingly little 
is known about the place of Belgium and Belgian firms in the international economy 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In the next paragraphs, this will 
be discussed, initially focusing on the entire country and afterward on the firm level. 
The place of Belgium 
In the Belgian national historiography, it has become a commonplace to state that the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century –also known as the Belle Epoque– was the 
golden age of Belgian capitalism. Belgium had a disproportionate impact during the First 
Global Economy, thanks to its industrial power. To illustrate this, historians enumerate 
the countries where Belgian businesses had invested in. However, their sources are often 
books of famous Belgian economists such as Chlepner, Deschesne, Durviaux and 
Baudhuin.52 Lacking more recent comprehensive economic histories of the nineteenth 
century, their works, written more than 60 years ago, still set the tone. Younger 
generations of economic historians have devoted their attention more to the turbulent 
twentieth century starting with the First World War.53 As a result, Belgium lacks adequate 
in-depth research into its economic system in the late nineteenth century and early 
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twentieth century. For a clear yet cursory image of the Belgian economy before WW1, we 
need to rely on older insights, updated with comparative European literature. 
To be sure, the period of 1850 to 1914 was undoubtedly exceptional in Belgian 
economic history. The country obtained an economic status far beyond its small size. As 
the first industrializing country in continental Europe, Belgium witnessed a strong 
industrial growth throughout the nineteenth century. Until 1913, it remained the second 
most industrialized country in the world, right after Great Britain.54 If accounted for 
population, Belgium ranked among the four most productive countries worldwide, both 
in 1880 and on the eve of the First World War. It followed the Western offshoots the 
United States, Australia and New Zealand, but it left behind the UK, Germany, France and 
the Netherlands.55 Even in absolute GDP, Belgium narrowly belonged to the ten largest 
industrial economies in the world as of 1913.56 After the First World War, the country lost 
its economic strength. This is a fact lamented by many Belgian historians nowadays.57 
Indeed, the crises and violent conflicts of the twentieth century have been harsh to 
Belgium. Gradually, the tiny country sunk in the European and global rankings of GDP per 
capita.58 Like J.L. van Zanden has argued for the Netherlands, Belgium also evolved “from 
a small ‘large economy’ to a large ‘small economy,’” although the Dutch have better 
maintained their position.59 
Despite these superlatives for Belle Epoque Belgium, the general figures disguise 
strong social and regional disparities. Belgium was a low-wage country with a very 
unequal society. Historically, the heavy industry emerged in the southern part of 
Belgium. Metallurgy and coal mining in a few Walloon basins spurred industrialization 
from the 1820s to the 1870s. They specialized in railway equipment, which was highly 
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demanded in the context of the development of large railroad networks all over Europe. 
Flanders, in contrast, remained poor, industrial development being limited to the port of 
Antwerp and the textile cluster around Ghent.60 In the course of the nineteenth century, 
the Belgian economy also went through a few difficult periods. During the crisis of 1873-
1895, the growth of the Belgian industry decelerated. The traditional sectors had 
difficulties to stand the rise of German and French competitors. Only after considerable 
investments in steel production, chemicals and electricity, the industry could get back on 
track. Nevertheless, the Second Industrial Revolution did not revive the Belgian economy 
as it transformed German business. In summary, Belgian industry underperformed in 
European comparison. Whereas it had an average growth of 2.5%, other industrialized 
economies such as Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark grew up to two 
percentage points faster between 1870 and 1913.61 
On the level of firms too, systematic research on Belgian business from an 
international perspective is scarce. Currently, we are only at the start of the debate on 
why and how Belgian firms engaged in FDI. Whereas historians from the Netherlands 
have intensively studied the many strong links between Dutch firms and the world 
economy, historical research on the dynamics of Belgian FDI and the strategies of 
multinational companies from Belgium is rare.62 Certainly, historians of the Belgian 
expansion have documented Belgian FDI in different world regions (cf. Chapter 1 for a 
discussion of the distribution of Belgian FDI).63 They have studied the economic, political 
and cultural relations between Belgium and e.g. Italy, Spain, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, 
India, China and Latin America.64 Besides these country studies, research has been 
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conducted on dozens of Belgian companies that internationalized since the Belle 
Epoque.65 
Historians working on nineteenth-century Belgium have repeatedly emphasized the 
importance of bank-led business groups in the domestic and international economy. 
Mixed banks engaged both in commercial and investment banking and as such played a 
crucial role in the core industries of mining, metallurgy and machinery. Their most 
emblematic exponent, the Société Générale de Belgique, not only held deposits and granted 
short-term loans, but also made long-term investments in the heavy industry. Gradually, 
the Société Générale and other large internationally active mixed banks including the 
Banque de Bruxelles, Banque d’Outremer, Banque Internationale de Bruxelles and the Brussels 
branch of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Paribas) started to invest abroad as well.66 
The mixed banks used holding companies to control their widespread investments. In 
essence, holding companies are “financial institutions which manage a portfolio of stocks 
in order to control the companies in which they hold a share of the equity capital.”67 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this corporate structure remained 
the typical instrument of Belgian capitalism.68 The holding companies provided not only 
financial services but also technical expertise to their domestic and foreign subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, they allowed making use of the Belgian stock market, which developed into 
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an efficient source of finance after 1870. The vivid Brussels Stock Exchange occupied an 
influent position in the European financial system, ranking fourth after London, Paris and 
Berlin.69 
Besides the financial groups, other Belgian multinationals have received attention. 
They were active in sectors such as transport and electricity70, trade71, construction and 
engineering72 and heavy industry73. Despite the global outlook of many of these 
companies, the cited works have hardly addressed their internationalization. Only a 
handful of authors have truly paid attention to the multinational character of their 
subject. The companies are mainly situated in the innovative sectors that emerged or 
transformed during the Second Industrial Revolution, especially in modern utilities and 
transport74 as well as in chemicals75. 
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In the absence of a synthesis of the Belgian business history literature, it is hard to 
make generalizations on the objectives of Belgian capitalism beyond borders. Although it 
does not incorporate recent literature, the best overview is written by the political 
scientist and historian of international relations Rik Coolsaet.76 His explanation for the 
increase of Belgian FDI before WW1 points to the depression of 1873. The following two 
decades of reduced economic growth incited Belgium’s most important trade partners to 
erect trade barriers. As a result of the French and German protectionism, the Belgian 
export economy started looking for alternative markets. The domestic market for the 
Belgian core products steel, coal and machinery was saturated. To create foreign demand, 
the leading financial institutions linked to the spearhead industries started investing in 
heavy and light railways abroad.77 These export-oriented branches have determined the 
classic image of the Belgian economic expansion around 1900. However, Coolsaet argues 
that not all of the Belgian foreign investments did aim to spur domestic production. In 
general, Belgian capital flowed to those countries where it could earn higher returns than 
on domestic securities. In addition, FDI was meant to support the import needs, especially 
natural resources, of Belgian industries and meet the consumption demands of the 
wealthy middle and upper class. So in reality, opening new markets and guaranteeing 
production growth was only one, yet important, part of the explanation.78 
Another important aspect of the history of the Belgian economic expansion is the 
question of government support. Did the Belgian state, like the Great Powers, promote 
and protect Belgian investments abroad? Unfortunately, the historical links between the 
State, business and international politics remain largely unexplored in the case of 
Belgium. As one of the few, J.-F. Abbeloos has investigated the link between Belgian 
economic expansion and the colonial ambitions of Leopold II. Abbeloos found out that the 
Belgian economic establishment pursued its own agenda of internationalization, more or 
less independent from King Leopold’s imperial project. Belgian financiers preferred to 
invest in the “industrializing areas of the capitalist periphery” rather than in an unstable 
imperialist venture ruled by their monarch.79 Only after the First World War, the 
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protected market of Belgian Congo became the prime export destination for Belgian 
capital. 
Conversely, Belgian multinational enterprise did not have the systematic support of 
the Belgian state either. Precisely because of its small-power status, Belgium was not in 
the position to actively and boldly promote and protect its economic interests abroad. 
The support was “limited to individuals within the political parties, the diplomatic corps 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”80 However, Abbeloos formulates the hypothesis that 
the invisibility of the Belgian State, linked to its neutrality, might have been the key to a 
successful penetration of fiercely contested markets such as China and Russia. 
Very recently, Houssine Alloul and Michael Auwers have opened up the debate.81 The 
authors call for a new generation of historians to critically assess the influent role of 
capital in Belgian foreign policy. In contrast to Abbeloos, their reading of the literature 
emphasizes that the support for big business was the largest priority of the Belgian State 
in the international sphere. Citing Coolsaet, Alloul and Auwers find that the Belgian elite 
consistently implemented the liberal consensus of low taxes, flexible corporate law and 
low wages to keep the Belgian industry competitive on the international market.82 In his 
PhD, Alloul also stresses the significance of the aid of the Belgian diplomatic and consular 
apparatus.83 However, Alloul and Auwers argue that these claims need further 
investigation. 
An extensive political and global history of the Empain group could provide new 
elements to nourish the debate. However, together with the bulk of the Belgian business 
histories, the historical research on the Empain group fails in addressing the objectives 
and business-state relations of Belgian multinational enterprise. Although Edouard 
Empain is used as a symbol of the Belgian economic expansion before World War I, a 
thorough historical analysis of his expansive business empire still needs to be made. This 
is all the more surprising, because the Empain group was one of Belgium’s most important 
multinationals which maintained a clear link with its country of origin. Instead, for 
decades, the fascinating story of Edouard Empain himself has attracted far more 
attention. The first short biography of Edouard Empain was written in the 1950s by 
Célestin Camus, a former director of the group’s main company in Belgian Congo.84 His 
hagiographic entry portrayed Empain as a self-made man, who founded his own bank in 
1880 to stay independent from the haute finance. Reportedly, his ambitions were only 
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tempered by ignorant government interference. According to Camus, Empain was a 
brilliant entrepreneur who foresaw the benefits of electricity and expanding abroad. This 
heroic image of the ‘Great Belgian’ has remained dominant in the more popular literature 
on Edouard Empain. The most extensive biography of the Empain dynasty has not 
changed this view, although it certainly nuanced some points.85 The journalist Yvon 
Toussaint pointed out that Edouard Empain was supported financially at the beginning of 
his career by a local noble family, rather than having built up his business empire all by 
himself. Unfortunately, in Toussaint’s book, the history of Empain’s businesses only 
served to illustrate the glamour of his private life. Moreover, the author regrettably 
invented stories whenever the sources lacked. Since he also refrained from citing 
references, clearly distinguishing fact from fiction remains impossible. 
Although fragmented, the geographic extension of Empain’s activities has received 
more attention in studies on Belgian-foreign business relations, similar to those 
mentioned above.86 In particular, Kurgan-Van Hentenryk produced an excellent study of 
the investments of Empain and other Belgian entrepreneurs in China. Her work is of great 
value for this dissertation. She has especially shed light on Empain’s important 
connections with the Parisian financial market and his friendship with King Leopold II.87 
Hausman et al. also pointed to the group’s close ties with France, the most important of 
twelve host countries of Empain’s foreign investments. “In its international business, it 
hired French as well as Belgian managers and engineers and used French along with 
Belgian banking services.”88 As a consequence, his businesses in France were researched 
most extensively, in the form of two doctoral dissertations and several articles.89 They 
have received much more attention than the Belgian activities. 
However, by studying France or another region exclusively, the previously cited 
authors have probably produced a biased view of the global business group that needs 
verification. In fact, the only account covering all continents was compiled by a 
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passionate collector, Jacques Simar.90 Unfortunately, his brief overview lacks depth, 
coherence, and critical distance. Simar simply listed all companies Empain founded and 
sporadically provided information on their development, without embedding them in a 
broader narrative or in the historiography. 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that we still know very little about the 
role of governments and multinationals from small countries in the First Global Economy. 
Research, including that on Belgium, seems to suggest that small country MNEs profited 
more of the global economic integration, but were more vulnerable in international 
relations. The two main trends of the pre-World War I world were thus more pronounced 
in the case of small countries. With its temporary status as economic giant but rather 
weak political influence, the history of Belgium particularly embodies the paradox of 
economic globalization and imperialist and nationalist rivalry. Therefore, the much 
needed global history of the Empain group can shed new light on the modern history of 
international business of Belgium in particular and of smaller and larger states in 
general.91 By connecting and comparing business operations in very different political 
settings such as Venezuela, Egypt, China and France, the political aspect of international 
entrepreneurship in the world economy before 1914 can finally get the centrality it 
deserves. I argue that, only by bringing political economy back in, we can get an insight 
into the nineteenth-century rise of multinationals and the market and non-market 
conditions that shaped them.92 
Exploiting the paradox of the First Global Economy: Strategies 
of MNEs from small states 
The historical paradox of globalization and territorialization and its differentiated effects 
on multinationals from small countries leads us to the following question: What strategies 
did an international entrepreneur from a small country pursue to prosper in the First 
Global Economy? From the analysis of Empain’s strategies to transform the global 
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economic and political challenges into opportunities emerges the main thesis of this 
dissertation: To understand the development of international business in the First Global 
Economy, we need to acknowledge the importance of the following three domains at least: (1) 
geographical and sectoral strategy, (2) corporate structure, and (3) business-government relations 
including political risk. With the study of the Empain group, I make a threefold argument 
that furthers the debate in all three fields. 
First of all, this dissertation starts from the main assumption that, contrary to the 
theories of multinational enterprise, not all large MNEs followed a premeditated master 
plan. Rather, I argue that Empain acted according to an entrepreneurial logic, making use 
of the opportunities the global economy offered. To show this, I analyze the activities of 
the Empain group from a geographical and sectoral perspective. 
Regarding the sectoral strategy, in the 1960s Joye established the view of the Empain 
group as a vertically integrated enterprise of operating companies, banks and holdings. 
All companies had a different role and could thus profit from a large project such as the 
development of an electrified urban transport network. Whereas the private bank would 
finance the operation, the holding companies would give technical advice and would 
sometimes even carry out the construction work. The group’s producer of electrical 
equipment could provide the necessary material for the rolling stock and for the power 
station. In addition, a company would be set up to supply the tramway network with 
electricity.93 Pierre Lanthier and later Caroline Suzor came to very similar conclusions, 
but embedded them in the French economic context. They also emphasized the 
importance of horizontal (in the same sector) and vertical (expand upstream in the value 
chain) integration. The related diversification from 1900 onwards was entirely in function 
of the new profitable activity: electricity.94 
However, these earlier business histories of the Empain group either represented the 
Empain group as a static system (Joye) or did not look beyond the borders of one country 
(Joye, Lanthier, Suzor). All three ignored the more enigmatic unrelated diversification. In 
contrast, my combined global approach seeks to explain the genesis and geographical and 
sectoral development of the business group. On the one hand, I substantiate the claim 
elaborated earlier in the introduction that internationalization did not always follow a 
gradual or incremental pattern (Uppsala) in the First Global Economy. Empain invested 
in a series of core markets and temporarily ‘hot’ destinations. On the other hand, based 
on the evolution of the Empain group before 1914, I argue that multinational business had 
to adapt to the innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution to be able to expand 
globally and face international competition. At the same time, the group’s unrelated 
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diversification suggests that this adaptation did not exclude other entrepreneurial 
opportunities. As will be explored below, my claim is that this flexibility was also reflected 
in the corporate structure and political positioning of the Empain group. 
The second argument of this dissertation is that the business group form was an 
efficient and versatile corporate structure in the First Global Economy, perfectly suited 
for the strategies of the Empain group. A common definition describes a business group 
as “a set of legally independent firms operating under a common central management, 
linked by persistent, formal and/or informal links.”95 Existing research on the Empain 
group has concluded that Empain controlled a “rather loose legal and financial structure 
of his numerous companies while maintaining a strong concentration of the production 
and management-related decision-making processes.” The strategy “relied on a 
federation of holding companies,” which were organized internationally to get access to 
different national financial markets and “were under direct family control.”96 Suzor 
showed that the group was run by the two Empain brothers and a small circle of 
professional managers, who stayed in the business group for a long period. The strategic 
management was centralized in the offices in Paris, but daily operational decisions took 
place on a local level. 
This dissertation seeks to verify the validity of these claims on the level of the entire 
multinational enterprise as well as connect it with the latest history and theory of 
business groups in general. As mentioned above, recent research has acknowledged the 
polymorphic character of international investment in the First Global Economy.97 
Likewise, decades after the first works on FSCs, experts have realized that they are not 
always that free-standing. They now emphasize that FSCs could have been embedded in 
larger corporate networks and business groups, linked by interlocking directorships and 
equity ties.98 
This in turn ties into the recent reappraisal of the role business groups have played 
and continue to play in developed economies. In the past, the research on modern 
business history has been dominated by the idea of the multidivisional firm as the 
ultimate goal of organizational evolution. According to the theory of the ‘managerial 
revolution’ that Chandler and his successors formulated, the control of firms shifted from 
the owners to salaried managers, allowing these firms to professionalize and expand 
rapidly. Under the management of these professional experts, the firms vertically 
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integrated different parts of the production chain instead of leaving them to the market. 
According to Chandler and management scholars, the ultimate goal for any large 
enterprise is to transform into an American style multidivisional firm, which constitutes 
the pinnacle of organizational efficiency.99 In this view, other organizational forms such 
as the business group were a suboptimal solution, merely suited to overcome the 
shortcomings of the market in emerging countries.100 
The same authors that somehow negatively perceived this corporate form, have very 
recently revised their view. They now have developed a more general framework 
including business groups in the West. Colpan and Hikino today argue that business 
groups “rose to function as a critical factor of industrial dynamics (…) in the late 
nineteenth century.”101 
The reappraisal of business groups links up with the importance of this organization 
form for the Belgian economy in the last two centuries. Both bank-led and family-
centered business groups were crucial players in Belgian economic history. In the past, 
scholars have frequently highlighted their advantages. They stressed the business 
group’s ability to diversify into different sectors and countries as well as its coordination 
function. Controlling various businesses via holding companies, the business group had 
excellent information on the growth perspectives in each subsidiary. Based on this 
information, it could very efficiently allocate resources.102 
According to Colpan and Hikino, business groups emerged in the West in part because 
their structure facilitated the investments necessary “to keep up with the ever-increasing 
minimum optimum scale” of production and distribution, a typical feature of the Second 
Industrial Revolution.103 The scale increase of business groups paralleled the rise of large 
integrated industrial enterprise in the same period. This dissertation will demonstrate 
that the Empain group perfectly used the business group form to finance its enormous 
expansion. This type of organization allowed Empain to massively invest in the 
innovative sectors of the Second Industrial Revolution. As such, I argue that the Empain 
group is an emblematic case that represents a broader trend in the history of the Belgian 
economic expansion. Although initially supported by traditional industries, Belgian 
traction companies all over the world gained a dynamic of their own. Electrification 
allowed them to prosper internationally. Similarly, scientific improvements supported 
 
                                                     
99 See for instance A.D. Chandler, Franco Amatori, and Takashi Hikino, Big Business and the Wealth of Nations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997). 
100 Asli M. Colpan, Takashi Hikino, and James R. Lincoln, eds., The Oxford handbook of business groups (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2010). 
101 Asli M. Colpan and Takashi Hikino, eds., Business Groups in the West: Origins, Evolution, and Resilience (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2018), v. 
102 Brion and Moreau, Tractebel, 8. 
103 Colpan and Hikino, Business Groups in the West, 36. 
General Introduction 
 27 
the expansion of Belgian chemical industry. Both electric traction and the chemical 
industry were innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution. 
However, Colpan and Hikino work with a rather narrow definition of the business 
group, making it hard to fit the Empain firms in their framework. Their definition 
presupposes diversification in predominantly unrelated sectors. Other types of business 
groups, they argue, resemble more the multidivisional enterprise with its clear product 
focus. The authors concentrate on the most common corporate governance structure: the 
hierarchical (pyramidal) organization. The archetypal hierarchical business group is a 
tier-structured pyramid with a holding company at the top, which controls a whole series 
of subsidiaries. These might in turn also control other subsidiaries. Yet, the Empain group, 
with its “federation of holding companies” at the apex and its largely related 
diversification, does not entirely match the criteria. It is, nevertheless, the argument of 
this dissertation that the main advantages identified by the business group literature 
(ample finance and hierarchical control) underlie the corporate design of the Empain 
group too. Therefore, this dissertation advocates a more nuanced approach to business 
groups grounded in historical reality, beyond the typical unrelatedly diversified 
pyramids. Moreover, I will claim that business groups had two additional advantages. On 
the one hand, they presented unequaled flexibility with regard to geographical expansion 
and (un)related diversification. For every opportunity the First Global Economy offered, 
Empain could establish a new ‘FSC-style’ subsidiary. On the other hand, the international 
business group allowed to perfect strategies to mitigate political risk (see below). I argue 
that Empain could forge interesting alliances with powerful foreign actors without losing 
control of his business empire. 
The third and last main argument of this study focuses on the political aspects of 
international business. I argue that international relations were not just a matter of 
states. Above, I have explained that the world market before 1914 was political and that 
states regarded MNEs as agents and extensions of their foreign policy. This implies that 
MNEs were actors in international politics too. So to understand the interplay of economy 
and politics, we need to look at the actions of multinationals. MNEs balanced on the 
intersection of the integrated world market and the global clash of nations. In particular, 
the focus on MNEs from small countries allows moving away from a state-centered 
history written from the perspective of the Great Powers.104 
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In contrast to what has been argued above, many business historians claim that in 
international business before the First World War, nationality did not matter.105 The 
consensus seems to be that the national origins of capital and goods were of secondary 
importance at most. Compared to the interwar years, the First Global Economy as a whole 
was extremely open to FDI. Only after 1918, foreign business could not escape political 
risk, including expropriation and exclusion on a large scale. Because of its centrality in 
this dissertation, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of ‘political risk’. In business 
history literature, the concept is closely linked to nationalism. It refers to an 
entrepreneur’s uncertainty about the consequences of “all political actions and 
governmental decisions” as well as the attitudes and reactions of the local population, 
possibly inspired by nationalism.106 
The image of the First Global Economy as a golden age for global capitalism has started 
to show some cracks. First of all, earlier sections of this introduction have nuanced this 
view. In a world without level playing field, entrepreneurs were subject to the vagaries of 
imperialism and economic nationalism. Secondly, some business historians now 
acknowledge that strategic sectors such as natural resources and services were politically 
sensitive and prone to nationalist reflexes.107 Especially providers of public utilities had 
to take political risk very seriously. Whereas manufacturing companies could easily 
relocate production in case of a hostile treatment, the assets of utilities were immovable. 
In addition, government interference was inextricably bound up with public utilities. 
Governments, more often than companies, took the initiative to provide their citizens 
with decent public services. Especially authorities in urbanizing regions were demanding, 
but often unwilling or unable to finance these utilities themselves. A solution was to issue 
a call for tenders, allowing several firms to compete to obtain the right to operate a 
railroad for instance. The right was granted to companies in the form of a concession, 
often with strict government regulation.108 
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The conceding authorities, not the company, had the ultimate power to decide on the 
fortunes of the public utility. As a result, the operating company always had to reckon 
with the risk of nationalization or municipalization. Of course, the conceding authorities 
wanted to secure the best possible service for the population at the most advantageous 
financial conditions. Yet, as domestic capital markets and technology were mostly 
insufficient, host country authorities frequently had to choose between companies from 
different foreign countries. Subsequently, governments could also have political grounds 
play a part in their choice of a particular company. Because of the ubiquity of the 
infrastructure in the city and the public character of the services, foreign-owned utilities 
were very sensitive to the slightest flicker of popular nationalism. Even municipal 
responsibilities such as urban transport, electricity, gas and water supply became a 
matter of international politics. 
In other words, in the First Global Economy the ‘liability of foreignness’ concerned not 
only the “costs of bridging distance” and “information asymmetries” but also 
“discrimination by governments, consumers and other stakeholders.”109 However, host 
countries do not discriminate in an undifferentiated way. Lubinski has convincingly 
argued that “foreignness per se is not a liability but it depends on local perception of the 
home country.” In her article, she analyzes the position of German multinationals in 
colonial India. Her conclusion was that “national origin can be a distinct asset at one point 
and a significant liability at another.”110 Lubinski refers to this as the “liability of home.” 
This shows that political uncertainty and discrimination were not only a risk, but also 
an opportunity, as Wubs, Forbes and Kurosawa have recently contended.111 From a 
business perspective, this duality gives agency to MNEs on the political world stage. The 
ability of a multinational to better avoid risk than other firms constitutes a relative 
competitive advantage. Multinational corporations did not just passively let the policy of 
governments affect their business. For instance, they actively tried to shape the political 
context via business diplomacy, i.e. seeking and maintaining contact with various actors 
in domestic and foreign governmental bodies.112 Therefore, this dissertation wants to 
expand on recent research about the various strategies MNEs could develop to mitigate 
political risk. I argue that in the globalized world before the First World War, the political 
fragmentation marked by imperialism and nationalism created risks, but that creative 
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entrepreneurs could transform some risks into opportunities. On the one hand, the 
political risk was situated in the attitude of the host country towards the MNE. At the 
same time, the MNE needed to maintain a close relationship with the home country 
government and sometimes limit the disadvantages linked to its nationality. 
By studying the Empain group, I will investigate to what extent the country of origin 
of the Empain group was a liability or an asset. I will test the hypotheses formulated in 
the literature: Could Empain rely on the Belgian neutrality when negotiating concessions 
with anti-imperialist governments? Was there indeed a Belgian “expansionist complex” 
that supported Empain’s FDI? The above-mentioned literature seems to suggest that big 
business, the political elite and the King united their efforts to promote Belgian interest 
abroad. If this was the case, was the economic diplomacy of a small state able to stand its 
ground against the Great Powers? In a sum, was the small country origin a blessing or a 
curse? 
Did the Empain group develop strategies to escape its ‘liability of home’? Historical 
case studies have emphasized the practice of altering corporate structures to handle 
political uncertainty. I will investigate how Empain managed to come loose from its 
Belgian origins to a certain extent. Arguably, he used the holding company organization 
as a flexible tool to ‘cloak’ its Belgian nationality. The term cloaking refers to the frequent 
historical practice of disguising the nationality of the management, shareholders and so 
on.113 I will examine in what way this allowed him to rely on the support of Great Powers, 
especially France, when the Belgian diplomacy was unable to influence the host country 
government. In return, did Empain permit the French government to use his businesses 
to pursue national aims in the struggle for global influence if he could maintain ultimate 
control? And how did the Empain group rely on the local elite of the host country to 
improve its relationship with the local government and to appease possible nationalist 
opposition? 
In sum, my three arguments will together explain the strategies of an MNE from a small 
country in the First Global Economy. They will present Empain as an entrepreneur tied 
to a specific historical context, making use of the economic and political circumstances 
by developing strategic organizational capabilities. 
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Sources, heuristic strategies and methods 
Writing a global history of the Empain group with special attention to the political aspects 
of doing business in the First Global Economy, has proven a challenging task. It means 
that besides the regular company records, one needs to find sources revealing the actors 
involved in the complex interplay between businesses and governments. However, the 
business records of the Empain group necessary to address the questions raised above are 
fragmentary, to say the least. Fortunately, I was able to cover many lacunae thanks to a 
combination of creativity and perseverance. As a result, this history of the Empain group 
is based on a wide array of sources. 
For the history of a business group, the records produced by the firms themselves are 
the most obvious and important sources. In the case of family businesses, one should add 
the personal archives of leading family members. Unfortunately, both types of sources 
are private property, of which conservation and accessibility might not be guaranteed. 
The history of the Empain group was intricately linked to the turbulent history of the 
family itself. Every transfer of leadership from one generation to the next only took place 
with great difficulty. Due to much dissension within the family, the personal files of the 
founder Edouard Empain have been lost. In the past, several researchers have vainly 
attempted to trace them. Alternatively, they have interviewed descendants about the 
family history, but the oral tradition is limited to some anecdotes.114 To everyone’s regret, 
the corporate archives have been dispersed and most of them lost as a consequence of 
the collapse of the group in the 1980s. Even before that period, Edouard-François Empain 
(heading the business group between 1946 and 1967, son of François Empain) had ordered 
the destruction of important collections of historical records to make room in the 
Brussels headquarters, including those of firms operating in France, Russia, Egypt and 
Congo.115 
By chance, the remnants of these fragmented archives have been transferred to the 
KMMA in 1980 after a campaign for the collection of business archives.116 They include 
the archives of nearly all of Empain’s activities in Russia, as well as very incomplete 
records of the Congolese railway CFL. Fortunately, several of Empain’s companies and 
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their archives had already left the group before the archival destruction in the 1950s. 
France nationalized all electricity companies after WW2, including SERVA, SEP, EGN and 
SNE.117 Other operating companies survived because they were jointly managed by 
Empain and other business groups with a stronger conservation culture. The latter’s 
archives contain the records of the Chemins de fer de la Basse-Egypte, the tramways in Cairo, 
Damascus, Madrid and Nantes. The Chemins de fer de la Banlieue de Reims, the Chemins de fer 
du Calvados and Cie générale de Chemins de fer et Tramways en Chine were taken over by other 
business groups before the 1950s. 
Virtually all archives of holding companies such as the Compagnie générale de railways et 
d’électricité have been liquidated together with the companies themselves or even before. 
However, I was able to trace the former CEO of the French company SPIE, the successor of 
the Parisienne Electrique. In the 1980s, a friend had saved the minutes of the board of 
directors of the first five years of the existence of this top holding company for him.118 
The importance of such a unique document cannot be underestimated: the minutes 
provide insights into the relationship of the holding company with subsidiaries in France 
and abroad, the criteria determining the investment strategy, etc. 
This research worked around the lack of substantial business group records, by 
collecting information from a wide range of sources in dozens of archives. I found 
personal correspondence of Empain in the private records of members of the bourgeoisie 
and the royal house in Belgium and France.119 Close collaborators of Empain had also 
preserved many interesting documents on the history of the Empain group before the 
First World War.120 Then, the archives of many contemporary businessmen, firms and 
associations contained details on investment projects, competition and cooperation.121 A 
public utility entrepreneur such as Empain had often dealt with the Belgian and French 
government, both for domestic and foreign matters. Therefore, the archives of the 
Belgian and French ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Railways and Public Works as 
well as the Belgian Ministry of Colonies and its predecessor were very insightful on the 
role of the state in the development of the Empain group. I have systematically gone 
through all the files regarding projects that could have been of interest to Empain. In an 
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attempt to include the British perspective, I have searched the full-text scans of the 
Confidential Print series for the Middle East and Africa. Unfortunately, this has not yielded 
any meaningful results, showing that Empain was not in the center of the attention of the 
Foreign Office. 
Of course, the archives of the conceding authorities, often local municipalities, have 
conserved much more, but the correspondence concerned almost exclusively the 
practical execution of the construction works rather than business strategies and politics. 
Empain’s position in the Belgian political arena is also investigated based on the digitized 
proceedings (Annales Parlementaires) and documents (Documents parlementaires) of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. 
The gap created by the destruction of corporate archives was also filled by the 
abundance of published corporate documents in various media. Fortunately, the business 
group of Empain was made of dozens of separate legal entities. Nearly all of them had 
produced public documents, that discussed matters that would have remained internal 
secrets in a multidivisional enterprise. Since 1873, every limited corporation established 
in Belgium had to publish its memorandum of association, modifications to articles of 
association and balance sheets in a special supplement to the Moniteur Belge. These 
documents provide information on topics such as the founders, the board of directors and 
the financial results of the firm. Recently digitized with full-text search possibility, this 
source of 200,000 pages revealed stakes of Empain in companies that could not be known 
otherwise. 
To inform their shareholders, the larger listed companies also published annual 
reports, in which the board of directors explained the general developments of the past 
year. Although their explanations are unfortunately too succinct to allow an in-depth 
analysis of the business strategy, they give a rosy yet valuable overview of the company’s 
activities. In some cases, the reports include critical questions of shareholders too. The 
key data were also summarized in specialized periodicals such as the Recueil Financier. 
This documentation produced by the companies themselves is completed with articles 
from the general and specialized press. While the latter focused on financial and 
economic analysis, the former covered all fields of society. Nevertheless, the general press 
sometimes offered an interesting view on political decisions involving the companies of 
Edouard Empain and on new directions of his businesses. In contrast, the financial papers 
such as the Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels were more interested in the latest evolutions of 
Empain’s businesses that could affect stock market quotations or dividends. I searched 
large on- and offline collections such as those of Gallica, Belgicapress, Delpher, Europeana 
Newspapers, Hathitrust, archive.org, Financial Times and The Economist, on the one hand, 
and of the Credit Lyonnais, Association nationale des porteurs français de valeurs mobilières and 
Bois du Cazier, on the other hand. 
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To address the issues raised in this introduction, I will use a mixed methodological 
approach.122 The analysis will be mainly qualitative, although supported by quantitative 
evidence. First, I will adopt a global perspective. I will look at the business group as a 
whole through three different lenses: geographical, sectoral and organizational. The data 
used in the first part has been collected in a relational database (see Appendix 2). For 
every firm of the business group, I have gathered information on topics including 
economic activity, ownership, board composition, date and place of incorporation and 
liquidation, headquarters location, stock market quotations, the evolution of the capital 
structure and profitability. 
Second, I conduct in-depth case studies on particular political investment contexts: 
Belgium, France, Venezuela and China. I picked these countries, first of all, because the 
activities in other markets are much less documented. In addition, the selected cases offer 
the opportunity to study political uncertainty in different geographical and temporal 
settings. Two important countries might have deserved a case study too: Egypt and 
Russia. However, a whole literature has already been devoted to the Egyptian case. In 
addition, the company archives of Heliopolis are currently inaccessible, whereas the 
existing archival sources do not reveal that much about political strategies. New insights 
would have required extensive research in archives in London and Cairo. Nevertheless, 
some crucial elements of the corporate history in Egypt will be included, thanks to a 
reading of the available literature and sources. For the Russian case, the existing sources 
do not provide much detail on the political aspects of international business. Here too, 
based on existing scholarship and archives, the salient elements supporting the general 
argument will be taken into account.123 
This dissertation is limited to the period between 1880 and 1914. Stopping at the First 
World War might seem artificial, as Edouard Empain only died in 1929. However, this 
study is not a biography nor a traditional business history. To write an exhaustive 
biography, the historian needs much more egodocuments.124 Lacking these, I 
acknowledge that I sometimes cannot definitively attribute decisions and actions to 
Empain himself. However, the pyramidal hierarchy of the business group implies that 
Empain always had ultimate control. As for a biography, a comprehensive company 
history requires access to well-inventoried corporate archives. Rather, this dissertation 
is something in between. Not unlike global microhistory, it studies global processes and 
 
                                                     
122 Recently, business historians have lauded the wide variety of methodologies in the discipline, including 
corporate history: Stephanie Decker, Matthias Kipping, and R Daniel Wadhwani, “New business histories! 
Plurality in business history research methods,” Business History 57, no. 1 (2015). 
123 See the historiographical discussion of the Empain group above for literature on both cases. 
124 On the many interesting insights biographies of entrepreneurs can produce, see Jacques Van Gerwen, Marcel 
Metze, and Hans Renders, eds., De ondernemersbiografie : mythe en werkelijkheid (Amsterdam: Boom, 2008). 
General Introduction 
 35 
connections through the eyes of a historical agent.125 Besides, the focus on an 
entrepreneur and his businesses ties in with the recent trend to see the global market not 
as an institution, but as a web of relations.126 Consequently, this dissertation uses the 
Empain group to ask a set of questions about the First Global Economy. Extending the 
timeframe would change the research questions, because in the history of the global 
economic system, the First World War was a watershed. In the case of the Empain group, 
it also broke the dynamics of foreign investments. Moreover, the availability of archives 
for the interwar period is even worse.127 
Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Together, they shed light on the dynamics of 
multinational enterprise in the First Global Economy. The first two chapters of Part I 
substantiate the first argument. They show that Empain’s investments were the result of 
an entrepreneurial logic combined with the pursuit of economies of scale and scope. In 
particular, Chapter 1 focuses on the internationalization process of the Empain group. 
The chapter maps out the geographical spread of the investments of Edouard Empain. It 
tries to uncover the political, economic and personal factors that explain the choice to 
enter specific foreign markets. Chapter 2 provides another explanation for the strong 
expansion of the Empain group. It looks at the diversification strategy of the group before 
the First World War. The third chapter of Part I makes the second argument. It revolves 
around the organizational structure of Empain’s business empire. In the chapter I analyze 
the different capabilities that result from the business group structure, concerning 
finance, control, professionalization and flexibility. 
Whereas Part I looks at the entire business group from a geographical, sectoral and 
organizational angle, Part II takes a case-study approach. To develop the third more 
complex argument about business-government relations and political risk, we need to 
compare different investment contexts. Therefore, the four chapters of the second part 
each study the political strategies of the business group in a specific country. Chapter 4 
 
                                                     
125 For a pioneering example of a global microhistory of business, see Angelika Epple, Das Unternehmen Stollwerck. 
Eine Mikrogeschichte der Globalisierung (Frankfurt: Campus, 2010). See also the conferences organized in Warwick 
by the Global Microhistory Network since 2018 
(https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/arts/history/ghcc/research/globalmicrohistory/) 
126 Johanson and Vahlne, “Uppsala.”; Jan Johanson and Jan-Erik Vahlne, “Markets as networks: implications for 
strategy-making,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 39, no. 4 (2011). 
127 Perhaps with the exception of the personal papers of Georges Theunis 
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on Belgium and Congo investigates the position and personal network of Empain in its 
home country. Thus, it provides a point of reference for the following chapters on foreign 
investments. The group’s expansion in France is the subject of Chapter 5. It explores the 
maneuvers of the Empain group to gain legitimacy and support in a nationalist climate. 
Chapters 6 and 7 concern the investments in Venezuela and China. They provide a 
differentiated analysis of the impact of Belgian neutrality on FDI. Additionally, both 
chapters shed new light on the complex interplay between the MNE, the home and the 
host countries when securing investments. In the general conclusion, I reformulate the 
three arguments. I show how Empain was able to turn the following aspects of the First 
Global Economy to his advantage: the worldwide investment opportunities and 
technological transformations, the organizational flexibility and finally the international 
political frictions. 
  
Part 1 Business beyond borders, sectors and classic 
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Chapter 1 The bumpy road to a global business 
empire 
1.1 Introduction 
This first chapter investigates the internationalization of the Empain group. It tries to 
understand the business world from the perspective of a Belgian entrepreneur eager to 
start his career in the late 1870s. The Empain group was part of this select group of 
internationally oriented Belgian businesses, in contrast to the bulk of SMEs confined to 
the domestic market. The question then is why Empain went abroad instead of focusing 
on Belgium? At first sight, it probably was an economic necessity. By its very nature, the 
Belgian public utility industry was limited by the smallness of the domestic market. 
Nevertheless, it needed growth because without economies of scale many public utilities 
could not become profitable (see Chapter 2). Therefore, international growth was the 
most obvious step. If any, it bears resemblance to a combination of what Dunning has 
called ‘efficiency-seeking’ and ‘market-seeking’ motives. Efficiency seekers go abroad to 
gain “from the common governance of geographically dispersed activities,” whereas 
market seekers locate their activities in places where there are a lot of customers.1 Apart 
from these purely economic reasons, could it be that foreign expansion was also a quest 
for prestige or the result of an expansionist ideology? Or more generally, was Empain 
more than others inclined to take a risk and go wherever profits were the highest? 
Before continuing, the expansionism hypothesis should be largely ruled out. From the 
1890s, some members of the economic elite promoted the ‘greater Belgium’, i.e. the 
economic and cultural expansion of the country beyond its borders. L’Expansion belge 
 
                                                     
1 However, market seekers set up production in a new market to substitute exports or to follow competitors 
(“follow the leader” behavior). According to Dunning, other MNEs resource-seeking among others. Resource 
seekers try to secure access to strategic necessities for their production. Dunning and Lundan, MNEs, 69-72. 
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wanted to maximize opportunities for Belgian entrepreneurs to invest abroad. Empain 
was certainly not one of the protagonists, but sponsored the movement in the 
background after 1900.2 Seemingly, heading a global business empire, he had every reason 
to support it. All the more because other Belgian captains of industry such as Ernest 
Solvay and Baron Lambert donated too.3 At this stage, it is tempting to conclude that 
Empain was rather an opportunist than an ideologically pure Belgian patriot. Part II will 
expand on this issue. 
Except for a first attempt to identify the motives of internationalization, this chapter 
also investigates the internationalization pattern. Where could an ambitious capitalist 
invest? Which countries appeared on the radar of the Empain group and what explains 
the eventual geographical distribution of the investments? Corporate sources from the 
First Global Economy rarely allow to understand the precise reasons for the choice to 
invest in a particular country. Entrepreneurs mostly did not write down their motives. 
For the history of the Empain group, this source problem is acute. However, the preserved 
minutes of the board of directors’ meetings of the Société parisienne pour l'industrie des 
chemins de fer et des tramways électriques (Parisienne Electrique) provide a unique insight in 
one of the crucial board rooms of the Empain group between 1900 and 1905. 
The minutes show that holding companies functioned as important hubs of 
information.4 The directors and the general manager proposed opportunities that they 
had received from their informal corporate network or that they had investigated 
themselves. The holding’s engineers systematically screened these investment options 
for technical feasibility and profitability. Most importantly, the expected rate of return 
had to be equal to the current returns in the sector. Only one in three propositions 
actually passed the study phase and was executed.5 Of course, the top managers’ 
 
                                                     
2 Empain was mainly involved in two initiatives. First, the establishment of the first royal Institut national de 
géographie (1882-1884) that initially published the Mouvement géographique. After the turn of the century, he was 
the cofounder of the Société belge d’Expansion nationale (1909-1911). Empain mainly contributed to the 
construction of a palace in Brussels that had to gather all the expansionist movements of the country. “Institut 
national de géographie: Constitution,”  no. 663, AMB, 22 Apr 1882; “Société belge d’Expansion nationale: Statuts,”  
no. 2951, AMB, 8 May 1909. 
3 Dumoulin, “Ontluiken,” 729-32; Laurent Delcourt, “La revue de l’Expansion belge: miroir de l’expansionnisme 
en Belgique: contribution à l’étude des millieux, des réseaux et des idées expansionnistes en Belgique avant la 
Première Guerre mondiale” (Unpublished MA Thesis, Université catholique de Louvain, 2000). 
4 On the role of information gained via the press and business networks in the patterns of investment, see the 
fifth chapter of Gary Bryan Magee and Andrew S. Thompson, Empire and globalisation : networks of people, goods 
and capital in the British world, c.1850-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010). 
5 For instance, the group did choose not to horizontally expand to Kiew, Palestine, Shanghai nor to Marseille, 
Saint-Nazaire, Montluçon, because there was no sound business case to be made. Parisienne Électrique, Minutes 
of the Board of directors,  Virtual Library, SPIE. 
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perspective on what was possible was also determined by their ‘mental maps’.6 It is 
important to question how they saw the world evolve economically and politically. 
Empain’s vision on the global economy and on many other excluded investment options 
remained, of course, implicit. To make sense of that, the business historian can only look 
at the ‘revealed strategies’ and put them into context.7 
Consequently, this chapter embeds the geography of the group’s investments in the 
bigger economic picture and the general flows of Belgian FDI. Where did Empain’s choices 
differ from larger capital fluxes in timing, size and direction? In addition, the chapter 
tentatively takes into account international politics as an explanation for investments in 
specific countries. However, the case studies in Part II will deal with this theme in detail. 
Research for France has shown that both economic and political factors have determined 
the geographical distribution of FDI. Entrepreneurs primarily focused on locations where 
returns were higher, while also considering political entities which were part of the 
French sphere of influence or were allies of France.8 
The graph (Fig. 2) below offers a starting point to understand when, where and how 
much the Empain group invested before the First World War. For seven sample years, it 
shows each host country as a proportion of the aggregate nominal capital of all companies 
controlled by the Empain group.9 Before the analysis, a methodological remark is 
necessary. Nominal capital is only a rough indicator, because it does not indicate the real 
size of the investments that the companies made. It would have been better to aggregate 
the liabilities of all companies, for these also include the borrowed capital used for 
investments. Unfortunately, exhaustive data for all companies is lacking. As many 
unlisted companies did not publish financial accounts, the calculation of total liabilities 
would be flawed. By way of experiment, I have calculated the distribution of total 
liabilities for the sample year 1914. Taking into account the firms lacking financial 
 
                                                     
6 On the concept of mental maps, see the special issues “Mental Maps,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28, no. 3 (2002); 
“Mental Maps: Geographical and Historical Perspectives,” Journal of Cultural Geography 35, no. 2 (2018). and 
especially the Dario Musolino, “The mental maps of Italian entrepreneurs: A quali-quantitative approach,” 
Journal of Cultural Geography 35, no. 2 (2018). He shows that rather than being rational economic actors, the 
geographies of entrepreneurs are influenced by prejudices and subjective information. 
7 According to Sluyterman, the ‘revealed strategies’ are the decisions that were actually taken. Keetie E. 
Sluyterman, Dutch Enterprise in the 20th Century: Business Strategies in Small Open Country (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2005), p. 2. 
8 Antoine Parent and Christophe Rault, “The influences affecting French assets abroad prior to 1914,” The Journal 
of Economic History 64, no. 2 (2004). 
9 The aggregates allow for capital increases and decreases. For the following companies where the Empain group 
was not the majority shareholder, but still had a significant degree of control, I have multiplied the nominal 
capital with a factor between 0 and 1 equal to the percentage of shares or directors that the Empain group 
controlled: TB, Nitrate Railways, TPDS and Eclairage de Tournai. 
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reports, the evolution remains more or less the same.10 Companies without a clear 
geographical focus (mostly holding companies) have been excluded. To test the data, I 
have compared the 1914 sample with the aggregate liabilities of all companies. The 
proportions remain more or less the same. The importance of Congo decreases because it 
is only financed with equity, whereas China equals the size of Chile and Spain because the 
Chinese railways were debt-financed. 
 
Figure 2 Regional distribution of investments: total nominal capital of controlled 
companies per country in sample years (1885-1914)11 
Up to 1914, the Empain group has effectively entered 16 national markets.12 Two long and 
one short period can be distinguished according to the speed of internationalization. The 
first phase started in 1878 and ended in 1893. In these 15 years, the Empain group set up 
 
                                                     
10 Obviously, consolidated accounts for the entire business group would be the ideal basis for balanced 
interpretations. Unfortunately, the quality and availability of historical financial accounts is too poor to allow 
this. 
11 Sources: financial data collected in the personal database from the AMB, 65AQ series of the ANMT, Recueil 
Financier, Gallica and Henry de Saint-Omer, Les entreprises belges en Égypte : rapport sur la situation économique des 
sociétés belges et belgo-égyptiennes fonctionnant en Egypte (Brussels: Picquart, 1907). 
12 Or even 17 markets if I had not opted to consider Algeria as a part of France and not merely as a colonial 
possession. Unlike Congo for Belgium and Egypt for Great Britain, France regarded Algeria as national territory 
and had integrated it in the administrative system of the départements. 
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business in France, Belgium, Argentina, Venezuela, the Netherlands and the Ottoman 
Empire. In the next two years (1894-95), however, the number of countries in which the 
Empain group operated doubled from six to twelve, adding Egypt, Serbia, Chile, Brazil, 
Austria-Hungary and Russia. During the third period, from 1896 to WW1, the Empain 
group included four more markets in its portfolio (Spain, China, Congo, Romania). What 
can explain this rapid, yet brief expansion during the second period? Although more 
context will be provided to clarify each investment in the following paragraphs, the 
global economic situation in 1894-95 is part of the explanation. After a depression of 
twenty years (‘Long Depression’), the world economy started to recover, with robust 
growth from 1895-96. This upward economic trend assured entrepreneurs such as Empain 
to safely make large investments all over the world. In the literature, the Belle Epoque 
(1895-1914) is also often hailed as the zenith of Belgian economic expansion. 
The first thing that draws the attention is the contrasting importance of the two 
strategically crucial markets Belgium and France. Between 1880 and 1888, these were the 
only two countries where the Empain group was active in. However, while in these years 
the capital stocks in both markets grew at the same pace, their paths diverged afterward. 
The graph shows that from the birth of the Empain group until the First World War, 
France was by far the most important host country, fluctuating around 50% of total 
nominal capital. This means that the group has continued investing in France, even if it 
diversified geographically. In contrast, the relatively modest share of Belgium is 
remarkable. Although the Empain group made relatively large investments in its home 
country in the beginning, it did not continue to invest at the same pace after 1885. During 
the 1890s, the share of Belgium in the total nominal capital had dropped to 3%. Only after 
the turn of the century Belgium regained importance as a host country for investments. 
Could it be that the Belgian market was saturated, until technological innovations opened 
up new possibilities in adjacent sectors (see Chapter 2)? In the end, before the First World 
War, Belgium was the third most important market together with Belgian Congo, far after 
France and almost on a par with Egypt. 
Secondly, besides France and Belgium, other markets mattered. The weight of Congo 
can be attributed to a single company, the highly capitalized Compagnie des chemins de fer 
du Congo supérieur aux Grands Lacs africains (75 million francs in 1914). From 1905 onwards, 
Egypt became the second host country, accounting for 15% in 1914. Latin America has 
briefly played a prominent role in the business group. In the first half of the 1890s, but 
only then, the continent (Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile) accounted for at least 
one third of all investments. Except for Empain’s interests in the Chilean nitrate business, 
the group divested massively. That same period was also the most international (see 
above). In relative terms, the share of the core markets France and Belgium also was at 
its lowest that year: less than half of the investment stock was located there, in contrast 
to two third on average. 
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The rapid internationalization of the Empain group between the late 1880s and the late 
1900s is remarkable on its own, but to what extent is it the exponent of a broader flow of 
Belgian FDI in that period? The comparison of the data for the Empain group with general 
data on the spread of Belgian FDI allows assessing whether Empain’s choices diverged in 
time and space from the average. The stock data presented in Figure 2 have been 
converted into flows per continent.13 Rather than at a given point in time, Figure 3 shows 
the average yearly investment made in different world regions. Before comparing the two 
graphs (Fig. 3 and 4) below, there are some important caveats to make. A long tradition 
of historians has tried to establish accurate estimates of Belgian FDI in the Belle Epoque.14 
From the two most recent estimates, by Dumoulin and by Peeters, I have opted for the 
latter. Both authors have tried to measure the flux of outgoing FDI every year, in contrast 
to the more static approach of total capital stocks employed above. However, whereas 
Dumoulin only looked at the initial nominal capital of the Belgian companies active 
abroad, regardless of capital increases, decreases and liquidations, Peeters measured the 
actual investments these companies made every year. He included over 700 companies in 
his sample, the bulk of it being firms registered under Belgian law listed on the stock 
exchanges of Brussels, Paris and/or Saint Petersburg. Compared to the sample of Empain 
companies, Peeters’ sample contains some methodological flaws. Unlike Peeters, I 
included Belgian-owned companies that were registered under foreign law. The French 
(capital) market was so closely integrated that Belgians directly invested in French 
companies, without leaving any paper trace in Belgium. Therefore, aggregates such as 
that of Peeters have underestimated the importance of France for Belgian capital.15 By 
integrating Empain’s foreign-registered companies, mostly in France and Egypt, I am able 
to fully account for the group’s presence in those two important markets. In addition, the 
Peeters sample is biased towards listed companies, whereas the Empain sample also 
comprises the approx. 25 unlisted companies of the business group (Chapter 3 will 
analyze these companies). 
General data series on capital stocks of Belgian FDI do not exist. Therefore, to optimize 
the comparison, the data on the Empain group have been transformed from capital stocks 
to capital flows. Investments in Belgium were excluded as they do not count as FDI. The 
 
                                                     
13 Stocks are the result of an accumulation of investment and are measured at a specific time, whereas flows 
represent the speed of accumulation, i.e. over an interval of time. For e.g. Europe, I have calculated the flows by 
taking the difference between the stocks in two subsequent sample years A and B, and dividing this difference 
by the number of years in the interval. As stocks can increase and decrease, flows can also be negative, pointing 
to a divestment from a certain area. 
14 For an elaborate discussion of the various estimates, including their own, see Dumoulin, Relations italo-belges, 
111-27; Wim Peeters, “Belgian Investment in Russia (1873-1913): Small country investments in one of largest 
emerging markets,” in XIIIth International Economic History Congress (Buenos Aires2002), 3-14. 
15 See also Paul Michotte, “Quelques aspects de l’expansion économique de la Belgique,” L’Expansion Belge 4, no. 
1 (1911): 33. 
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flows present the top countries for Belgian FDI per decade and illustrate which 
destinations were ‘hot’ in a particular period. To make the comparison more explicit, I 
interpret the graph as the investment behavior of a fictitious Belgian investor who 
perfectly imitates the general trend of Belgian FDI. Although the approach is somewhat 
artificial, as hardly any investor did invest in all regions, it is nevertheless very 
informative. When comparing the spread of investments of the Empain group with the 
average Belgian investor, some interesting patterns emerge. In short, the Empain group 
has mainly invested in, ranked by order of importance, Western Europe, the Middle East, 
Belgian Congo, Russia and Latin America. This selection of regions matches that of the 
average, although the importance heavily contrasts. How to explain that Empain’s 
interests in the Congo exceeded the general share? Conversely, the average Belgian 
investor devoted much more attention to Russia and Latin America over the whole 
period. Up to 1890, Europe and South America were the two most important regions 
receiving Belgian FDI. Afterward, the Empain group kept away from the continent, while 
other Belgian investors continued to see the potential of Latin America. This is something 
to investigate further in this chapter. 
Empain was also totally absent from North America, accounting for 4% of total Belgian 
investments in the period. Analyzing Empain’s absence and the general little interest is 
beyond the scope of this research. A tentative explanation might be that Belgian 
entrepreneurs in Canada and the United States mainly focused on natural resources, real 
estate and chemicals (Solvay), whereas the public utility industry was dominated by large 
American and German groups.16 
 
                                                     
16 Ginette Kurgan-van Hentenryk and Julie Laureyssens, Un siècle d’investissements belges au Canada (Brussels: 
Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1986); Mira Wilkins, The History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 
1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989). 
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Figure 3 Net capital account outflow through FDI of the Empain group, currently yearly 
averages in % (1880-1914)17 
What also needs clarification is the discrepancy between the small share of Empain and 
the massive Belgian investments in Russia during the 1890s. Entrepreneurs particularly 
focused on urban transport and heavy industry. As the Empain group was active in 
tramways too, why did the ‘Russian fever’ of 1895-1900 barely captivate it? Only on the 
eve of the First World War, the proportions of both samples correspond. From the 
previous discussion of Empain’s investment based on capital stocks data, one might 
conclude that the 1890s were the group’s most global decade. Surprisingly, this is not 
reflected in the data on capital flows. Whereas Belgian FDI flew to all continents and 
especially to Russia, Empain continued focusing on Europe. Keep in mind, however, that 
the statistics with regard to Belgian FDI in Europe are biased (see above). The capital flows 
of Empain give a more balanced image than the capital stocks of 1895, which accidentally 
capture the group’s most global moment. Some investments outside Europe already dated 
from the 1880s and were soon to be liquidated. The presence in other new markets was 
not deepened in the following years, as it was often the consequence of a once-only 
investment. Considered over the years, the efforts in France and Spain were far more 
decisive. Surprisingly, investments in other traditional European host countries for 
Belgian FDI such as Italy are entirely absent. Finally, the increasing capital flows to the 
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Middle East are reflected in the investment behavior of the Empain group. However, it is 
not as straightforward as to say that Empain merely followed the broader Belgian trend. 
As mentioned above, the group’s interests in Egypt were such that they might influence 
the general statistics on their own. 
 
Figure 4 Net capital account outflow through Belgian FDI, current yearly averages in % 
(1879-1913)18 
Apart from a fictitious average Belgian investor, Empain can also be compared to 
entrepreneurs of flesh and blood. Edouard Otlet (1842-1907) started in the same sectors 
as Empain in the early 1870s, earning the nickname “the tramway King”. He set different 
priorities in the internationalization of his business group. Like Empain, he also invested 
in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Spain and Egypt. However, 
he was also active in the popular markets Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy as well as 
Persia and Algeria. Otlet cooperated with Empain in the 1880s and early 1890s (see below) 
and continued to share business opportunities with him. Empain, however, refused any 
further cooperation afterward and they became fierce competitors. Otlet surpassed 
 
                                                     
18 Wim Peeters, “Foreign Direct Investment within a reconstructed balance of payments, Preliminary results for 
Belgium (1879-1939),” in Public Debt, Public Finance, Money and Balance of Payments in Debtor Countries (1890-1932/33), 
B16- Proceedings Twelfth International Economic History Congress, ed. C.E. Núñez, et al. (Sevilla: Universidad de 
Sevilla, 1998), 120. 
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Empain in the risks he took, but his global strategy seemed less systematic. Due to several 
bad investments, he became dependent on large banks.19 
In the remainder of the chapter, I will discuss the market entry of the Empain group in 
loose chronological order. I start with the early career of Empain in Belgium and the 
genesis of the business group. That section simultaneously deals with France, as that is 
where the foundations of the Empain group are to be looked for surprisingly. The next 
sections deal with Europe, South America, the Middle East, Russia, China and Congo and 
try to analyze why Empain chose to invest there or not. 
1.1 Belgium, France and Europe (1878/1880-…) 
1.1.1 Business in Belgium before the group 
In 1851, the clerc, organist and freshly appointed local schoolteacher François-Julien 
Empain (°1822) married Catherine Lolivier (°1825) in Beloeil, a small town in the province 
of Hainaut, close to the French border. François-Julien’s and Catherine’s ancestors were 
lower-middle-class artisans. A bit more than nine months later, their first child, Edouard 
Louis Joseph Empain was born. After Edouard, 5 daughters and one son, would follow. 
Three more daughters did not make it to their third birthday. Edouard and Marie-Louise 
(°1856) were born in Belœil, before the family moved to Tongres-Notre-Dame, only a few 
kilometers away. There, Florence (°1860) and François (°1862) were born. In 1863, father 
François-Julien was promoted to the municipal school of Blicquy, a small village in the 
same region. The long-standing mayor of the village, Alexis du Roy de Blicquy supported 
his appointment, which came with a comfortable salary. In Blicquy, the three youngest 
daughters, Anne-Cathérine (°1864), Irma (a.k.a. Emma) (°1868) and Louise (°1871) were 
born. 
In this environment, Edouard Empain grew up, went to school and church. Having 
finished primary education at the age of 14, the eldest son got the chance to pursue 
secondary education. Probably, the du Roy de Blicquy family financed his studies at the 
Collège episcopal St-Augustin of Enghien, where he stayed from 1867 to 1870.20 Allegedly, 
 
                                                     
19 The Otlet group tried to remain a genuine family business, where all family members were involved. 
Unfortunately, not all of them had good management qualities. Michel Dumoulin, “Edouard Otlet,” in Biographie 
Nationale (Brussels: Bruylant, 1979); De Ryck, “Otlet.” 
20 Guy Waltenier, “Les quartiers d’ascendance du Baron Édouard Empain (1852-1929),” L’intermédiaire des 
généalogistes, no. 235 (February) (1985): 49. 
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Edouard Empain was not a brilliant student and at the age of 18 he did not pursue higher 
education. Many biographers have written that he obtained an engineering degree, but 
his descendants deny this. More likely, Empain tried to find a job. At the end of 1872, he 
moved to Brussels where he could start as an apprentice draftsman in the Société 
métallurgique et charbonnière belge.21 Probably, the relationship with Alexis du Roy de 
Blicquy, somehow Empain’s protector, facilitated the start of his career, as Arthur du Roy 
de Blicquy, son of Alexis, was the chief engineer of the company at that time.22 
The Société métallurgique possessed several workshops for the construction of railway 
material, especially rolling stock, as well as different coal mines in the province of 
Hainaut. By studying different projects in railroad construction and mining, Empain 
gained experience in both fields. Apparently, the directors of the company were pleased 
with his work. Several contemporaries of Empain report how Empain used to tell the 
anecdote that one of the shareholders of the Société métallurgique, the French banker Henri 
de Lamontat, asked the company managers to study a stone quarry in Belgium, in which 
he wanted to invest. They chose Edouard Empain, who wrote a critical report. The quality 
of the report pleased Henri de Lamontat.23 De Lamontat’s continuous praise of Empain 
likely contributed to the latter’s promotion in the company. Empain is reportedly 
promoted chef du bureau d’études and chief engineer of the company.24 
Besides his work at the Société métallurgique, Empain was looking for other 
entrepreneurial opportunities. Possibly during his study work at the company, or at least 
via its extensive network, Empain took an interest in stone quarries. In October 1878, 
Empain, who called himself “maître de carriers,” entered into partnership with Emile 
Mestreit. Mestreit was part of a family with strong ties to the Société métallurgique and was 
himself an employee of that company.25 Edouard Empain was responsible for industrial 
and commercial affairs, while his colleague Emile Mestreit led the company. Arguably, 
 
                                                     
21 In October 1872, the population register of Brussels mentioned him as a “student”. The Société métallurgique et 
charbonnière is founded in May 1873 after the merger of several firms of Simon Philippart. Kurgan-van 
Hentenryk, Rail, 249. 
22 “Distribution des récompenses accordées à l’occasion de l’Exposition Universelle de Vienne,” Le Bien Public, 9 
Feb 1874. 
23 Also spelled ‘de Lamonta’, “Tribunaux,” L’Indépendance Belge, 18 Aug 1876; Toussaint, Barons, 23-24; Duchesne, 
“Général.” 
24 Although I have not found any primary sources that can prove this promotion. 
25 At the time of his marriage, Mestreit worked for the Société générale d’exploitation de chemins de fer, which was 
transformed into the Société métallurgique et charbonnière in 1873. Marriage certificate of Emile Mestreit 
(Schaarbeek), 19 Mar 1870, Burgerlijke stand: Huwelijksakten - Vlaams-Brabant en Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest, 42, 
ARA. 
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Empain had to look for interesting quarries to exploit. Not more than eight months later, 
in June 1879, both partners decided to end their collaboration.26 
This was probably due to the fact that a month before, Edouard Empain had become a 
member of the board of directors of a recently founded limited company, the Société 
anonyme des marbres. The founders, among them Edmond Terlinden, brought in a 
workshop to carve marble and building stones, which had been active for five years in 
Cureghem-sous-Anderlecht, near Brussels Midi station. Edmond Terlinden and his co-
founders received 1000 of the 1200 shares of 500 francs.27 Edmond Terlinden (°1830-†1900) 
was part of a noble family from Ghent and secretary of the bank Caisse des Propriétaires.28 
We cannot know for sure how Terlinden and Empain got acquainted. We do know that in 
1881, they were both appointed on the board of the Société métallurgique, which was 
renamed La Métallurgique, société anonyme de construction (La Métallurgique) in 1880.29 
As director of the SA des marbres, Empain searched new quarries to supply the mason’s 
yard in Brussels. By the beginning of 1880, he had obtained three marble and stone 
quarries situated between Philippeville and Couvin in the South of Belgium. Empain sold 
one of them to another “maître de carrières” and he brought the other two into the SA 
des Marbres in January 1881.30 Consequently, the limited company raised its capital from 
600,000 to 1,100,000 francs. As compensation for the quarries, Empain received all the new 
shares, making him the largest shareowner. A year later, Empain had obtained an absolute 
majority and proposed to sell all the quarries to another company. Soon afterward, they 
dissolved the company. The annual accounts do not allow an assessment of the success of 
the company. At least, it was active at a period of rapid urban development in Brussels. 
The company undoubtedly had to provide stones and marble for the construction of the 
new Palace of Justice, finished in 1883. The amount needed for the largest building in the 
world was colossal.31 However, in 1880, the company made a loss of 20,000 francs, the year 
afterward the loss had accumulated to 500,000 francs. Perhaps Empain proposed the 
dissolution in 1882 to prevent further losses. It is unclear whether or not Empain himself 
 
                                                     
26 “E. Mestreit & Cie,”  no. 1141, AMB, 11 Oct 1878; “E. Mestreit & Cie: Dissolution,”  no. 721, AMB, 25 Jun 1879. 
27 “Extrait de l’acte de Société en commandite simple sous la firme : H. Bragard et Cie à Cureghem,”  no. 261, 
AMB, 1 Mar 1875; “Société anomyme des Marbres: Constitution,”  no. 474, AMB, 26 Apr 1879. 
28 “Modifications aux statuts de la Société anonyme du Charbonnage de Homvent,”  no. 35, AMB, 7 Jan 1875. 
29 “La Métallurgique, société anonyme de construction: Extrait du PV de l’AGO,”  no. 514, AMB, 26 Mar 1881. 
30 “Société générale des carrières: Statuts,”  no. 1378, AMB, 19 Sep 1881; “SA des Marbres,”  no. 93, AMB, 16 Jan 
1881. 
31 Bruxelles, Ville d’art et d’histoire: Le Palais de Justice, (Brussels: Région Bruxelles-Capitale, 2001), 
http://patrimoine.brussels/liens/publications-en-ligne/versions-pdf/bvah/le-palais-de-justice. 
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turned it to his advantage in the end, since he had been rewarded generously for putting 
in the quarries.32 
Empain’s activities in the quarry business must have contributed to his wealth, but the 
question remains how he had been able to buy these three quarries in the first place. In 
1880, he was also wealthy enough to employ a staff of ten (domestic?) workers.33 Although 
there is no clear proof, it is very likely that the du Roy de Blicquy family has granted him 
a loan or even a starting capital to enable him to acquire these quarries. Empain’s 
descendants and biographers believe that the support of the du Roy de Blicquy family 
essentially launched Empain’s career. Later, Edouard Empain is said to have repeatedly 
instructed his sons: “Whatever a Blicquy might ask, give it to him. We owe everything to 
this family.”34 When Empain started as a private banker in February 1881, the network of 
La Métallurgique most likely provided his first clients. The funds earned with the sale of 
the quarries could also have formed a basis for his banking activities. 
The sale of the three quarries by 1881 marked the end of a brief enterprise in the quarry 
sector. The development of Empain’s business group followed a different course, starting 
in the railroad industry. However, Edouard Empain did not step out of the quarry business 
entirely. He remained a small shareholder of the Société générale des carrières, a company 
similar to the SA des Marbres.35 Together with Edmond Terlinden, he owned the slate 
quarry of Saint-Joseph d’Oignies until they dissolved the operating company in 1891.36 
1.1.2 Boomerang expansion: To France and back to Belgium 
The history of the business group of the Belgian Edouard Empain did not start in 
Belgium, but in France. Only in a second phase, the Empain group began operating in its 
home country. This inversion was due to the investment context in both countries. 
Empain’s search for railway concessions started in a period of transition. At the end of 
the 1870s, Belgium as well as France were reconsidering their policy towards the 
development of a second rail network. The heavy standard-gauge37 main railroads had 
been finished and the governments wanted to set up a program to develop a dense 
network of local railways connecting the countryside to the main lines (for France, see 
 
                                                     
32 “SA des Marbres: Bilan,”  no. 763, AMB, 31 Dec 1881; “SA des Marbres: Apport,”  no. 346, AMB, 12 Mar 1882; “SA 
des Marbres: Dissolution,”  no. 784, AMB, 5 May 1882. 
33 Registre des patentes,  Finances et fiscalité, ACB. 
34 “Quoi que puisse vous demander un Blicquy, accordez-lui. Nous devons tout à cette famille!”, Toussaint, 
Barons, 21. 
35 “Société générale des carrières: Statuts,”  no. 1378, AMB, 19 Sep 1881. 
36 “Ardoisière Saint-Joseph d’Oignies: Dissolution,”  no. 536, AMB, 20 Mar 1891. 
37 This refers to the space between the two rails of a railroad track. For instance, standard gauge is 1.435 meter. 
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Fig. 5). In Belgium, this type of railroad was called chemins de fer vicinaux or 
buurtspoorwegen (vicinal railways). In France it was known as chemins de fer secondaires or 
chemins de fer d’intérêt local, as opposed to chemins de fer d’intérêt général. As these local 
railways were generally constructed using narrow gauge (voie étroite), particularly meter 
gauge, they were better adapted to difficult terrain because they could make tighter 
curves. Combined with the use of lighter material and rolling stock, this made narrow-
gauge railways less expensive in construction and operation. Because of the lighter 
equipment, they were also called light railways in the past.38 This dissertation uses light 
rail(ways) as an umbrella term for railroads that are not part of urban transport or the 
main lines (see also Chapter 2). 
 
Figure 5 Main and secondary railway lines ever operated in France (1831-2001)39 
Most logically, a group of Belgian railway entrepreneurs would start looking for 
concessions in their home country. From the late 1870s, Empain and his partners had 
plans to develop light railways in Belgium. Probably, they had put a lot of effort into 
 
                                                     
38 John Charles MacKay, Light railways for the United Kingdom, India, and the colonies: A practical handbook... (London: 
C. Lockwood and Son, 1896). 
39 Etienne Auphan, “L’apogée des chemins de fer secondaires en France: Essai d’interprétation cartographique,” 
Revue d’histoire des chemins de fer, no. 24-25 (2002). Image URL: 
https://journals.openedition.org/rhcf/docannexe/image/2028/img-1.jpg 
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applying for concessions there.40 However, the existing Belgian laws on vicinal railroads 
and the discussion on a possible legal reform severely hampered the development of a 
light rail system. Lacking better options in Belgium, the network around Empain seized 
the opportunity to take control of a small light rail network that was right across the 
French border (see below). The idea arose that the network in Valenciennes could be a 
gateway to more concessions in Belgium. Empain and partners from the business network 
of La Métallurgique established a holding company, the Compagnie générale de Railways à voie 
étroite (Voie étroite) in 1881 to execute these plans. The Voie étroite envisioned a long vicinal 
railroad connecting Valenciennes with Charleroi, via Quiévrain and Mons. However, 
applications for this and other projects were rejected and the directors complained about 
the “imperfect law on tramways” in Belgium.41 
The directors referred to the law of July 9, 1875, organizing the funding and 
construction of tramways and local railways. This law spurred the development of urban 
horse-drawn tramways, but not of local light railways. According to Bart van der Herten, 
projects had low expected profits and were watched closely by the government. In 
addition, the State did not provide any subsidy to attract investors. Rather, it was very 
wary of granting concessions. Between 1875 and 1884, only 10% of over 50 projects were 
approved and executed. Sometimes not one company reacted to a call for tender, at other 
times the government simply ignored companies’ requests.42 On the graph (Fig. 6) below, 
we can see that only 35 km of track was constructed in that ten-year period. According to 
the directors of the Voie étroite, the limited growth had political causes. The Belgian 
government was preparing a new law to install a public company controlling a 
countrywide network of local railroads, the future Société nationale des chemins de fer 
vicinaux (SNCV). So it preferred not to grant too many concessions to private 
entrepreneurs. The reorganization only took effect in 1885, but had a tremendous impact, 
as can be seen on Figure 6. 
 
                                                     
40 However, the Inventory of the archives of the Ministerie van Verkeer en Infrastructuur: Stads- en 
streekvervoer, I 644, ARA. does not mention Empain, du Roy de Blicquy or van den Bogaerde, although it 
contains the names of many other applicants. 
41 “loi imparfaite sur les Tramways”, “Voie étroite: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 18 Oct 1882. See 
also: Lanthier, “Constructions,” 7. 
42 Bart van der Herten, België onder stoom: Transport en communicatie tijdens de 19de eeuw (Leuven: Leuven UP, 2004), 
384-89. 
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Figure 6 Growth of the local rail-/tramway and SNCV network in Belgium in km, 
logarithmic scale - base 10 (1869-1913)43 
Belgium, the most obvious market, was thus hard to enter. The legal-political situation 
added to the limited opportunities of what was a small market by nature. Regardless of 
the business environment in Belgium in that specific period, sooner or later Empain had 
to look beyond the Belgian market to obtain the desired economies of scale. The 
neighboring countries were an obvious choice. By focusing on France, Empain and his 
partners followed the path of many Belgian investors in that period. The Belgian 
economic elite shared a common language and culture with their southern neighbors. 
Both trade, capital flows and labor migration between the Belgian and French markets 
were intensive. For Belgium, France was the most important trade partner and host 
country of FDI since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 at the latest. Entrepreneurs such as 
Simon Philippart and Edouard Otlet invested heavily in local railroads.44 
Fortunately for Empain and his partners, they arrived in France at a slightly better 
time than in Belgium. In France too, local authorities had awaited the legal reform to take 
place. The competent authorities, the conseils généraux of the departments, had hesitated 
to grant new concessions due to the many bankruptcies (e.g. Simon Philippart, see 
Chapter 5). Most of them simply postponed their initiatives in expectation of the French 
Parliament to end its discussions on the new law on light rail concessions. Therefore, 
 
                                                     
43 Based on data from van der Herten, België, 497, 500-01. 
44 Firmin Lentacker, La frontière franco-belge: Étude géographique des effets d’une frontière internationale sur la vie de 
relations (Lille: Morel & Corduant, 1974), 159-88; Suzor, Empain en France, 67-73. 
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between 1877 and 1880 the growth of conceded light railways strongly decelerated.45 
Precisely in this period, Empain made his first documented attempt to find railway 
concessions in France. As early as 1878, Empain and the railway specialist46 Henri van den 
Bogaerde proposed to construct a steam-powered tramway in Sète. Two years later, the 
city refused to grant them the project.47 The legal uncertainty might have caused the 
failure of the negotiations. 
Meanwhile, the business circles of La Métallurgique had been able to lay their hands on 
a railway concession in the industrial city of Valenciennes. Right across the French 
border, the architect Adolphe Thérin had obtained a concession in 1877 for a horse 
tramway network. Despite having done all the necessary studies, Thérin had failed to find 
sufficient funds, so he had ceded his concession to the two Parisian entrepreneurs Fresson 
and Varez. Together with the Parisian International Chèque Bank, they wanted to construct 
and operate the short line. The Compagnie des Mines d’Anzin was willing to sponsor, for the 
line would link the mines with the city center. However, the three parties had not been 
able to agree about the amount and length of lines and had canceled the partnership.48 
Most likely, the absence of new policy has contributed to the difficulties. 
Early 1880, the Société anonyme des tramways et chemins de fer économiques de Valenciennes 
à Anzin et ses extensions (Valenciennes-Anzin), founded one month earlier for the occasion, 
took over the concession and decided to implement steam traction instead of horse 
traction. Besides Fresson and some of the original Parisian bankers, the founders were 
Belgian and French financiers and engineers. Somehow, they had a link to La Métallurgique 
for they appointed Edouard Empain on the board of directors and set up headquarters at 
rue de l’Enseignement 30 in Brussels, Empain’s residence. His fellow-engineer Henri van 
den Bogaerde and La Métallurgique-shareholder Joseph Van Dooren were also appointed. 
The business model was based on the transportation of workers and cargo from and to 
the industrial districts of Valenciennes.49 
 
                                                     
45 Wolkowitsch, “Siècle,” 282-84. 
46 Empain and van den Bogaerde had worked together, probably in the offices of la Métallurgique, for they jointly 
filed an application for a patent on a new rail type in March 1878. Belgian patent granted to Edouard Empain 
and Henri van den Bogaerde, 15 Apr 1878, Brevets d’invention, 44727, ARA2; “Avis aux actionnaires,” Le Bien Public, 
29 Nov 1877. 
47 “Tramways de Cette,” Rapport de l’Ingénieur en Chef, August 1878; “Tramways de Cette,” Rapports et délibérations, 
Aug 1881. 
48 Lanthier, “Constructions,” 6-7. 
49 “Tramways et chemins de fer économiques de Valenciennes à Anzin et ses extensions,”  no. 293, AMB, 9 Mar 
1880; “Tramways et chemins de fer économiques de Valenciennes à Anzin et ses extensions,”  no. 294, AMB, 9 
Mar 1880; “Prospect: Tramways et chemins de fer économiques de Valenciennes à Anzin et ses extensions,” 
L’Indépendance Belge, 4 Apr 1880; Gérard Urbin, Un siècle de transports publics dans le Valenciennois (Valenciennes: 
Semurval, 1983). 
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In contrast to the previous owners, the Empain group could already benefit from the 
new legislation. Its takeover of the Valenciennes project almost coincided with the 
promulgation of the new legal framework in June 1880. The law created a fresh dynamic 
and a positive climate for concessions. By connecting rural France to the main railway 
system, the authorities believed to generate a lot of passenger traffic and even more 
transport of goods. To attract private investors, the reform organized a government aid 
system in case the revenue remained below expectations. Besides a modest income 
guarantee, the State could offer subsidies for the construction of the lines. However, the 
Valenciennes-Anzin line was not subsidized. It could easily survive without it, thanks to 
the intense traffic in a densely populated area. Yet, most subsequent lines were not just 
as profitable. Chapter 5 will demonstrate that, when Empain as a foreign entrepreneur 
tried to combine these individual concessions to generate economies of scale, he had to 
overcome fierce political resistance. 
 
Figure 7 Map of all the investments of the Empain group in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
northern France (1880-1914)50 
Because of the Brussels-based free-standing company operating in Valenciennes, the 
Empain group internationalized from the start. It would go, however, a bit too far to call 
it ‘born global’ immediately. Although the concession was situated in France, it was 
merely 30 km away from the home town of the Empain and the du Roy de Blicquy family 
(see Fig. 7). As mentioned, the early strategy of the Empain group was French-Belgian: 
 
                                                     
50 Designed by the author. Source: personal database 
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create a transregional cross-border connection between Valenciennes and Mons. This 
project succeeded on the French side, but fell behind on the Belgian side. 
The Empain group only became a real multinational enterprise, i.e. operating in two 
different countries, in the following years. Despite the bad investment climate in Belgium 
before the establishment of the SNCV, the Empain group managed to secure two steam-
powered tramways in Liège and Brussels. It could already rely on its experience abroad 
to invest at home, like a boomerang returning to its origin. In the spring of 1881, the Voie 
étroite applied for a concession to construct and operate a steam railroad between Liège 
and the suburb Jemeppe (9 km). This was one of the few calls for light rail concessions in 
Belgium and also the first suburban line to be completely operated with steam.51 There 
was only one other applicant.52 The Voie étroite obtained it and passed it to a newly 
established subsidiary, the Société anonyme des railways économiques de Liége, Seraing et 
extensions (RELSE). The Voie étroite acquired total control over the company and reserved 
the right to construct and arm all the lines operated by the RELSE.53 In 1882, managers and 
directors of La Métallurgique also proposed a steam-powered tramway line from the 
historic center of Brussels to the forested suburb of Ixelles. The municipality of Ixelles 
agreed, leading to a concession to be operated by the Empain group (Chemin de fer à voie 
étroite de Bruxelles à Ixelles-Boendael) from 1884.54 
Like in France, the new legal framework of 1885 led to a vivid dynamic in Belgium. The 
state-owned enterprise SNCV decided, in consultation with the municipalities and 
provinces, which lines would be constructed. Between 1885 and 1914, its rail network 
yearly grew with 17% on average.55 SNCV also financed the lines, but it appealed to the 
private sector for their construction and operation. The Empain group enthusiastically 
welcomed this steady flow of invitations to tender, for it would provide a more stable 
income. The Voie étroite successfully competed to lease the SNCV’s first railroad, between 
Ostend and Nieuwpoort at the coast. Arthur du Roy de Blicquy’s presence on the board of 
directors of the SNCV must have positively influenced the decision.56 The lease contract 
included a guaranteed income plus a share of the gross revenue. The surplus went to the 
State, the owner of the infrastructure and the rolling stock.57 
 
                                                     
51 In the same year, another railway was conceded to the Société des chemins de fer vicinaux belges in Charleroi. F. 
Dierick, “Charleroi Découverte: Les tramways à Charleroi,”  http://www.charleroi-
decouverte.be/pages/index.php?id=434. 
52 “L’adjudication du tram,” La Meuse, 4 Jun 1881. 
53 “Railways économiques de Liége-Seraing: Statuts,”  no. 1208, AMB, 21 Jul 1881. 
54 “Nouvelles du Jour: Ixelles-Boendael,” L’Echo du Parlement, 15 Jul 1884; “Voie étroite: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” 
Supplément MIM, 15 Oct 1884. 
55 Own calculations based on van der Herten, België, 497. 
56 A. du Roy de Blicquy was a director from the establishment in 1885 until his death in 1907. Recueil Financier, 
1907, 366. 
57 “Voie étroite: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 21 Oct 1885; van der Herten, België, 389-96. 
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In the following decades, France, not Belgium, evolved into the largest market of the 
Empain group. Capital flew into different sectors in all corners of the country (see Fig. 8). 
In Chapter 2, I will discuss in detail how these different branches of industry were 
vertically integrated. The maps of Belgium and France already show that in some cases 
the Empain group tried to cluster complementary activities. Also in the expansion of the 
railroad network, one can observe this geographical concentration. Large clusters of 
traction and power production were for example situated in Valenciennes, Paris, 
Brussels, Liège, Ostend and Nantes. In the area of Charleroi, the Empain group even 
operated manufacturing, electricity and rail companies. In some areas, the Empain group 
had become a full-service provider, giving them a strong market position vis-à-vis the 
local authorities. It possibly generated local spillover effects in the operation of these 
adjacent utilities. 
 
Figure 8 Map of all the investments of the Empain group in France (northern departments 
excl.) (1880-1914)58 
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1.1.3 The lesser neighbors 
The Empain group was far more active in France than in the three other neighboring 
countries of Belgium. During the 4 decades under study, it was very modestly present in 
the Netherlands and not at all in Germany and Great Britain. For railway entrepreneurs, 
the German market was hard to access. Between 1870 and 1914, the German government 
steadily nationalized all main railroads in the country. On a local level, government 
interference inspired by municipalism also deterred potential private initiative. A lack of 
advantageous legislation made investing in light railways unattractive during the 1880s. 
Only in 1892, a new law on private railways provoked a boom in construction, but even 
then the financial support of the state remained limited.59 Belgian investor Edouard Otlet 
had operated tramways in Berlin, Düsseldorf and Munich in the 1880s, but he had also 
gradually abandoned his German businesses due to the unbearable pressure of the 
municipalities.60 In the next decade, potential foreign tramway entrepreneurs had to 
reckon with a very strong domestic competition. The German electric industry massively 
took charge of the electrification of tramway networks. By 1902, 91% of the mileage had 
been electrified.61 As a result, the Brussels tramway holdings such as the Société générale 
des chemin de fer économiques (Chemins de fer économiques), Compagnie Mutuelle de Tramways 
(CMT) and Société générale belge d’entreprises électriques (SGBEE) were hardly present in 
Germany. 
The business group was not present in Great Britain either. Britain was Belgium’s 
second trading partner, on a par with Germany. However, Belgian public utility investors 
including Empain made few attempts to enter the market. This was very much for the 
same reasons as in Germany. Because of the strong municipalism, the state had taken 
control of many public utilities in the 1890s. In addition, the solid position of big German 
and American firms made competition difficult.62 Perhaps, cultural differences were also 
at stake, at least indirectly. One might speculate that, for the French-speaking Empain, 
the language barrier might have limited his network and opportunities in English and 
German-speaking regions. However, this does not mean that Empain immediately 
excluded any collaboration with German or British capitalists abroad (see Chapter 3). 
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In the Netherlands, the Hollandsche Ijzeren Spoorweg-Maatschappij and the Maatschappij 
tot Exploitatie van Staatsspoorwegen dominated the railroad sector. Not only were they the 
biggest operators of main railroads, both companies also operated a large share of light 
railways. However, the specialized Nederlandsche Tramweg Maatschappij operated an even 
larger light rail network. Whereas in France and Belgium the government started 
subsidizing the construction and/or operation from the 1880s, the Netherlands waited 
until the turn of the century before awarding financial stimuli for steam tramways. Still, 
the municipalities interfered to such an extent in their urban tramways that private 
enterprise had to reckon with high public demands. As a consequence, this limitation of 
the freedom of enterprise frightened some investors.63 
The genesis of Empain’s only successful project in the Netherlands resembles the 
history of the first light rail of the group. Like the Valenciennes-Anzin in northern France, 
the Empain group sought to develop a vicinal railroad network in the Dutch-Belgian 
borderland. In the 1880s, many local dignitaries had tried to obtain permissions and 
realize vicinal railroads in the region between Brabant cities Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. 
All of them had failed, mainly due to a lack of funding.64 The penultimate Dutch-Belgian 
company trying to do better had ordered material at La Métallurgique. However, it went 
bankrupt before it could pay the manufacturing company. To find a solution for the 
pending claim, La Métallurgique’s board member Jules Carlier went to The Hague at the 
beginning of the year 1888. He negotiated with the Dutch Minister of Waterstaat to 
transfer the concession from the bankrupt Dutch-Belgian company to Carlier himself. The 
Minister of Waterstaat advised him to find a respectable Dutch citizen to officially file the 
application. Carlier quickly found the mayor of Arnhem, D.-J.-A. van Lawick van Pabst van 
Nyevelt. However, other Dutch entrepreneurs had heard the news of the failure of the 
Dutch-Belgian company and competed for the concession too. A little bit pressure from 
the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sufficed to convince the Dutch government to 
choose Carlier and van Pabst.65 
Carlier tried to interest his partners at the Empain group in constructing and operating 
the light rail between Breda and the Belgian border in Wernhout. The Empain group had 
the means and the expertise: The Chemins de fer économiques du Nord (Econord, est. 1883) 
had constructed a similar line between Valenciennes and Quiévrain and RELSE operated 
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SNCV lines all over Belgium. Nevertheless, Empain only moved forward with the project 
in November 1889, when he established the Zuid-Nederlandsche-Stoomtramweg Maatschappij 
(ZNSM). Arguably, he had awaited the very recent news that the SNCV authorized the 
extension of the Antwerp-Brasschaat line all the way to the Belgian side of the border in 
Wuustwezel. An uninterrupted connection between Breda and Antwerp would certainly 
generate much traffic.66 
In the summer of 1893, the Empain group tried to repeat the ZNSM project, but this 
time in the east of Brabant. A local dignitary and member of the provincial council of 
Noord-Brabant, J.F. Pompen, had obtained the concession for a vicinal railroad of 56 km 
from Veghel to the Belgian border via Eindhoven. The plan was to connect with the 
Belgian SNCV line between Arendonk and Turnhout, which had opened earlier that year. 
Arguably, a tramway line through the fertile region would contribute to its economic 
development.67 Pompen attracted Empain and other collaborators of the business group 
to provide the funds for the new company. They gave the firm the very ambitious name 
of Nationale Maatschappij der Nederlandsche Buurtspoorwegen, inspired by the Belgian SNCV. 
Chairman Pompen, Empain, Brussels banker d’Aoust and mayor of Eindhoven J.-T. Smits 
van Oijen formed the first board of directors.68 Unique for the Netherlands at that time, 
the investors could count on state subsidies granted by the central and municipal 
governments.69 However, the relations between the Belgian financiers and the Dutch local 
politicians got quickly blurred. Empain and his partners considered the state contribution 
too low. Disappointed, they withdrew from the project in 1894 and Pompen continued the 
project with Dutch financiers only.70 
1.1.4 Southern and Eastern Europe 
Besides the Belgian transborder investments discussed above, Italy, Spain and, to a lesser 
degree, Portugal were privileged host countries for Belgian FDI. Although Mediterranean 
Europe was in the process of industrialization and urbanization, the Empain group did 
not pay a lot of attention to these markets. In Italy, Belgian capital had financed over a 
hundred tramway and light rail lines before 1914. They were controlled by holding 
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companies similar to the Empain group such as the Chemins de fer économiques, the Chemins 
de fer secondaires, Engetra and the Otlet group. Perhaps the investment climate was not 
optimal at the time the Voie étroite holding company had liquid assets. From 1888, when 
the Empain group started entering new markets, the Italian economy went through a 
severe crisis that lasted until 1895.71 Even after the economic recovery, the Paris holding 
company of the group studied interesting offers for electrification in Napoli, but the 
board decided to reject them because it was too far from the group’s core markets.72 
The Empain group showed a bit more interest in Spain, although the efforts 
concretized only once in the establishment of the Société générale des Tramways électriques 
en Espagne (1899). With this company, three Belgian tramway holdings – the Chemins de fer 
économiques, Tramways Réunis and the Empain group – wanted to develop and electrify 
tramway networks in the whole Iberian peninsula. The large share capital of 20 million 
francs indicated their ambitions. In the end, the company only owned a network in the 
Spanish capital Madrid and a light rail in the vicinity of Barcelona.73 Finally, an attempt 
to obtain the concession of the tramways of Porto (Portugal) failed. The joint proposition 
of the Empain group and other Belgian holdings was rejected in 1905.74 
The sphere of action of Belgian tramway companies also stretched out to the Balkans 
and Eastern Europe, albeit less than to the western Mediterranean.75 Around the 
international turn of the Belgian economy in 1895, Empain also briefly considered gaining 
a firm foothold in the Western Balkans. In 1894-1895, the business group had two 
opportunities to do so, but decided not to take on a long-term commitment in the region. 
In 1894, Empain acquired the concession to operate tramways in the Serbian capital of 
Belgrade from his long-standing business partner Edmond Caze. However, Empain did not 
see a clear business case for that tramway network and preferred to sell it (see Chapter 
2). In the same year, one of the group’s holding companies, the Compagnie belge des Chemins 
de fer réunis (Réunis), became the majority shareholder of the Kreutz-Belovar (Hungarian: 
Kőrös-Belovár, Croatian: Križevci-Bjelovar) railway that had very recently opened. This 
light railway of 30 km was privately owned, but its operation was outsourced to the 
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Hungarian State Railways.76 Unlike some other assets of the Réunis, this was not a portfolio 
investment. Empain personally went to Vienna in June 1894 to close the deal.77 The 
Empain group delegated as many as 4 collaborators to the board of directors to safeguard 
its interests.78 However, the railway did not fit in any long-term strategy in the region, so 
the Réunis sold its share in 1899. 
 
Figure 9 Map of all the investments of the Empain group outside Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands (1880-1914)79 
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1.2 The first steps overseas: Latin America (1888-…) 
The internationalization pattern of the Empain group was not a textbook example of 
incremental internationalization. In 1888, after the group had received a capital injection, 
the next market to enter after France and Belgium was not another neighboring country 
or somewhere else in Europe. In contrast, the Empain group participated in two railway 
businesses in Argentina and Venezuela (see Fig. 9). This resembles the behavior of ‘born 
global firms.’ Due to a lack of sources such as the minutes of the board of directors’ 
meetings, we can only look at circumstantial evidence to understand this extraordinary 
move. 
In the late nineteenth century, Latin America consisted of large export economies 
specialized in agricultural and mineral commodities. To get these primary products out 
of the country, the Latin American countries needed to construct massive infrastructure 
works. Transportation and communication were crucial for the export-led growth model 
to function, but the domestic financial markets were too small to fund these utilities. 
Therefore, the Latin American governments turned to foreign capital. The capital 
demands were so high that by 1914 South America was the continent most exposed to 
foreign investment.80 After the turbulent period between independence and the 1870s, 
Latin America offered a more reliable investment climate. The massive influx of foreign 
capital reinforced “the basic cultural affinity that gave Latin America closer and broader 
links with the capital-exporting countries than were enjoyed by Asia, Africa or the Middle 
East.”81 In general, the British led the way in financing railroads and public utilities in 
Latin America. Great Britain and the other large investing countries France and Germany 
mainly invested in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, whereas US investors focused on Mexico 
and Cuba. Besides those already mentioned, Chile and Uruguay belonged to the top 
receiving countries.82 Belgian interests were oriented towards Argentina and Brazil. 
Especially in Argentina, Belgian firms belonged to the most active group of foreign 
investors between 1890 and the First World War.83 Besides projects in the large cities of 
Latin America, Belgian capital also tried to find areas where the competition of British 
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and French interests was weaker. While the Great Powers were predominant in the 
populated centers, Belgian investors explored remote areas such as Mato Grosso and 
Araguaya in Brazil.84 
Until the First World War, two boom periods of FDI can be distinguished in Latin 
America: the first in the 1880s and the second from 1894 to 1914. In both waves, Edouard 
Empain was among the Belgian capitalists that participated. The first boom period was 
dominated by British capital. Between 1880 and 1890, total British investment in the 
region more than doubled.85 The Belgian financial world, in search of higher returns, 
imitated the City and invested in public debt and railroad projects between 1886 and 
1889.86 As one of the few, Empain went as far as making considerable direct investments 
during the rush on Latin American securities. As mentioned, Belgian capital faced strong 
European competition in the region. This explains why Empain’s two projects were 
situated along the Argentinian border with Paraguay as well as in Venezuela. 
The first plan concerned a railway concession in northern Argentina. In the fall of 1888, 
Edouard Otlet contacted Edouard Empain with an offer to set up a joint venture. Since the 
mid-1880s Otlet had investigated investment opportunities in Latin America. After plans 
for railways in Cuba, Bolivia and Brazil, Otlet got interested in a railway concession at the 
Argentinian border with Paraguay. As a part of a larger railway plan, the Argentinian 
government offered subsidies for connecting Puerto Reconquista with the remote and 
scarcely populated area of Formosa. Once Otlet had bought the concession from the 
Argentinian agency A. Pelaez y Co., he and Empain jointly founded a firm (Grand chemin 
de fer central sud-américain) that would construct and operate the 450 km long railroad. 
They also discussed other interesting concessions in Argentina, such as one for gas 
distribution in the capital Buenos Aires, but those plans never materialized.87 
Venezuela, the host country of the second project, was hardly popular among Belgian 
investors. Foreign businesses in Venezuela, certainly from Belgium, were rare. 
Nevertheless, the Voie étroite holding company ended up in the country in 1888, 
constructing a railway for the British Carenero Railway Company. The motivations of the 
directors of the Voie étroite are easy to identify. Venezuela had a relatively stable political 
system in the 1880s. Guzman Blanco’s government was known for its large infrastructure 
works and its very liberal policy towards FDI. Some British, German and French 
entrepreneurs had already been attracted by the dozens of railway concessions and the 
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high state guarantees (returns of up to 7%).88 After Argentina and Brazil, Venezuela 
provided promising opportunities. The 15 years before 1890 had been a period of 
sustained economic growth. The GDP per capita peaked at an all-time high.89 
The Empain group availed itself of its presence as a subcontractor to search Venezuela 
for interesting direct investments. Empain made use of the services of Arthur Le Mye. As 
one of the few Belgians living in Venezuela at that time, Le Mye acted as some kind of 
broker for interesting business opportunities.90 In 1889, he had already tried to mediate 
between Empain and Edmond Caze and mining concession owners in Venezuela who were 
looking for foreign funds.91 In the autumn of 1890, Le Mye acted on behalf of Empain and 
Caze to purchase the concession for the waterworks of the Venezuelan capital Caracas.92 
The Compagnie générale des Eaux de Caracas (Eaux de Caracas, est. 1891) was a 7 million francs 
investment, but turned into a financial disaster by 1895 due to insurmountable economic 
and political troubles (see Chapter 6). 
The boom period of the 1880s abruptly ended with the Argentinian crash of 1890, also 
known as the ‘Baring Crisis’. To finance its infrastructure programs, Argentina had taken 
up too much external debt. Sustained deficit spending led to a default on sovereign debt, 
which was especially held by the Baring Brothers Bank in London. This bank had bought 
a lot of Argentinian government paper and had to be saved by a British consortium. In 
Argentina, the Baring Crisis escalated into a financial and banking crisis that also affected 
Uruguay. Only after 1894, the Argentinian economy recovered.93 The shock of the 
Argentinian default also altered the European perception of Latin American securities in 
general. Lacking sufficient information to adequately assess the financial situation, 
British investors did not distinguish anymore between Argentinian and other Latin 
American securities. Only after five years, they regained trust in the creditworthiness of 
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the Latin American countries.94 The Latin American economic crisis also fatally impacted 
Empain’s investments of the first boom period. In sum, both the Grand Central Sud-
Américain and the Eaux de Caracas collapsed because of the government default, as they 
could not survive without state aid. 
In 1895 started a second boom period in South America, which coincided with an 
improvement of the global economic climate. Nevertheless, Belgian investors remained 
wary of possible financial instability. Therefore, they diversified their investments to land 
property and real estate.95 This time, Empain ventured into Brazil and Chile. As 
mentioned, the dominant investing countries such as Great Britain pushed Belgium to the 
margins of the economic heartland of Latin America. Still, Belgian entrepreneurs were 
the third-largest investor in Brazil in the decade up to 1895.96 They focused on the tropical 
inlands of the Mato Grosso and the Amazon. A group of Antwerp traders and bankers 
regarded the low land price in this inhospitable area as an opportunity. In 1895, this 
group, together with the secretary of La Métallurgique Jules Carlier, bought a huge estate 
to raise cattle and extract rubber. After a few months, Carlier, most likely, must have 
convinced Empain to join the Compagnie des Produits Cibils (Produits Cibils). However, the 
company went through different difficult periods. Due to boundless ambition, 
mismanagement and a bad assessment of the local political system, the project remained 
below expectations before it was sold in 1911. 
Chili was not at all a destination for Belgian FDI in the mid-1890s, but Great Britain and 
Germany controlled considerable parts of the economy. Chili largely depended on the 
extraction and export of nitratine, a powerful fertilizer. In 1895, British investors 
controlled 60% and the Germans 8% of this sector.97 Meanwhile, the Belgians present in 
the country were engineers, not entrepreneurs. Since 1889, some 25 railway engineers 
had followed professor Louis Cousin to assist the Chilean state to construct and manage 
the country’s railroads. This did lead to many contracts for Belgian railway equipment 
worth millions, but not to a significant inflow of FDI.98 At the current state of historical 
research, it is safe to say that Empain was the first Belgian entrepreneur to invest millions 
in Chile. After the turn of the century, other attempts were made to construct railroads 
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in Chile, but they did not survive for long.99 Empain’s renewed interest in Latin America 
met with the desire of ‘nitrate king’ John Thomas North to partially divest from the 
Chilean nitrate sector. In this context, Colonel North’s main nitrate transport company, 
the Nitrate Railways, had obtained a listing on the Paris Bourse in 1894. North was probably 
looking for interested parties in Brussels that wanted to take over a fraction of the 
portfolio he held in the many nitrate extracting companies he controlled.100 Most likely, 
North came across Empain because one of the group’s holding companies, the Réunis, had 
acquired a small block of shares of Nitrate Railways right after its listing in Paris.101 Empain 
must have seen North’s move as a valuable opportunity for at least two reasons. First, 
making a direct investment in Chile in the form of a new company based on a nitrate 
concession was hardly possible in 1895. The British had already obtained the best 
concessions and had monopolized the Chilean market after the Civil War of 1891. Second, 
Empain did not have a large network in the City of London that would allow him to make 
substantial investments in nitrate companies that were not listed in Brussels. The offer of 
the Nitrate King himself at once granted Empain access to and direct influence in the 
closed nitrate market. North might have appreciated the advantage of tapping an 
additional capital market. The securities of the various nitrate companies he controlled 
were not listed in Brussels. However, the newly established investment trust of Edouard 
Empain was, so interested Belgian investors could indirectly acquire shares of North’s 
companies.102 
In the end, the nitrate business in Chile was the only long-term project of the Empain 
group in Latin America. The other attempts in Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil did not 
produce the profits it hoped for. As a consequence, the Empain group adopted a very 
conservative strategy towards investments in Latin America after 1895. Only a small share 
of the total group capital still flew to the continent afterward. On the one hand, these 
were investments necessary to keep fixed assets productive (Produits Cibils). On the other 
hand, Empain made some smaller investments in Brazilian railroad companies based in 
Belgium.103 
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1.3 Business in ‘the Orient’: the Middle East and North Africa 
(1891-…) 
The Middle East and North Africa were not on the horizon of the Empain group in the 
1880s. This started to change in the next decades, with some investments in the Ottoman 
Empire and Egypt. Only after the turn of the century, the region became a focal point of 
the group, with nearly 20% of total FDI. 
Empain’s first encounter with the region was in 1887, when he and his French partner 
Edmond Caze in principle obtained a concession of 200 km of light railways in French 
Algeria. By the time the project had passed the many administrative hurdles and could be 
executed, Empain had already withdrawn. To construct and operate the network, Caze 
founded the Chemins de fer sur route d’Algérie (est. 1892) without Empain. Empain must have 
changed his mind, because in 1894, the directors of the befriended holding company 
Chemins de fer économiques consulted Empain about investing in Algeria. Empain then 
declared that “he was of the opinion that there were interesting opportunities in Algeria, 
but that he himself had decided not to pay attention to Algerian businesses anymore.”104 
In general, Algeria struggled to attract private capital. Despite a lot of public investments, 
entrepreneurs stayed away, because they deemed the Algerian market too small and 
overprotected. Apart from the state-sponsored railroads, only mining could draw the 
attention of foreign investors.105 Fifteen years later, when the Empain group retried to 
enter Algeria, their investment was precisely related to the phosphate mining sector. In 
1909, there was renewed interest in exploiting the rich reserves of phosphates in Djebel 
Onk in the northeast of Algeria. In May of that year, a consortium of entrepreneurs 
declared wanting to unearth the resource. The Empain group’s small Société d'Études des 
Chemins de fer et des Phosphates du Djebel Onk, established in August 1909, had to study the 
route of a railway that could transport the phosphate from the mines to the coast. They 
had been a bit too optimistic, though, as the actual mining did not start before 1926.106 
Instead of staking its funds on Algeria in the early 1890s, the Empain group decided to 
make its first steps in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. The Ottoman Empire had been a 
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long-standing, yet unimportant, trading partner of Belgium. Belgian exports to the region 
came down to machines, textiles, metals, glass and chemicals.107 Nevertheless, Belgian 
capital had already managed to gain a foothold in the Ottoman public utility sector. Up to 
1892, the following Belgian-owned companies had been founded: Tramways de Gueuz-Tépé 
(1885), Gaz de Beyrouth (1887), Gaz de Salonique (1889), Gaz de Scutari (1891), Tramways de 
Salonique (1892) and Gaz de Stamboul (1892). However, urban public utilities were not the 
preferred destination of FDI. The bulk of German, French and British capital flew into 
railroads. Despite the excellent reputation of the Belgian railroad sector, Belgian 
investors had great difficulties to obtain Ottoman railway concessions and mostly failed 
to gather the large capital if they did. As a matter of fact, “the hunt for Ottoman railway 
concessions in the 1890s and its intricate political intrigues, proved to be beyond the 
leverage power of Belgian companies, in the face of overwhelming French and German 
strategic jockeying.”108 
Notwithstanding the difficult position of Belgian business in the Ottoman Empire, the 
Empain group managed to partake in the only railway concession a Belgian entrepreneur 
could obtain and develop. This person was Georges Nagelmackers, the famous founder of 
the Compagnie internationale des Wagons-Lits, operating the Orient-Express. Nagelmackers 
“was very well connected in Istanbul, having personal access to the Great Power 
ambassadors, high Ottoman officials and even the Sultan himself. His position as a banker 
and his international standing” allowed him in 1891 to buy an unfinished isolated railroad 
between the port of Mudanya at the Marmara Sea and inland Bursa (42 km).109 
Nagelmackers reserved a share for the Voie étroite in the new Société Ottomane du chemin de 
fer de Moudania-Brousse and a seat on the board of directors for Edouard Empain.110 Ten 
years later, the Réunis also invested. Nagelmackers had a French entrepreneur 
reconstruct the narrow-gauge railroad. After two years of operational deficit, 
Nagelmackers charged the Voie étroite to take over the operation of the line from 1894 
onwards. The Moudania-Brousse needed the holding’s expertise to become profitable.111 
Gradually, the Empain group evolved from the simple operator to the full owner of the 
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line. From 1901 until the First World War, the Empain group possessed at least 98% of the 
subsidiary’s capital.112 
The concession included a possible extension of 100 km to Bilecik and thus link the 
railroad to the Anatolian railway network. This would have generated a lot of additional 
traffic.113 However, the Sultan refused any extension as the German and French 
governments were also putting pressure on the Sultan to obtain concessions in the same 
area. The unimportant Mudanya-Bursa line had the lowest priority. Despite many 
attempts by Georges Nagelmackers himself, via the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no 
extension could be constructed. Neither did the Moudania-Brousse obtain the electric 
lighting concession of the city of Bursa.114 
The economic relations between Belgium and Egypt in the 1890s resembled those with 
the Ottoman Empire. Thanks to a trade agreement (1891), Belgium belonged to the ten 
most important trade partners of Egypt. From a Belgian perspective, though, the trade 
with Egypt was rather insignificant, except for the rolling stock ordered by the Egyptian 
State Railways.115 Of the about a hundred Belgians permanently living in Egypt, the 
Belgian lawyers working in the International Mixed Courts were the most prominent.116 
Only two companies had moved from Belgium to Egypt before 1894. F. Lambert et Ralli 
established a trading house in 1892 and the mechanical engineering firm Baume et Marpent 
set up a production unit in Cairo one year later.117 
Given the limited interest of Belgian capital for Egypt, the joint venture of the Empain 
group and the Chemins de fer économiques to obtain the tramway network of Cairo in 1894 
was a pioneering initiative. Both business groups had been separately studying 
opportunities such as the Cairo tramway since 1891. Reportedly, Edouard Empain 
received advice on investments from the French director of the Egyptian State Railways 
Victor Prompt.118 Finally, Empain and the Belgian Chemins de fer économiques successfully 
joined their efforts to obtain the concession of the Cairo tramway in 1894.119 For the 
Empain group, it meant the start of massive investments in Lower Egypt. Actively 
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encouraged and supported by the Belgian Consul General Maskens, Empain and the 
Chemins de fer économiques also applied for a light rail concession in the Nile Delta in 
1895.120 Other Belgian investors also found their way to Egypt and set up businesses in real 
estate, agriculture and construction. However, the most notable and largest Belgian 
enterprise in Egypt was the construction of the Heliopolis district near Cairo from 1905 
onwards. 
From then on, Empain personally started to spend disproportionate attention to his 
Egyptian businesses. This simply cannot be explained by looking at economic motives 
alone. It was also a matter of prestige. The Empain brothers got passionate about the 
history and art of the country. They donated Egyptian artifacts and financed 
archeological missions. The Empains shared their Egyptomania with a large part of the 
(French-speaking) elite. Since the Description de l’Egypte (1809), fascination for and 
traveling to Egypt had become prestigious.121 To the best of our knowledge, Edouard and 
François have never been to China, Congo or Latin America, but they have resided dozens 
of times in Egypt during their lifetime. In his testament, Edouard Empain stressed the 
personal significance of his visionary Heliopolis project. He advised his sons: “Heliopolis 
is a great work to which my name is attached, and consequently theirs, and which, 
carefully managed, as I have done so far, will bring them honor and large profits.”122 
1.4 Half-hearted rush to Russia (1895-…) 
Empain’s investments in Russian tramways starting in 1895 were part of a broader flow 
of foreign, especially Belgian, capital into the Tsarist empire. From the 1870s, Russia 
actively pursued an industrialization policy. The government set up a railway 
development plan and took protectionist measures to support the domestic industry. 
This, in turn, incited foreign firms that used to export to the country to establish 
production units in Russia itself. The huge market, with a high demand for industrial 
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products, was attractive to foreign investors. The policies to stimulate industrial growth 
and attract foreign capital of Finance Minister Sergeï Witte and his predecessors led to an 
economic boom culminating between 1895 and 1899. In the 1880s, some Belgian 
businessmen already invested in tramways in large Russian cities and in the heavy 
industry of the Donetz in southern Russia. These first movers, especially the steel factory 
of Cockerill la Dniéprovienne, yielded high returns in the decade before 1895.123 The success 
of la Dniéprovienne convinced the heavy industry near Liège to establish mines, metal and 
steel companies in the Donetz Basin (present-day Ukraine), whereas the Brussels’ 
tramway holdings were attracted by the possibilities of electrifying existing networks in 
Russia’s fast-growing cities. Annaert, Buelens and Cuyvers list other reasons why Belgian 
investments in the Tsarist empire exploded from 1895.124 First of all, investors eager to 
diversify their portfolio found Russia a stable, trustworthy country with higher 
expectations concerning financial returns. Secondly, the French-Russian military and 
financial Alliance of 1894 strengthened the economic ties between the two countries. This 
even led to a brief “Russia mania” in France. The Belgian and French financial markets 
were interwoven and Belgian investors had a great affinity with their francophone 
neighboring country. As a result, Belgian finance enthusiastically invested in Russia, 
becoming the largest foreign owner of Russian assets at the end of the boom period (1900) 
before France.125 
Both from the perspective of the group’s history and of the history of Belgian 
investment in Russia, the Empain group did not seem to play a dominant role. Considering 
that all of the group’s four tramway companies in Russia were established during the 
boom period (one in 1895, one in 1896 and two in 1897), it seems that the Empain group 
was rather a follower in this market. In the 1880s, Belgian holding companies had already 
developed tramway networks in large cities such as Odessa (1880), Warsaw (1882), 
Kharkov (1883), Moscow (1885), Tbilisi (1885) and Rostov-on-Don (1886). Whereas in that 
period the Empain group was not yet active in urban transport, its four networks acquired 
between 1895 and 1897 were part of a general strategy of electrification (see Chapter 2). 
A large business group with plenty of liquid assets such as the Empain group could have 
done more in that boom period. Belgian investors had founded a total of eighteen 
tramway companies in Russia between 1893 and 1900. On the eve of WW1, all Belgian 
financiers together controlled half of this market, owning some 29 companies in total. In 
terms of the share of total capital invested by Belgians, the Empain group only ranked 
fourth (10%). The Union des Tramways (23%) of Edouard Otlet, the business group of 
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Edouard Thys (20%) and the SGBEE (17%) preceded it. Other important Belgian tramway 
holdings were the CMT (8% of total capital) and Société générale de Tramways et d’Application 
d’Electricité (6%).126 The Empain group clearly did not want to or could not take the lead in 
the Russian tramway market. What happened? 
First of all, the above (abridged) list of tramway holdings active in Russia already shows 
that Belgian competition was strong and cooperation rather uncommon. In addition, the 
German electric holding companies (‘electroholdings’) were also actively searching the 
Russian market. Secondly, to scan the huge territory for opportunities, a foreign 
businessman needed qualified local agents. The CMT, for example, closely collaborated 
with the Russian engineer Ivan Likhatschew between 1895 and 1914. With his connections 
at the court of the Czar, he was responsible on his own for the many concessions and joint 
ventures of the CMT in Russia.127 In contrast, Empain could only count on two less efficient 
agents, and only for a limited time: Edouard Denis and Félicien Maes. Until he took some 
distance from his boss in 1893, Denis was working for Edouard Otlet in Persia. He was also 
traveling the Russian Empire for Otlet and informed him about interesting tramway 
networks. Before Empain acquired the four Russian tramway networks, Otlet had already 
studied them and assessed their feasibility and profitability based on the information of 
Denis. For instance, in 1892, Denis had offered the tramways of Tashkent to Otlet, but the 
latter was not interested. Three years later, Empain, however, had a different view and 
bought the concession. Denis also delivered him the concession of Chișinău in 1895.128 The 
Frenchman Félicien Maes, who lived in Saint Petersburg and Paris, also brought in one 
concession. These two perfectly illustrate the rather passive attitude Empain was forced 
to adopt in Russia. The Empain group depended on the loyalty of its agents for the 
acquisition of concessions. Unfortunately, both persons were among the least loyal 
elements in the business group. Denis started on its own in 1898 and Félicien Maes was 
too busy setting up Russian firms for other Western investors. Maes, a personality of 
dubious reputation, finally left the group completely in 1901.129 Lacking competent 
agents, the Empain group could not fully exploit the opportunities of the boom period. 
However, from 1911 onwards, the Empain group had new ambitions in the Russian 
empire. It called in the managers of its Russian tramway companies to actively search for 
transport and electricity concessions in Central Asia (Kokand, Baku). The opportunities 
 
                                                     
126 de Massol de Rebetz, “Sociétés,” 53, 64, 73, 80, 89, 105. 
127 René Brion, “Charles Charlier,” in Dictionnaire des patrons en Belgique: Les hommes, les entreprises, les réseaux, ed. 
Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, Serge Jaumain, and Valérie Montens (Brussels: De Boeck Université, 1996). 
128 Roland Dussart-Desart, “Edouard Denis,” in Nouvelle Biographie Nationale (Brussels: Academie Royale de 
Belgique, 2012); John P. McKay, Pioneers for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization  (1885-1913) 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 100-01. 
129 “Tramways d’Astrakhan: Statuts,”  no. 2910, AMB, 20 Aug 1896; McKay, Pioneers, 58. 
The bumpy road to a global business empire 
 75 
were so promising that Empain established the ambitious Société Industrielle d'Électricité 
pour la Russie (SIER) in 1913. Several projects were on the verge of being realized when the 
First World War broke out.130 
1.5 Neutral Belgium in China (1897-…) 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Belgian diplomacy tried to encourage 
intense economic relations with China. With the conclusion of a trade agreement (1865) 
and the attempts to establish a shipping connection between Antwerp and a Chinese port, 
the Belgian government was hoping that Belgian industrialists would gain an interest in 
doing business with or in China. It also actively promoted Belgian products there to 
increase direct trade between the two countries. However, to many diplomats’ despair, 
only one Belgian trading company had opened up a branch in Shanghai by 1895. Likewise, 
the metal giant Cockerill from Liège was the only industrial firm interested in production 
in China itself. Its plans did not materialize as such, but its engineers oversaw the 
construction of the Hanyang Iron Works, finished in 1894.131 
In these years, Great Britain dominated Western relations with China. Two thirds of all 
foreign firms in China belonged to the British, which formed 42% of the foreign 
population in the treaty ports. With their colony in Hong Kong and their control over 
Chinese trade and customs authorities, Great Britain had a predominant position in the 
Far East. Yet, Japan had also come to play an important role. After it severely weakened 
China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1895), it enlarged its influence on the continent. 
The defeat of the Chinese Empire opened the door for a struggle for influence of the Great 
Powers. Russia, France and Germany wanted to obtain the same favors as Great Britain 
and Japan. This rivalry led to a ‘scramble for concessions’ where many foreign powers 
tried to get a piece of the cake. China was forced to give in to claims on territory, railroads, 
financial deals and the liberalization of trade.132 
In this ‘scramble’, the Belgian government tried to position its country as an innocent 
industrial nation. The visit of a top official from the Chinese Empire, Viceroy Li 
Hongzhang, to different European capitals offered a perfect occasion. King Leopold II also 
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invited him to Belgium and granted him a private audience. During his visit at the 
beginning of July 1896, Li was impressed by the factories of Cockerill, Val-Saint-Lambert and 
Fabrique Nationale d’Armes in Liège. He showed an interest in the advanced technology of 
Belgium in the field of machinery and weaponry. The visit of Li drew a lot of attention in 
the streets and was widely covered by all the newspapers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
seized the opportunity to intensively study the possibilities for Belgian business in 
China.133 Baron de Vinck, the minister for Belgium in China, and the commercial director 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Léon Capelle accompanied Li Hongzhang during his 
whole trip to Belgium. Right after Li left, de Vinck welcomed in the Musée commercial all 
industrialists and merchants interested in business in China.134 The buzz of Li’s visit also 
aroused the interest of Empain. Empain had a conversation with de Vinck before the 
latter left to China at the end of July 1896. Empain had informed de Vinck about his 
possible projects in the country. They had agreed that de Vinck would be on the lookout 
for interesting investments in tramways and would alert Empain so that he could send an 
engineer to study the opportunity.135 Empain clearly wanted to carry on with it, because 
he founded a new holding company a few weeks after de Vinck left for China. The 
Compagnie russe-française des chemins de fer et de tramways (Russe-française) had to focus on 
tramways and railways not only in France and Russia, but also in China.136 
In the autumn of 1896, the Chinese government was looking for foreign funds to 
construct a railroad between the capital Beijing and the inland commercial hub Hankou. 
Wary of the imperialist aspirations of Great Powers, the Chinese leaders approached 
smaller or neutral powers such as the United States, Belgium or Austria. No doubt, the 
promotional tour of Li in Belgium had improved the country’s reputation concerning 
railroads and the steel industry. Chinese decision-makers such as Li Hongzhang, Zhang 
Zhidong and Sheng Xuanhuai took a benevolent stance towards Belgium, which they 
perceived as an industrious country without a political hidden agenda. The Belgian 
government managed to convince the Belgian haute finance to consider the Beijing-
Hankou project. In March 1897 the Société Générale de Belgique and some railway 
manufacturers such as La Métallurgique founded the Société d’étude de chemins de fer en Chine 
(Société d’étude) to finance a technical research mission. The Société d’étude sent some 
engineers to the region who could investigate the technical specifications of the line.137 
The news of the establishment of the Société d’étude must have alerted Empain. Was he 
perhaps tipped by Jules Carlier of La Métallurgique and director of the Société d’étude that 
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the negotiations were close to a breakthrough? In any case, the promising Beijing-Hankou 
railroad proved to Empain that China indeed had business potential. This urged him to 
take quick action. Although he had not heard about any opportunity from de Vinck, 
Empain started to gather financial partners to form the Syndicat d’études en Chine in the 
weeks after the creation of the Société d’étude. The syndicate (est. July 10, 1897) hired the 
railway engineer Armand Rouffart to go to China. Rouffart encountered many difficulties 
in finding interesting concessions, but in the end he secured an agreement with the 
Chinese government. This led to the establishment of the Compagnie générale de chemins de 
fer et de tramways en Chine in 1900.138 
During the next decades, the Empain group even increased its railway construction 
projects in China (see Chapter 7). Yet, Empain refused to expand to neighboring Siam. In 
1900, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed him to invest in the country, but 
Empain replied that he did not have the financial and human resources nor the time to 
turn to Siam.139 
1.6 Prestige in Leopold’s Congo (1902-…) 
From the foundation of his Congo Free State (CFS) in 1885, King Leopold II wanted to 
implicate Belgian finance in the economic development of the colony. He feared that too 
much foreign investment could weaken the position of Belgium in the CFS. Without 
strong financial ties, Belgium risked losing its claim on the colony, Leopold II believed. 
Unfortunately, Belgian business showed little interest in the private colonial enterprise 
of Leopold. Albert Thys, the King’s equerry (Dutch: ordonnansofficier), had great difficulty 
to gather the capital for the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l’Industrie (CCCI). The 
CCCI, established in 1886-1887, was the first private company to be active in the CFS. 
Besides Thys, Leopold II was able to interest a select club of private bankers from Brussels 
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and Antwerp: Balser, Lambert, Alexandre de Browne de Tiège and Philippson.140 When 
lacking external funds, Leopold broke into his personal reserves.141 Noticing that the 
colonial project was evolving into a personal financial disaster, Leopold II changed tactics 
in 1891. The système domanial and the establishment of various charted companies such as 
the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company and the Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo 
saved Leopold’s fortune, but at a tremendous cost. Based on a system of ruthless 
exploitation, the extractive economy made huge profits out of the rubber boom. Empain 
stayed away from the red rubber business, but had followed the Congolese enterprises of 
Albert Thys closely. Edouard Empain had personally subscribed to a small number of 
shares of the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l’Industrie and its subsidiary Compagnie 
du Katanga at their incorporation in 1887 respectively 1892.142 The Réunis had shares of the 
Chemin de fer du Congo in its portfolio from 1900 onwards.143 Empain’s relatively little 
interest in Congolese business before 1900 can be explained by the absence of railroad 
projects that had passed the conceptual stage. Even if Empain also ventured into mining 
and agriculture in Latin America, I assume that he still preferred to invest in the core 
industry, i.e. traction. 
Empain’s decision to radically scale up his ambitions in Congo was motivated by his 
personal relationship with Leopold II. At the turn of the century, the Sovereign of the CFS 
wanted to gain independence from the small circle of private bankers. Leopold aimed to 
outweigh the importance of Albert Thys, with whom he had an argument about the 
economic policy in Congo. Therefore, Leopold turned towards Empain in 1901 to finance 
the construction of a railroad in the Congolese inland (Compagnie du chemin de fer du Congo 
supérieur aux Grands Lacs africains). Leopold II must have thought he could persuade 
Empain by offering him the first serious railroad opportunity since the Chemin de fer du 
Congo in 1887. Several elements convinced Empain. He highly valued his relationship with 
the King and was not averse to the prestige that a large railway investment in Congo 
entailed. The Belgian press unanimously hailed the plans as “a decisive step in the History 
of Civilization.”144 Most importantly, the King guaranteed a stable return on investment 
of at least 4%. A tumultuous failed attempt to construct a railroad in French Ivory Coast 
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also incited Empain to accept this investment in a politically protected environment (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). 
Leopold’s alliance with Edouard Empain marked the shift towards a closer relationship 
with the financial establishment of Brussels. In 1906, Leopold II finally convinced the 
directors of the Société Générale to step in the Congolese market (Union Minière du Haut-
Katanga, Compagnie du chemin de fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga, Forminière).145 Empain did not 
make a second large-scale investment in Congo before 1914, but the CFL tripled its capital 
by then. In addition, the CFL had given Empain a stronger appetite for Congolese business 
projects: he personally invested in at least six of them after 1902.146 
From a broader perspective, the colonial turn in the history of the Empain group is 
remarkable. Jean-Luc Vellut has shown how Belgian entrepreneurs (e.g. Thys) used 
investments in Leopoldian Congo as a springboard for expansion elsewhere in the world. 
Empain and the Société Générale followed a different path. They only invested in the colony 
after they had built a multinational business empire.147 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
At the end of this chapter, a first answer can be given on the why, where and how of the 
internationalization of the Empain group. Basically, the multinational enterprise of 
Edouard Empain was born out of the need to achieve economies of scale. Why Empain 
decided not to look for scale in quarrying, but in rail transport will be addressed in the 
next chapter. In sum, the business environment of La Métallurgique presented a lot of 
opportunities in light railways. However, this chapter has shown that, whereas the 
marble industry was flourishing in Belgium, the embryonic Empain group had to divert 
to France to do business. The Belgian political-legal environment forced Empain and his 
partners to enter the domestic market via a large French detour. 
This specific pattern of internationalization shows that, historically, the incremental 
process starting in the home country was far from universal. Instead, the Empain group 
emerged from a free-standing company in France, expanded to its home market the year 
after and evolved into a large business empire active in 16 markets worldwide. This 
 
                                                     
145 Guy Vanthemsche, La Belgique et le Congo: L’impact de la colonie sur la métropole (1885-1980), revised ed., vol. 4, 
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146 Recueil Financier, 1914. 
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‘boomerang’ or reverse expansion once again emphasizes the multiple forms of FDI in the 
First Global Economy. 
The market selection and the mode of entry mainly depended on three factors in the 
economic, political and personal sphere. First and foremost, the economic logic of high 
returns guided the decision-making of the top executives. There was no big plan behind 
it. Empain and his close collaborators just had to allocate the limited available resources 
and capabilities to the most promising project. This does not mean that they just played 
safe and imitated the overall Belgian capital outflow. The business group did follow other 
Belgian investors to regions that were hot at a given moment, but it also set its own 
priorities. It entered the markets of Venezuela, Chile, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt and 
China earlier than the average MNE. The Empain group also made clear individual 
choices. After a series of failed investments, Empain lost faith in Latin America whereas 
his Belgian competitors continued to believe in its potential. His attitude towards Russia 
remained conservative until 1911. Other markets were deliberately neglected: Italy for 
instance and for a while also Algeria. 
This wide geographical distribution of assets rather than deepening the activities in a 
few markets was perhaps typical of Belgian holding capitalism. This was at least Pierre 
Lanthier’s tentative conclusion for Belgian investment in Canada.148 Empain also pursued 
horizontal diversification, but much less international vertical integration. Only in 
France, Belgium and Egypt, the group’s most important host countries, integrated 
regional clusters emerged. The issues of vertical integration and risk spreading through 
diversification are the subject of the next two chapters. 
Secondly, international politics seemed to matter for MNEs from a small country such 
as Belgium. The structure of the First Global Economy determined the choice of countries 
Empain could invest in. Rather than competing with big business from the Great Powers, 
Belgian MNEs preferred to focus on Europe and peripheral, less developed regions such 
as Venezuela and the borderlands of Argentina and Brazil. The geography of the Empain 
group suggests that Belgian entrepreneurs had to concentrate on the fringes and fault 
lines of the spheres of influence of the Great Powers. Based on the Chinese case, a 
tentative conclusion could be that the neutrality of Belgium really played an important 
role. These essential issues are dealt with in Part II. 
Thirdly, local embeddedness, personal relations, ideas and preferences determined the 
mode and successful entry of a market. The frame of reference of the Empain 
management was Belgian. Gradually, as France became the most important market, the 
mental maps also included a more French perspective. Without this Belgian-French 
worldview, the Empain group would not have (tried to) invest in Congo and Ivory Coast. 
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One should not forget either that countries such as Congo, China and Egypt appealed to 
the imagination of the investing public and the society at large. Empain was probably not 
insensitive to the prestige that came with the investments. In Egypt, his personal 
commitment exceeded potential economic benefits. 
Empain’s wide network of informal contacts emphasizes the relational character of the 
First Global Economy. Somehow, it supports the trend, mentioned in the general 
introduction, to see markets more as networks than as institutions. Whereas the group 
owed its first concessions in France and the Netherlands to Empain’s connections at La 
Métallurgique, the subsequent lack of qualified agents in some areas led to failed attempts 
to invest. It shows that in most cases, loyal local collaborators were essential to successful 
internationalization. Finally, the active role of the consular diplomacy also emerged from 
this geographic overview (e.g. Egypt, Siam). While this will be further investigated in Part 
II, it is safe to say that diplomats acted as brokers for Belgian business abroad. 
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Chapter 2 Escaping steam, embracing electricity 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a geographical historical overview of the global expansion 
of the Empain group, sketching the investment climate in various world regions. In the 
present chapter, I situate the business group of Edouard Empain in the broader economic 
history of industrialization. It is important to study the sectors the business group was 
active in to understand how its revenue model worked. However, an analysis of the 
corporate strategies cannot succeed without taking into account the economic conditions 
determining them. Like the previous chapter, this chapter adopts a board room 
perspective. It investigates the challenges and opportunities present in the economy of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This period coincided with the transition 
from the First Industrial Revolution to the Second Industrial Revolution. New industries 
based on innovations such as electricity and chemicals were taking over the position of 
the old heavy industry as the driving force of the economy. Experts on industrialization 
and large technical systems theory stress that electricity and its applications formed a 
new technological system. The components of such a complex system were intricately 
linked and influenced each other. In the long run, new technological systems or clusters 
radically transformed the economy. For Belgium, Boschma has shown that 1880 was a 
pivotal year. In terms of innovation, Germany and the US were overtaking the early 
industrializers UK and Belgium. The year 1880 therefore marked the end of the 
dominance of the “steam-transport-iron” cluster and the start of new innovative 
industries including the “electric cluster”.1 
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For the analysis of the corporate strategy2 of any large business group, a few concepts 
are key: vertical and horizontal integration as well as related and unrelated 
diversification. First, in economic theory, vertical integration is the process where a firm 
incorporates parts of the production chain. This process is called ‘backward’ when a firm 
starts to produce specific goods that it previously bought from suppliers. ‘Forward’ 
vertical integration occurs when a firm takes over the intermediaries that separate it 
from the end user of the product. So instead of relying on the market of suppliers and 
distributors, the firm tries to get a grip on the whole production chain. These strategies 
allow the firm to increase coordination and cost efficiency and control the parts of the 
chain with the highest profit margins. Historically, backward vertical integration was 
sometimes useful in new industries. According to David Teece’s reading of Chandler, 
“when certain inputs are not available in competitive supply, vertical integration [might 
have been] necessary to assure the quality or quantity of supply.”3 The usefulness 
vanished as soon as the number of suppliers increased. 
Second, the concept of horizontal integration or combination refers to expansion 
within the same sector. A firm can specialize in a specific branch of industry by 
intensifying production or acquiring competitors. Increasing the output can generate 
significant economies of scale and organizational capabilities.4 Thirdly and finally, a 
company can diversify in sectors that are related or unrelated to its core business. The 
acquired expertise in one field can be used to expand to a related field. Unrelated 
diversification is often a way to invest in products with higher returns and spread the risk 
of a bad investment.5 
Then what is the group’s corporate strategy between 1880 and 1914? In other words, 
how did Empain anticipate the radical economic transformation powered by electricity? 
Figures 10 and 11 tentatively answer this question by presenting the businesses the 
Empain group was active in. For seven sample years, they show each sector as a 
proportion of the aggregate nominal capital of all companies controlled by the Empain 
group. The only sector left out of the analysis here is the supply of technical and financial 
services. The holding companies of the business group employed funds for technical 
advice, general contracting and financial intermediation. Banking was a lucrative 
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3 William Lazonick and David J. Teece, eds., Management Innovation: Essays in the Spirit of Alfred D. Chandler Jr 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 77. 
4 A.D. Chandler, Scale and scope: The dynamics of industrial capitalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1990). 
5 Pasquale Massimo Picone and Giovanni Battista Dagnino, “Revamping research on unrelated diversification 
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activity. However, the investment portfolio of the holding companies formed the 
majority of their assets. Therefore, they are excluded from the sectoral analysis. Taking 
them into account would only lead to flawed data. Chapter 3 extensively deals with the 
holding companies and their crucial features. 
 
Figure 10 Relative share of sectors for sample years, based on total nominal capital (1885-
1914)6 
The graph shows that in 30 years the business group radically diversified. This raises 
several questions. They will be examined in the following sections, which discuss every 
sector in loose historical order. Why did Empain start in railways? What made him 
diversify in the 1890s? What explains the large but short-lived unrelated diversification 
into agriculture, water management, chemicals, …? After 1895 (light) railways only 
accounted for one quarter of the total nominal capital. Why did the group resolutely 
diversify to electric utilities in that period? Was it the first to implement this innovative 
technology? It can be noticed that the step towards electric tramways provoked a 
thorough vertical integration. After the turn of the century, the business group invested 
massively in electricity supply and manufacturing. By 1914, both sectors combined had 
become as important as electric tramways. What reasons were behind these massive 
investments? 
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Figure 11 Total nominal capital per sector for sample years in million francs (1885-1914)7 
Figure 11 explicitly shows that diversification was not incompatible with sustained 
growth in every sector. Between 1880 and 1914, the group had exponentially grown, 
especially after the economic crisis of the 1880s and early 1890s. Due to a lack of sources, 
we have to use aggregated nominal capital instead of turnover as an indicator of the 
group’s size. In absolute figures, the capital gathered to finance the enterprises in the 
different branches of industry increased tenfold from roughly 6 million in 1885 to 600 
million 30 years later. Achieving economies of scale was a must in times of increasing 
industrial concentration. Yet, why did the Empain group also continue to expand in the 
‘traditional’ railway business, albeit at a slower pace? And how should one interpret the 
dozens of millions of francs devoted to real estate activities in Heliopolis? Similar to the 
first unrelated diversification in 1895, Heliopolis tied up many financial resources. 
However, the vertically integrated industries always constituted about four fifths or more 
of total nominal capital.8 
Finally, the diversification raises questions linked to other chapters. Chapter 1 has 
shown that the Empain group rapidly internationalized and entered markets for 
economic, political and personal reasons. But to what extent was the global expansion 
also linked to the electric revolution? To put it differently, did electrification trigger the 
expansion to specific markets? One also wonders about the organizational form. Where 
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could the Empain group find the enormous amount of capital to finance the exponential 
growth shown in Figure 11 and how could it manage a diversified enterprise? Chapter 3 
will deal with these topics in greater detail. 
2.2 Empain’s two-track strategy for transportation 
2.2.1 Steam-powered railways (1880-…) 
Edouard Empain will always be known as a specialist in railroads. However, at the end 
of the 1870s, Edouard Empain was actually active in two sectors. On the one hand, he had 
specialized in marble and stone quarries in the south of Belgium. On the other hand, he 
worked in the heavy industry typical of Belgium as a manager of La Métallurgique. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the company possessed three workshops 
manufacturing railroad material. After a reorganization in 1880, this became the 
company’s core business.9 With the acquired expertise in railroads, Empain actively 
searched for rail concessions on behalf of his employer. The railway equipment boom had 
ended in the 1870s. After a period of acute recession (1878-1879), La Métallurgique urgently 
needed extra clients. By financing new railroads at home and abroad, the manufacturer 
hoped to receive equipment orders. This is similar to the Unternehmergeschäft typical for 
German electric holding companies. This style of market expansion by “organizing, 
financing, equipping and managing new ventures themselves” required a lot of capital.10 
As shown in Chapter 1, the search for and eventual operation of concessions was an 
integral part of the responsibilities of the managers and partners of La Métallurgique. Their 
ambitious expansion goal directly led to increased sales. After its establishment, the 
Valenciennes-Anzin immediately ordered several locomotive engines as well as passenger 
and freight cars.11 
Empain had the choice: pursuing a career in the marble industry or devote his energy 
to the ambitious initiative of La Métallurgique, where he had been appointed to the board. 
Empain opted for the latter. He and other entrepreneurs from La Métallurgique were 
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actually determined to go beyond the usual Unternehmergeschäft for the benefit of the 
manufacturing company. They clearly believed that the construction and operation of 
light rail could be rewarding in itself. This was a long-term strategy, with the need to 
invest capital for a longer period. Instead, Empain could have taken a large interest in La 
Métallurgique and gradually dissociate himself from the operating companies. He did not, 
for equity ties between La Métallurgique and the Empain group were very weak.12 
The top management of La Métallurgique and Empain in particular now pursued two 
diverging strategies: constructing and operating railroad concessions as well as 
increasing the production of railroad equipment. Quickly, the railroad activities grew into 
a self-sufficient business, with dynamics different from the manufacturer’s logic. The 
business group, run by Empain since 1880, gradually came loose from La Métallurgique. La 
Métallurgique stopped intervening in new businesses of the Empain group after 1884. In 
1887, Edouard Empain resigned from the board of La Métallurgique. Yet, many other 
director interlocks continued until the First World War. The relationship between the two 
groups slowly evolved into one between supplier and customer, though embedded in a 
strong personal business network. Occasionally, this network still served for other 
business opportunities. 
As a result of the shared origins and the strong personal relations, La Métallurgique and 
its French subsidiary Ateliers du Nord de la France (ANF, est. 1882) remained the privileged 
supplier of the Empain group. Between 1880 and 1914, the Empain companies ordered 
thousands of locomotive engines, carriages, wagons as well as other railway material.13 
Conversely, Pierre Lanthier has argued that ANF could only survive before 1900 thanks to 
the orders of the Empain group. In Belgium, La Métallurgique had a more dominant 
position, since it was one of the largest rolling stock manufacturers before the First World 
War.14 
Were Empain and his partners right to start a business group based on the construction 
and the operation of light rail? In other words, did the most important branch of industry 
 
                                                     
12 In the 1880s and 1890s, the Empain brothers had a maximum interest of 2% in the business group of la 
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within the Empain group also generate an important return? In 1880, the expectations 
were high. However, the transport sector was very sensitive to the recession of the 1880s 
and early 1890s. Also for a later period (1901), Lanthier found French figures showing that 
running light rail concessions was not very profitable in reality. Most lines had failed to 
attract the expected goods traffic and the number of passengers remained low. The lines 
crossed less densely populated rural areas that were very characteristic of France in that 
period. In fact, the light railways connected small towns rather than cities.15 Like their 
competitors, the French operating companies of the Empain group relied on state aid. 
The Chemins de fer du Périgord derived 50% of their gross revenue for 1890 from the 
government guarantee. Of course, this company had only been established three years 
before. The French law had designed the guaranteed income precisely to tide over the 
start-up phase. However, in 1905, subsidies still formed 25% of gross revenue for one of 
Empain’s oldest companies, the Econord.16 In Belgian Congo, the lengthier railroad of CFL 
also failed to generate the minimal return on equity of 4%, guaranteed by Leopold II. In 
some years, the CFL did not even manage to earn a quarter of the necessary amount. Year 
after year, the Belgian state had to pay the difference (see also Chapter 4).17 
On average, the return of the light railways remained low and followed the general 
business cycle. In France, the steady rise of passenger traffic per km, e.g. +81% between 
1901 and 1911, did not result in a general improvement of the operator’s performance. 
The increase was very unequally distributed, also within the Empain group. The historic 
network of Valenciennes-Anzin (Econord after 1883) was among the busiest networks in the 
whole of France, whereas a line of the Compagnie générale des Chemins de fer vicinaux near 
Switzerland transported nearly 30 times fewer passengers.18 
As a matter of fact, due to high sunk costs typical of infrastructure industries, the 
Empain group was trapped in the light rail sector characterized by low profits. The 
group’s main answer to this problem was growth. Essentially, the diversification to the 
more lucrative electric tramways after 1894 also fitted in this strategy. Only by creating 
more and larger networks at home and abroad could the Empain group achieve 
economies of scale and acquire strategic capabilities. Therefore, the holding companies 
continuously searched for new concessions and expanded existing rail networks. Up to 
1894, most of the growth was realized in Belgium and France (see Fig. 12). In the next 
decade, the French network expanded from 362 km to 1773 km. This could have been 
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much more, for the Empain group tried to obtain concessions in at least 28 departments 
before 1900. Twelve of them eventually granted one or more lines.19 On the eve of the 
First World War, the Empain group controlled over 2000 km of tracks, being 10% of the 
total light rail network. It was the second-largest operator in France, after the French 
Société générale des Chemins de fer économiques (2403 km) and before the Belgian-owned Cie 
de Chemins de fer départementaux (1400 km).20 In Belgium, the Empain group had become 
one of the largest private operators too. It controlled over twenty SNCV-lines.21 
 
Figure 12 Tramway and (light) railway network per country in km (1894-1914)22 
This growth was the result of more, but also larger networks. The Empain group pursued 
a strategy of creating economically viable and interconnected networks. Both in light 
railways, heavy railroads and tramways applied: The larger the network, the higher and 
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CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 28 Mar 1905; Recueil Financier, 1905. 
1914 figures: “Recettes,” Le Messager de Bruxelles, 31 Mar 1914; “Réunis: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 
22 Apr 1914; “Railways&Electricité: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 22 Apr 1914; Recueil Financier, 1915. 
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more regular the returns will be. In general, expansion improved financial results: 
whereas 35% of French small-scale (1-50 km) companies suffered an operational loss, this 
dropped to 20% for larger companies operating 100 km or more.23 In France and Belgium, 
almost all genuine light rail networks of the Empain group had attained this critical size 
(see Table 1). The Empain group had especially applied for concessions in many adjacent 
French departments, creating interdepartmental networks.24 However, as departments 
could differ in policy and usually conceded lines in dribs and drabs, developing rational 
networks was not always easy. 
Unlike the French Société générale des Chemins de fer économiques, the Empain group did 
not manage to group all these concessions in one large operating company. Instead, it 
concentrated its interests in several holding companies and centralized the management 
in few headquarters (see Chapter 3). In the end, this had the same effect as one large 
operating company: a large-scale horizontal integration that could smoothe the 
differences in performance of individual lines. In addition, the Empain group had the 
particularity to go abroad. Few other light rail operators had expanded beyond one or 
two core markets.25 After 1904, the Empain group realized most of its growth outside 
France. By 1914, it (partially) controlled nearly 4000 km of railroads in France, Congo, 
Belgium, China, Egypt, Chile, the Netherlands, Spain, Russia and the Ottoman Empire (see 
Fig. 12 above). 
The railroads can be divided into three broad categories. Firstly, you have the light rail 
networks in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Egyptian Nile Delta (see Table 1). 
They are organized in a pattern similar to a web, with a limited number of central nodes. 
Wherever possible, Empain constructed the tracks on meter gauge to save money. 
Secondly, there are the more elongated lines going from A to B that cover larger 
distances. These include the Chemins de fer du Congo supérieur aux Grands Lacs africains (CFL) 
bypassing several unnavigable sections of the Congo River, the Nitrate Railways in Chile 
connecting the mines to the ports, the Pienlo railway in China linking two important 
cities and finally a shorter line between the commercial town Bursa and the port of 
Mudanya (Ottoman Empire). The long-distance railroads were more expensive to 
construct and were built on standard gauge. For economic reasons, the CFL and the 
Mudanya-Bursa were on narrow-gauge. Thirdly, there are the urban tramway networks 
in Russia, Spain, but also in France, Belgium, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. They are the 
subject of the next section. 
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Table 1 (Light) rail networks operated by the Empain group worldwide in chronological 
order26 
Operating company (1914) Location Operation 
period 
Length 
(1914, km) 
Chemins de fer économiques du Nord northern & eastern FR 1880-1914 376 
Chemin de fer élec. d’Ostende-Blankenberghe Coast, BE 1885-1914 146 
Tramways électriques de Gand Ghent, BE 1886-1914 54° 
Tramways élec. du Pays de Charleroi Charleroi, BE 1887-1914 74° 
Chemins de fer de Pau-Oloron-Mauléon et 
Tramways de Bayonne à Biarritz 
Pyrénées-Atl., FR 1888-1911 193° 
Chemins de fer du Périgord Dordogne, FR 1888-1914 154 
ZNSM N. Brabant, NL 1890-1914 94 
Chemin de fer de Moudania-Brousse Bursa, Ottoman Empire 1893-1914 42 
Cie. gén. des chemins de fer vicinaux eastern FR 1894-1914 671 
Chemins de fer du Calvados Calvados, FR 1894-1914 206 
Nitrate Railways* Chile 1895-1914 605 
Chemins de fer de la banlieue de Reims Marne, FR 1895-1914 399 
Chemins de fer de la Basse Egypte Nile Delta, EG 1897-1914 121 
CFL Congo 1906-1914 482 
Chemins de fer et tramways en Chine Kaifeng-Luoyang, CN 1907-1914 242 
If the operation of railways did not become the most rewarding branch of the business 
group, it still entailed a more lucrative business: general contracting. So from the early 
beginning, the Empain group integrated backwardly to include a welcome addition to the 
income derived from railway concessions: constructing the infrastructure. Very often, a 
government concession for rail or tramways comprised both the construction and 
operation of the network. Generally, the concessionaire could take higher margins on the 
former, as the regulator stipulated maximum prices the operator could charge. 
Therefore, the majority of the different holdings founded by Edouard Empain had an 
important branch that was responsible for the construction of the railway 
infrastructure.27 The holding companies prospered the most when the group obtained 
concessions for new lines or for the transformation of existing lines. On these occasions, 
their subsidiaries could commission them with lucrative construction works. For 
instance, Lanthier has shown that especially in its early years the financial performance 
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27 Many holding companies active in electric utilities internalized construction. Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, 
Global Electrification, 60-61. 
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of the Voie étroite was linked to its activities as a general contractor.28 Similarly, the 
fourfold increase of RELSE’s ROE coincided with the electrification of lines in Ghent and 
Ostend (1896-98). In only one instance, as far as the sources tell, the holding companies 
constructed on behalf of an external operating company.29 In 1888-1891, the Voie étroite 
worked as a subcontractor for the British Carenero Railway Company in Venezuela. This 
turned into a financial disaster. Only on rare occasions, the concession for operation was 
not paired with a construction job (e.g. the CFL, see Chapter 4). 
 
Figure 13 Light railway station of the Chemins de fer économiques du Nord in Champier (FR)30 
2.2.2 Embracing the electric revolution in urban transport (1894-…) 
The mid-1890s marked a turning point in the history of the Empain group. In that period, 
the business group broke its dependence on technology and products of the First 
Industrial Revolution. Besides steam-powered light railways, the group now also invested 
in electric traction. Electricity and its applications were one of the main innovations of 
the Second Industrial Revolution. By investing in urban tramways, the Empain group 
entered a market that was undergoing a total transformation due to this new technology. 
As a consequence, the business group constantly had to keep track of the developments. 
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29 Even the group’s French holding Parisienne Electrique focused on its own subsidiaries before WW1. Lanthier, 
“Stratégies,” 244. 
30 On the line Vienne-Charavines (Isère), c. 1891-1903. CHAMPIER (Isère): La Gare. Arrivée du Tramway, 
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This would ultimately lead to further related diversification, as shown in the next 
sections. 
At first sight, one might expect that the Empain group would already have expanded 
to urban tramways before the mid-1890s. The tramway business was very similar to 
operating light railways, basically offering the same service. The urban context only 
required other material and technical conditions. As opposed to steam-powered light 
railways, urban tramways were pulled by horses and nearly always constructed on the 
public highway. However, for such a closely related diversification, the Empain group 
could use the strategic assets and capabilities it had acquired in its core business. Other 
transport companies such as the Belgian Chemins de fer économiques and the Otlet group 
controlled both urban and rural networks, but the former did not interest the Empain 
group before the introduction of electric power as a mode of traction. 
To understand Empain’s initial reserve towards urban transport and the reversal in the 
mid-1890s, we need to discuss the economics of horse-drawn tramways and the potential 
of electricity in the city.31 The horse-drawn tramway in itself already was quite innovative 
when introduced in the 1860s. Before public transport in the city was limited to the 
omnibus. Put on rails, the tramway could move faster and carry more passengers. Most 
large European cities quickly welcomed this innovation and installed horsecar systems in 
the 1860s and 1870s. At the start of his career, Empain was already a bit too late. Taking 
over established tramway networks was not a serious option, for a familiar reason. Like 
for light rail, construction rather than operation was the largest source of profit for the 
horsecar entrepreneur.32 The operating companies needed a large cavalry, soon afflicted 
with disease and age. Horses were expensive, unreliable and polluted the city.33 In 
addition, the number of passengers on horsecars grew only very slowly in the 1880s, 
despite the general urbanization. Historian John McKay even speaks of stagnation.34 
Engineers and entrepreneurs feverishly searched for alternative sources of energy 
such as steam and electricity. In general, the noise and the smoke made steam engines 
unsuitable for an urban setting. Steam tram locomotives specially adapted to the severe 
antipollution restrictions were so expensive that they rarely had a significant advantage 
over horsecars.35 Tramway companies expected a lot from a new technology: electric 
 
                                                     
31 Costa and Fernandes provide an excellent summary of the literature cited below. They show how electric 
technology radically changed the structure of the public transport market. Álvaro Costa and Ruben Fernandes, 
“Urban public transport in Europe: Technology diffusion and market organisation,” Transportation Research Part 
A: Policy and Practice 46, no. 2 (2012). 
32 McKay, Tramways, 16-18, 20-21. 
33 Brion and Moreau, Tractebel, 100. 
34 McKay, Tramways, 22-25. 
35 McKay, Tramways, 27-32. 
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traction. The principles of electricity had been known for decades, lighting was the first 
promising application. Steps towards the use of electricity for rail traction came later. 
This type of traction needed a constant supply of electricity from a central station to 
moving vehicles. This was hard to realize and partly explains the slow transformation, 
but alternatives such as on-board batteries proved unsuccessful in the long run.36 
The first successful experiments in Europe took place in Berlin in 1881, under the 
supervision of Siemens. A few experimental systems slowly spread in the 1880s, but the 
first large commercial tramway network using overhead electric traction was developed 
by Frank J. Sprague in Virginia in 1888. At that time, Europe had 35 km of tramway lines 
with different modes of electric traction, while the United States already had 80 km. 
Whereas North America decisively opted for the new technology in the next five years, 
European tramway companies were much more hesitant. As of 1893, the US had 
electrified 61% of its tramway network, against 3-4% in Europe. In Europe, many rivaling 
systems next to overhead wire traction had subsisted. Tramway companies and 
municipalities awaited the results of the different modes before transforming their 
networks massively.37 Only after 1893, electrification in Europe accelerated. By the turn 
of the century, Germany had electrified 91% of its tramway mileage, France 44% and Great 
Britain 38%. In the US, electric tramways made 97.5% of total tramway mileage.38 
Many economic advantages underlay the relatively rapid electrification of tramways. 
Electric motors were cleaner, quieter and more reliable than animals. Compared to steam 
engines, electric motors were much smaller for the same power, they performed better 
and enabled to start and stop much easier. A faster service also meant that the expensive 
rolling stock could be used more intensively. This, in turn, led to lower fares and thus 
more customers. The powerful electric traction also allowed larger, more comfortable 
cars. In comparison with horsecars, profitability doubled. Some companies generated 
profit margins of up to 60%. In terms of economic performance, tramway companies in 
general also outclassed light rail operators.39 
However, electrification required massive capital, to the point that electric utilities 
belonged to the most capital intensive industries prior to WW1. Before the first tram 
could even ride, huge amounts of investments had to be done. The owners of small-scale 
companies operating modest horse-drawn tramway networks (5-10 km) could not raise 
 
                                                     
36 Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, Global Electrification, 17. 
37 McKay, Tramways, 70-73. 
38 For the US and Germany, see: Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, Global Electrification, 17; For France, see: 
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this capital. Only large public companies and holdings were able to finance this 
transformation.40 
In this context of higher returns and high capital needs, Empain had enough incentives 
to invest in tramways too. Commanding a considerable amount of capital (see Fig. 11 
above), he could easily gather the necessary funds and technical expertise to secure a 
strong position in the market of electric tramways. Empain decided to step in by the mid-
1890s, because the first operational results of electric traction had shown the increased 
profitability. For the Empain group, the higher expected returns were also a way to 
compensate for the poor performance of the light railways. Many other financial groups 
in Belgium and Europe saw the opportunity too. Almost simultaneously, they founded 
specialized electroholdings, e.g. SGBEE (est. 1895), the CMT (est. 1895), Compagnie générale 
de traction (est. 1896) and Sofina (est. 1898).41 Not only large German, French, Swiss and 
Belgian banks were behind these electroholdings, but also electrical manufacturers. The 
largest players on the French urban transport market all had their origins in 
manufacturing. By diversifying to electric utilities, the Empain group had to compete 
against powerful new players, which were absent in the light railway sector.42 
Table 2 Evolution of the rail network of the Empain group, in km (1894-1914)43 
 
1893/4 1904 1914 
Railways 708 2179 3000 
Railways (elec.) 0 17 126 
Tramways 39 51 67 
Tramways (elec.) 0 328 596 
The Empain group was certainly not the first Belgian or French group to electrify a 
network, rather a closer follower. Like the large financial groups, the Empain had waited 
until the new technology started to prove its worth. Moreover, Empain could hardly 
pioneer in the electrification in Belgium and France, because he did not possess many 
horse-drawn lines to electrify, unlike some of his competitors. Except for one, all 
networks of the Empain group were serviced by steam engines. The lines crossed 
suburban and rural areas, where steam power was convenient and not contested. The 
business group had been operating only one horsecar system since 1881. The short line (3 
km) in Boulogne-sur-Mer was barely profitable and the Voie étroite had repeatedly tried 
to sell it.44 Three other light rail lines in Liège, Brussels and Bayonne could be assimilated 
 
                                                     
40 Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, Global Electrification, 19-22; Wolkowitsch, “Siècle.” 
41 Brion and Moreau, Tractebel, 27-33. 
42 Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, Global Electrification, 91-104. 
43 Sources are the same as for Fig. 12 
44 “Voie étroite: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 17 Oct 1888; “Voie étroite: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” 
Supplément MIM, 17 Oct 1888. 
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to urban tramways because they crossed densely populated areas. As a result, at the 
beginning of the year 1894, only 39 km (5%) counted as (semi-)urban tramway network 
versus 708 km of light rail track (see Table 2). These tramways had been acquired or 
constructed when electrification was not yet on the agenda. 
In contrast, from 1894 the group quickly accumulated electrifiable networks of which 
the economic performance could be improved. Within a year’s time, Empain frenetically 
scouted for good opportunities. By December 1894, he had taken decisive steps in 
Boulogne-sur-Mer, Cairo and Lille. Nevertheless, this first year also involved some less 
successful ventures in Brussels, Belgrade and Paris. While his proposition to install an 
experimental cable system linking the upper and lower part of Brussels’ city center was 
rejected, Empain managed to buy the partially electrified network of Belgrade (Serbia).45 
As a consequence, the Tramways de la ville de Belgrade was the first electric utility the 
Empain group operated. Yet, the competing CMT acquired the lighting concession and 
power station.46 Without the synergy of the lighting and tramway concession, the heavily 
indebted business was not profitable. Empain preferred to get rid of the tramway 
network. As early as October 1895, he proposed a takeover to Edouard Otlet.47 Without 
any further electrification of the network, Empain finally sold it to the CMT three years 
later.48 In the spring of 1894, Empain also tried to get a foothold in the Paris tramway 
sector. The group founded the Société parisienne de tramways intercommunaux that pursued 
two electric tramway concessions in the Paris banlieue in particular.49 Later on both 
attempts failed due to fierce competition.50 
Despite these initial difficulties inherent to diversification, the Empain group 
somehow predictably forced a breakthrough in the sole horse-drawn tramway it already 
owned. After many years’ negotiations, the Voie étroite and the municipality of Boulogne-
sur-Mer reached an agreement in May 1894 on important extensions. The new line 
connecting the upper and lower part of the town had to be electrified, for horses could 
not pull the tram up the steep slope.51 In other cities too, hilly terrain was one of the 
reasons to opt for electric traction.52 The Boulogne-sur-Mer project included the 
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construction of a power station in the city. This was the first power plant the Empain 
group built. Due to disagreements with the authorities, the transformation was only 
completed in 1898.53 
Two other major opportunities succeeded too in 1894. First, Edouard Empain and the 
Belgian Chemins de fer économiques received the concession for a large tramway system in 
Cairo, to be electrified from the start.54 Second, the Empain group acquired the horse-
drawn tramway lines of the Tramways du Département du Nord in Lille, with the explicit aim 
to electrify it.55 Concrete plans to electrify the existing network of Bruxelles-Ixelles-
Boendael and to construct electric lines in Astrakhan, Russia followed two years later.56 
As mentioned before, the overhead wire system did not immediately convince all 
municipalities and tramway companies in Europe. In 1896, the holding company Réunis 
was of the firm opinion that traction technologies based on “overhead wires or batteries, 
dry steam, gas and compressed air [were] competing with nearly equal chances of 
success.”57 Therefore, the Empain group bet on different modes of electric traction such 
as accumulators, the surface-contact system and the overhead wire. Although the 
overhead wire was the most cost-efficient, many municipalities privileged esthetic 
solutions that did not need drastic infrastructure works. Tramway companies had to yield 
to the preferences of the city councilors. That is why, on the one hand, the Compagnie des 
Tramways électriques Nord-Parisiens employed the normal overhead wire in the Parisian 
suburbs but switched to the surface-contact system (Claret-Vuilleumier) once the tram 
entered the Paris municipality.58 On the other hand, the Empain group received the 
concession of the electric tramway in Ghent precisely because it could offer an alternative 
to the overhead wire, considered too ugly by the local city council. The Voie étroite and 
the RELSE had experience with another, more esthetic traction system. In June 1897, they 
had just equipped part of their urban network in Ostend with engines powered by on-
board accumulators. A demonstration in Ostend convinced the Ghent bench of Mayor and 
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Aldermen.59 However, by 1900, the accumulator system had frequently proven its 
deficiencies. The accumulators, produced by Electricité et Hydraulique (E&H), were not 
powerful enough, often leading to breakdowns.60 Realizing that it had been too ambitious, 
the Tramways électriques de Gand repeatedly requested the city to apply the trolley system 
everywhere. The municipality was not amused. After a long period of hesitation, the city 
council agreed to issue a new call for tenders, which the Tramways de Gand only won after 
it had offered better conditions for the city.61 
Table 3 Tramway networks operated by the Empain group worldwide in chronological 
order62 
Last operating company Location Operation 
period 
length in 
1914 (km) 
RELSE & Tramway de Cointe Liège, BE 1881-1914 21 
Twys électriques de Boulogne-sur-Mer Boulogne, FR 1881-1914 19 
Twys Bruxellois* Brussels, BE 1884-1914 152 
Twys électriques de Gand Ghent, BE 1886-1914 54° 
Twys électriques du Pays de Charleroi Charleroi, BE 1887-1914 74° 
Chemins de fer de Pau-Oloron-Mauléon et 
Twys de Bayonne à Biarritz 
Pyrénées-Atl., FR 1888-1911 193° 
Twys électriques de Lille et banlieue Lille, FR 1895-1914 102 
Twys de Kischinew Chișinău, RU 1895-1914 15 
Twys du Caire Cairo, EG 1896-1914 53 
Twys de Berditcheff Berdichev, RU 1897-1914 3 
Twys de Taschkent Tashkent, RU 1899-1914 19 
Twys électriques en Espagne Madrid, ES 1899-1914 77 
Chemin de fer métropolitain de Paris Paris, FR 1900-1914 78 
Twys de Paris et de la Seine (TPDS)* Paris, FR 1900-1914 268 
Twys d’Astrakhan Astrakhan, RU 1900-1914 24 
Twys et éclairage électriques de Damas* Damascus, Ottoman 
Empire 
1907-1914 7 
Electric Railways Heliopolis Oasis Co. Cairo, EG 1908-1914 27 
Twys de Nantes Nantes, FR 1910-1914 38 
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A decade after opening up a new branch of investments, the group already possessed 
a total of 379 km of tramway mileage, of which 87% was immediately constructed or 
transformed to electric traction (see Table 2). This shows that the Empain group had made 
a huge leap in ten years, almost exclusively investing in those tramways that could be 
electrified. The electrification efforts were far better than the average of 44% in France 
for 1900 (see above). Before the First World War, the Empain group had acquired a strong 
position in the tramway sector. Table 3 shows that it was present in 16 cities worldwide. 
In Belgium it controlled –partially or fully– more than 30% of total tramway mileage. In 
the much larger French market, Empain still controlled 13% of tramway mileage. 
However, the diversification into profitable electric tramways did not mark the end of 
the other railroad activities. Instead of divesting, the Empain group had kept developing 
its light railways and heavy railroad networks, motivated by economies of scale (see the 
previous section). Between 1894 and 1914, it had tripled the total mileage of rail track. 
Light and heavy rail still accounted for more than 85% of the total mileage. Electric 
traction only formed 1% of the total. These were some 17 km of vicinal lines in the suburbs 
of Charleroi, that could be assimilated to passenger tramways.63 Another ten years later, 
the electrification of the rail network had increased from 13 to 19%, but this can be largely 
attributed to the sustained electrification of the group’s tramways (90% electrified), while 
only 4% of the railways had undergone the same transformation. 
What can explain this discrepancy? Light rail was steam-powered, so the benefits of 
electric traction were proportionally smaller, despite a higher efficiency than steam 
traction. Electrification of light rail networks only became a real executable option after 
1910, and at that time most of the networks were already extended. Electrifying such long 
distances came at a very high cost and the extremely low current returns could not justify 
these exorbitant expenses.64 Priority was given to the busiest lines in densely populated 
areas and in very hilly regions. Within the Empain group, this came down to the already 
mentioned vicinal lines in Charleroi, the lines from Valenciennes to its suburbs and to the 
central strip of the touristic Belgian Coast.65 
 
                                                     
63 Davies, Vicinal. 
64 Lanthier, “Constructions,” 181-2. 
65 Econord: Rapport du CA à l’AGO, 11 May 1914, 65AQE518, ANMT; Tramways Electriques du Pays de Charleroi: 
Rapport du CA, 11 Mar 1915, Stads- en streekvervoer 1842-2003, I 644/2142, ARA; Chemin de fer électrique 
d’Ostende-Blankenberghe et extensions: Rapport du CA à l’AGO, 1 Apr 1909, 65AQE541, ANMT. 
Escaping steam, embracing electricity 
 101 
2.3 Powering cities, transport and industry (1903-…) 
The electrification of tramways strongly pushed the Empain group to diversify into the 
production of electricity. The decision to invest in electric tramways forced the Empain 
group to overthink its sectoral strategy. Its new position as an electricity consumer 
eventually sparked a whole process of vertical integration, from power production to 
electrical manufacturing. The output of the power plants and workshops was intended 
for the use of its own operating companies. However, only large-scale production was 
cost-effective. The group’s demand for electricity was not enough to allow this. 
Therefore, the power plants needed to find other energy consumers. They came into 
conflict with the gas industry. To compete with gas producers, the Empain group 
diversified into the gas industry as well. Finally, the group also tried to secure its own fuel 
supplies by prospecting for coal. This section discusses the economic reasons behind the 
diversification into electricity and gas production as well as coal mining. 
The group’s diversification into electric power supply was a textbook example of 
backward vertical integration when sufficient inputs were lacking. From the mid-1890s, 
the need for electricity rapidly increased. As soon as the electric tramway rode the streets 
of Cairo in 1896, the Empain group had become an electricity consumer too. At the turn 
of the century, the Empain group already had to power some 300 km of electrified tracks. 
The options for the Empain group were limited: Buy electric power elsewhere or 
internalize its production. Before the electrification of urban transport, most cities did 
not have substantial power stations, perhaps except for a small facility for public 
lighting.66 Finding a cheap external electricity supplier was therefore very hard. Only in 
Paris, where several electricity producers competed, could the Cie des Tramways électriques 
Nord-Parisiens procure its power from Le Triphasé. Due to the abundant supply, this was 
cheaper than investing in a proper power station.67 In other cities, Empain’s tramway 
companies had to produce the necessary electricity themselves. Their small production 
facilities in e.g. Cairo, Boulogne, Ixelles and Ghent generated just enough current for the 
needs of the tramway service. However, even for small power stations, the investment 
costs were high. The companies needed to provide a sufficiently large capacity, for 
tramways had a very irregular power consumption with high peaks during rush hours. At 
other times, the power stations would practically be idle. 
The solution to this inefficiency was to find other customers to maximally exploit the 
capacity of the power stations. The more customers, the larger the power stations, the 
lower the production costs of electricity could be. For this reason, whenever possible, the 
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Empain group always demanded a concession for public lighting when it operated a 
tramway somewhere. By day the power station could supply the tramway and by night it 
could light the streets. This synergy was vital to some companies. For instance, the failure 
to combine both activities determined the decision to sell the Tramways de la ville de 
Belgrade.68 When the Tramways électriques de Lille et de sa banlieue (TELB) finally obtained 
permission to electrify its network in 1900, the management conceived a power station 
with a capacity of 2600 kW (later even 3500 kW) much larger than necessary for its own 
consumption (1500 kW at the most). It anticipated future extensions of the tramway lines, 
but also intended to sell the exceeding power to industrial users in the region. Soon after 
the TELB started selling in 1905, a competing electricity producer in Lille sued them. The 
judge had their production shut down temporarily because they were legally restricted 
to produce for the tramway company.69 Everything considered the sale of electricity by 
electric tramway companies remained modest. After the legalization of its situation, it 
only accounted for 4% of the TELB’s total gross revenue.70 
As the following paragraphs show, only independent electricity producers could 
fundamentally transform the sector. The inauguration of the Paris Métro was the event 
that triggered the construction of the first multi-purpose power station in France. In 
1898, the Métro’s strategy to secure electric power supply did not deviate from the one 
followed by the other transport companies. The directors of the Compagnie du chemin de 
fer métropolitain de Paris (CMP) could obviously foresee that the Métro would be a large 
consumer of electricity. Therefore, the plans included the construction of a large power 
station along the Seine. As new lines were opened, the plant at Quai de la Rapée had to 
expand. Between 1899 and 1902, the capacity had increased to 6000 kW and afterward 
another 8400 kW was added.71 In early 1903, however, the fast-growing CMP expected to 
need an additional 18,000 kW within a few years. The current location, right in the city 
center, had limited room for such a substantial expansion. Based on these two facts, 
Empain’s French holding Parisienne Electrique decided to change its strategy.72 By 
establishing the stand-alone Société d’Électricité de Paris (SEP), the Parisienne Electrique split 
off the production of electricity from the transport companies. An independent 
specialized firm such as the SEP could produce at a much larger scale and conclude 
contracts with both the Métropolitain and other industrial customers such as tramway 
companies (e.g. Cie des Tramways électriques Nord-Parisiens from 1907) and factories. 
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Between 1903 and 1905, the SEP constructed one of the most modern power stations in 
the world and the largest of France.73 From the start, the station counted 4 turbines of 
5000 to 6000 kW each, instead of the usual 1000 kW. Situated on large terrains near the 
Seine in Saint-Denis, the northern banlieue, the SEP had many possibilities to expand. The 
initial capacity was 24,000 kW, but by 1914 it had tripled to 72,000 kW.74 
In Belgium, the same evolution towards large-scale multi-purpose power stations took 
place, almost simultaneously. In 1901, the most important electroholdings, the Empain 
group included, jointly founded the Société intercommunale belge d’électricité (Intercom). 
Under the leadership of the SGBEE, Banque de Bruxelles and Paribas, Intercom had to study 
the potential of electricity distribution on a regional scale. Instead of supplying one town, 
power stations should increasingly supply a wider area via their own distribution 
network. This had become possible thanks to recent technological innovations. 
Transporting electricity over longer distances was far more efficient at a high voltage and 
using alternating current instead of direct current. In the region of Charleroi, Intercom 
controlled the first company with a regional scope producing alternating current at a 
high voltage, the Société d'Électricité du Bassin de Charleroi (est. 1901).75 The Empain group 
had a small block of shares in both Intercom and its subsidiary and delegated one of its 
executives to both boards of directors. 
After 1903, this executive resigned from the board because the Empain group had plans 
to produce electricity itself. The new strategy in Paris and the takeover of the Ateliers de 
constructions électriques de Charleroi (ACEC) in July 1904 (see below) encouraged Empain to 
invest in Belgian power plants too. The new power stations could become the first 
customers of ACEC, an electrical engineering company. In the fall of that year, the Empain 
group founded the Électricité du Pays de Liège and the Société bruxelloise d’électricité. Together 
with the business group of Raoul Warocqué, Empain also set up the Société d’électricité du 
Hainaut and took over the Compagnie d’Électricité de Seraing.76 
On the eve of the Great War, the Empain group had become a major player on the 
Belgian and French electricity market. In Belgium, the cooperation of the Belgian holding 
companies in the early 1900s had made way for fierce competition. The group of SGBEE-
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Intercom and the Société Générale de Belgique were its most important competitors. Intercom 
controlled electricity companies in the provinces of Hainaut (Bassin de Charleroi, 1901, 
Borinage, 1903), Brabant (Louvain, 1908) Antwerp (Nord de la Belgique, 1909), Liège (Est de la 
Belgique, 1910) and West Flanders (Ouest de la Belgique, 1911). The Société Générale followed 
by constructing large units in Antwerp (1905) and East Flanders (1911).77 
Table 4 Electricity production in Belgium before WW178 
Producer Installed capacity 
(1000 kW, 1914) 
Production 
(million kWh, 1913) 
Empain group (total) 49 57 
   Bruxelloise d’électricité 10 7.5 
   Électricité du Pays de Liége 12 14 
   Gaz et Électricité du Hainaut 20.5 35.5 
   Cdf élec. Ostende-Blankenberghe 6 ? 
   Tramways électriques de Gand 0.6 ? 
Other private producers 65 83 
Municipal power plants 14 28 
Self-producing industry 434 1302 
GRAND TOTAL 562 1470 
Empain, SGBEE-Intercom and the Société Générale owned the largest power stations in 
Belgium. The Empain group alone controlled 48,500 kW or 40% of the total capacity 
installed by private producers (see Table 4). Similarly, it had a share of over 40% in the 
market of private electricity production. To whom did the Empain group sell their 
product? Evidently, the group’s tramway companies became privileged clients. 
Technological innovation, however, had realized a whole set of new applications for 
electricity in industry and even households. Due to the large-scale power stations, the 
price in Belgium also dropped from 0.4 franc to 0.14 franc per kWh between 1904 and 
1914. This resulted in a steeply rising demand.79 The Belgian private suppliers responded 
by multiplying the production from 3.2 million kWh in 1904 to 140 million kWh ten years 
later.80 However, from Table 4 we can also conclude that this market could have been 
much bigger. The majority of industrial firms produced their energy themselves. The 
heavy industry such as mining and metallurgy particularly needed a very large quantity 
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of driving power. As private producers could not meet this ever-increasing demand 
and/or asked a high price, the industry thus had a good reason to integrate electricity 
production and become ‘self-producing’.81 
Table 5 Electricity production by the Empain group in France (1915)82 
Producer Power station Installed capacity 
(1000 kW) 
Production (million 
kWh, 1913/14) 
Empain group (total) 159  
   CMP Bercy 11.4  
   SEP Saint-Denis I 72 145.483 
   EGN Jeumont 18.4 28.384 
   EGN Lomme 16.5  
   SNE Chantenay 17.5 14.685 
   SERVA Valenciennes 20  
   TELB Lille 3.5  
Other thermic power producers 384  
Hydroelectric power producers 368  
GRAND TOTAL 911 1800 
The French electricity market before the First World War was different from the Belgian 
one, although the heavy industry in France also largely produced its own electricity.86 
Despite the potential size of the market, the French total production was only 22% bigger 
than the Belgian (see Table 5). This is the result of the relatively slow development of 
electricity in France. Compared to Belgium, the French market was not mature at all: for 
the year 1913 the per capita production was about 43 kWh per Frenchman as opposed to 
192 kWh for a Belgian inhabitant.87 A distinguishing characteristic of France is also the 
importance of hydroelectric power. As mentioned before, Empain did not invest in this 
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type of power generation, concentrated in the southeast of the country. Nevertheless, the 
business group occupied a strong position in the national market and especially among 
the thermic power producers. It controlled 17% of total installed capacity and even 29% 
of the total capacity of thermic power stations. 
The diversification of the Empain group into gas was a way of breaking open the 
market of lighting and power. Due to the backward integration of the Empain group of 
electric power supply, it had entered the rather closed energy market. In Belgium and 
France, the gas industry closely and critically watched the expansion of electricity. This 
is because electricity is a substitute good of gas. For a very long time, the gas producers 
had dominated this sector. Especially in Belgium and Northern France, gas companies had 
been supplying cities, industry and households since the 1860s for lighting and power. 
Different from natural gas, the ‘coal gas’ or ‘town gas’ was produced by heating coal in a 
vacuum and then distributed to households and factories. The vested interests of the gas 
industry felt threatened by the arrival of electricity producers and tried to stop them at 
any cost. Many of the companies possessed profitable gas factories and lighting 
concessions. Their long-term monopolies and distribution rights hampered the 
development of electricity production in the same region. Therefore, the Belgian and 
French electroholdings pursued a diversification strategy via two methods: acquisitions 
and mergers. One the one hand, they could take over the gas factories and concessions to 
make sure that competition would not oppose the expansion of their electricity business. 
This is what the Ateliers de constructions électriques du Nord et de l’Est (ACENE) has done in 
the area around Jeumont, where she wanted to sell the surplus production of its power 
station. Because the sale of both electricity and gas kept increasing, ACENE split off these 
activities and transferred it to a new firm, the Électricité et Gaz du Nord (EGN, est. 1910).88 
On the other hand, the electroholdings could ask gas holding companies to join their 
electricity business. On several occasions, the gas companies welcomed this opportunity 
that allowed them to diversify their interests.89 
The Empain group made its first steps in the gas industry by pursuing an acquisition 
strategy. In 1904, it had already founded a first electricity company in Hainaut, together 
with the local captain of industry Raoul Warocqué (Electricité du Hainaut). This formed the 
basis of an intense collaboration between both business groups. Warocqué was a very 
prominent owner of coal mines and, to a lesser extent, power stations in the province of 
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Hainaut.90 In order to allow their joint venture to expand, in November 1905, the Empain 
group proposed Warocqué to jointly acquire all gas factories and concessions from the 
Société d’Eclairage du Centre and bring them into their Electricité du Hainaut.91 As a result, 
the energy company changed its name to Gaz et Electricité du Hainaut. Instead of competing 
with the local historical gas company Eclairage du Centre, Empain and Warocqué preferred 
to start producing city gas themselves. As a coal mine owner, both the gas and electricity 
business could mean a lot for Warocqué. On the one hand, Warocqué could lay his hands 
on cheap coal, the raw material necessary to produce the town gas. On the other hand, 
these coal mines needed the electricity produced by the Gaz et Électricité du Hainaut, 
because the extraction process required a lot of power. 
A few years later, the Empain group pursued the strategy of merging with gas 
competitors by founding two joint ventures with the Compagnie générale pour l'éclairage et 
le chauffage par le gaz. In both cases, Empain threatened to start supplying electricity on a 
large scale in the Belgian-French border region where the gas company had old lighting 
concessions. The two groups preferred cooperation over competition, resulting in the 
establishment of the Eclairage, chauffage et force motrice de Tournai et extensions (est. 1910) 
and the Société d'Électricité de la région de Valenciennes-Anzin (SERVA, est. 1913).92 
However, the expansion into the gas industry was not merely a way of limiting the 
competition for electricity production. The Empain group still believed in the potential 
of gas as an energy source. The gas sector continued growing, as more and more 
municipalities granted concessions.93 Empain’s gas companies tried to keep pace with the 
growing demand and increase output. The EGN explicitly pursued a strategy of expansion 
and technical innovation. By unifying independent gas factories and centralizing the 
management, the company wanted to create economies of scale. In Belgium too, the 
production sites generally became more powerful.94 However, the production figures of 
the Gaz et Électricité du Hainaut put the growth of gas in perspective. Whereas its sales of 
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gas witnessed an increase of 62% from 6.8 million m³ to 11 million m³ between 1904 and 
1913, electricity augmented with an incredible 2450% between 1907 and 1913.95 
Still following the same reasoning of securing important inputs, the Empain group 
attempted to integrate the extraction of coal. Given its electricity production and many 
railroads with steam engine locomotives, the Empain group had grown into a very large 
consumer of fuel. Apart from the hydroelectric power station supplying the Tramways et 
éclairage électriques de Damas, all production units were coal-fired power plants.96 The 
choice for coal-fired power stations was a deliberate one. The Empain group very much 
appreciated the stability of their production. Provided that they had a continuous supply 
of coal, these conventional thermic power stations could quickly respond to fluctuations 
in demand. In 1913, EGN had considered buying a large volume of power from a 
hydropower plant on the Rhône. The instability of hydroelectric power production was 
the main reason why the board of directors abandoned the plan.97 Indeed, hydropower 
was influenced by natural circumstances, but could produce very cheap on some 
occasions. In contrast, the profit margins of conventional thermic power stations heavily 
depended on the price of coal. The SEP, the largest of them, consumed no less than 200,000 
tons of coal per year.98 
A potential next step in backward vertical integration was therefore to secure a cheap 
and stable supply of fuel. Before the First World War, the Empain group controlled several 
companies situated in the mining districts in Hainaut. When in 1912 optimistic reports 
appeared about potential ramifications of coal deposits at the French side of the border, 
the Empain group saw its chance. The EGN, together with ACENE, ACEC and Gaz et Électricité 
du Hainaut, made drillings in the area around La Longueville at the French-Belgian border. 
Edouard Empain had bought hundreds of hectares of land to develop a huge rolling stock 
manufacturer there, as will be explained below. He hoped that this new company could 
exploit the mines as soon as important coal stocks had been found. However, the war 
stopped the digging before the engineers had reached the layers estimated to be at a 
depth of 800 m. The Empain group did not resume the digging after the war.99 The 
question remains to what extent this diversification should be taken seriously. Whereas 
the lack of supply underlay the other backward integration plans, coal mining was a big 
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market in Belgium. In the past, coal was widely available at competitive prices. Only in 
1910 did the national consumption exceed the national production and had coal to be 
imported.100 Although this trend continued in the next years, it is difficult to imagine that 
the Empain group could have immediately responded to the increasing demand. If it had 
found coal, it is unlikely that it could have extracted it cost-effectively from the start. 
2.4 Becoming its own manufacturer (1904-…) 
As discussed in the previous sections, the business model of the Empain group in the first 
decades was constructing and operating railroads and tramways. With the wave of 
electrification from 1895, the holding companies also started to construct power stations 
and electrify urban transport. In this position as an operator and general contractor, the 
business group had to acquire manufactured goods such as rolling stock, rails, electric 
locomotives, cables and turbines from external producers. In sum, it found itself at the 
end of the production chain. Historically, the Empain group even owed its existence to 
the position of equipment buyer. Its long-standing intimate relationship with the 
manufacturing industry (La Métallurgique) had confined the Empain group to the role of 
railroad operator. For a very long-time, Empain saw no need or possibility to diversify to 
manufacturing. However, after the turn of the century, the electric revolution and the 
long economic boom incited the Empain group to break free and become its own supplier 
in a specific range of products. These supplies could be split into two categories: electrical 
equipment in the first place and railway equipment in the second place. They are both 
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Firstly, electrical equipment was a product of the Second Industrial Revolution and 
belonged to a different universe than that of the typical steam-powered railways. 
Electrical manufacturing only became a considerable market in the 1890s. By then, 
several branches of industry had discovered the various applications of electricity. The 
electric revolution also affected the customer-supplier relationship with La Métallurgique, 
because of the radically different technology. La Métallurgique was specialized in steam 
locomotives and not at all in electric traction. However, the manufacturer and Empain 
had jointly tried to get a foothold in the sector of electrical engineering at an early 
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stage.101 Previous histories of the Empain group have totally neglected this attempt. In 
1882, when the commercialization of electricity was still in its infancy, board members 
and managers of La Métallurgique established the Walter Electric Company. This was a small 
joint venture with the American inventor Hugo Walter to exploit his patents outside 
North America. Walter’s inventions of most interest to La Métallurgique were an 
electromagnetic brake and an electric engine for the traction of tramcars. Walter signed 
a contract to supervise the testing and production of the breaks in Brussels. Soon after 
Walter’s arrival, he successfully tested the new type of brakes at the tracks of Empain’s 
Valenciennes-Anzin company.102 However, Empain and his partners clearly were hoping for 
more. By having Walter work for them for several years, they wanted to profit from 
possible future inventions. Yet, the only traces of new inventions are the filing of two 
patents. First, Walter filed an improvement of his patented electric motor. Together with 
Empain, he filed a second patent in Belgium and France on improvements of the light 
bulb.103 After two years, he returned to the United States. Walter’s innovations came too 
early, as it was not yet possible to produce and sell them on a large scale. As the ambitions 
had failed to materialize, Empain finally dissolved the company in 1891.104 
If La Métallurgique had successfully innovated in the 1880s, the Empain group would not 
have been forced to turn to other manufacturers to supply electric equipment. Now, it 
had to hire specialized electrical engineering companies to electrify its tramway lines. In 
Cairo, the Union Electricitäts-Gesellschaft (UEG) constructed the group’s first power station 
(1894).105 The Belgian manufacturer E&H was commissioned for the electrification of the 
Bruxelles-Ixelles-Boendael tramway (1896), whereas Siemens & Halske installed the group’s 
first Russian power station in Astrakhan (1899).106 Afterward, the Tramways d’Astrakhan 
ordered its first electric locomotive engines at E&H.107 Even when the group’s holding 
company Russe-française itself took charge of the construction of the SEP’s generation 
station in 1903, it still had to order the turbines at an external company. The turbines 
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were constructed by the French subsidiary of the Swiss multinational Brown-Boveri with 
its own patented technology.108 
Along with the expansion of electricity as the energy source of the future for lighting, 
traction and power other machines, the demand for electrical equipment was growing 
quickly. Empain must have jealously observed the large German and American electrical 
engineering companies conquering the market. According to Global Electrification, in 
business history most equipment suppliers including AEG, Westinghouse, Siemens and 
General Electric became electric utility operators. The common rationale for suppliers to 
construct and sometimes operate so-called “manufacturer’s satellites” was twofold. First, 
they could increase sales volumes, because the electric utility needed to buy power 
equipment. Second, the establishment of a power station led to the spread of electricity 
in that region. It created a new market of electricity consumers buying electric 
machinery. These equipment suppliers were looking for short-term profits derived from 
manufacturing, i.e. Unternehmergeschäft, instead of making profit in the long run by 
operating the utility. They could not afford to tie up a significant amount of capital for 
decades. Therefore, most manufacturers loosened the ownership ties after the utility was 
up and running. Anyhow, these utility companies often remained captive customers due 
to the specificity of the equipment used for the construction. The utilities depended on 
the patented technology of the electrical engineering companies. In consequence, these 
could continue to sell their products at a very high margin.109 
Part of the literature confusingly assimilates the diversification strategy of the Empain 
group to the German electroholdings. It would take minority stakes in foreign electric 
tramway companies to sell its electrical equipment.110 However, it is rather the contrary. 
The Empain group had been a utility operator for decades. Its business strategy was more 
similar to the one adopted by banks and financial holding companies. They made long-
term investments aiming at sustained returns in the long run. Since 1894, the Empain 
group had increasingly invested in electric transport and power stations. Probably, 
Empain could not stand to watch the high profits flow away to the manufacturers. 
Perhaps he would have accepted it if it were La Métallurgique, but not the competing 
electrical engineering multinationals. 
Similar to the integrated electroholdings, Empain aimed to create lucrative synergies 
between construction, operation and manufacturing. This backward vertical integration 
from operator to manufacturer was rather unconventional. The Empain group moved in 
the opposite direction of what was typical behavior according to Global electrification. The 
Empain group was an operator of electric utilities starting to manufacture for its own use. 
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Unlike the electrical engineering companies, Empain simultaneously had the ambition 
and the ability to tie up capital for a longer period and keep managing the operating 
companies. 
So where and how did Empain become its own supplier of electrical equipment? In 
1904, Empain seized an opportunity to take over a large production facility in Charleroi 
(Belgium) with a branch in Jeumont, right across the French border. It could perfectly 
supply Belgium and France, the two markets were most of the group’s electric utilities 
were situated. However, the Belgian market was very competitive. The German electrical 
companies such as AEG and Siemens occupied a very strong position. Due to their 
connections with German big banks, they could offer very generous terms of payment 
and low prices. In contrast, Belgian electrical firms were small and traditionally managed 
and could hardly win this price war.111 To do so, the Belgian electrical industry needed 
massive capital investments. However, until 1914 the Empain group was the only large 
Belgian financial group to massively invest in the sector. Some other very important 
holding companies such as Sofina, SGBEE and the Chemins de fer économiques had strong ties 
with the German industry and were less keen to follow Empain’s example.112 
To be able to successfully compete with the established foreign manufacturers, Empain 
needed to produce on a large scale from the start. This became possible in the spring of 
1904. One of Belgium’s leading electrical manufacturers, E&H, had gotten in a difficult 
financial position due to overstretched ambitions in Russia. The Empain group, which had 
been a regular customer of E&H, took over the ailing firm at a bargain and turned it into 
a new company, ACEC. The former owner Julien Dulait had opened an additional large 
workshop in Jeumont a few years ago to circumvent French import taxes and supply the 
French market directly. As mentioned, for Empain this French embeddedness was an 
incredible asset.113 
To give both workshops the chance to reach a critical scale, Empain provided ACEC 
with sufficient capital and leased the Jeumont factory to the Parisienne Electrique. Under 
Parisian management, the Jeumont branch grew rapidly, thanks to many orders from 
French and foreign customers outside the group. This motivated the Empain group to 
split off the Jeumont factory entirely and establish it as an independent firm in 1906. 
Empain predicted a bright future for ACENE, for the company was provided with a capital 
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of 20 million francs. At the same time, its older sister company ACEC had only 5 million 
francs share capital. However, they cooperated rather closely, certainly in the early 
years.114 ACEC and Parisienne Electrique had signed an agreement in 1904 which reserved 
the French market for the Jeumont workshops and the Belgian market for ACEC. The 
profits from orders from third countries were shared.115 In later years, ACEC still 
particularly supplied the Belgian market as well as Belgian firms abroad.116 ACENE’s main 
market was France, but it also exported a lot. Large orders were often shared, for instance 
the installation of a high-voltage cable of 30 km.117 Although they were primarily 
manufacturers, ACEC and ACENE also had to provide an integrated installation service. 
Many public administrations put out the electrification of their territory via a call for 
tenders. By this means, foreign manufacturers tried to increase their sales. Winning a 
tender was another way of ACEC and ACENE to face the competition.118 
Their research and development departments (R&D) also shared personnel and 
studies.119 Neither firm invested massively in R&D. They completed their own patents on 
alternators, a three-phase motor, pumps and hoists with purchased technology. By 
acquiring specific patents, ACEC and ACENE could specialize in particular domains such as 
electric machines for mines (Ilgner), pumps (Rateau) and electric traction (the multiple-
unit train control system of Sprague). If they did not possess the necessary technology, 
they were not afraid to cooperate with other firms that were technically more 
advanced.120 
In their expansion, both ACEC and ACENE aspired to the model of AEG in Germany. The 
directors justified their investment plans in the communication to the shareholders. The 
major investments had to transform ACEC and ACENE into a “complete and autonomous 
industrial complex comparable to similar large organizations abroad.”121 Most of the 
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capital was invested in top-notch machinery and additional specialized workshops. 
Gradually, both firms depended less on suppliers of finished products by integrating parts 
of the production process. First of all, ACENE added a cable works in 1907, including a 
copper wire drawing works. As Belgium did not have any of that kind, ACENE could supply 
both the French and Belgian markets. Because of the proximity to the Belgian border and 
the many Belgian clients within the business group, ACENE managed to stand up to the 
strong German competition in Belgium.122 In 1910-11, ACEC also built a cable and copper 
wire works, taking over ACENE’s market share. Both cable works also included a plant for 
tubes and insulating material as well as a rolling mill that all produced cable 
components.123 Because the irregular supply of metals delayed production, ACENE, and 
later ACEC, integrated a bronze and iron smelting facility. ACENE quickly started smelting 
steel too. They produced the metals for internal demand, i.e. the manufacturing of 
electrical equipment, but not exclusively. 
Within a decade, the two electrical equipment manufacturers of the Empain group 
grew into the largest in Belgium and France in their specific sector. In that period of time, 
the turnover had increased fivefold to 25 million francs for ACEC and 28 million francs for 
ACENE in 1913.124 The number of workers was comparable too. On the eve of the First 
World War, ACEC employed nearly 3000 persons, including some 500 engineers and office 
workers. ACENE employed 2200 blue collar workers. This may seem a lot, but it is nothing 
compared to the German industrial giants. In the same year, AEG and Siemens both had a 
turnover of over 500 million francs and a workforce of at least 60,000 persons.125 Yet, ACEC 
had become the largest manufacturer in Belgium and twice as large as the second largest, 
the Compagnie internationale d’Électricité from Liège. ACENE had also conquered a place 
among the most important electric manufacturers in France such as Thomson-Houston and 
Schneider et Cie.126 
What can explain the steady growth of both manufacturers? Lanthier advances some 
arguments in his thesis chapter on ACENE. Most of them also hold true for ACEC. First of 
all, both firms could skip the difficult start-up phase typical for industrial enterprises, 
thanks to the abundant orders they receive from companies within the Empain group. 
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Urban transport firms and electricity producers such as the CMP, SEP and Tramways du 
Caire –the clientèle captive in Lanthier’s words– massively ordered engines and turbo-
alternators. However, tramway companies from France and the UK, Belgian coal mines 
were also important customers. Due to the wave of electrification, ACEC and ACENE could 
profit from the rising demand for power cables. For instance, ACENE supplied all the 
cables of the Métro for 15 years. Secondly, the manufacturer’s embeddedness in the 
business group guaranteed a stable financial situation. Through several capital increases, 
the group had invested over 90 million francs in the two factories.127 These were 
continuously expanded and equipped with top-notch machines. That way, they could 
easily keep ahead of the increasing demand. On the other hand, they could freely 
determine the range of products, as they were not bound to specific important patents. 
Thanks to this technological flexibility, they specialized in all equipment for electric 
traction and electricity production. Both factories were very well situated and directly 
connected to the river Sambre and the railroad. ACEC and ACENE were each close to the 
French-Belgian border and could easily serve the core markets. According to Lanthier, 
ACENE profited from the cheap Belgian workforce that was better skilled than most 
French workers. However, these factors were not sufficient to prosper in a competitive 
market. ACEC and ACENE managed to develop a vertically integrated and large-scale 
production capacity before most of their competitors did.128 
As mentioned above, the integration of electrical manufacturing was a first step to 
loosen the relationship with La Métallurgique. Subsequently, the Empain group distanced 
itself more radically from its original supplier network. The establishment of ACEC and 
ACENE had been a necessity, because its partner had failed to evolve. Yet, in the early 
1910s Empain decided to partially internalize the production of rolling stock and railway 
equipment. This announced the end of a privileged partnership of 30 years with La 
Métallurgique. Whereas electrical equipment was a product belonging to the Second 
Industrial Revolution, Empain now decided to compete with them in their own market. 
Rolling stock and railway material had a long tradition in Belgium and France. Since the 
First Industrial Revolution, its production was closely connected to the coal and steel 
industry and had occupied an important position in the economy. However, Empain had 
noticed that the market for locomotive production was booming. One historian speaks of 
the “nine years of euphoria” (1905-1914).129 The French and Belgian manufacturers even 
experienced difficulties to cope with the increasing demand. Empain wanted to fill this 
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void by starting to produce rolling stock, especially in steel. To this end, he acquired large 
forested terrains in 1911, expanded to 375 hectares in 1913. The land was situated on the 
southern side of the French-Belgian border in Feignies.130 By 1914, Empain had 
transferred the properties to the new Forges et Ateliers de la Longueville (la Longueville) and 
the factories had been finished. These included a hall to process steel plates and sections, 
an assembly hall, a hall to paint and several offices. Besides rolling stock, the factories 
could construct other large machines for agriculture, mining and electricity. On the eve 
of WW1, the company could start producing. The first orders had been placed. La 
Longueville also planned to add a steelworks and blast furnaces. However, the war 
obstructed these plans. Nevertheless, la Longueville was another step towards backward 
vertical integration. The group increasingly wanted to lay its hands on the whole supply 
chain. On the one hand, they tried to extract fuels such as coal, as mentioned above, and 
charcoal (in the woods around the workshops). On the other hand, they also intended to 
produce steel themselves as raw material for the manufacturing of train cars.131 
2.5 Hop off in a new city: The development of Heliopolis 
(1905-…) 
At a time when Edouard Empain headed a large integrated business group active in rail 
transport, manufacturing and energy supply, he set himself to an entirely new project: 
urban development. Between 1905 and 1929, Empain dedicated a great deal of his time 
and energy to the development of Heliopolis, a new town in the desert near Cairo. He 
yearly spent several months there for the rest of his life. According to Robert Ilbert, the 
authority on the history of Heliopolis, it is hard to explain why Empain all of a sudden 
decided to start an urbanistic project in Egypt. In addition, Heliopolis remained almost 
totally isolated from the rest of the business empire.132 The following paragraphs argue 
that this is only partly true. Empain ended up as a real estate developer because he wanted 
to produce and sell electricity in the first place. 
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At the turn of the twentieth century, housing prices in the ever-expanding Egyptian 
capital were skyrocketing. Many entrepreneurs had transformed into frenetic 
speculators, as their previous occupation was much less profitable. In some areas, an 
unbuild surface was more expensive than a large city palace in Paris.133 Land speculators 
primarily bought large plots directly north of Cairo’s old town, because everybody 
believed that the city was to expand in that direction. A few years later, the speculators 
hoped to sell the land at a large profit. Many housing projects next to the city center such 
as Zamalek and Garden City bet on the very same expansion. Other suburbs had been 
developed further away from Cairo and relied on a railway connection with the capital. 
In the 1890s Maadi and the spa resort Helwan 15 km more to the south had emerged as 
satellite cities along the Nile.134 
As the Cairo-Helwan railway was the lifeline of the two suburbs, it drew the attention 
of the manager of the group’s Tramways du Caire, who informed Empain in 1904.135 By then, 
the group had acquired precious expertise in railroad operation and electricity 
production and had even tried to electrify long-distance railroads (see Chapter 4 on the 
Brussels-Antwerp interurban). In Cairo, Empain was considering doing all three things. 
Firstly, he wanted to build a large power station near Cairo to supply electricity to the 
entire agglomeration. Secondly, he also intended buying the short Cairo-Helwan and 
Cairo-Matarieh railroads. He would electrify them and supply them from the new power 
plant. Thirdly and consequently, the Empain group could offer a faster connection with 
Cairo to the inhabitants of the suburbs. However, this integrated plan failed as soon as 
the competitor Delta Light Railways acquired the railway to Helwan before Empain could 
make an interesting bid. Moreover, the Egyptian State refused to sell the Cairo-Matarieh 
line.136 
If electrifying existing connections to suburbs was not an option anymore, Empain 
changed his tack. The new concept consisted of constructing an electric railroad to a new 
town, yet to be developed. However, as opposed to Maadi and Helwan, Heliopolis was 
much larger and resolutely went against the idea of expansion along the Nile banks. 
Empain and his local business partner Boghos Nubar Pacha opted for the creation of a 
garden city in the desert northeast of Cairo. Because no one else was interested and 
Boghos Nubar had excellent connections, the government sold them 2500 hectares 
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(tripled to 7500 hectares in 1910) at a ridiculously low price.137 While terrains in the most 
distant outskirts of Cairo were sold at 1 £.E. per m², they paid 4200 times less.138 
For Empain, the lucrative combination of electrified transport and electricity 
production remained the main goal. In the early years of the Heliopolis project, he 
confided to the French ambassador in Cairo that the electric railway was “what interested 
him the most.”139 It yielded a higher and more stable revenue than real estate 
development. However, Heliopolis quickly surpassed the power station and the railroad. 
It became a Gesammtkunstwerk in which Empain put his vision and creative urge. 
Initially, the plan was to construct a city of leisure for the European tourists and the 
Cairo elite, as the next section on the Marseille-Alexandria shipping line will also show. 
Soon, a gigantic hotel, a race court, a Luna Park and an airfield emerged. After the collapse 
of the Egyptian economy in 1907, the Cairo Electric Railways and Heliopolis Oases Company 
(HOC) shifted the project’s scope to include residential areas for Egyptians of all classes. 
The housing company especially aimed at middle-class citizens working in Cairo that 
were looking for an affordable and comfortable place to live. The fares of the electric 
railway and tramways were kept low to encourage this. By 1914, the city already housed 
5000 inhabitants, but the population multiplied to 24,000 at the end of the 1920s.140 
So, contrary to the assertion of Ilbert, the origins of Heliopolis were related to the core 
business of the Empain group. Only, he had the guts to create a demand for electric 
transportation by developing a town in the desert himself. The development of Heliopolis 
shows other links with other investments of the group as well. First, the electric railway, 
completed by two tramway lines, to the new town perfectly fitted in Cairo’s existing 
tramway network, operated by the Empain group. Secondly, obtaining a government 
concession and executing public works was Empain’s core business. Of course, the Empain 
group had never developed a whole city, including selling land plots and organizing urban 
life. However, in the last twenty years, the business group had gained the experience to 
construct a power station and grid, streets, sewers, water supply and other infrastructure. 
Third, the large scale of these (electric) public utilities provided extra work for the 
general contracting services of the group as well as a lot of orders for ACEC and ACENE. 
Finally, the pursued strategy did not differ from the general strategy of the group. 
Heliopolis was an all-encompassing project in itself, showing the group’s vertical 
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integration on a micro-scale. Like for Empain’s other public utility companies, the 
massive investments in infrastructure and housing were meant to pay in the long run. It 
lasted 10 years before the HOC broke even for the first time. Yet, the long-term profits 
were secured considering their monopoly on transportation, water and electricity 
distribution in a growing city.141 
2.6 Chasing other opportunities (1890-…) 
It is hard to identify a strategy underlying the investments in sectors other than railways, 
electric utilities and manufacturing. The rather modest diversification into agriculture, 
water management as well as maritime and bus transport seems to answer a different 
logic. The ventures transcend the process of upward vertical integration that 
characterizes the history of the business group before the First World War. Instead, they 
are the result of an entrepreneurial dynamic not unlike the one discussed in Chapter 1.142 
Empain or other top managers identified promising opportunities, without taking 
account of the complementarity of the activities. However, both the core and unrelated 
industries still had some features in common. Like in transport, electricity and urban 
development, the diversified investment projects were based on government 
concessions. Except for agriculture, they also revolved around a specific public service. 
They can be divided into two categories according to their relatedness to the group’s core 
services and products. 
The first category, i.e. related diversification, included businesses that were natural 
extensions of existing transport activities. The start-up of bus transport and inland water 
transport services was a survival strategy for Empain’s business in Egypt. As a 
consequence, they were the initiative of two well-established subsidiaries and as such 
strongly embedded in the business group. Both the Chemins de fer de la Basse Egypte and the 
Tramways du Caire faced powerful competitors. In the first case, the Basse Egypte needed to 
remove a missing link on its main light rail line (Mansurah-Matarieh). The company 
wished to link this line with the important import-export harbor of Port Said at the other 
side of Lake Menzaleh. After a rejected request to extend the line on a railway 
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embankment, the Basse Egypte was forced to establish a ferry service together with its 
biggest competitor. The Menzaleh Canal and Navigation Company (est. 1904) was vital, for it 
generated considerable freight traffic for the Basse Egypte railways.143 In the second case, 
the Tramways du Caire was also forced to react on a move of the competition. Although the 
company controlled a large flourishing tramway network, other companies in the city 
provided transportation services too. The Tramways du Caire largely dominated the 
market, as competitors just ran horse-drawn omnibuses. When one of these omnibus 
companies started early 1906 to transform its service into autobuses, it threatened to take 
a larger market share. The Tramways du Caire had to act quickly and founded The Cairo 
Public Motor Car Service. They reluctantly decided to experiment with a service on a few 
lines. However, the technology would only become reliable from the 1920s.144 After a bit 
more than a year, the monthly loss still amounted to 10,000 francs. Realizing that they 
could not organize a profitable service and that the competition ceased to pose a serious 
threat, they preferred to cease activities and sell the buses.145 
The second category concerned rather unrelated diversification. Empain started early 
with a water management business (1.6.1). In the following decades, the entrepreneur 
also made excursions into chemicals (1.6.2), agriculture (1.6.3) and steamshipping (1.6.4). 
These isolated investments were unknown territory for the Empain group. They 
transcended the statutory boundaries the holding companies had set themselves. In 
consequence, Empain personally invested in these high-risk enterprises without the 
financial backing of the holding companies. Yet, they were part of the ecosystem of the 
Empain group and shared directors, personnel and resources with the other Empain 
companies. Every investment followed an economic rationale, but for diverse reasons the 
Empain group hardly succeeded in transforming them into flourishing businesses. 
Probably, the group lacked relevant technical expertise in these unrelated sectors. In 
addition, the first three investments took place in Latin America. The continent promised 
high returns, but also witnessed periods of political and economic instability. 
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2.6.1 Water management 
In 1890, for the first time ever, Empain diversified away from transportation to water 
management through the Cie générale des Eaux de Caracas. Together with his usual business 
partners, he acquired the right to construct and operate a whole system of water 
distribution and sewers in the Venezuelan capital Caracas. Already present in Venezuela 
to construct a railway, Empain could easily reuse its staff and local connections for 
another public utility project. Although the equipment had to be ordered in Belgium, 
creating a market for befriended companies was not the purpose. There were no ties with 
the principal supplier Compagnie générale des Conduites d’Eau in Liège.146 To be sure, the 
expected operational profits were very high. Unfortunately, civil war and fierce political 
opposition fatally obstructed the development of the Eaux de Caracas. Chapter 6 will go 
more into detail on these political aspects. 
2.6.2 Natural nitrate 
In the wake of the general renewed interest in Latin American markets, Empain added 
another sector to its personal investment portfolio: the chemical industry in Chile. 
Initially, the Empain group had made a portfolio investment in the Nitrate Railways 
Company Ltd, a railroad operator like many others in the group’s portfolio. Being part of 
the group’s core business, at later stages other holding companies of the group and 
Empain himself took an interest in the share capital. By 1914 the Nitrate Railways had 
evolved from portfolio to direct investment, with a combined interest of 20% and 2 out of 
8 directors reporting to Empain.147 All in all, this was just another case of horizontal 
integration. 
However, the Nitrate Railways did not just transport anything. Their cargo primarily 
consisted of nitratine, a mineral that could be used as a fertilizer in agriculture and as a 
component of explosives. The natural nitrate mining industry was booming in Chile. The 
South American country possessed a worldwide monopoly on the production of nitratine 
(aka sodium nitrate). Countries with a large agricultural sector such as France, Germany 
and Belgium were important importers.148 Farmers increasingly discovered the benefits 
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of mineral fertilizers such as nitratine and superphosphate. In Belgium, the demand for 
such fertilizers quadrupled between 1884 and 1914.149 
 
Figure 14 Nitrate price per ton, converted to 1995 US dollar (1880-1930)150 
Empain thus had many reasons to believe in the potential of Chilean nitratine, which 
supplied almost 80 percent of the nitrogen used in the world in the 1890s. The Chilean 
nitrate industry boomed, but as a consequence of this quasi-monopoly, the sector 
frequently faced overproduction crises. As soon as the demand for nitratine in Europe 
stagnated, the producers tried to limit the supply. Therefore, they united in syndicates, 
the so-called combinacions. Between 1884 and 1909, the syndicates more or less managed 
to control prices, albeit for short periods. However, the syndicates could not entirely 
break the cyclical behavior of the market and still faced overproduction crises from time 
to time (see Fig. 14).151 In 1894-1895, the moment Empain decided to establish a specialized 
investment fund, the business cycle had reached a high point. Thanks to an effective 
combinacion, the nitrate price stood at its highest point since 1885. The sudden collapse of 
the syndicate in April 1894 could have been a warning. However, at the incorporation of 
the investment fund Compagnie générale des nitrates, the producers were still optimistic 
about restoring the price cartel.152 The negotiations broke down and the nitrate price 
plummeted the years after.153 Until 1914, the industry faced several crises. This resulted 
in very poor performance for the Cie générale des nitrates. A lot of financial years had to be 
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closed at a loss. By 1903, Edouard Empain had even lost up to 3 million francs. Only from 
1910 onwards, the shareholders received a dividend of 2 to 5% because of the steadily 
increasing demand on the world market.154 
2.6.3 Tropical agriculture 
Empain showed an interest in Latin America going beyond the nitrate sector. In 1895, 
he also got involved in meat production in Central-West Brazil. The Antwerp businessmen 
Alexis Mols155 and Auguste Grisar156, as well as Jules Carlier, had recently acquired a huge 
ranch in the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso. The newly established Compagnie des 
Produits Cibils paid the seller, the Uruguayan industrialist Jaime Buxareo Cibils, a large 
block of shares. The domain of 750,000 hectares (one quarter of Belgium) was situated 
close to Descalvados and housed 175,000 heads of cattle. Previously, Cibils himself had 
turned the country estate into a modern-run business with a large abattoir, refrigeration 
and electricity.157 The Belgian buyers intensified the production of beef and by-products 
even more. 
Albeit at a smaller scale, the Produits Cibils were part of a larger trend of 
internationalization in the meat industry.158 In response to the growing worldwide 
demand for meat products, huge ranches in Uruguay, Argentina, the United States, New 
Zealand and Australia had turned to the export market. In 1865, the Liebig’s Extract of 
Meat Company started to commercialize meat extract on an industrial scale. In the 
following decades, Liebig Co and competitors such as Kemmerich, Maggi and La Plata 
Extract of Beef Co shipped their products around the world. Antwerp was a very important 
import harbor for meat extract from the Uruguayan and Argentinian ranches.159 The first 
central depot of the Liebig Co and a meatpacking plant were based in the port. The 
merchant families with German roots Osterrieth and Grisar were among the main 
financiers of the local Liebig branch. In Belgium, the Produits Cibils had been a famous 
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brand since the 1880s. Their meat extract, boiled and canned beef sold very well to 
European households, but also to hospitals, armies and poorhouses.160 
These circumstances explain why two Antwerp trans-Atlantic merchants had taken 
the initiative of the Produits Cibils. Directly involved in the trade that made Antwerp the 
sales hub for livestock products from Latin America, they wanted to integrate a Latin 
American production facility as a part of the value chain. Meanwhile, Empain was clearly 
hoping to get a foothold in Latin America. Knowing that Cibils was eager to cash his 
stocks, Mols or Carlier must have introduced him to Empain. The latter took over the 
majority of Cibils' interest, becoming the main shareholder of the Produits Cibils. However, 
the Empain group never took care of the management. The group of colonial 
entrepreneur Albert Thys took control after a few years. Despite their large ambitions, 
also in rubber extraction, the Brazilian estate had to be sold in 1911. The output had 
remained well below expectations. 
2.6.4 Steamshipping 
The last business venture of considerable importance that Empain personally 
undertook before 1914 concerned a steamshipping line in the Mediterranean. Once more, 
this was a completely different and highly competitive market. With very high entry costs 
and an oligopoly of large companies, even giants such as J.P. Morgan had failed to enter 
the shipping market.161 Yet, Empain’s intentions were clear. In the context of the 
development of Heliopolis as a place of leisure for the European and Egyptian elite, 
Empain and his partners wanted to attract as many European tourists as possible. The 
best way to profit from the rising passenger traffic from Europe to Egypt was by 
establishing a proper shipping line. To this end, Empain and British and Egyptian 
entrepreneurs founded the Egyptian Mail Steamship Company Ltd (est. 1906).162 The company 
used almost its entire capital of roughly 17 million francs to order two large passenger 
steamers, the “Heliopolis” and “Cairo” of 8 million francs each. From December 1907, the 
ships weekly sailed between Marseille and Cairo. Whereas the direct competitors 
Norddeutsche Lloyd and Messageries Maritimes needed four and a half days to cross the 
Mediterranean, the Egyptian Mail Steamship could do it in three days at an average of 20 
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knots.163 The founders speculated that the reduced travel time and the luxury would 
divert many customers from the competition as well as attract additional tourists to 
Egypt. 
This was a big risk, to say the least. Despite an international advertisement campaign 
and a promotional maiden trip, the ticket sales could not cover the substantial 
expenses.164 The size, speed and luxury of the ships came at a high price. The investments 
were enormous. In addition, an economic crisis broke out in Egypt in 1907, resulting in a 
collapse of trade with Europe. Soon, the company got into financial difficulties, as a part 
of the shareholders could not meet the board of directors’ demand for extra cash by fully 
paying in their shares.165 On top of all that, Empain and his co-founders had 
underestimated the resistance of long-established shipping companies. After the winter 
season the Egyptian Mail’s competitors united in a cartel and collectively lowered their 
fares by 50%.166 Finally, after only 7 months in operation, the company was winded up in 
London in July 1908 and the ships were sold.167 The financial disaster hit Empain badly. To 
avoid bankruptcy, he even had used his bank to lend extra cash to extend the company 
life, but to no avail.168 The shareholders lost at least 70% of their investment.169 As the 
principal promoter, Empain even suffered a personal loss of more than 6 million francs, 
according to an informal note of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.170 
2.7 Conclusion 
Edouard Empain made his debut as an entrepreneur at a juncture. In 1880, the First 
Industrial Revolution was on its last legs, while the technological innovations (steel, 
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chemicals, electricity, …) leading to the Second Industrial Revolution had not yet reached 
full maturity. Soon after, the new technological system of electricity radically 
transformed entire industries. Empain, however, started doing business in one of the 
traditional pillars of the Belgian economy that developed during the industrialization: the 
“steam-transport-iron” cluster. A manufacturer of railway equipment launched him as a 
light railway entrepreneur in the first place. However, it soon appeared that this intimate 
relationship had forced the Empain group in the role of (light) railway operator, at the 
end of the value chain of transportation. This business was not so profitable as expected, 
although general contracting partly compensated this. In the long run, merely 
transporting passengers and freight was not viable. Realizing this in the early 1890s, 
Empain pursued two strategies. First, he diversified to unrelated sectors where the 
predicted profits were higher. This is why he seized the entrepreneurial opportunities in 
the Eaux de Caracas, Produits Cibils and Cie générale des Nitrates. 
As a second strategy, having far more important consequences for the evolution of the 
business group, Empain invested in urban tramways that could be electrified. The 
businessman recognized the transformative power of electricity and that it could be the 
energy source of the future. That is the moment when Empain embraced the huge 
potential of the innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution, electricity in particular. 
The Empain group was not the first nor the only enterprise to understand this. Belgian 
holding companies linked to banks and heavy industry had developed horsecar networks 
as Unternehmergeschäft, not unlike Empain had constructed light railways to the benefit of 
La Métallurgique. These horse-drawn tramway operators welcomed the excellent 
performance of electric traction. In this new technological system, there were also new 
competitors that Empain had not encountered in light railways. For German and 
American electric engineering companies, massive electrification of urban transport was 
an opportunity to sell more products. Both the tramway holdings and electric 
engineering firms were slightly earlier than the Empain group to start the 
transformation. The business group was rather a close follower regarding this process. 
However, at least two things make the case of the Empain group exceptional. First of 
all, the business group was the only in Belgium who carried through the vertical 
integration to such an extent, able to meet its own needs with regard to equipment. The 
Empain group was the only Belgian electroholding that controlled a large manufacturing 
company (ACEC), capable of competing with foreign manufacturers in Belgium and 
abroad. Unlike other Belgian groups, the Empain group had no strong ties to foreign 
banks or manufacturers, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. Having remained independent, 
the business group could copy the strategy of the electrical engineering companies and 
supply its self-created market. However, whereas other manufacturers at most kept a 
minority stake in the operating companies they had floated, the Empain group 
maintained managerial control. This brings us to the second singularity. Empain 
continued to pursue growth in (light) railways. In other words, rather than ‘escaping 
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steam’ entirely, the Empain group had adopted a two-pronged strategy. Empain was 
standing with one leg in the First Industrial Revolution and with the other in the Second 
Industrial Revolution. The Empain group kept expanding its rail networks probably 
because it still believed it could make the heavy investments pay off by achieving 
economies of scale. In addition, the top management erroneously believed that electricity 
would soon revolutionize the railroad sector like it had transformed the tramway 
business. 
As the Empain group anticipated, or at least capitalized on, the radical electrification, 
it shows its remarkable capacity to adapt. Innovation was not only a matter of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction, but also of skillful adaptation. By diversifying to 
electric tramways, Empain entered a new technological system. The interlinked and 
transformative nature of the electrical system provoked a chain reaction of vertical 
integration, starting with the production of electricity. As mentioned in the introduction, 
new industries were often characterized by a lack of sufficient supply. That was the main 
reason why the Empain group had to generate electric power itself. Subsequently, it 
pioneered after all by turning this necessity into a new profitable business. Empain used 
his abundant financial resources to achieve a competitive advantage based on scale. The 
business group was the first in France and Belgium to construct large power stations able 
to supply cheap electricity to diverse clients in a wider area. In these two markets, it had 
a first-mover advantage. 
The innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution - and electricity was no exception 
- also gave rise to the birth of certain industries and the relative decline of others. The 
strong personal and business connection with La Métallurgique did not survive the 
transition. La Métallurgique failed to adapt and remained a classic steam-powered rolling 
stock manufacturer. This was an incentive to start manufacturing itself. The manufacture 
of electrical equipment was also the most profitable part of the supply chain, requiring 
sophisticated innovative technologies. The backward vertical integration did not limit 
itself to new industries. In the economic boom before WW1, the increasing demand for 
rolling stock and coal triggered the establishment of la Longueville and prospective 
drillings respectively. 
Eventually, the diversification into gas and urban development also resulted from 
Empain’s move into the electric industry. On the one hand, the Empain group started 
producing gas wherever the vested interests of the gas industry were threatening the 
growth opportunities for electricity production. On the other hand, the town of Heliopolis 
was conceived to attract customers that would use the electric utilities controlled by the 
Empain group. In the end, both the gas companies and Heliopolis also got their own 
independent dynamics. 
The economic track of the Empain group sketched above links up with questions 
formulated in the previous and next chapters. When combining the spatial and sectoral 
dimensions of the expansion of the Empain group, it is safe to say that the diversification 
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had a strong geographic focus. In the end, the vertical integration of electricity-related 
businesses occurred in the industrialized countries Belgium and France. In the Belgian-
French border region, the Empain group could even provide a wide-ranging service 
(electricity, gas, transport), making it an interesting partner for collectivities. However, 
electrification, the search for electrifiable tramways in particular, also directed the 
group’s expansion to Egypt, Serbia, Russia and later Spain and Ottoman Syria. In the latter 
four regions, the Empain group only invested in electric urban transport. The cities 
outside of Belgium and France where Empain was active in were situated in non-
industrialized and industrializing countries. In contrast, the cities themselves –as 
“portals of globalization”– were open to modern comfort and technology.171 That way, 
electrification broadened the geographical perspective of the Empain group too. 
So far, the Empain group has been characterized by internationalization, on the one 
hand, and adaptation and innovation, on the other hand. But the global corporate 
strategy also raises questions regarding organization and profitability. The next chapter 
needs to study this. It is necessary to explain why Empain chose a particular 
organizational form. Chapter 3 will examine how the business group made the above-
mentioned processes possible and reasonable. It will also investigate the hypothesis that 
the timely diversification was a success story before 1914. Did Empain’s businesses in the 
constantly innovating electric cluster really yield the highest returns? Before elaborating 
on business groups in the next chapter, the sectoral distribution depicted above already 
problematizes its rigid definition formulated in the general introduction. The group had 
invested 80% of its capital in related and 20% in unrelated products. This already shows 
that the diversification of a business group was not exclusively related or unrelated. 
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Chapter 3 The business group: A corporate 
structure for worldwide expansion 
3.1 Introduction 
Hitherto, this dissertation has presented the Empain group as a large enterprise active in 
related (transport, electricity, manufacturing) and rather unrelated industries. This was 
accompanied by geographical expansion, extending over 16 markets on four continents. 
One man, Edouard Empain, seconded by his brother François, founded and ultimately 
controlled nearly all of these businesses. Figure 11 in the introduction of the previous 
chapter had already demonstrated the tremendous growth of this family-owned business 
empire. The share capital of all subsidiaries increased tenfold from 6 to 600 million in a 
time span of 30 years. The question then is how Empain organized this steady increase in 
scale and scope without hazarding the unity of the business group and without letting 
control slip out of his hands. 
This issue of corporate governance, finance and management links to the history of 
family multinationals and business groups in general. One of the major issues in family 
business studies has been to challenge the alleged superiority of the modern managerial 
enterprise. Especially since Chandler, family businesses are sometimes believed to be 
risk-averse small- and medium-sized enterprises, in contrast to large integrated MNEs. 
Family ownership was said to be incompatible with international growth. Family 
businesses are therefore frequently labeled as ‘reluctant internationalizers’. However, a 
recent edited volume on Family Multinationals seems to suggest otherwise.1 It shows that 
many family businesses were willing to take risks and successfully expanded abroad. 
However, the editors conclude that they still faced two trade-offs. Generally, the family’s 
main concern is to preserve independence and control. First of all, it clashes with the 
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large amounts of capital needed to enter foreign markets. Depending on the attitude of 
the family, ranging from “family first” to “business first,” it has to balance its options. If 
they remain closed to external resources, this might impede growth. In contrast, if they 
open to external finance to grow internationally, they will have to share control with the 
outside investors. Secondly, in a similar vein, family firms have to decide to what extent 
they attract external managers. Whereas open family firms hire professionals, closed 
family firms are reluctant to do so, fearing to lose control. However, the current 
executives, mostly trusted relatives, might not have the technical and managerial skills 
indispensable to survive in innovative sectors. 
In the long run, there have been large family firms that have been able to overcome 
this dilemma. The Endurance of Family Business shows that some family businesses had the 
capabilities to adapt to the changing external conditions of the twentieth century.2 The 
family ownership and control successfully survived diversification and the 
professionalization of management. Both edited volumes already tentatively indicate 
that business groups are an important part of the explanation. In-depth historical case 
studies such as the present dissertation can contribute to this debate. I argue that the 
history of the Empain group brilliantly shows that growth, professionalization and family 
control could go together. The success of this combination is due to the specific corporate 
form of the business group. 
In the business group literature, family-led enterprises are a central category of 
analysis. Families controlled and continue to control many of the largest business groups 
of the last two centuries. In the last decade, experts have come to realize that business 
groups are not just a corporate form suited for emerging countries. Business historians 
have shown their dominance in early industrializing economies too (see below). The most 
common advantageous features of business groups cited in the literature are the spread 
of risk, ample financing options, concentration of ownership and control, and the 
integration of proprietary knowledge and skills. In this chapter, I investigate the 
corporate structure of Empain’s business empire. I will explore the common 
characteristics of the business group and show how they constituted competitive 
advantages for the Empain group. In addition, I argue that the business group had two 
more assets. First, they enabled fast organic growth without reorganization. Empain 
could flexibly respond to opportunities in different sectors and countries. For every new 
project, he could create a new FSC-like company adapted to the specific regulations and 
requirements of the host country. Second, the business group developed into a versatile 
instrument for political maneuvering in the tense international context. A very recent 
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volume on political risk has emphasized the importance of holding companies for 
political risk management. However, the authors admit that more research into the 
subject is needed.3 I will contribute to this debate by demonstrating that with holding 
companies and operating subsidiaries registered in different countries, Empain could 
skillfully position his businesses to influence local perception in the host country. In 
addition, Empain could accept foreign capital in selected operating companies to rally the 
support of a Great Power. 
After this introduction follows an analysis of the development of the holding company 
organization. In the third section, I position the Empain group in the business group 
literature more extensively and introduce the key features as mentioned above. 
Afterward, I analyze these key advantages and add political flexibility to the framework. 
Section 3.4 will explore how the business group form enabled Empain to build up a stable 
and profitable enterprise. In Section 3.5, I examine Empain’s relationship with the banks 
and his preference for the stock market, which is explained by his desire to remain 
independent. Section 3.6 discusses the rather limited separation of ownership from 
control and the related question of whether the Empain group was a genuine family 
business. Given this complex structure involving several holding companies and over 80 
legal entities in a dozen countries, the also question arises how Empain created an 
efficient management structure. Section 3.7 focuses on how the group pooled managerial 
and technical resources. Finally, Section 3.8 investigates how Empain politically exploited 
the presence of his companies in different countries. 
3.2 Snapshot and genesis of the holding company maze 
In 1914, the businesses of Empain together formed a complex set of firms linked by 
multiple ownership ties (see Fig. 16). Edouard and François Empain, including Edouard’s 
private bank, stood at the top of a more or less pyramidal structure. Instead of the 
traditional single exclusive family holding company at the helm (see Fig. 15), the Empain 
brothers directly controlled the first tier of three (at some point even four) equally 
important top holding companies.4 The Empain brothers closely held the Réunis, the 
Compagnie générale de railways et d’électricité (Railways&Electricité) as well as the Parisienne 
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Electrique. Yet, each top holding also owned substantial blocks of shares in the other ones, 
also known as cross-holding. 
 
Figure 15 Archetypal structure of a pyramidal business group5 
The second tier was made of specialized holding companies. These were founded with the 
specific aim to control a set of operating companies sharing some characteristics. To the 
category of the specialized holding companies belong the Tramways de Lille (est. 1894), 
Fédération française et belge de Tramways (est. 1898), Société générale de tramways électriques 
en Espagne (est. 1899), Eclairage du Centre (since 1906), Compagnie auxilaire d’électricité de 
Nantes (est. 1912) and the SIER (est. 1913). The status of the RELSE (est. 1881) and the Cie 
générale des nitrates (est. 1895) was more ambiguous. The RELSE started as an operating 
company (Liège-Seraing), before also taking an interest of nearly 50% in the ZNSM in 1889. 
The Voie étroite did not have enough liquidity to subscribe to the entire capital of the new 
firm. However, the RELSE continued to operate a large network of light railways. Only 
between 1896 and 1903, the value of its portfolio and private interests came close to 50% 
of its productive assets. The Cie générale des nitrates was another outsider. It functioned as 
an investment trust instead of a holding company. It did not have the intention to 
exercise control over the companies in which it had an interest, except for the Nitrate 
Railways. In addition, it was financially independent of the business group. Empain 
directly controlled it, without the investment of the top holdings. The firms in the third 
tier were countless operating companies spread over more than a dozen countries. Their 
large number was due to the multinational character of the business empire. To abide by 
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the specific regulations of every host country, Empain had to establish local subsidiaries.6 
For public utilities, this went even further. Sometimes, the Empain group was legally 
obliged to create a new company for every new concession it obtained: one utility, one 
company (see below). Although most subsidiaries were the result of organic growth, the 
business group also made a few acquisitions.7 These companies were easily integrated 
into the loose structure, but with the creation of synergies. In that perspective, the 
Empain group looked like a collection of free-standing companies, embedded in an 
overarching structure. 
 
Figure 16 Stylized representation of the ownership structure of the Empain group (1905-
1914)8 
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Due to the situation explained above, the ownership structure was very complex. 
Operating companies could be owned in several different constellations. The first, most 
common possibility was the ownership by one or more top holding companies. This is 
category (1) on the chart. This ownership was not fixed. Controlling blocks of shares 
circulated and spread among the parent companies, depending on their liquid assets and 
projects. Secondly, these top holding companies could also share the ownership of a 
subsidiary (2) with one or more specialized holding companies. The Tramways électriques 
de Boulogne-sur-Mer, for example, were controlled by both the Railways&Electricité and the 
Française&Belge. Similarly, the Empains also owned certain subsidiaries such as the 
Bruxelles-Ixelles-Boendael and specialized holding companies such as the Tramways 
électriques en Espagne together with a top holding company. Thirdly, specialized holding 
companies such as the Tramways de Lille could entirely own its subsidiary (3) the TELB. 
Fourthly, the Empain brothers could directly control an operating subsidiary (4), e.g. 
ACEC. In the past, this had also happened with the Eaux de Caracas, the Produits Cibils and 
the Egyptian Mail. These more ‘personal businesses’ largely operated outside of the 
holding company structures, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Fifthly and finally, some large 
operating companies also owned other operating companies (5), sometimes with the 
support of one or more top holding companies. For instance, the EGN and the Tramways 
électriques du Pays de Charleroi shared the ownership of the Gaz et Electricité du Hainaut with 
the Railways&Electricité, Parisienne Electrique and the Eclairage du Centre. 
This analysis of the ownership structure in 1914 has shown that Edouard Empain had 
developed a complex corporate group with not one, but many holding companies to 
finance and control its businesses. What could have motivated the choice to broaden the 
top of the pyramid by gradually adding holding companies? To fully understand this, it is 
necessary to retrace the genesis of the corporate structure since 1881 and examine the 
historical conditions that shaped it. 
In 1881, Empain and partners from La Métallurgique, the Caisse des Propriétaires and the 
SA des Marbres founded the Compagnie générale de railways à voie étroite (capital 1.6 million 
francs). Chapter 1 has demonstrated that they intended to develop the network of 
Valenciennes-Anzin and search for other concessions. As was not uncommon in Belgium, 
the Voie étroite would function as a holding company to centralize all projects and provide 
studies and other technical and financial services.9 Meanwhile, La Métallurgique realized 
that they needed to actively boost demand for their core product, railway equipment. 
Therefore, La Métallurgique initiated the Compagnie auxiliaire belge de chemins de fer (est. 
1881) after the example of the French Compagnie auxiliaire des chemins de fer et travaux 
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publics (est. 1879). The new company lent rolling stock, especially freight cars, and other 
railway material to operating companies in need. To this end, the Auxiliaire belge had to 
order a lot of material at La Métallurgique.10 
A year after its establishment, the Voie étroite recognized that it had to cut expenses 
and rationalize its structure. As the establishment of many subsidiaries to individually 
operate each transport network increased overhead costs, the directors of the Voie étroite, 
La Métallurgique and of the Auxiliaire belge decided to cooperate more closely by 
specializing their companies. Together they founded the SA d’exploitation économique de 
railways (Exploitation économique, est. 1882) and provided it with a large share capital of 10 
million francs. The new company concentrated the operational services of existing and 
future railroad projects prepared and constructed by the Voie étroite. The Exploitation 
économique in turn would control the operating companies (instead of establishing 
additional independent subsidiaries) and take over the day-to-day operations. The 
different networks could share a single management, accountants, personnel and get coal 
at a cheaper price. In addition, the “grouping of scattered concessions” would result in a 
“mutual association” that guaranteed a more stable revenue for the shareholders.11 
According to Lanthier, the early division of labor within the Empain group via holding 
companies had two more reasons in the French context. First of all, it is remarkable that 
the group preferred to establish the separate Exploitation économique to centralize 
operations instead of organizing an operational division within the Voie étroite. However, 
the French State subsidized the operation of some railroads and had the right to inspect 
the corporate finance. By splitting up construction and operation, the Voie étroite could 
keep its independence. Secondly, France combated the creation of too large networks and 
speculative enterprises. So instead of merging all concessions into a few large operating 
companies, the group had no other choice than to legally separate the subsidiaries (see 
Chapter 5). However, the management and workforce were concentrated as much as 
possible.12 On the Belgian side, on the contrary, the RELSE effectively clustered the 
operation of regionally dispersed light rail concessions. 
Unfortunately, the entire specialization to improve efficiency proved very vulnerable 
to economic shocks. Between 1883 and 1886, economic growth strongly declined in 
Western Europe. The depression hit the industry and financial markets. The Empain 
group had to scale down its ambitions and consolidate its projects. The Exploitation 
économique was dissolved and La Métallurgique sold its rolling stock leasing company 
Auxiliaire Belge. The disappearance of the Exploitation économique meant that the 
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development of the Voie étroite seriously decelerated. Besides its normal engineering and 
construction business, the holding company now had to commit more of its liquid assets 
to prefinance its subsidiaries. These entirely depended on the advances of the Voie étroite 
until the construction of the network was finished. In other words, it again had to assume 
the role of a financial holding company like in the beginning. With large sums 
immobilized in its affiliates, the Voie étroite had less room for new projects.13 
Only when the economy recovered in 1887-1888, the Voie étroite could triple its 
financial resources to invest in new large projects. Two of them turned into a disaster by 
1890-1891. The failure of the Carenero Railway (see Chapter 6) and of the Grand Central Sud-
Américain caused considerable losses and put pressure on the profits of the Voie étroite. 
The Latin American disaster hindered the Voie étroite to gather the new funds it needed 
for other projects. Therefore, the Empain group founded a second holding company, the 
Compagnie belge des chemins de fer réunis (Réunis, est. 1892). From the bad experience of the 
1880s, the Empain group had learned that it needed to spread the risk much more. In 
consequence, it conceived the Réunis as an investment trust, a well-known instrument in 
Great Britain. By spreading its investments over dozens of companies, a trust could 
establish a “mutuality of risks” and secure a stable revenue.14 With a total capital of 5 
million francs, mostly debt, the Réunis mixed long-term interests in subsidiaries of the 
business group with smaller, more speculative portfolio investments in railroads all over 
the world. In the first years, the holding company took over part of the portfolio of 
Empain and of the Voie étroite, including some less productive securities. This gave the 
Voie étroite more resources to invest elsewhere. However, the Réunis could not assist the 
Voie étroite in every new project. Bearing in mind the failed projects in South America, the 
portfolio of the Réunis limited itself by statute to securities of railroad companies already 
in operation or that had a guaranteed revenue.15 The new holding company was to 
become one of the main financial pillars for the business group, some kind of ‘cash cow’ 
that could provide intra-group loans if necessary (see below). 
The economic boom and the breakthrough of electric traction in Western Europe in 
the mid-1890s presented the Empain group with a threefold problem. First, the statutes 
of the Voie étroite were written in a time when electricity was not yet an alternative to 
steam power. The Empain group needed a holding company that explicitly could 
construct electric tramways as well as sell the surplus electricity of the accompanying 
 
                                                     
13 “Voie étroite: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 17 Jun 1883; Lanthier, “Constructions,” 455-57. 
14 “mutualité de risques”, “Belgique,” MIM, 19 Jun 1892. See also Lanthier, “Constructions,” 461-62. 
15 This also explains why the Réunis could only invest in the HOC (est. 1906) after 1910, when the electric railway 
was inaugurated in Heliopolis. “Compagnie belge des Chemins de fer réunis: Statuts,”  no. 1511, AMB, 5 Jun 1892; 
“Réunis: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 26 Apr 1911. 
The business group 
 137 
power station.16 Second, electrification was very capital intensive and could not be 
financed by the Voie étroite and the Réunis alone. Third, the growing world economy 
created new investment opportunities, especially in Russia. To face these challenges, the 
Empain group founded a third top holding company: the Compagnie russe-française de 
chemins de fer et de tramways (Russe-française, est. 1896) with a capital of 3.5 million francs 
and 3.5 million francs of bonds. With the new resources, Empain made investments in 
Russia, France, Belgium, Egypt and China. Most importantly, the business group used this 
holding company to take control of the Compagnie du chemin de fer métropolitain de Paris.17 
The Paris Métro was big business and put France even more center stage in the 
business empire of Empain. Thanks to the Métro, the business group had become a 
considerable power in French financial circles. With the creation of a fourth holding 
company in 1900, Empain hoped to profit from the large Parisian capital market and to 
support the development of the Métro. The idea was to develop a vertically integrated 
cluster around rail traction and electricity production. Whereas the Russe-française could 
only produce electricity in cities where it possessed an electric tramway, the new Société 
parisienne pour l’industrie des chemins de fer et des tramways électriques (Parisienne Electrique) 
had a much larger scope including the production of electrical equipment. The Parisienne 
Electrique immediately became the French counterpart of the Russe-française as a holding 
company and general contractor.18 Not limited to projects in France, it built up a portfolio 
of various Empain companies in Russia, China, Belgium and Egypt too. Its scope quickly 
surpassed the electricity business by becoming the French partner of the group’s 
enterprises in Chinese and Congolese heavy railways. Thanks to a cartel with the Russe-
française, the Parisienne Electrique could quickly take part in the ongoing construction of 
electric tramways in France and Russia.19 It also constructed the power station of the SEP 
together with the Russe-française. 
Four years after the establishment of the Parisienne Electrique, Empain realized that the 
opportunities for the large-scale production and distribution of electricity had only 
expanded, whereas “all the good tramways had been constructed.” Limited to the 
transport business, the chairman of the Voie étroite lamented that it could no longer “find 
new food for its business,” i.e. new investment projects.20 Looking to France, where the 
Parisienne Electrique had successfully engaged in the electric industry, Empain recognized 
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17 “Russe-française: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 23 Mar 1898; “Russe-Française: Rapport du CA à 
l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 22 Mar 1899. 
18 Lanthier, “Constructions,” 467-68. 
19 “Parisienne Electrique: Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 30 May 1901. See also Lanthier, “Stratégies,” 
233. 
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Rapport du CA à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 19 Oct 1904. 
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the need for a Belgian equivalent of the French holding company. In the spring of 1904, 
the Empain group had to use the Parisienne Electrique to bid for the construction of the 
Brussels power station, for none of the Belgian holding companies specialized in 
electricity production. Chapter 4 will explain that, partly due to its foreignness, the 
Parisienne Electrique did not obtain the project. 
Instead of adding another holding company, the Empain group rationalized its 
structure by merging the similar holding companies/general contractors Voie étroite and 
Russe-française into the new Compagnie générale de railways et d’électricité 
(Railways&Electricité, est. 1904). This merger was part of a broader consolidation 
movement in Western Europe, as a consequence of the crisis of 1900-1903. AEG and UEG 
as well as Siemens and Schuckert had merged their activities in Germany and abroad. 
Smaller Belgian electric engineering firms had gone bankrupt. Even the holding company 
CMT went through harsh times. Meanwhile, more and more capital was needed to develop 
the Belgian power grid.21 That is why, by 1905, the Railways&Electricité was equipped with 
a capital of 15 million francs in equity and 20 million francs in bonds. It quickly became 
the most important holding company in the business group. 
In conclusion, the history of the Empain group is characterized by a multiplication of 
holding companies. The sketched evolution has demonstrated that it was more 
convenient to establish an extra holding company than to reorganize the whole 
structure. Because the holding companies provided capital, technical services and 
personnel, the business group survived crises and occasional losses. The Voie étroite, Russe-
française, Parisienne Electrique and Railways&Electricité all engaged in general contracting to 
support their income. The Réunis tried to achieve the same via portfolio investment. 
Finally, all top holdings transcended their place of incorporation. They had an 
international scope, but some of them specialized in certain regions and industries. 
3.3 The Empain group, a business group? 
The Empain group thus gradually developed into a complex governance structure. The 
finding that it was organized through a multi-layered system of ownership ties suggests 
that it can be categorized as a business group. As mentioned in the introduction, business 
groups abounded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Historically, 
business groups were not merely a suboptimal solution to overcome the shortcomings of 
developing economies. Instead they were also key actors able to face the challenges of the 
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Second Industrial Revolution in more advanced economies. But what makes a business 
group a business group? According to a common definition, formulated by Barbero and 
Puig, it is “a set of legally independent firms operating under a common central 
management, linked by persistent, formal and/or informal links.”22 A business group 
offers a diversified range of products and/or services, which can be either related or 
unrelated. The ownership is mostly concentrated in the hands of a family, bank or State. 
The legally distinct firms are linked together via “equity or social ties and reinforced by 
cross-shareholding and interlocking directorates.”23 Morck and Yeung also focus on 
corporate governance. They speak of a business group whenever two or more distinct 
entities are “controlled by a single decision-maker,” being most of the time a family or 
occasionally a single person.24 The literature distinguishes between horizontal ‘network’ 
and hierarchical ‘pyramidal’ types of business groups. In a horizontal structure the 
companies form a loose alliance, but maintain nearly all their strategic and financial 
autonomy.25 Far more important for this research and more robust as a category are the 
pyramidal business groups (see Fig. 15). These are based on the principle of a higher 
authority. This controlling entity at the apex can be of formal or informal nature. In the 
first case, this is a holding company, which owns and controls the operating companies. 
In the second case, the family does not establish a formal corporate entity but directly 
owns the companies underneath.26 
The Empain group corresponded to what is defined in the literature as a family-owned 
pyramidal business group. Typically, family members have a majority interest in the 
single or several holding companies at the top, that serve as control unit(s). The top 
managers are recruited both within the family and among salaried experts. However, the 
family holds a “tight grip on the basic strategic and financial decision-making.”27 The 
operating units are tiers of listed companies. These are not wholly owned by the business 
group, for their shares were traded on the stock exchange. Most of the growth is created 
by forming new listed affiliates in a diversified, yet focused range of sectors.28 
The preceding all applies to the Empain group before 1914. However, the editors of the 
authoritative volume on Business Groups in the West combine this governance and finance 
perspective with a restriction based on the product portfolio. To them, the category of 
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26 Colpan, Hikino, and Lincoln, Oxford Handbook, 20. 
27 Colpan and Hikino, Business Groups in the West, 17. 
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the diversified business group only includes those having diversified into unrelated 
sectors. The editors would argue that holding company organizations with a related 
diversification strategy rather resemble the Chandlerian firm, despite a lesser 
development of managerial hierarchies.29 As a result, the Empain group strictly speaking 
did not correspond to the definition of the diversified business group, because it had a 
clear product focus. The group had invested 80% of its capital in closely linked industries 
and the other 20% in unrelated sectors (see Chapter 2). 
However, I argue that the commonalities are such that the analysis of the Empain 
group as a business group is still very fruitful. It even demonstrates the flexibility of the 
business group form, allowing efficient investments in both related and unrelated 
sectors. This view is supported by Youssef Cassis, who also struggled with the proposed 
narrow definition in his contribution to the volume. His own concept of the French 
hierarchical groupe led by an all-powerful entrepreneur fits rather well with the image of 
the Empain group. 
The main characteristic of France’s leading groupes (Saint-Gobain, Thomson, 
Compagnie Générale d’Electricité, Schneider, Renault, and many others) was that a 
number of their activities—which were mostly in single or related industries—were 
undertaken through legally independent units, in which the parent company held 
a majority or a controlling minority stake. Vertical integration, whether backward 
or forward, usually involved the creation of a new company, which often shared its 
registered office and senior management with the parent company.30 
According to Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, the Empain group could also be compared with the 
Japanese zaibatsu. The zaibatsu emerged as pyramidal business groups during the rapid 
industrialization of Japan between the 1880s and the 1920s. The three largest had their 
own bank and a private holding company at the apex. The ownership was concentrated 
in the hands of the family, which exercised ultimate control. The holding company 
maintained an interest of 65% on average in the subsidiaries. On a functional and 
operational level, the family appointed professional managers. The biggest differences 
with the Empain group were that over the decades the zaibatsu diversified from paper 
over mining to banking, i.e. very unrelated industries. They also held very strict control 
over affiliated firms whereas the Empain group was more loosely organized. In addition, 
the Empain group did not have a general trading company like the zaibatsu.31 
Now that I have argued that the Empain group shows very strong similarities to 
diversified business groups, let us examine the competitive advantages linked to this 
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particular organizational form. The business group literature has identified a number of 
possible reasons for its existence. First and foremost, the business group is a way of 
overcoming the weaknesses of inefficient markets. Like the firm itself, the business group 
is an institution meant to reduce transaction costs. In economies where information was 
difficult to access and trust and investor protection was low, business groups could 
internalize transactions otherwise completed via labor, capital, product and other 
markets.32 However, in early industrializing economies with generally lower transaction 
costs, entrepreneurs used the business group structure too. It was their way of getting 
easy access to the capital market. 
“As the Second Industrial Revolution transformed the technological and economic 
foundation of the modern industrial economy after the late nineteenth century, the 
amount of financial resources that individuals, families, and kin networks could 
rally became marginal relative to the amount of investment capital required to 
exploit economies of scale in those capital-intensive industries which became the 
driving core of the modern economy. Only with the mobilization and pooling of 
financial resources available society-wide could the large modern industrial 
enterprise secure the necessary amount of capital to achieve its potential in the 
production of goods and services.”33 
Secondly, and linked to the aspect of finance, the business group in its pyramidal form 
allowed entrepreneurs to maintain a certain degree of control, despite opening up 
corporate ownership to the broader public. With an initially small private capital, families 
could still run business empires in capital-intensive sectors. Morck referred to it as the 
‘Great Pyramids,’ which mainly exist to “magnify merely large family fortunes into 
control over corporate assets worth vastly more.”34 These ‘pyramids’ are formed by 
holding companies, owning a controlling block in the first tier of subsidiaries. These 
companies in turn hold a controlling block in the second tier of firms and so on. To 
exercise control, the firms even do not need to own the majority of the shares, because 
small shareholders usually do not vote and founders frequently rewarded themselves 
with more exclusive shares giving special voting rights. 
Thirdly, business groups are a mechanism to reduce market risks. “By holding individual 
operating units legally independently, controlling shareholders can isolate those risks.”35 
In other words, the failure of one operating company should not contaminate the other 
subsidiaries, given the limited liability of all the group companies. The holding company, 
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clustering several of those operating subsidiaries, could compensate for the losses of one 
with the profits of the others. 
3.4 Risk spreading: ‘Group solidarity’ 
Section 3.2 already cited annual reports of the Empain group stressing that the holding 
companies were an efficient device to spread the risk and guarantee a stable revenue. 
This theory was, of course, in part a marketing strategy. This section investigates what 
implications the mutualization of risk had in practice. It looks at the survival rate of the 
group companies, and asks whether the holding companies could generate stable profits. 
Finally, it analyzes how this profit was composed: which companies produced good 
financial results and which performed poorly? In other words, which firms filled the 
financial gap caused by others? 
Longevity was a typical feature of family firms, yet not exclusively. To study this, we 
need to temporarily extend our period. Between 1880 and 1980, only 15 out of 85 firms 
owned by the Empain group were liquidated due to bad financial results. This implies that 
more than 80% of the Empain companies survived, suggesting that the financial 
protection of the business group was effective. The holding companies provided security 
and stability. For instance, the median life expectancy of firms within the Empain group 
was 25 years. In other words, half of the firms remained active for more than a quarter of 
a century from the moment of their creation/acquisition until their sale/liquidation.36 As 
will be explained below, some firms survived yet performed poorly. Subsidiaries could 
bridge a difficult financial period with a credit from the holding companies. 
Regarding the period of 1880-1914, only in very few cases, the Empain group sold a 
company. Whereas two small projects in the Balkan (Tramways de Belgrade and Kreutz-
Belovar) did not offer a long-term perspective, the Chemins de fer de Pau-Oloron-Mauléon et 
Tramways de Bayonne à Biarritz and the Chemin de fer de Bayonne-Anglet-Biarritz had been 
part of the business groups for over a decade and were situated in its core market. 
Although there were no signs that they were making a loss, the Empain group decided to 
sell the two lines connecting Bayonne with Biarritz as well as a light rail network in the 
Pyrenees. The two companies were trying to obtain electrification, but faced conflicts 
with the French authorities. Finally, the holding company Fédération française et belge de 
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tramways sold its two subsidiaries arguing that “the sold lines only represented a small 
business and precisely one that, far from yielding the most, has prevented from 
distributing higher dividends.”37 
 
Figure 17 The financial performance of the five main holding companies, weighted average 
of ROE (1882-1913)38 
The holding companies promised their shareholders to provide a stable revenue. Figure 
17 shows that that was not always the case. As mentioned above, the holding companies 
were not immune to the economic crises of the mid-1880s, the mid-1890s and 1901-1904. 
Despite a very active start, the ROE of the Voie étroite dropped to a low of 2.2% in 1886. The 
worldwide economic boom after 1896 is also quite visible. In 1899 the Voie étroite, Russe-
française and Réunis together reached a return of nearly 12%. What strikes is that the more 
the business group grew, the more the returns stabilized as a whole, especially after 1904. 
However, the whole period considered, there are some discrepancies between holding 
companies. On the one end of the spectrum, the Russe-française, performing the best with 
an average ROE of 10.8%, clearly had a profitable business model. On the other end, the 
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Parisienne Electrique performed about 4 percentage points worse. It started in a difficult 
economic period, which put pressure on her financial results in the first years. 
The performance of the holding companies can be an indicator of the general 
prosperity of the business group. All in all, the Empain group performed relatively well 
compared to several benchmarks. The following benchmark figures are borrowed from 
the Performance of European business in the twentieth century project.39 With their average 
ROE of 8.2% for the period 1911-1913, the holding companies were situated in the pack of 
the leading French companies. However, compared to a sample of 17 leading Belgian 
companies, the Empain group only ranked 15th. But perhaps it is fairer to compare with 
the sample including the largest European transport and utility companies, the relevant 
sector. Then we see that the Empain group performed well above the median ROE of 6.3%. 
Finally, when taking all large European companies as a benchmark, where the median 
ROE was 8.7%, it can be concluded that the Empain group did not perform particularly 
brilliantly, but also not bad for a public utilities business group.40 
To obtain this level of return, the holding companies needed to have a sound business 
model. The revenue mainly came from three sources. First, most holding companies had 
their own operational income. They acted as general contractors and financial service 
providers for their affiliates. Secondly, the holding companies established new 
companies, which they floated as soon as they were profitable. The capital gains on these 
shares constituted a fair deal of the parent company’s profits. Thirdly, they received the 
dividends paid out by their subsidiaries.41 
As dividends were one of the three sources of income contributing to the average ROE 
of 8.2%, the holding companies needed to own subsidiaries yielding much higher as well 
as much lower returns. In Tables 6 and 7, the best- and worst-performing firms (of which 
this information is available) are listed. Table 6 shows all the companies of the Empain 
group that had a ROE of more than 6% on the eve of the First World War.42 These twenty-
two companies were the backbone of the business group, allowing other less profitable 
companies to survive. What helped is that the best performing category carried more 
weight than the worst performing category, as the former contained companies on 
average nearly twice as large. 
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Table 6 Top 22 best-performing companies of the Empain group (1911-13)43 
Company Sector Nom.cap. 
(mln frs) 
Avg. ROE, 
1911-13 
Chemins de fer et tramways en Chine Heavy rail 1 85.6% 
Tramways du Caire Elec. urban transport 15 17.4% 
RELSE Elec. urban transport° 2.5 13.9% 
Tramways Bruxellois* Elec. urban transport 11 12.6% 
Chemin de fer métropolitain de Paris Elec. urban transport 68 10.9% 
ACEC Elec. manufacturing 12.5 9.9% 
Railways&Electricité Holding company 50 9.6% 
Tramways élec. de Gand Elec. urban transport 3.5 9.0% 
Tramways élec. en Espagne Elec. urban transport 20 8.8% 
Tramways élec. du Pays de Charleroi Elec. urban transport 2 8.2% 
SEP Electricity supply 25 8.1% 
Cie. gén. des Chemins de fer vicinaux Light rail 5 7.9% 
Chemin de fer élec. Ostende-Blankenberghe Elec. urban transport 2.5 7.9% 
Parisienne Electrique Holding company 45 7.8% 
Chemins de fer de la Basse Egypte Light rail 7.5 7.5% 
Tramways de Taschkent Elec. urban transport 3.5 7.3% 
Chemins de fer de la banlieue de Reims Light rail 4.5 7.2% 
Cie belge des Chemins de fer réunis Holding company 25 6.8% 
Tramways de Lille Holding company 10 6.5% 
Gaz et Électricité du Hainaut Electricity & gas supply 18 6.3% 
Tramways d’Astrakhan Elec. urban transport 2.5 6.1% 
TELB Elec. urban transport 30 6.1% 
Perhaps surprisingly, the most profitable company before the Great War is the Compagnie 
générale de chemins de fer et de tramways en Chine. As will be further explained in Chapter 7, 
the small company derived astronomic profits from the issue of a large Chinese 
government loan. Rather than the operation of the Pienlo railway, these lucrative 
financial services formed the main source of profit. Except for the Cie générale, the top five 
consists of electric urban transport companies. In fact, half of the 22 companies are active 
in this sector. Chapter 2 has pointed out that the electrification of tramways had an 
enormous impact on the operating margin. Hence, efficient transport networks in 
densely populated cities such as Cairo, Brussels, Paris and Madrid generated a lot of 
wealth for the Empain group. Among the best-performing companies, one can also 
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observe the group’s three top holding companies, one manufacturing company (ACEC) 
and two power producers in bustling areas. Counterintuitively, the table also contains 
three light rail companies. Whereas Chapter 2 stressed the mediocre financial results of 
light rail in France, the two French companies in question were the exception. They 
enjoyed considerable economies of scale as they each possessed a large and coherent 
network. Moreover, the Basse Egypte connected the Nile Delta, the most economically 
productive region of Egypt, to the outside world. 
Table 7 Top 11 worst-performing companies of the Empain group (1911-13)44 
Company Sector Nom. cap. 
(mln frs) 
Avg. ROE, 
1911-13 
Tramway de Cointe Elec. urban transport 0.25 -2.0% 
Travaux Publics du Caire Real estate 6 -1.3% 
Éclairage du Centre Gas supply 6 0.0% 
Tramways de Kischinew Elec. urban transport 1.5 0.3% 
Tramways élec. de Damas Elec. urban transport 6 0.5% 
Heliopolis Palace Hôtel du Caire Real estate 4 1.4% 
HOC Real estate 50 1.5% 
Chemins de fer économiques du Nord Light rail 19.2 2.4% 
Cie d’électricité de Seraing Electricity supply 3 2.9% 
Chemins de fer du Calvados Light rail 3.5 3.0%* 
Chemins de fer du Périgord Light rail 3 3.0%* 
In the environment of a business group, some firms could survive despite their poor 
financial performance. Table 7 gathers all the companies belonging to the Empain group 
with a ROE of 3% or less. In 1913, Empain and other entrepreneurs would have preferred 
to invest only in projects yielding more than 3%. Otherwise, they had better bought low 
risk long-term Belgian and French government bonds with an average nominal interest 
rate of 3.3% in 1911-1913.45 However, the Empain group generally focused on the long 
term and could wait until projects started to flourish. For instance, the three real estate 
firms listed in the table formed the core of the Heliopolis project, which was still in its 
infancy. Empain guessed that the business would pay out in the long run. For the light 
rail companies, this was also the idea. The Chemins de fer du Périgord and du Calvados were 
relatively small and could not survive without state subsidies and an occasional credit 
from the holding companies. The Econord had run up in debt in the past and was now 
investing to electrify part of its network. However, as these firms were part of the larger 
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business group, the generated economies of scale allowed them to survive and still yield 
some profit. In addition, the Empain group had taken over the Tramway de Cointe and the 
Eclairage du Centre in the 1900s hoping to rationalize their operation. However, it took 
more than ten years to digest the accumulated debts from the past. Finally, two larger 
electric tramways also underperformed. In Chișinău (Kischinew), several economic crises 
and the resistance of the government against electrification had caused a heavy burden 
of debt. Damascus suffered from the Ottoman political instability and wars thwarting the 
large investments made to electrify the network. 
3.5 The quest for finance and the concern for independency 
The scale increase brought about by the Second Industrial Revolution forced many 
traditional family firms into a secondary position. In capital-intensive industries such as 
railroads, public utilities and equipment manufacturing, large joint-stock companies took 
the lead, for they were best suited to gather funds. However, experts on family business 
including Andrea Colli have shown that some family businesses perfectly adapted to the 
new conditions. As mentioned in the general introduction, they made use of business 
groups to involve external finance in a flexible way and were able to follow the pace of 
expansion of the large managerial enterprises.46 The case of the Empain group brilliantly 
supports the view that family business groups could be big business too. By 1914, the 
Empain brothers could control subsidiaries with a share capital of 600 million francs by 
controlling holding companies only worth 110 million francs. The leverage is significant: 
for every franc invested in the capital of the holding company, they could control 6 francs 
of capital in the subsidiaries.47 In other words, they just needed to make a decisive 
investment in the top holding companies to control everything else. Whereas the next 
section elaborates on the control mechanism, this section investigates the role of finance 
in this pyramidal structure. In short, where did the companies of the Empain group find 
the necessary external funds? 
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3.5.1 Empain, the banks and joint ventures 
Unlike most business groups in Belgium, Empain has always kept as much distance as 
possible from the large Belgian mixed banks. Large bank-centered business groups 
controlled a considerable part of the Belgian economy before 1914, especially in the coal, 
steel, traction and electric industry. In 1911, they had acquired large blocks of shares in 
41% of all Belgian joint-stock companies.48 The mixed banks frequently extended 
commercial credit to firms whether affiliated or not. This gave the banks a large influence 
over the business of these firms. 
The Empain group, in contrast, preferred not to rely on bank loans in order to keep its 
independence. Instead, Edouard Empain founded his own bank in 1881. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, Empain probably had gathered a starting capital with the help of the du Roy 
de Blicquy family and by selling quarries.49 Several large family businesses, like the 
zaibatsu, established a bank to independently finance growth. The Solvays founded their 
Mutuelle in 1914 for investments in the family business. It became the financial pivot of 
the Solvay empire in the interwar years. The Turkish family business group Koç, 
established in the 1920s, had a small private bank too.50 
As the name suggests, the Maison de banque E.-L.-J. Empain was essentially a small private 
bank, without a separate legal personality.51 Because Empain did not incorporate its 
banking activities, these melted into his personal finances. This was typical for the late 
nineteenth century, when banking still was based on mutual trust and good connections 
– a broad network of entrepreneurs in Empain’s case. Basically, before the legal reform of 
the 1930s, anyone could start banking without official permission or leaving a paper 
trail.52 This type of bank mostly operated with great discretion, making it hard to know 
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anything about it.53 Despite erroneous rumors about a possible incorporation already in 
1898, Empain only decided to transform his personal bank into a limited liability company 
after the First World War.54 Edouard Empain granted the shares of the Banque Industrielle 
Belge (est. 1919) to his brother François and other close collaborators, while keeping a 
majority of 71% for himself.55 
From 1881 onwards, the Banque E.-L.-J. Empain was the financial hub of the business 
group and almost exclusively focused on its development. It seems that E.-L.-J. Empain was 
not really a deposit bank, for group companies also placed their liquid assets with large 
joint-stock banks.56 It was rather the group’s own investment bank. Since its 
establishment, the bank was the main issuer in Brussels of new stocks and bonds of the 
affiliated companies.57 Usually, Empain subscribed to the capital of the firms of the 
business group, before selling the bulk of it to the broader public. Edouard Empain was 
also the official banker of the holding companies and subsidiaries, organizing their 
payments and paying their dividends to the shareholders.58 The bank also granted short- 
and long-term credits to the subsidiaries. For instance, it lent 500,000 francs to the 
Produits Cibils in 1901 and a similar sum to the Cie Gle de chemins de fer et tramways en Chine 
in 1912.59 In the 1900s, the capacities of the bank had augmented to such an extent60 that 
she could issue a Chinese loan of 44 million francs.61 In rare instances, the bank intervened 
in businesses that did not belong to the Empain group. For instance, Edouard Empain 
sporadically made small portfolio investments in banks, insurance companies, tramway 
holding companies, coal mines and colonial enterprises.62 He also helped to save two 
Brussels bankers on the verge of bankruptcy in 1907.63 Finally, the Banque Empain 
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participated in the banking consortium that was formed at the outbreak of the First World 
War. As one of the twenty contributing banks and as a member of the board of directors, 
Empain had to help stabilize the Belgian financial system.64 
To be sure, the Empain brothers could not finance the entire business group without 
the help of external partners. In the first decade of its existence, the Empain group closely 
collaborated with La Métallurgique and its shareholders and directors. A secretary and a 
director of the real estate bank Caisse des Propriétaires, which also granted credit to La 
Métallurgique, were board members of the Voie étroite. The financial involvement of this 
early network diminished over the years, although ANF, the French subsidiary of La 
Métallurgique, still took an interest of 4% in the Parisienne Electrique in 1900.65 There were 
also less successful partnerships in the first decades. In 1888, Empain set up a joint 
venture with the Belgian magnate Edouard Otlet. After the Grand Central Sud-Américain 
completely failed, Empain refused to cooperate with him in the future, becoming his 
biggest competitor instead.66 
With the expansion of the business group in the 1890s, Empain was more keen to 
cooperate with both private bankers and large banking groups. These banks almost 
exclusively acted as investing partners, not as money lenders. The business group 
structure lent itself perfectly to set up joint ventures. The Empain group allowed external 
financial contributions without necessarily losing full control. On the other hand, 
partners were placed on an equal footing within the subsidiary, instead of feeling 
overwhelmed by the size of the total business group.67 
Since 1894, the group’s most important Belgian partner was the Société générale de 
chemins de fer économiques (Chemins de fer économiques), founded by the Banque de Bruxelles 
and Paribas. Together with the Empain group, it established joint ventures for electric 
tramways in Cairo, Madrid and Damascus as well as a light rail network in the Egyptian 
Nile Delta. Satisfied by the collaboration so far, Empain even offered the Chemins de fer 
économiques a stake of 1.2 million francs (17%) in the holding company Russe-française in 
1896. In the end they could not agree on the conditions of the deal.68 Ten years later, the 
Banque de Bruxelles itself did take an interest in Empain’s Belgian holding companies, the 
HOC in Heliopolis and in the Paris Métro.69 Empain also managed to draw the attention of 
Raphaël de Bauer. He was the manager of the Brussels branch of the mighty French bank 
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Paribas. In 1895, he had joined the board of directors at the Paris headquarters. Starting 
with the Chinese projects of Empain, Paribas itself or the Brussels branch invested in some 
large enterprises of the business group. It took stakes of up to 6% in firms such as the CFL, 
Parisienne Electrique and Société française d'entreprises en Egypte. In the firms where it was 
represented, the bank occasionally served as a credit provider.70 
Other large financial institutions such as the Société Générale de Belgique and the Banque 
d’Outremer had much looser ties to the business group. In the first twenty years of his 
career, Empain had managed to stay out of the waters of the old Belgian financial giant. 
After the first encounter of the two groups in the Tramways Bruxellois (1900), it took until 
1906 for the Société Générale to invest in the Empain companies directly. The Société 
Générale took small interests in the top holding companies Réunis (1906) and 
Railways&Electricité (1908). Afterward, the two business groups collaborated in China and 
established a joint venture (Cie Auxiliaire d’Electricité de Nantes) for electric utilities in 
Nantes. Another sign of rapprochement was the directorate (1909-10) of the French Cie 
des Chemins de fer vicinaux offered to the governor of the Société Générale Ferdinand 
Baeyens. Empain also encountered the Banque d’Outremer, led by the colonial 
entrepreneur Albert Thys, on three occasions at least. Empain partnered up with Thys to 
save the Produits Cibils in 1899. Afterward, the Banque d’Outremer declined an offer of shares 
in the Russe-française, but it did participate in the establishment of the CFL in 1902.71 
Empain also sporadically allowed and encouraged private bankers from Brussels, Liège 
and Paris to invest. Many of them were part of well-established banking families: 
Nagelmackers, Cassel, Balser, Dubois, Lambert, Stern, Philippson, Goudchaux, … However, 
only with the Banque Bénard et Jarislowsky (Bénard&Jarislowsky) the business group 
developed a structural partnership. This private bank was founded in 1885 by Adrien 
Bénard and Sigismond Jarislowsky. They were investment bankers, soon involved in the 
Compagnie Continentale Edison. Thus, they had plenty of experience in the French 
electricity business. In 1897, Empain collaborated with them to apply for the concession 
of the Paris Métro. It was the start of an intense, yet far from exclusive collaboration. 
Bénard&Jarislowsky became the business group’s main banker in France. It was deeply 
involved in many new ventures in France or where there was a French component 
(Chemins de fer et tramways en Chine, Fédération française et belge de tramways, Parisienne 
Electrique, CFL). Like the Banque Empain in Brussels, it also took care of the IPOs and official 
listings of the group firms on the Paris Stock Exchange.72 
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In sum, the Empain group had managed to secure the support of very influential 
financial institutions, which had considerable leverage to transform projects into 
successful businesses.73 Yet, Empain always remained master of his own business group. 
He confined the cooperation with powerful financial groups to specific projects and 
avoided losing control over subsidiaries. 
3.5.2 Going public: Stock and bond markets 
More than relying on banks, the broader public was the business group’s main source of 
finance. In this respect, the holding companies at the top of the pyramidal structure serve 
a twofold purpose. On the one hand, as mentioned in section 3.4, the holding companies 
reduced the risk and could therefore attract more investors. Those wary of putting their 
money into one unstable firm could invest in a trust with many securities. Especially the 
Réunis is similar to the many closed-end funds in the late nineteenth century, most 
famously the Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust.74 As such, the holding company 
functioned as an intermediary, protecting subsidiaries from the market and investors 
from bigger risks. Instead of having the subsidiaries directly address the capital market, 
the holding companies could raise money on the market with greater ease and then invest 
it in the daughter companies themselves. On the other hand, they allowed small savers 
and other investor groups to pump money into a particular subsidiary, without the 
Empain brothers losing control of the holding company. Usually, when a subsidiary was 
incorporated or increased its capital, the Banque E.-L.-J. Empain and the holding companies 
subscribed to the capital in its entirety. Only afterward, they would sell their shares to 
the broader public, but kept a controlling block. To this end, Empain made a lot of 
publicity, including ads in many Belgian, some French and occasionally Dutch 
newspapers. For larger businesses, Empain formed a syndicate with befriended banks to 
issue the new shares, preferably directly at the stock exchange.75 
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In fact, the business group was known for its strategy to speculate on the stock 
exchange with shares of Empain companies. Empain watched their quotation very closely 
and did not hesitate to inflate the prices of shares, even if the subsidiary was not yet in 
operation. When the prices had reached a high, Empain or the holding companies sold a 
part of their shares. Conversely, Empain also tried to support the share price when the 
speculation had brought it down. Because of its market power and large PR budget, the 
Empain group could influence the stock markets and maximize the profits derived from 
its ‘agiotage’. This was particularly the case for the highly mediatized Métropolitain, listed 
in Paris and Brussels. The price of a share (nominal value 250 francs) in Paris fluctuated 
between 400 and 698 francs until the First World War.76 The prices did not necessarily run 
parallel in Brussels, so Empain could also take advantage of this difference.77 
Despite some speculation, the basic policy of the Empain group was long-term 
oriented. In his answer to a critical shareholder, the chairman of the Parisienne Electrique 
Berthelot explained the principle. The holding company held shares for a long time, to 
profit from their value increase and the dividends. “In the important businesses that we 
consider belonging to our group to a certain degree, we do not have the habit to diminish 
our stake in times of crisis.” He continued by saying that the Parisienne Electrique only sold 
the shares of its subsidiaries when their success was certain. The holding company always 
kept a minority stake “sufficient to ensure the continuity of the management conceived 
at the start-up of the enterprise.”78 
Besides equity, the Empain group also issued corporate bonds. This was a way of 
expanding without diluting Empain’s ownership interest or claiming a part of the profits. 
However, Figure 18 shows that in the 1880s, it was impossible to finance the enterprise 
with debt. The depression and deflation deterred investors. The Empain group needed to 
wait until it had enough lines in exploitation that could generate a sufficient and stable 
revenue. The establishment of the Réunis and the Russe-française reinforced this tendency, 
reaching the point in 1896 where bonds were twice as important as equity (75%/25%) in 
the corporate finance of the holding companies. After 1900, the group again favored 
equity finance, this time because the business group was doing much better on the stock 
market (see Fig. 19). The holding companies could issue new shares at a premium of 60% 
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of the nominal value. These premiums formed an important source of finance in the 
decade up to the First World War.79 
 
Figure 18 The ratio of equity versus bonds as a source of finance of the top holding 
companies (1882-1913)80 
Precisely because the Empain group relied so much on the money of the broader public, 
it had every reason to list as many of its companies as possible and the sooner the better. 
That way the largest shareholders (the Empains and the holding companies) could more 
easily sell their shares. Of the 76 firms for which a listing was conceivable, 64% were listed 
on a stock exchange.81 Four out of five of these companies were listed within two years 
after incorporation or after the takeover by the Empain group if they were not listed 
already. This is actually more than five years faster than the average company listed on 
the Paris Stock Exchange.82 It took the other 20% Empain companies, mostly in the railway 
business, much longer to take the step to the stock exchange. Some like the Tramways 
électriques du Pays de Charleroi (3 years) and the Bruxelloise d’électricité (4 years) awaited the 
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completion of the construction works.83 Other tramway and light rail companies needed 
more than a decade to generate sufficient profits that could attract investors, as analyzed 
above. Fourteen years after its establishment, the ZNSM distributed a dividend of approx. 
2%, which the Empain group deemed enough to charm the Brussels Stock Exchange.84 
 
Figure 19 Deflated price evolution of all shares of the Empain group listed on the Brussels 
Stock Exchange compared to the sector index, 1880=100 (1880-1914)85 
A bit more than one third of the Empain companies never listed its shares. They can be 
divided into three groups. The first group contained operating companies of light rail 
networks (Périgord, Bayonne-Biarritz, Calvados, Moudania-Brousse) that were too small 
to require a lot of capital or that hardly produced any surplus value for its shareholders. 
Secondly, some companies had never passed the conceptual stage of their intended 
project: Tramways de Neuilly-Montmartre, Phosphates du Djebel Onk and Tramways de 
Berditscheff. The third group included subsidiaries such as the TELB, SERVA, Chemins de fer 
et tramways en Chine and Terrains du Caire, which were so closely held by the holding 
companies that they did not need external investors. 
For the Empain group, with its companies mainly registered in Brussels and Paris, the 
markets of these two capitals were preferable to float securities. The majority of firms 
having their registered office in Belgium, the Brussels Stock Exchange seemed a logical 
choice. As a financial center, Brussels ranked fourth in Europe after London, Paris and 
Berlin. The Belgian capital market was well known for its very liberal legislation on 
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corporations, favorable taxation and “the plentiful Belgian domestic savings.”86 In 
addition, the Brussels Stock Exchange had very low requirements, allowing both Belgian 
and foreign stocks. The autonomous Stock Exchange Commission used its absolute 
freedom to accept new listings. In consequence, the number of listed securities steeply 
rose from 470 in 1880 to 2200 thirty years later.87 
However, the larger the business group became, the more Empain needed to find 
additional sources of capital. Like many other Belgian entrepreneurs, Empain turned to 
France, especially after the turn of the century.88 Paris was the second-largest capital 
market in the world, after London but before New York and Berlin.89 However, the listing 
requirements of the Official Paris Stock Exchange were a lot more rigorous. The 
application of each company went through a strict procedure. Foreign values were only 
accepted if they were already listed on an exchange in their home country. Their second 
listing in Paris was subject to the approval of the French government. The autonomous 
Compagnie des Agents de Change and the Ministry of Finance assessed the financial viability 
of the firm and the economic interest of a listing. However, the French Minister of Foreign 
Affairs also had a right of veto. He had to evaluate if the company fitted in the broader 
foreign policy and was in the interest of France.90 The difficulty to get listed in Paris is 
reflected by the fact that some French companies were listed only in Brussels and not in 
Paris. 
Fifteen of the largest Empain companies received a secondary listing after they had 
already been traded in Brussels or Paris. These large holding and industrial companies 
needed a large market to optimally float their shares and could benefit from the 
additional trade created by a second listing. Whereas the shares of the Belgian Réunis, 
Russe-française and ACEC were accepted in Paris after a successful listing in Brussels, the 
French firms Chemins de fer vicinaux, ACENE and EGN received a second listing in Brussels. 
Thanks to thorough preparation, the IPO of the Parisienne Electrique, CFL, 
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requirements on the London, Berlin, Paris, and New York stock exchanges,” The International Journal of Accounting 
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Railways&Electricité and CMP could be almost simultaneously organized at the Stock 
Exchanges of Brussels and Paris. The example of the Tramways de Paris et du Département 
de la Seine (TPDS), the second-largest surface transport company in Paris, perfectly 
illustrates the policy of the Empain group. The business group had acquired a 
considerable interest in the company in 1910 as a consequence of a merger. One year later, 
the Empain group introduced the stocks at the Brussels Bourse, while it had also been 
listed in Paris since 1891. 
That the secondary listing in Paris was not a sinecure is illustrated by the following 
two cases. The Brussels Stock Exchange accepted the Econord (est. 1883) within a year after 
its incorporation, but the French government was more reluctant to allow the company 
in Paris due to legal irregularities. It first obtained a listing in Lille in 1886 and only one 
year later at the stock exchange of the French capital. The HOC was even more suspicious 
in the minds of French officials, because of the alleged speculative nature of the Heliopolis 
project. Empain had by all means tried to obtain the official listing on the Paris Stock 
Exchange after the IPO in Brussels. The French government, however, categorically 
refused. It based its refusal on the poor financial outlook of the company.91 However, it 
was listed on the Stock Exchange in Cairo.92 
Surprisingly, Empain showed much less interest in British finance, despite the 
importance of the London capital market. Only when the dominant position of Great 
Britain in a specific market required this, Empain mobilized British capital. As far as the 
sources tell, he had made one fruitless trip to London early in his career.93 Afterward, 
Empain partnered up with British capitalists for the Chilean nitrate and for the Chemins 
de fer de la Basse-Egypte. As soon as the Egyptian activities were assuming vast proportions, 
he activated this modest British network to invest in the HOC and the Egyptian Mail 
Steamship. That is why these two companies also issued shares in London.94 
Empain did hardly contact German investors. However, while many biographers write 
that he was too Francophile to collaborate with them, he did not entirely avoid them. In 
1898, Empain attempted to have the German-owned Sofina invest in his business in 
China.95 Yet, it seems that the German option generally was a lever to encourage France 
to show more benevolence. For instance, in 1912, the German Dresdner Bank and the 
Deutsch Orient Bank were interested in acquiring an interest of 40% in the HOC. Empain 
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immediately warned the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “They feared indeed that the 
German investors seek to absorb the enterprise completely and to transform the new city 
into a German city.”96 The French government was, of course, very sensitive to this 
German threat and wanted to preserve the French-Belgian allure of Heliopolis. But as 
mentioned above, the bad financial performance of the company absolutely excluded a 
listing. 
3.5.3 Lenders within the group: Inter-firm loans 
As discussed above, companies affiliated to the Empain group did not rely on banks for 
credit. Banks merely acted as investing partners. Holding companies, on the contrary, 
acted as the group’s credit providers, together with the Banque E.-L.-J. Empain. These 
credits were of paramount importance for companies in their infancy. After their 
establishment, most companies had to heavily invest before earning profits. As a 
consequence, in the first years they could not easily independently raise money on the 
market. Some subsidiaries, as discussed, actually never managed to do so in their entire 
lifecycle. In 1906, Edouard Empain explained to the shareholders of the Réunis one of the 
main tasks of the holding company. The Réunis always needed to have enough liquid 
assets, for it was the “banker of the subsidiaries to which advances on current accounts 
[were] made to allow them new lines before they issue[d] bonds. That is how the Company 
has helped the Vicinaux, the Railways&Electricité [and] the Tramways de Lille.”97 The other 
holding companies, specialized in general contracting, also extended credits of several 
million francs to their subsidiaries, mostly to prefinance the construction works they 
were executing for the operating companies.98 
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3.6 Control: The open family firm 
 
Figure 20 A stylized pyramidal business group99 
The pyramidal system of the business group allowed Empain to ultimately control a lot 
of companies with a relatively limited amount of capital. In the business group literature, 
ultimate control means to be “in a position to control, or materially to influence, the 
management of one or more other companies by virtue, in part at least, of its ownership 
of securities in the other company or companies.”100 Throughout the decades, the Empain 
brothers closely held the shares of the top holding companies.101 These come down to the 
theoretical “family firm” of Figure 20. The family ownership was strengthened by a 
strategy of cross-shareholding among the holding companies, which also limited the risk 
of a hostile takeover. As the largest shareholders of the firms at the top, the Empain 
brothers could control all the subsidiaries underneath. Every tier just had to own more 
than 50% in the next tier, while the public shareholders could provide the rest of the 
capital of the firms. As mentioned, in the early twentieth century, having a majority was 
not strictly necessary to control a company. At most general assemblies of Empain’s top 
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holding companies, only a handful of shareholders showed up.102 This leads to the remark 
that, thanks to the control of this pyramid, the Empains could tunnel the profits from the 
lowest tier to the top holding companies. Via the possession of special shares (‘founder’s 
shares’), Edouard and François amassed a fortune despite the occasional bad performance 
of the business group at the stock exchange.103 
Figure 21 Edouard and François Empain (early twentieth century)104 
 
Among historians of the Empain group, there is some debate on the extent to which the 
business group was a family business. Based on an analysis of French companies, Suzor 
believes it was not, because the family conserved only part of the power. Family members 
other than the Empain brothers were not part of corporate boards before 1914.105 Instead, 
Empain hired salaried managers. This research follows the definition of Andrea Colli, who 
states that a family business is an enterprise where one or more family members own a 
sufficient part of the capital to influence the strategy and appoint senior executives.106 I 
argue that, in the case of the Empain group, the degree of control was even higher than 
required by Colli, for the Empain brothers were in the top management themselves. Not 
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content with supervising, both brothers were managing directors of the holding 
companies for a long time. François Empain (see Fig. 21), a doctor of law and political 
science (1880-1884), had joined the group in 1888-89 after a short career as a lawyer.107 He 
immediately became director of the Voie étroite and rose to be Edouard Empain’s right 
hand. Together, the Empain brothers were directors of nearly 60% of the group companies 
(49 out of 84). In more than half of these 49 cases, they were both represented, for instance 
in the top holding companies. No other top collaborator was a director of all 4 and then 3 
top holding companies. In the other half of the 49 cases, Edouard Empain served alone on 
the board or delegated his brother François. Being too busy, Edouard also handed some 
of his directorates over to François after 1900. Generally, whenever Edouard was abroad 
or unavailable, he had his brother replace him and take care of important business.108 
It is true that, as Suzor has written, wherever the Empain brothers were not in the 
board of directors themselves, i.e. in the other 35 out of 84 companies, they delegated 
their closest collaborators. Whereas in a classic family business, the leader would appoint 
relatives to safeguard its interests in the subsidiaries, Empain secured the collaboration 
of several highly skilled managers. Roch Boulvin combined important positions in the 
holding companies with directorships in many electricity and gas-producing companies 
such as the SEP, EGN, SERVA, Cie d’électricité de Seraing, CAEN as well as the electric 
equipment manufacturer ACENE. The Empain brothers entrusted Alfred de Wandre with 
a directorship of the CMP, the TPDS, the Nitrate Railways and the Société française 
d’entreprises en Egypte. André Berthelot also supervised the interests of the Empains in 
some of the same companies as well as in the Compagnie Parisienne de Distribution 
d’Electricité and the Société d'Études des Chemins de fer et des Phosphates du Djebel Onk. Finally, 
Arthur du Roy de Blicquy and afterward his nephew Edouard represented the Empain 
brothers in diverse companies managed from the Brussels headquarters. Thus, these few 
top directors were the “eyes” of the Empain brothers in the boards where they were not 
directors themselves. Generally, Edouard Empain was involved in the start-up of a new 
company or project and took care of crucial steps such as going public. As soon as the 
business was up and running, Empain delegated the further strategic management of 
some subsidiaries to his finest collaborators. However, he retained the right of veto in 
important matters and intervened if problems occurred. Specific projects such as the 
Métropolitain, the Chinese railway loans and the businesses in Cairo, he followed very 
closely. 
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Figure 22 The direct offspring of François-Julien and Cathérine Empain109 
The corporate policy was thus designed and executed by the Empain brothers and a 
small circle of top directors. Nevertheless, Edouard Empain also tried to involve his 
relatives in the business as much as possible. Lacking other brothers, Empain gave his five 
brothers-in-law positions in the business group (see Fig. 22). Already in 1881, Empain 
paired his oldest sister Marie-Louise with Emile André. André came from Beloeil and was 
at that time an engineer at La Métallurgique. Via this matrimonial strategy, Empain created 
a reliable loyal collaborator. André became director of the Bruxelles-Ixelles-Boendael and 
went on a mission to Argentina for the Grand Central Sud-Américain. After his death in 1889, 
Marie-Louise remarried. Her new husband was Jacques Debs, an important magistrate in 
Boulogne-sur-Mer. In the 1890s and 1900s, he was president of the Court of First Instance 
of Boulogne. He advised the Empain group on a lot of legal issues. He also was the only 
family member to sit on the board of the CMP.110 
The most important brother-in-law was also the last to join the Empain family. After 
his marriage with Emma Empain in 1902, Eugène Harmant relatively quickly became one 
of the twenty most important directors before the First World War (see below). He had 
the right profile for it. Graduated as an engineer in 1894, he served in the army as a 
lieutenant colonel. From 1908, Harmant received mandates in ten Empain companies, 
even joining the board of the holding companies Railways&Electricité and Réunis in 1914. 
He also possessed some shares of the former. 
Two more in-laws played a role in the business group. Zénon Glorieux was a medical 
doctor in Brussels. Having married Anne Empain in 1890, he acquired small blocks of 
shares in some Empain companies. From 1896 until at least 1914, he was an auditor of 6 
firms (incl. Railways&Electricité). He also was a director of the Produits Cibils in the early 
years. Finally, Louise Empain married Henri-Louis Denis in 1896. He was an artillery 
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lieutenant in the Belgian army, later being promoted general.111 On behalf of Empain and 
Leopold II, Denis left on a mission to Morocco in 1904. With auditor mandates in only 
three companies, he did not play an important role in the business group before 1914. 
In conclusion, the Empain group has never been a traditional private family business. 
It was rather an “open family firm,” where family members shared the management with 
professionals.112 The more relatives were qualified, the more directorships Edouard 
Empain offered them. So to a certain degree, Empain understood his business empire as 
belonging to the family. However, the awareness that his legacy had to be passed on to 
the next generation came rather late. Empain recognized his two sons only at the end of 
WW1.113 But as soon as they had reached the age of majority, they received some 
directorships in the business group. Slowly but surely, Jean and Louis Empain could 
participate in the strategic management in the second half of the 1920s. However, the 
first generation stayed in charge until Edouard’s death in 1929. Empain’s understanding 
of family ownership was perfectly exemplified in his letter to Jean Jadot (Société Générale) 
during the First World War. Empain considered opening up the capital of ACEC to the 
Générale, but “we remain, personally and by far, the largest shareholders of the Ateliers 
and we hope it will always be a family business and a national business.”114 With ‘family,’ 
Empain in the first place probably meant himself and his brother. 
3.7 Pooling of managerial and technical resources 
In terms of corporate governance and management professionalization too, the 
stereotype about business groups is that they are inferior to large managerial 
corporations. Allegedly, their diversified product portfolio prevents the generation of 
competitive advantage in that respect. However, Colpan and Hikino have argued that 
As long as the group headquarters continues to take the primary role of effective 
administrative coordination, it can realize positive spillovers (…) across individual 
operational affiliates. The business group form may then prove a competitive asset, 
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with its accumulated knowledge in administrative skills, financial capabilities, 
human resource management, and marketing expertise that the groups acquire 
through consecutive entries.115 
The complex structure of the Empain group, made of eighty legally independent firms, 
risked being inefficient too. In this section, I argue that Empain tried to overcome the 
possible inefficiency by achieving a similar “administrative coordination.” He did this 
primarily by concentrating the group’s senior management, on the one hand, and the 
physical headquarters of all the companies, on the other hand. In addition, I argue that 
the holding company organization permitted Empain to recruit external experts and 
appoint them on the board of directors of specific related subsidiaries. Yet, these 
managers could not challenge the ultimate control of the family, who owned the holding 
companies. 
3.7.1 The thirty leading executives of the business group 
The last section has already demonstrated that the strategies were designed in the 
holding companies by a small selection of top directors. The group, however, was kept 
together by more than just the Empain brothers and the deputies Boulvin, de Wandre, 
Berthelot and du Roy de Blicquy. The crucial instrument to give the subsidiaries a certain 
coherence and common strategy was the use of interlocking directorates. A director 
interlock occurs when one person is a member of the board of directors of two or more 
companies at the same time. This is a common feature of business groups. Vertical 
interlocks (between parent and subsidiary) serve to monitor and control. Directors of the 
top holding companies can propagate the general strategy lower in the pyramid. In 
contrast, horizontal interlocks allow coordinating by sharing information among related 
subsidiaries.116 
I argue that, instead of clear managerial hierarchies, the Empain group intensively 
used the principle of interlocking directorates to concentrate strategic management in 
the hands of a relatively small team of top collaborators. As a matter of fact, not more 
than thirty people held 50% of all yearly mandates available in the history of the Empain 
group until the First World War (see Table 8).117 The top five directors were even 
responsible for 25% of all yearly mandates. In their peak year, they each had between ten 
and thirty interlocking directorates. The concentrated power was such that the thirty key 
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figures only formed 9% of all the people having been on the board of an Empain company. 
The composition of the top management was very stable. Most top directors had a career 
in the business group of twenty years or more. Mostly, they remained directors until their 
death.118 
When looking closer at their profiles, four categories of top executives can be 
distinguished. The first group consisted of family and relations from the early days of the 
business group. Arthur du Roy de Blicquy, Edmond Terlinden, Jules Carlier, Maurice 
Anspach all came from the business environment of La Métallurgique and the Caisse des 
Propriétaires. Alphonse Braem119 (not in the top 30), a long-standing director of the Voie 
étroite¸ had the same background. Especially in the first two decades, Empain relied on 
these loyal collaborators, of which some already had an engineering background. 
However, the more the business group grew and the more complex the applied 
technology became, Empain recruited professionally trained specialists and influential 
figures outside the original network. In fact, the directors from the early years (before 
1890) only formed one third of the top 30. Likewise, only three family members held a top 
executive position. This demonstrates the degree of openness of the family business 
group of the Empains. 
It is thus not surprising that civil engineers formed the second, large group. With their 
degrees obtained in renowned engineering schools in Belgium and France, these 
executives brought in specialized knowhow and management skills. The engineers 
mostly started their career as manager of operating and holding companies of the Empain 
group. In this regard, Armand Rouffart, Alfred de Wandre, Maurice Dutillieux, Georges 
Theunis120, Louis Genis121 and Raynald Legouëz should be cited. Roch Boulvin was even a 
professor teaching the applications of electricity at Ghent University before he was 
approached to supervise the electric transformation of the Empain group.122 Other 
engineers were rather at the end of their professional career. Auguste Doniol and Auguste 
Stoecklin were both top officials in the French Ministry of Public Works. In their function, 
they had written countless reports on applications for concessions, even coming from the 
Empain group.123 Their expertise and network were extremely helpful when negotiating 
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utility projects with the French authorities. On the Belgian side, Leopold Garnir (not in 
the top 30) had a similar high profile. He was the managing director of the Belgian State 
Railways and advisor of the Railway Minister, before he became a member of the board of 
five Empain companies in 1906.124 
Table 8 Top directors holding half of all the directorships within the Empain group (1880-
1914)125 
 Name Natio
nality 
# of 
mandates 
(% of total) 
Entry 
date 
in 
group 
Biography in-/outside group 
1 Edouard Empain BE 517 (9.0) 1880 Founder 
2 François Empain BE 430 (7.5) 1889 Brother, right hand of Edouard 
3 Arthur du Roy de 
Blicquy 
BE 179 (3.1) 1881 Engineer, director of La 
Métallurgique 
4 Roch Boulvin BE 161 (2.8) 1899 Academic, became general 
manager and director of electric 
utilities 
5 Edmond Caze FR 161 (2.8) 1883 Politician, director of French 
subsidiaries 
6 André Berthelot FR 118 (2.1) 1902 Politician, starts in CMP and PE 
7 Alfred de Wandre FR 114 (2.0) 1890 Engineer, starts as a general 
manager of French railway 
companies 
8 Auguste Doniol FR 94 (1.6) 1900 Top official in French Ministry of 
Public Works (…-1899) 
9 Raynald Legouëz FR 83 (1.4) 1901 Engineer of the Paris Métro, 
started as manager of the PE 
10 Achille Huart-
Hamoir 
BE 82 (1.4) 1887 Local politician (Schaerbeek) 
11 Maurice Anspach BE 79 (1.4) 1889 Engineer, director of La 
Métallurgique and of the CGER 
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 Name Natio
nality 
# of 
mandates 
(% of total) 
Entry 
date 
in 
group 
Biography in-/outside group 
12 Adolphe Dupont-
Rucloux 
BE 74 (1.3) 1881 Engineer, politician 
13 Adrien-Léon Bénard FR 69 (1.2) 1897 Private banker 
14 Léon Janssen BE 68 (1.2) 1900 Director of tramway companies 
and of the Société Générale 
15 Edmond Terlinden BE 60 (1.0) 1881 Engineer, secretary of the Caisse 
des Propriétaires, director of La 
Métallurgique 
16 Jules Carlier BE 58 (1.0) 1882 Director of La Métallurgique, 
politician 
17 Auguste de la Hault BE 55 (1.0) 1895 Banker and tramway magnate 
18 Maurice Dutillieux BE 53 (0.9) 1900 Engineer, started as manager of 
the Voie étroite 
19 Georges Theunis BE 48 (0.8) 1898 Electrical engineer 
20 Eugène Harmant BE 48 (0.8) 1908 Brother-in-law, engineer 
21 Edouard Demeure BE 43 (0.8) 1904 Started as director of E&H 
22 Louis Genis FR 41 (0.7) 1899 Engineering officer (military) 
23 Adrien d'Oultremont BE 39 (0.7) 1881 Nobleman, independent investor 
24 Raphael de Bauer BE 37 (0.6) 1899 Banker of Paribas 
25 Jules Jacobs BE 37 (0.6) 1899 Repr. the holding Chemins de fer 
économiques 
26 Auguste Le Brun BE 36 (0.6) 1901 Repr. the holding Chemins de fer 
économiques 
27 John Rogers UK 36 (0.6) 1905 Lieutenant colonel, in Egyptian 
civil service 
28 Armand Dresse BE 35 (0.6) 1896 Financier/politician/lawyer 
(Liège) 
29 Armand Rouffart BE 35 (0.6) 1891 Engineer, started as manager of 
the Voie étroite 
30 John d’Oultremont BE 34 (0.6) 1905 Nobleman, equerry of Leopold II 
 Other directors … 2828 (49.2)   
Thirdly, Empain recruited financial and legal experts. People such as Achille Huart-
Hamoir, alderman of Finance and later mayor of Schaerbeek and jurist Edouard du Roy 
de Blicquy were long-standing collaborators. The insurance expert Amédée Begault126 and 
auditor Léon Favresse (both not in the top 30) were put in to coordinate the financial 
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accounts of the holding companies and its many subsidiaries. Edouard Demeure came 
from a family of magistrates too. He joined the close circle of collaborators after the 
business group had acquired the E&H, of which he was a director. An anecdote illustrates 
Empain’s need for legal advisors specialized in corporate law. The young Henry Le Boeuf 
(not in the top 30) was combining his studies with a job in the offices of Empain in 
Brussels. As soon as he obtained his law degree in 1898, Empain sent him to Sam Wiener, 
an eminent corporate lawyer. In a letter to a friend, Le Boeuf recalled that Empain 
explained the objective: 
I want you to stay with me. You have done your law studies, you and I need to take 
advantage of it. Therefore, you are going to do an internship at S.W.’s (it’s Empain 
who told me about this lawyer) and I myself will present you, to make clear what I 
want. He will have you study cases of finance, public limited companies, etc., he will 
only give you small stuff just enough to inform you about the procedures, 
judgments, and other businesses. Do this for three years, while staying at my place 
every afternoon, and within three years, you will be of value, relatively, that is.127 
The fourth category comprised top politicians and members of the financial elite. Empain 
attracted influential statesmen to his business group before the First World War. The 
three most important were Edmond Caze, André Berthelot and Paul de Smet de Naeyer. 
In 1883, Empain partnered up with Caze, who was a French MP and senator almost 
continuously until his death in 1907. He had been a member of the French government 
led by Gambetta in 1881. Caze joined the board of every French light rail and tramway 
company founded before 1900. However, he never got appointed as a director of a holding 
company. After the inauguration of the Paris Métro, Empain recruited André Berthelot to 
become one of the senior executives of the business group. Berthelot had been a 
municipal councilor in Paris (1894-1898) and MP (1898-1902) and was afterward granted 
directorates in French, Belgian, Egyptian and Russian firms of the Empain group. Empain 
gradually developed a friendship with André and his brother Daniel. This professor in 
Physics and Chemistry (not in the top 30) also served on the board of nine electric utility 
companies of the group. Lastly, after his rich political career, the former Prime Minister 
(1896-1907) Paul de Smet de Naeyer (not in the top 30) joined the board of many Belgian 
 
                                                     
127 “Je désire que vous restiez chez moi. Vous avez fait vos études de droit, il faut que vous et moi en profitions. 
Pour cela, vous allez faire un stage chez S.W. (c’est Emp. qui m’a indiqué cet avocat) et j’irai vous présenter moi-
même, pour bien faire comprendre ce que je désire. Il vous fera étudier des affaires de finance, de Stés ann., etc., 
il ne vous donnera de petites crottes que juste ce qu’il vous faudra pour vous mettre au courant des procédures. 
levées de jugement, et autres cuisines. Faites cela pendant trois ans, en restant chez moi tous les après-midi, et 
dans trois ans, vous serez une valeur, relativement, bien entendu.” Valérie Montens and Etienne Davignon, Le 
palais des beaux-arts: La création d’un haut lieu de culture à Bruxelles (1928-1945) (Brussels: Éditions de l’Université de 
Bruxelles, 2000), 21. 
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companies, including the Société Générale. Many entrepreneurs wanted to take advantage 
of his influential network. Empain offered him directorships of the Réunis, 
Railways&Electricité, Tramways électriques de Gand and ACEC, which he held until his decease 
in 1913. 
Some eminent figures of the Belgian elite were also quite present in the boards of 
Empain companies. Adrien and his brother John d’Oultremont were of wealthy noble 
lineage. John d’Oultremont was very close with King Leopold II, whom he served as Grand 
Maréchal de la Cour.128 The editor-in-chief of the Moniteur des Intérêts Matériels Georges de 
Laveleye (not in the top 30) and the entrepreneurs/politicians Adolphe Dupont-Rucloux 
and Armand Dresse from Liège also held quite a lot of directorships before the First World 
War. Other close collaborators of Empain such as Theunis only became famous politicians 
and captains of industry after 1918. 
The fifth and final category (not in bold) included those top executives that were not 
directors on behalf of Empain. Their presence was the result of the many financial 
collaborations with other bankers and holding companies. These investing partners 
defended their own interests before those of Empain: Auguste de la Hault, Adrien Bénard, 
Léon Janssen, Raphaël de Bauer, Jules Jacobs and Auguste Le Brun. John Rogers Pacha was 
involved in all businesses of Empain in Egypt, because he had important connections in 
the Egyptian administration while at the same time he led a large British holding 
company in the country. 
 
3.7.2 Between Brussels, Paris and elsewhere: The centralization and 
circulation of human resources 
Ever since the establishment of the first company in 1880, the headquarters of the 
business group was situated in the district of Notre-Dame-des-Neiges in Brussels. Empain 
installed his bank in large offices at the Place de la Liberté in 1881, only two blocks away 
from the headquarters of La Métallurgique (Place de Louvain 1). He had bought a mansion 
from a wealthy nobleman at the junction of the rue de l’Enseignement, rue du Congrès 
and the rue de la Presse in Brussels (see Fig. 23).129 Every new Belgian company set up its 
registered office here. 
 
                                                     
128 This is the highest Officer of the Royal Household, comparable to the Lord Chamberlain in the UK. 
129 Government of the Brussels-Capital Region, “Arrêté du Gouvernement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 
entamant la procédure de classement comme monument de la totalité de l’ancien hôtel et banque Empain sis 
rue du Congrès 33-33A, rue de l’Enseignement 91, 93-95 et 97 et rue de la Presse 1-3 et 5 à Bruxelles,” (Brussels: 
Chancellerie, 2003). 
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Figure 23 Hotel de Knuyt de Vosmaer (rue du Congrès 33-33A)130 
As Empain was also forming companies in France, he concentrated their head offices in 
the rue de Courcelles 49 in Paris, where he was also domiciled. In 1895, the Parisian 
headquarters moved to rue Auber 8. Due to the steady development of Empain’s activities 
in France, the offices in the rue Auber were bursting at the seams. New companies such 
as the CMP, Parisienne Electrique and SEP set up their headquarters in the Avenue de l’Opéra. 
Finally, Empain acquired a private mansion at the Rue de Lisbonne 50 and offices at the 
Boulevard Haussmann 75 in 1907. Afterward, all French companies were concentrated in 
these two locations, close to Gare Saint-Lazare. The area around this station was a classic 
business district, especially for railway companies.131 The headquarters in the 
architectural style of Haussmann had to radiate the power and prestige of the business 
group. For instance, the offices in the Boulevard Hausmann were next to those of the very 
prestigious Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits.132 From a strategic perspective, a 
strong presence in the capital of a political and financial power was paramount to secure 
French and foreign investments. 
When taking a snapshot in 1914 (see Table 9), it is noticeable that the registered offices 
of the group companies133 were divided over the headquarters in Brussels, rue de Lisbonne 
 
                                                     
130 Source: “Herman NV: Hotel Empain,”  http://hermannv.be/project-view/hotel-empain/. 
131 Wolkowitsch, “Siècle,” 127. 
132 Cécile Chaumier, “Un patrimoine de la communication d’entreprise: Les sièges sociaux parisiens des 
anciennes compagnies d’électricité (1889-1946),” Flux 82, no. 4 (2010). https://www.cairn.info/revue-flux1-
2010-4-page-8.htm#re2no2 
133 The headquarters of the joint ventures Tramways du Caire, Chemins de fer de la Basse-Égypte, Tramways électriques 
en Espagne, Tramways et éclairage électriques de Damas (Chemins de fer économiques group); Cie Auxiliaire d’Electricité 
de Nantes (Cie Mutuelle des Tramways); Produits Cibils (Banque d’Outremer) were situated in the offices of the 
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(Paris), Boulevard Haussmann (Paris) and at the operation site. The Banque E.-L.-J. Empain 
in Brussels was the primary headquarters of the Empain group for Belgium and abroad. It 
hosted Belgian holding companies (including the Tramways de Lille), power and traction 
companies and ACEC. In addition, similar companies active in Russia, China, Congo, Chile, 
Romania and Egypt elected domicile at the Brussels premises. The Paris headquarters 
specialized in French firms. These were distributed over the Lisbonne and Haussmann 
buildings. The mansion in the rue de Lisbonne hosted almost all traction companies as 
well as la Longueville. The Haussmann building, on the other hand, hosted the Parisienne 
Electrique, the CMP, ACENE and all French power companies. As opposed to the Lisbonne 
offices, two firms active abroad (Phosphates du Djebel Onk and SIER) had installed their 
management there. 
Table 9 The Empain headquarters in Brussels, Paris and locally (1914)134 
HQ Active in Belgium Active in France Active abroad 
Brussels 
(20 firms) 
Eclairage du Centre, 
Réunis, 
Railways&Electricité, 
Fédération FR-BE, 
Ostende-Blankenberghe, 
Twys élec. Charleroi, 
ACEC, Elec. Seraing, Gaz 
Elec. Hainaut, SBE 
Tramways de Lille CFL, Eclairage de Galatz, 
Travaux Publics du Caire, 
Heliopolis Palace Hotel, 
Cdf et Twys Chine, 
Générale Nitrates, Twys 
Kischinew, Twys 
Astrakhan, Twys 
Taschkent 
Paris-
Haussmann 
(7 firms) 
 SNE, CMP, Parisienne 
Electrique, ACENE, EGN, 
SEP, SERVA 
 
Paris-
Lisbonne 
(12 firms) 
 
Econord (adm), TELB 
(adm), Cdf Vicinaux, Twys 
Boulogne, Cdf Banlieue de 
Reims, la Longueville, Cdf 
Calvados, Cdf Périgord 
Moudania-Brousse (adm), 
SIER, Phosphates du 
Djebel Onk, HOC (adm) 
Locally 
(15 firms) 
RELSE, Eclairage de 
Tournai, Elec. Pays Liège, 
Twys élec. Gand, Twy 
Cointe 
Econord, TELB Moudania-Brousse, Twys 
élec. Damas, Ottomane 
d'Eclairage, HOC, Terrains 
du Caire, Cairo Suburban, 
Menzaleh Navigation, 
ZNSM 
Although the default option was incorporation in Belgium, some companies had to 
establish their headquarters in the host country. Legal reasons were often behind this. 
The stipulations of the concession often specified the city where the headquarters had to 
 
                                                     
investing partners, as they were responsible for the operational management. See also Brion and Moreau, 
Tractebel. 
134 (adm)= administrative office. Source: Recueil Financier, Gallica, annual reports of the firms 
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be based. Operating companies in Liège, Ghent and Tournai had to respect this rule. The 
ZNSM office had to be registered in the Netherlands. Ottoman and Egyptian law required 
that firms had their registered office in the country, i.e. in Istanbul and Cairo. The group 
tried to work around this obligation by establishing administrative offices, officially or in 
fact, in order to centralize management nevertheless. Wherever the registered office was, 
board meetings were always held in Brussels or Paris. The Econord managed operations 
from Paris rather than from Anzin, where it had its registered office. Final decisions on 
the development of Heliopolis were taken in Paris and Brussels, although the company 
had large headquarters in the town itself.135 
Grouping the headquarters of holding companies and subsidiaries had to reduce costs, 
facilitate interfirm cooperation and help to preserve the unity of the business group. 
Strategic decision-making, corporate finance and accountancy were centralized, whereas 
operational management was decentralized to the production/operation site.136 The 
physical concentration blurred the separation between individual companies. In the 
headquarters, holding companies and subsidiaries shared offices, secretaries, managers, 
accountants, etc.137 The accounting of many French firms was centralized in the 
Hausmann offices. From 1897 to 1914, the Frenchman Albert Mary was the chief 
accountant at the headquarters in Brussels. Empain charged him with the organization 
of the administration and bookkeeping of the entire group.138 In this function, he served 
as an auditor of not less than twenty-three companies. Engineers of the holding 
companies were in close contact with the personnel of subsidiaries. In 1904, the Parisienne 
Electrique specifically hired an electrical engineer to provide consultancy to its 
subsidiaries such as the CMP, SEP, Tramways Nord-Parisiens, Bayonne-Biarritz as well as to 
the holding company itself.139 The Parisienne Electrique and other holding companies 
occasionally took over the accountancy, the administration or the supervision of 
construction works from their subsidiaries.140 As a consequence of this intensive 
rationalization, the French Cie générale des Chemins de fer vicinaux could operate its light 
rail network with an administrative staff of only thirteen people, whereas the rival Cie de 
Chemins de fer Départementaux needed the equivalent of 42 staff members.141 
 
                                                     
135 See Chapter 2 of Ilbert, Le Caire. 
136 Suzor, Empain en France, 311. 
137 For instance, the Tramways électriques Nord-Parisiens shared its offices with the SEP from 1903 until 1905. SEP 
paid part of the rent, maintenance of the offices, general expenses, and the wages of a general secretary and 
accountant. Suzor, Empain en France, 314. 
138 Mary Albert,  Légion d’Honneur (Base Léonore), 19800035/652/75112, FRAN. 
139 Meetings of 28 May 1904 & 19 Apr 1905, Parisienne Électrique, Minutes of the Board of directors, SPIE. 
140 Meeting of 10 Sep 1902, Parisienne Électrique, Minutes of the Board of directors, SPIE; Suzor, Empain en France, 
313-14. 
141 Wolkowitsch, “Siècle,” 252. 
The business group 
 173 
The scale of the business group had other advantages with regard to management. 
There was in fact an internal labor market for the middle management. In this respect, it 
is interesting to analyze the successive managers at the Tramways d’Astrakhan (est. 1896). 
When the corporate board needed to find a chief operating officer in 1899, the Voie étroite 
detached one of its engineers, Mr. Groutars. This engineer had already gained experience 
at the group’s tramway company Bruxelles-Ixelles-Boendael. Three years later Groutars was 
replaced by the then manager of the Chemin de fer Moudania-Brousse (Ottoman Empire), 
the Frenchman Jean Faure.142 Lastly, in 1908, the sister company in Tashkent lacked a 
manager. It temporarily hired the manager of Astrakhan, Mr. Deltenre. This caused a 
vacancy in Astrakhan, which was filled in by the chief operating officer of the TELB in 
Lille.143 Engineers employed by the business group even circulated outside Europe. For 
instance, the chief operating officer of the Chemins de fer de la Basse-Egypte became the 
local manager of the Nitrate Railways in Chile in 1909.144 
The senior executives did not only capitalize on the experience the middle 
management had gained in previous positions within the group. They also took advantage 
of the scale of the business group for training. If practical knowledge that had been 
acquired in one operating company was common to a certain industry, it circulated 
among different subsidiaries. In particular, the electrification of urban transport required 
new skills. On more than one occasion, managers did internships at other operating sites 
in Boulogne-sur-Mer, Liège, Ostend and Ghent, before taking charge of the recently 
electrified tramway network in Russia. Likewise, the Parisienne Electrique decided to send 
all its personnel, “of whatever rank and whatever department they belong to, to do an 
internship as a tram driver at the Cie des Tramways Nord-Parisiens and the Métropolitain.”145 
On the operational level, subsidiaries transfer knowhow too. The very same CMP send two 
of its senior drivers on secondment to Cairo for three months to train the local staff to be 
a tramway driver.146 
Wherever internal training did not suffice, Empain attracted highly skilled executives, 
as mentioned above. They had acquired competencies in previous positions outside the 
Empain group or by completing studies at prestigious schools such as the Institut 
Montefiore for electricity in Liège (Theunis, A. Della Riccia) and the Ecole nationale des Ponts 
 
                                                     
142 Meetings of 6 Nov 1899 & 5 Jun 1902, Minutes of the Board of directors, HA.02.01.314, KMMA. 
143 Meeting of 25 Aug 1908, Minutes of the Board of directors,  Archives of the Empain group, HA.02.01.315, KMMA. 
144 “Compagnie générale des nitrates: Rapport du CA,” L’Echo de la Bourse, 23 Apr 1909. 
145 “de quelque grade qu’ils soient, et quels que soient les services auxquels ils appartiennent, feront un stage de 
wattman à la Cie des Tramways Nord-Parisiens et au Métropolitain”, Meeting of 29 Mar 1901, Parisienne 
Électrique, Minutes of the Board of directors, SPIE. 
146 “The Cairo Electric Railways and Heliopolis Oases Company,” Revue municipale, 16 Apr 1910. 
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et Chaussées of Paris (Doniol, Legouëz).147 As Empain was dependent on qualitative 
graduates from higher technical education institutions in Belgium and France, he was 
keen to sponsor them. In 1899, he was one of the main donors of the Institut 
électromécanique at the Catholic University of Louvain. It had to educate mechanical 
engineers in the applications of electricity.148 After WW1, the Empain group made a much 
larger donation to the universities of Louvain and Brussels for the modernization of their 
engineering schools.149 
3.8 The multinational business group: A political chameleon? 
The basic assumption in international business is that “each multinational corporation is 
headquartered in a single country (…) because a firm can only register its existence in a 
nation state.”150 Since the development of corporate law, a company always has to be 
registered according to the law of a particular country, giving it a corporate nationality. 
However, even before the First World War the law had many difficulties to deal with the 
various forms of international investment, for regulation on corporations was very 
liberal. Legal scholars active in the period heavily discussed the question. The aim was to 
avoid any possible ambiguity and limit the room for interpretation. In the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, the place of incorporation also determined the nationality of a company. On 
the European continent, the nationality usually corresponded to the country where the 
firm had its domicile. To be the siège social effectif, this registered office effectively had to 
be used for the meetings of the board of directors and the general assembly as well as host 
the main company headquarters. The nationality had important consequences: It fixed 
the national legal framework by which the multinational had to abide as well as the 
country in which it had to pay taxes.151 
Despite the simple rules outlined above, the determination of the corporate nationality 
was rather complex in the First Global Economy. The mobility of capital and the liberal 
 
                                                     
147 On the fame of the Institut Montefiore, see Caron et al., Electricité, 1: Espoirs et conquêtes 1881-1918, 279-86. 
148 Kenneth Bertrams, Universités et entreprises: Milieux académiques et industriels en Belgique (1880-1970) (Brussels: Le 
Cri, 2006), 97; See also “Agentschap Onroerend Erfgoed: Thermotechnisch instituut en de Speciale Scholen voor 
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150 Jones, Multinationals and global capitalism, 221. 
151 R. E. L. Vaughn Williams and Matthew Chrussachi, “The Nationality of Corporations,” Law Quarterly Review 49 
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corporate law complicated the issue. Many firms had their legal domicile in one place, but 
their production, shareholders and directors were in another country. According to 
Jones, these substantial enterprises “might well be best regarded as mixed nationality 
ventures rather than belonging to a single country.”152 
However, states preferred a clear corporate nationality not only for the rule of law and 
for taxation, but also for political reasons. In the general introduction, I have argued that 
investments flowing from a home country to a host country were instrumentalized in the 
broader geopolitical rivalry, but also raised nationalist opposition. Governments and 
populations based their perception of the national identity of a firm on more than the 
legal nationality alone. The ‘foreignness’ of a firm was determined by the name, the place 
of incorporation, the location of the headquarters and of the markets as well as the 
national origin of the shareholders, the directors and the employees. 
Therefore, it was in the interest of MNEs to control as much as possible all of these 
factors that might influence their position in politics and society. The design of a flexible 
corporate structure was key in this respect. Firms could adapt to local markets and make 
use of the ambiguity surrounding the corporate national identity. For instance, by 
reorganizing their corporate structure, MNEs could disguise ownership and appear more 
local (cloaking). Before examining the strategies of the Empain group, it is necessary to 
put these in the broader context of the First Global Economy by selecting three other 
cases from that period. The Compagnie Internationale des Wagons-Lits (CIWL), 
Koninklijke/Shell and Volkart were three multinationals from small countries, respectively 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Their histories already show that the 
management of political uncertainty was crucial in that period. 
The history of the CIWL is a perfect illustration of the issue.153 The Belgian Georges 
Nagelmackers founded the company in 1876 in Brussels. His aim was to transport wealthy 
travelers across the European continent in luxurious sleeping cars. Soon, general 
manager Nagelmackers was able to reach agreements with national railway 
administrations of nearly all important countries to use their infrastructure. Because of 
the international political tensions, Nagelmackers had to proceed cautiously. He pursued 
several strategies to master the political situation. They regard the composition of the 
board of directors and management, the place of the headquarters and the nationality of 
the shareholders. 
The board of directors comprised not only Belgian friends and relatives, but also 
French, British, German and Austrian dignitaries. Before 1914, the chairman and top 
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153 Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraph is based on the little historical research conducted on the 
CIWL: Albert Mühl and Jürgen Klein, Reisen in Luxuszügen: Die Internationale Schlafwagengesellschaft (Freiburg: EK-
Verlag, 2006); Alban Guizol, “Développement spatial et constitution d’un réseau multinational: La Compagnie 
internationale des Wagons-lits” (Unpublished PhD Diss., Université Paris I, 1995). 
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management were always Belgians, although Nagelmackers’ assistant Napoleon 
Schroeder was originally German. The bulk of the shareholders lived in Belgium, France, 
Germany and Great Britain. 
So far, the MNE seems to have had an international and slightly neutral Belgian 
character. However, the company had already moved part of its management to Paris a 
few years after its incorporation. Paris was a crucial transport hub for the Wagons-Lits. 
The company needed to keep in touch with the French railway companies. French 
influence increased rapidly after the financial crisis of 1900. The CIWL was on the verge of 
bankruptcy and had to be saved by French big banks. Now, the entire management was 
centralized in Paris. The legal headquarters in Brussels had been relegated to a regional 
branch. The French government and press also regarded Georges Nagelmackers as a 
citizen of France, where he had his permanent residence. The French State also decorated 
him commander of the Légion d’Honneur.154 
The management of the CIWL did everything to safeguard its neutrality in the context 
of the political tensions on the European continent. However, the French interference 
displeased the German railway administration. In the 1880s and early 1890s, the Prussian 
railway minister had already temporarily banned CIWL from the territory because he did 
not like to support a company with French interests. As soon as the difficulties were 
ironed out, the CIWL established a subsidiary registered in Germany and with a large 
financial input from local bankers. When after 1905, the British increased their interest 
in the company, the general manager Schroeder was worried. The British shareholders 
might spoil the company’s good relations with the different governments and railway 
administrations on the continent. In addition, Schroeder wrote that if the British 
dominated the Wagons-Lits, this might “spark national aspirations against us.”155 
The history of Koninklijke/Shell is similar, yet it pursued strategies on a global scale. The 
Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maatschappij was based in The Hague, whereas the 
headquarters of the Shell Transport & Trading Company were in London. They each profited 
from their membership of the Dutch and British empire. The Koninklijke needed the 
proximity to the colonial government in The Hague to obtain oil concessions in the Dutch 
East Indies, whereas Shell made use of the extensive trade network of the British Empire 
and of the availability of capital in the City. In 1907, the Koninklijke decided to merge with 
Shell instead of taking it over. A Dutch takeover would have meant the loss of access to 
the British Empire. The founder explained the decision by referring to the issue of 
nationality: “We depend too much on the British government because we have to sell a 
large share of our products in the British colonies.”156 Therefore, they worked out a dual 
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legal structure with a British and a Dutch mother company. The group kept two 
headquarters. The directors were also either Dutch or British, able to lead the 
negotiations with their respective governments. The dual structure had two additional 
advantages. The Koninklijke could continue to meet the conditions of the concessions in 
the Dutch Indies, while Shell could provide the group with the power and prestige of the 
British Empire. 
The Swiss-owned multinational merchant house Volkart also played with the location 
of its headquarters. For similar reasons as the Koninklijke/Shell, it transferred its main 
offices from Winterthur to London in 1892. Because of Volkart’s intensive trade with the 
Indian colony, it was important that its customers in London and India viewed the 
company as British. The firm was thus officially British, although the actual headquarters 
remained in Switzerland. During the First World War, the concern about its corporate 
nationality was the exact opposite. Now, the multinational decided to stress its Swiss 
identity in all communication, because of the advantages of neutrality linked to it.157 
Let us now turn to the Empain group. From the analysis in the previous chapters 
emerged the view of the Empain group as a business group with assets in sixteen 
countries. It is therefore not surprising that the Empain group has tried to control the 
national origin of its shareholders and directors as well as its corporate structure, in order 
to fit with local and international politics. I argue that the multinational character of 
Empain’s holding companies in particular allowed the group to flexibly maneuver 
between the Belgian, French and local centers of power. 
Forbes et al. assert that in Europe, holding companies were often used “in the efforts 
to deal with political risks.”158 The case of Empain strengthens this claim. As explained 
above, up to four holding companies controlled the subsidiaries. Their existence is due to 
various reasons, but Empain could surely take advantage of their multinational character. 
Empain’s first holding companies were genuinely Belgian. The Compagnie belge des chemins 
de fer réunis even carried the nationality in its name. By mentioning it explicitly, Empain 
perhaps also hoped to take advantage of the solid reputation Belgium had acquired in 
railroads and tramways.159 
In 1896, however, Empain called his Brussels-based holding company the Compagnie 
russe-française de chemins de fer et de tramways (Russe-française). Surprisingly, the name 
made the French financial press feel betrayed. They knew that the company, French or 
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Russian only by name, was on the contrary directed and controlled by Belgian 
capitalists.160 The founders had imagined a French-looking company, with offices in Paris 
and Saint Petersburg. However, it had only one Frenchman (Félicien Maes) and one 
Russian (Mikhail Annenkov) on the board of directors. One the one hand, the name 
referred to the company’s core markets. On the other hand, it is also very likely that the 
Empain group wanted to bestow the Belgian company with the prestige of two Great 
Powers, who had recently concluded a diplomatic alliance (1891/93). In the wake of this 
partnership, investing in Russia became a trend in France and Belgium. As a result, many 
companies adopted the predicament franco-russe.161 
The Société parisienne pour l'industrie des chemins de fer et des tramways électriques 
(Parisienne Electrique) was the first holding actually established in France. The name 
referred to the place where it was both registered and listed as well as where its 
headquarters were located. In addition, French banks and private investors owned a large 
part of the share capital. French top officials were recruited on the board of directors. 
Nevertheless, because the Empain group still had corporate control, some journalists 
would not recognize the company as French. According to L’Information, the Parisienne 
Electrique was Belgian, but Empain “had it naturalized” to obtain tramway concessions 
and easy access to the Paris stock exchange.162 
If one looks at the nationality of the directors of the Empain group in general and of 
the holding companies in particular, the remarks about the corporate national identity 
were understandable, but too simplistic. Not only three fourth of the top collaborators 
were Belgian (see above), the directors from the home country were dominant over the 
whole period. They held more than two thirds of all yearly directorates. Some 20 % was 
held by Frenchmen.163 In the holding companies too, the majority of the directors were 
Belgian. This started to change slightly with the creation of the Parisienne Electrique and 
certainly on the eve of the First World War (see Chapter 5). Belgians were present on 
nearly every board, but the second most important nationality differed according to the 
 
                                                     
160 “Cie russe-française de chemins de fer et de tramways,” Journal des Actionnaires, 7 Apr 1901; “Compagnie Russe-
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162 “Etudes financières: Société Parisienne,” L’Information, 1 Jun 1901. 
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host country. Firms operating on the French market had a French-Belgian board. In the 
Netherlands, the Frenchmen were replaced by Dutch notables. In Egypt, the British 
directors were fewer in number than the Belgians, but outnumbered the French directors. 
This suggests that Empain adapted the composition of the boards to the specific political 
circumstances. 
From the perspective of ownership too, Belgium clearly had the ascendancy over 
France in the Empain group. Although the Parisienne Electrique was partly created to give 
a more local image to the businesses in France, no subsidiary of importance is controlled 
by the Parisienne Electrique alone. In most cases, it shared the ownership with the Belgian 
holding companies. This means that the shareholders of firms in France were never 
exclusively French. This suggests that Empain did not have the intention to entirely cloak 
the fact that ultimate control was in Belgian hands. None of the holding companies had a 
restrictive geographical focus. However, whereas the Railways&Electricité and Réunis 
owned many French firms, the Parisienne Electrique did not control a single firm in 
Belgium. In other foreign markets too, the Belgian holding companies were the driving 
force. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the holding companies were based both in Belgium and 
France, which makes the Empain group special. This binational structure reminds of the 
'dual listed company' (DLC).164 Mostly as a result of a merger, the DLC existed of two 
companies with separate legal and national identities. Although each mother company 
had its own headquarters and was listed on the national stock exchange, they still operate 
as a single economic entity. In the early twentieth century, the DLC was very exceptional. 
Shell and Unilever are the most famous examples. There are, however, some structural 
differences between the DLC and the Empain group. On the one hand, there were never 
two, but three to four intricately linked top holding companies. On the other hand, they 
were all listed both in Brussels and Paris. Besides financial optimization, the binational 
structure facilitated political strategies. 
The option to have both Belgian and French holding companies invest in an operating 
subsidiary gave the Empain group the opportunity to ask diplomatic support of both 
countries. The cases of two Belgian tramway companies in the Russian Empire illustrate 
this strategy. Since 1890, the city of Chișinău in present-day Moldova possessed a horse-
drawn tramway. The Empain group had bought the small network in 1895 with the aim 
of expanding and electrifying it. However, the negotiations with the local authorities on 
the electrification appeared very difficult. After several years of trying, the Belgian 
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mother company Voie étroite of the Belgian-registered tramway company Tramways de 
Kischinew wanted to request diplomatic support. In order to get the help of the powerful 
French diplomacy, the Voie étroite offered to the group’s main French holding company 
Parisienne Electrique to buy into the Tramways de Kischinew. As soon as ‘French’ investors 
had taken an interest in the tramway company, the Belgian mother company could ask 
the French Embassy in Saint Petersburg to appeal to the Chișinău Municipality. 
Apparently, the French intervention did not have the wanted effect, for the company only 
obtained electrification in 1911.165 
One year later, a similar situation occurred when the sister company Tramways 
d’Astrakhan quarreled with the city council of Astrakhan about the tramway service. 
Edouard Empain again approached the French embassy in Russia – instead of its Belgian 
counterpart – to intercede. This time, the French holding company Parisienne Electrique 
owned 50% of the tramway company, while the Belgian Russe-française owned the other 
half. To better their chances, Empain invited the Frenchman Doniol to join the board. The 
company also replaced the Belgian manager by a Frenchman and opened an office in 
Paris, in the building of the Parisienne Electrique.166 However, French diplomacy refused 
any cooperation. “The French government cannot officially grant the support of the 
ambassador for [the] firm is Belgian, while the influence of French diplomacy is reserved 
for firms that pay taxes in France.”167 Finally, the board dismissed Empain’s suggestion to 
transform the Tramways d’Astrakhan into a French firm, because it would raise the tax 
burden. 
By 1913, the difficulty to receive the approval of the French government for diplomatic 
support as well as for access to the Paris Stock Exchange incited the Empain group to 
change the strategy. For the first time, instead of ordinarily establishing a Belgian free-
standing company, the Empain group chose to incorporate the Société Industrielle 
d’Electricité pour la Russie (SIER) in Paris. This new holding company had to control and 
expand the group operations in Russia.168 This was not an isolated incident. In the same 
year, the Empain brothers made an interesting declaration to the French ambassador in 
Cairo. They were considering establishing a French firm for Egypt, because “more and 
 
                                                     
165 Meeting of 20 Jul 1900, Parisienne Électrique, Minutes of the Board of directors, SPIE; de Massol de Rebetz, 
“Sociétés,” 207. 
166 Meeting of 2 May 1902, Minutes of the Board of directors, HA.02.01.314, KMMA; Meeting of 22 Apr 1902, 
Parisienne Électrique, Minutes of the Board of directors, SPIE. 
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more, they wanted to do their business on the Paris market.”169 As a matter of fact, the 
listing requirements for French firms were less stringent. 
To conclude, this section has shown that the business group form had clear advantages 
to maneuver in the nationally delineated world economy. Like some kind of chameleon, 
the Empain group tried to adapt to different political environments. The group’s 
embeddedness in different countries and cities gave it the opportunity to involve the local 
elite or the hegemonic power, without losing control. On the contrary, the CIWL was less 
organized as a business group. As a result, the integrated firm itself was subject to 
constant struggles for national influence and nationalist opposition. 
3.9 Conclusion 
From the early beginning in 1881, the foundations of the Empain group were a bank and 
a holding company. In Belgium, both types of firms were not uncommon, but Empain has 
frequently made use of them. While expanding operations in a growing number of 
countries, the Empain group evolved into a complex multinational business group. 
Although the structure developed organically and sometimes in an improvised way, 
Empain had many reasons not to alter it fundamentally. Of course, it was a way to give a 
certain coherence to the more than 80 companies founded or acquired before the First 
World War. In particular, it provided three crucial advantages. 
First of all, the business group form offered many possibilities with regard to finance. 
These include the spread of risk and the wide range of funding options. The organization 
into holding companies and legally distinct subsidiaries was a perfect way to spread the 
risk and provide shelter to investors as well as group companies. In addition, the best-
performing companies compensated the modest yield of others. The Empain group 
preferred to procure capital via joint ventures and stock markets rather than via bank 
loans. It tried to remain independent from large financial groups. Empain cooperated 
with venture capitalists and later with big banks, but confined these joint ventures to 
specific projects, without them gaining influence in the parent companies. Empain’s 
private bank and the holding companies replaced the tasks of the large financial 
institutions. They subscribed to the capital increases of operating companies, extended 
credits to starting subsidiaries and organized payments. 
 
                                                     
169 “de plus en plus, ils voulaient faire leurs affaires sur le marché de Paris”, Defrance (Cairo) to Jonnart (Paris), 
24 Jan 1913, B-0031291, CAEF. 
Beyond borders, sectors and classic corporations 
182 
Above all, the capital came from Belgian and French savers. To reach them, the Empain 
group listed as many companies on the stock exchange as possible. Thanks to the listings, 
the firms could profit from high quotations to increase their capital at a premium. In 
addition, the holding companies could bolster their coffers by speculating with the shares 
of their subsidiaries. Besides short-term speculation, the business group aimed to create 
value in the long term. Therefore, the holding companies followed a “buy and hold” 
strategy. Until the subsidiary was mature enough to make profits, the holding companies 
held its shares closely. Afterward, they only kept a controlling block, while selling the 
other shares, preferably with a profit. Empain had a preference for listings on the stock 
exchanges of Brussels or Paris, ideally on both of them. That way, the Empain group could 
tap the capital markets of both countries. His network in the City was very limited, so he 
only turned to the largest capital market in the world in cases that absolutely required 
the presence of British capitalists. 
Secondly, the business group structure limited the trade-off of external finance versus 
family control. Running a family business did not exclude growth and professionalization. 
The complex ownership structure was designed to dominate a maximum number of 
companies with relatively limited personal capital. Whenever the shares of the 
subsidiaries were widely dispersed, the Empain brothers merely needed to hold the 
parent companies more closely and make sure they in turn owned at least a controlling 
minority interest in the subsidiaries. This means that the financial leverage of the 
Empains was impressive. Moreover, despite the relatively loose financial structure, the 
Empain brothers held a tight grip on the strategic decision-making. The Empains took 
charge of launching new projects, taking important financial measures and allocating 
managers. In sum, they were responsible for the coordination and organization of the 
economies of scale and scope within the business group. However, with the geographical 
and sectoral diversification came the need for professionalization and centralization. 
Rather than appointing the closest family members, Edouard Empain entrusted skilled 
managers with the representation of his interests in his or his brother’s absence. Empain’s 
relatives only received important positions if they qualified. The broader circle of top 
executives therefore included only one brother-in-law. Instead, the bulk consisted of 
trained engineers, financial and legal experts as well as politicians and top officials. Even 
Empain’s original network already contained a lot of highly educated businessmen and 
not just ‘family, friends and fools’. In sum, the Empain group was not a classic family 
business and more an open family firm. 
Thirdly and finally, business groups were an evident form in the First Global Economy, 
especially in public utilities, because they provided organizational and political 
flexibility. On the one hand, the Empain group could flexibly respond to investment 
opportunities by simply adding another subsidiary or even a holding company to the 
structure. This enables both organic growth and growth through acquisitions. Thanks to 
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director interlocks and the centralization in the Brussels and Paris headquarters, the 
myriad of companies remained manageable. 
On the other hand, the business group of Empain was politically versatile. With the 
principle of one utility, one firm, Empain could adapt to foreign legislation and meet the 
specific demands of local administrations. This had the additional advantage that e.g. 
municipalities had the feeling to deal with a single foreign company instead of a 
multinational business empire. Moreover, the multitude of holding companies allowed 
Empain to give each public utility the appropriate national identity. Sometimes, it was 
better to give the subsidiary a local appearance to mitigate political risk. At other times, 
the Empain group had to involve capitalists from Great Powers to obtain international 
support. The establishment of the French Parisienne Electrique in particular suggests that 
Empain tried to develop a chameleonic strategy, alternating a Belgian and French image. 
The country studies of Part II will show how the business group could exploit the above-
mentioned capacities, including its versatile multinational identity. 
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Part 2 Securing investments: Political strategies 
towards home and host countries 
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Chapter 4 Belgium and the Congo: A ‘home 
game’? 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the first in a series of chapters looking at the political aspects of 
international business. In the general introduction, I have formulated a number of 
hypotheses about the liability of foreignness and how multinationals developed 
strategies to overcome this. Conversely, the concept of liability of foreignness also 
implied the existence of a ‘liability of home’. Both concepts not only refer to foreign 
investments, but also suggest that the right national origin could be an asset in the home 
country. By virtue of his place of birth and the domicile of most of his companies, Empain 
was considered a Belgian entrepreneur. Therefore, the main question of this chapter is 
whether the Empain group had a ‘home advantage’ in Belgium. If so, how could Empain 
successfully exploit his Belgian identity to secure important investments? Furthermore, 
could Empain extend his ‘home advantage’ to the Belgian imperial space, i.e. the Congo 
Free State? 
There are two crucial aspects to the main question. The first is related to the existence 
of a business-government nexus in Belle Epoque Belgium. Could it be that Belgian 
entrepreneurs had to engage in business diplomacy and build up a network in political 
and business circles to secure important investments? The second transcends the 
importance of good connections, and questions the significance of nationality. My 
hypothesis is that nationality mattered depending on the context. In the Belgian small 
open economy, there were numerous foreign competitors on the market. I hypothesize 
that Belgians only had an advantage in case of Belgian-foreign competition. Even in that 
case, there is some reason for doubt, for the following reason. 
Most Belgian historians would argue that (economic) nationalism was not a driving 
force in national politics, as the Belgian state and its elite were ultraliberal and free-trade-
oriented. The political struggles were situated in other domains. Fin-de-siècle Belgium 
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was a very unequal society, where the economic elite had monopolized political power. 
Large landowners, industrialists, lawyers, etc. dominated local and national politics. The 
bulk of the working and agricultural classes could not aspire to any social mobility. 
Society was politically deeply divided between a Catholic majority and a minority of 
anticlerical liberals and socialists. Catholics had conquered an absolute majority in the 
Parliament in 1884 and continued to form one-party governments until 1917. The whole 
of society (education, unions, clubs, …) was organized along sectarian lines, with a large 
cleavage between the Catholic, socialist and liberal ideologies (pillarization).1 However, 
very recent research by Van Ginderachter has demonstrated that there was some popular 
nationalism in the working class.2 Because of the complexity of the issue, this needs 
further investigation. How could the Belgian Empain capitalize on this latent 
nationalism? 
By focusing on Belgium, this chapter fills a gap in the historiography of the Empain 
group. Empain’s investments abroad have repeatedly been studied, but his position in 
Belgium is only superficially known. Yet, the Belgian side of the multinational business 
group should be studied, especially since it serves a point of reference for the following 
chapters. Only by studying the home country will we be able to compare investment 
contexts in other countries. 
This chapter is structured in six parts. The first section discusses the significance of 
Edouard Empain in Belgium up to 1900. It sketches an image of an upcoming entrepreneur 
who establishes himself in the high financial circles of Brussels. In the second section, 
special attention is given to Empain’s relationship with Leopold II. The next two sections 
discuss two high-profile investment projects: the Brussels-Antwerp interurban and the 
creation of ACEC. The cases illustrate the privileges the business group derived from 
Empain’s excellent relationship with Catholic politicians. The establishment of ACEC in 
particular raises interesting points about the role of nationalist rhetoric in Empain’s 
flying start in the emerging electricity industry. The fifth section resumes the overview 
of the reinforced position of Empain in Belgian business and society. The sixth and final 
section investigates how the group’s activities in Leopold’s Congo should be interpreted. 
Were Empain’s privileges and the political circumstances the same in Belgium and the 
colony? The comparison of both contexts puts the relative importance of personal 
networks and of Belgian identity in perspective. 
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Belgium and the Congo 
 189 
4.2 The rise of an ambitious businessman (1880-1900) 
Edouard Empain was an exception to the limited social mobility in late-nineteenth-
century Belgium. He belonged to a small new elite that was able to profit from the 
opportunities offered by industrialization. Other famous contemporary examples are 
Ferdinand Baeyens and Jean Jadot, successive governors of the Société Générale, as well as 
Ernest Solvay of the eponymous business group. 
Born in a Catholic middle-class family and starting as a draftsman in the 1870s, Empain 
had become a wealthy banker in Brussels by the mid-1890s.3 This rise was exceptional, as 
three out of four Belgian bankers of Empain’s generation (born in the 1840s and 1850s) 
held a higher education degree, mostly in law or engineering.4 Specialized in railways and 
tramways, Empain was not yet the public figure famous in national political and economic 
circles. His name appeared in the press in relation to news about his business ventures. 
For the Empain group, Belgium was at that time a relatively small market in terms of 
invested capital. The bulk of Empain’s resources went abroad. Among the Brussels 
financial elite, with whom he often partnered up for foreign projects, Empain had a solid 
reputation. To keep up his standing as a wealthy industrialist, Empain eagerly 
participated in activities that suited his new social class. He was regularly seen at theater 
plays, parties and dinners. His brother François was an enthusiastic lover of opera. 
Edouard and François had their horses participate in contests all over the country, 
sponsored the first automobile races and donated to charity.5 Edouard’s appointment as 
commissioner for the World Exhibitions in Antwerp and Brussels of 1894 and 1897 proves 
that he too had obtained a certain position in Belgian business circles.6 
For the early 1890s, there is no proof that Empain was already in the position to 
influence policy affecting his businesses in Belgium. To be sure, Empain had started to 
collaborate closely with politicians of different ideologies such as Adrien d’Oultremont, 
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1893. 
Securing investments 
190 
Jules Carlier, Adolphe Dupont-Rucloux and Achille Huart-Hamoir.7 In the next decade, he 
hired the services of politicians/business lawyers Jules Renkin and Georges Grimard, and 
appointed Victor Fris as chairman of the Tramways de Lille.8 The presence of politically 
active people in the business group could indicate some political influence. Yet, the 
general entanglement of politics and business in the Belle Epoque makes it hard to assess 
if these individuals were partners of Empain precisely because of their political 
connection. Their political mandate might sometimes just have been a coincidence. 
Nevertheless, thanks to Adrien d’Oultremont, the expanding Empain group could count 
on the support of the Belgian government. In the early 1890s, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was favorably disposed towards the Eaux de Caracas in Venezuela, of which 
d’Oultremont was a director (see Chapter 6). 
Empain’s reputation and influence increased only slowly, but this started to change 
with his tramway plans in Brussels in the mid-1890s. In the entire country, the business 
group merely controlled some 300 km of light rail and tramway lines in the countryside. 
With the Chemin de fer à voie étroite de Bruxelles à Ixelles-Boendael (BIB), the group possessed 
one politically more visible line in the Belgian capital. Because BIB was mainly active in 
the southeastern suburbs, Empain initially did not pose a direct threat to the mighty 
Tramways Bruxellois (TB), the largest tramway operator in the capital. However, in the 
1890s, Empain continued to apply for concessions within the sphere of the TB. He aimed 
to expand to the city center.9 As such, Empain started to poach in the territory of large 
financial groups, the Société Générale in this case. In 1893, the TB could still avoid 
competition by offering to cooperate in a project to connect the lower and upper parts of 
the city. Empain and the TB agreed to merge their interests in case one of them was 
selected, but political discussions indeterminately postponed a decision in any 
direction.10 Three years later, Empain again directly confronted the TB for the concession 
of the extension of a TB line. Finally, BIB, the TB and the minister consulted to maintain 
the privileged position of the TB, but the Empain group received prestigious concessions 
 
                                                     
7 D’Oultremont (independent, Chamber of Representatives 1884-1892), Carlier (liberal, Chamber of 
Representatives 1886-1892), Dupont-Rucloux (liberal, Provincial Council of Liège 1878-1892), Huart-Hamoir 
(liberal, alderman (1895-1902) and mayor of Schaerbeek (1903-1909), Provincial Council of Brabant (1895(?)-
1899) 
8 Renkin (Catholic, Chamber of Representatives 1896-1934), Grimard (socialist, Municipal Council of Brussels 
1895-1899, Chamber of Representatives 1898-1900, Senate 1900-1908), Fris (Catholic, Chamber of 
Representatives 1884-1900, Senate 1900-1913) 
9 “Chronique du jour,” Journal de Bruxelles, 23 Mar 1890. 
10 “Un trottoir roulant,” La Meuse, 8 Nov 1895; “La Commission,” La Meuse, 13 Feb 1894; “Les moyens de transport 
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in compensation.11 These included two electric tramway lines connecting the city center 
with the terrains of the Universal Exposition of 1897. One of them followed the track of 
the newly constructed avenue leading to the Colonial Exposition in Tervueren, conceived 
by King Leopold II himself. As a consequence of these extensions, BIB doubled its tramway 
mileage and became an important actor in the Brussels transport system.12 
The TB, BIB and other tramway companies in Brussels slowly followed the 
electrification trend that transformed the urban transport sector in the late 1890s. To 
justify these massive investments, the TB wanted to secure its existence in the long run. 
This is why its parent company, the Société Générale, repeatedly approached the central 
and local government to unify all concessions and extend their validity, as a part would 
expire in 1909. In 1897, the municipality of Brussels took the demand of the TB seriously.13 
The news of the direct negotiations encouraged competitors to spontaneously submit 
alternative projects in the absence of an official invitation to tender. Tramway 
entrepreneur Edouard Otlet published a proposal to establish the Nouveaux Tramways 
Bruxellois, but most politicians ignored or discredited his project. Reportedly, the Empain 
group also prepared a proposition to take over the expiring concessions of the TB.14 Given 
both the size of its network and the reputation that it was gaining by being part of the 
consortium allowed to build and operate the Paris Métro, the TB could not ignore that the 
Empain group was to pose a serious threat to its interests.15 
This made BIB an interesting target for a takeover. Realizing that further competition 
could harm both firms, negotiations between them started in January 1898.16 Within a 
month, the boards of directors came to an agreement. The TB could acquire the network 
of the BIB if the parliament voted the unification and extensions of the TB concessions. In 
return, the Empain group received about 15 million francs, partly in TB shares, for a 
company worth about 11 million francs. As a result of their secured interest in TB of at 
least 16%, the Empain group received three seats in the board of directors.17 
Whereas Catholic senator Edouard Otlet lacked the power to persuade his fellow party 
members, the influential directors of the TB and the Société Générale effectively put 
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pressure on the municipal council and the national government. The takeover of BIB and 
the reorganization of the network were adopted by the City of Brussels a few months after 
the deal between both companies. Political protest impeded a steady adoption in 
Parliament, but the law was finally voted in August 1899.18 According to De Ryck, the 
appointment of the Empain brothers to the board of the TB was an important asset to put 
pressure on the Catholic government.19 However, no contemporary sources can really 
prove this. Arguably, Empain’s soft power at that time was rather limited compared to 
the channels through which the Société Générale could convey its message to leading 
Belgian politicians.20 
What did affect the standing of Empain was his budding collaboration with Leopold II. 
Edouard Empain, and to a lesser extent François, had become welcome guests at the Royal 
Palace from 1897 onwards. As this considerably promoted Empain’s position in the 
Belgian elite, the following section investigates it in detail. 
4.3 A peculiar friendship: Empain and King Leopold II 
King Leopold II, with his unquenchable appetite for business, was always looking for 
‘accomplices’ who could assist him in his business projects in his Congo Free State (CFS) 
and elsewhere.21 More than anything, Leopold II was looking for fresh money to finance 
his colony. He convinced large Belgian and French banks to subscribe to a lottery loan of 
150 million francs in 1888.22 In this context, Empain appeared for the first time in the 
service of the King, at least indirectly. A year after the issue of the loan, Edouard Empain 
and his then close partner Edouard Otlet reported from Paris to Comte Adrien 
d’Oultremont, a business relation of theirs and brother of the King’s Grand Maréchal de la 
Cour. Their mission had been to investigate the financial viability of the loan. Otlet and 
Empain expressed their gratitude for being able to help his Majesty with “the immense 
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works that He has undertaken in Africa.”23 It is, however, unclear to what extent the King 
himself was aware of this mission. In any case, Leopold II did not particularly notice 
Empain, although the latter had slowly started to invest in colonial firms around the same 
period (see Chapter 1). Empain had another connection to the Royal Palace, though it is 
uncertain if precisely this brought him closer to the King. His close partner Arthur du Roy 
de Blicquy had a brother Fernand, who was the personal aide-de-camp (1870-1905) of 
crown prince Philippe. Fernand’s son was equerry (1898-1900) of Philippe and afterward 
of Prince/King Albert (1900-1917).24 
The real rapprochement between Empain and Leopold II only happened as soon as 
Empain took an interest in Leopold II’s second passion: China. Empain started to be 
invited to the parties at the Royal Palace after the visit of the Chinese Viceroy Li 
Hongzhang in July 1896 (see Chapter 1).25 In 1898, his brother François Empain was invited 
to attend a more exclusive dinner in presence of the King, Belgian ministers and Chinese 
diplomats. From the next year onwards, Edouard Empain was frequently granted this 
honor too, in a more intimate setting with a limited number of guests. On several 
occasions, Edouard was even given a seat at the King’s table. During the dinners, he was 
often in the presence of the King’s favorite partners Lambert, Thys and Wiener as well as 
loyal government members such as Minister of Foreign Affairs de Favereau and Minister 
of Finance de Smet de Naeyer.26 
With the visits to the Palace, Empain also started to render services to the King. He 
remained a loyal collaborator until the King’s death in 1909.27 Empain also expressed his 
loyalty by intimidating critics such as Bunau-Varilla, his acquaintance and editor of the 
Parisian newspaper Le Matin, as well as Jourdain, the editor of the Brussels newspaper Le 
Patriote.28 Gradually, Empain became Leopold’s all-round economic-diplomatic advisor 
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24 “Ars Moriendi: du Roy de Blicquy Fernand,”  http://www.ars-moriendi.be/DU_ROY_DE_BLICQUY1870.HTM; 
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and financier. At first, the favors only concerned Chinese businesses, but in the second 
instance they also included Congolese financial matters. Thirdly and finally, Empain 
assisted Leopold in projects in Morocco and elsewhere. 
Firstly, Empain combined the management of his own project in China with favors for 
the King regarding the American China Development Company (ACDC) and the Tianjin 
concession. On the one hand, Empain helped Leopold II to secure control over the ACDC, 
which had obtained the concession for the Hankou-Canton railway. Keeping the entire 
arterial railroad Beijing-Hankou-Canton in Belgian hands was an obsession of King 
Leopold, until China bought the Hankou-Canton back in 1904. Empain made payments on 
behalf of the King and advised him on sophisticated financial constructions. He vainly 
went to Paris to convince French big banks of investing in the ACDC. On the other hand, 
Empain gladly acted as a straw man in the efforts to obtain a territorial concession in 
Tianjin. In 1901, for instance, he becomes the main director of the new Société Asiatique. 
This rather thin construction was meant to financially support Leopold’s efforts in 
China.29 
Secondly, by 1901 Leopold II had also started to rely on Empain for financial matters in 
his private colony. As mentioned in the first chapter, the King’s regular collaborator 
Albert Thys had fallen into disgrace and Leopold II was looking for new businessmen. 
With his wide and influential network in Paris, Empain was the man after Leopold’s heart. 
Empain was thrilled to contribute to “the great African work of the King.”30 Leopold II 
charged him to unofficially represent the CFS in Paris and to negotiate with the Chemin de 
fer du Congo on behalf of the colony. Most importantly, Empain accepted to finance the 
Chemins de fer du Congo Supérieur aux Grands Lacs africains (CFL). In addition, he tried to find 
Belgian and French bankers ready to accept the remainder of the lottery loan of 1888 in 
their portfolio. He already had done something similar in 1889, but now he could use his 
influential status in Paris. In November 1902, Empain managed to persuade his close 
partners Bénard&Jarislowsky to take charge of half of the remaining bonds. In turn, Empain 
personally vouched for a part of the bonds accepted by Bénard&Jarislowsky, worth 3 million 
francs. This way, the King could remain behind the scenes, while still securing access to 
the Paris Stock Exchange.31 
Thirdly, Empain assisted the King in his colonial aspirations in the area of Agadir, 
Morocco.32 Empain organized a covert expedition to Morocco in 1904 that had to obtain a 
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territorial concession from the Sultan. The mission was led by collaborators of Empain: 
Georges Grimard and Henri Denis, respectively a friend and a brother-in-law of the 
Belgian banker. Despite avoiding any reference to Empain and thus to the King, foreign 
Powers soon discovered the true royal nature of the mission. After French and Spanish 
opposition, Grimard and his retinue had to return to Belgium without success.33 
 
Figure 24 Press cartoon depicting Edouard Empain and Leopold II (1903)34 
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Despite Leopold’s efforts to use Empain as a cover, the good relationship between the two 
was a public secret. From 1901 at the latest, when the CFL project took shape, journalists, 
politicians and diplomats knew that Empain was “one of the businessmen and confidants 
of King Leopold II”35, perhaps even the “favorite financier.”36 On the one hand, Empain’s 
royal friendship conveyed a lot of prestige. The investments of the Empain group 
suddenly enjoyed the alleged protection of the King. On some occasions, this was not far 
from the truth. Both in Belgium and China, Leopold II lobbied for Empain, as discussed 
further in this dissertation. On the other hand, the association with the King also had a 
drawback. Leopold was a very controversial personality and had many enemies in 
Belgium and abroad. As a result, Empain’s dealings with the King were the object of 
derision in popular media. Press cartoons such as Figure 24 were one form of criticism. 
Another one was Les Carnets du Roi, a widely circulated satire on Leopold II that cited 
Empain at length.37 He is staged as one of the important persons the King granted 
audiences to. The book provided a caricatural, yet not totally inaccurate portrait of the 
self-made banker. Indeed, Empain was of humble origin. Moreover, he had not always 
wanted to help the King at any price.38 
Mr. Empain will rarely bother you and he will even gladly wait until you send for 
him. He will seem very charmed and very surprised by the honor you do to him and 
he will endeavor to persuade you in two words that the long-awaited audience is 
totally unexpected for him. Mr. Empain does not make sentences and he is devoid 
of any grandiloquence. He is a laborious and calculating chief clerk and knows the 
exact price of the services he can offer you. Tell him briefly what you have to say to 
him and listen to his answer. He will always be precise and clear and will endeavor 
to appear without ulterior motives. But don’t trust what he tells you. Never commit 
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yourself totally. With this man you are always being rolled and your prestige will 
do nothing against the apparent logic of his deductions.39 
Because Empain was so close to Leopold II, his most virulent critic already imagined him 
a baron in 1903.40 Finally, Leopold awarded Empain the title in 1907, removing the last 
doubts about the excellent ties between both (see Fig. 25 for the coat of arms).41 No 
observer really wondered why. As one French newspaper smartly wrote, “the King-
businessman owed this great mark of respect to the king of the businessmen.”42 Leopold 
II famously was generous with decorations in recognition for services rendered. He also 
used decorations to please people from whom he wanted something in return. However, 
the title of baron was already a token of the King’s particular appreciation. Only close 
collaborators and dignitaries received the honor to be created baron ex nihilo. For 
comparison, Empain was in the good company of Léon Lambert (1896), who financed 
Leopold’s colony from the start; Edmond van Eetvelde (1897), the long-standing secretary 
of the King; Ferdinand Baeyens, governor of the Société Générale (1904); and Maurice 
Joostens (1904), a Belgian diplomat who had distinguished himself in China. Only Paul de 
Smet de Naeyer, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Public Works, was 
immediately created count in the same period (1900).43 
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Gemeentekrediet, 1992). 
Securing investments 
198 
 
Figure 25 Coat of arms of Baron Edouard Empain (1907)44 
4.4 A private interurban between Brussels and Antwerp? 
(1900-1903) 
The turn of the century marked a watershed in Empain’s rise to national fame. His 
transport enterprises in Egypt, Russia, China, Spain and especially France had added to 
his aura of an important businessman. The Empain brothers had secured a prominent 
position in the dominant transport firms of both Brussels and Paris. At the start of the 
century, the electric revolution offered new opportunities to invest in the home market 
and give Belgium a central place in the business group. In the late 1890s, the Empain 
brothers had also established close relations with the Catholic Conservatives. François 
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Empain was even tipped as the local Catholic candidate for the Senate in 1900.45 On top of 
that, they had been invited several times at the Royal Palace. 
Empain’s involvement in the plans for the first electric railway in Belgium perfectly 
illustrates the change in status of the businessman. Empain’s excellent relations with the 
Catholic Party and King Leopold made him a protagonist in the story. Inspired by the 
evolution in other industrializing countries such as the United States and Germany, the 
Société Générale made the central government a proposition in early 1900. Explicitly 
referring to the successful electric interurban railways in the US, where thousands of 
kilometers of such kind had already been finished, the Société Générale proposed to 
construct a direct line from Brussels to Antwerp.46 The train would provide a fast link 
between the two largest Belgian cities. Trains would ride at a commercial speed of at least 
100 km/h. Exclusively meant for passengers, these could see their travel time reduced 
from 55 to 25 minutes. Because of the new technology and the high costs associated with 
it, the Société Générale, together with the TB, some banks and the German UEG, convinced 
the central government to rely on private partners to finance and operate the line. This 
was a very interesting opportunity for investors, because the Brussels-Antwerp line was 
the busiest of Belgium, with at least 1.5 million passengers a year.47 The Société Générale 
wanted to invest 40 million with 4% return guaranteed by the State. It asked for a 
concession of 60 years, although the State could buy back the railway already after ten 
years. However, completely convinced of the necessity and urgency of the project, 
neither the Belgian financiers nor the Catholic government had expected any political 
resistance. Several MPs, also from the Catholic majority, criticized the hastiness and lack 
of transparency of the project. At the demand of Belgian business organizations, later 
drafts of the program contained a closed-market clause, stipulating that the national 
industry should provide most of the material. However, electrical equipment was 
exempted because of the sophisticated technology. Most likely, the Société Générale 
wanted to keep its partner UEG on board. Consequently, a socialist MP questioned the 
participation of German electric industry to the detriment of the Belgian electrical 
engineers.48 This was already a forerunner of the protectionism that would lead to the 
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establishment of ACEC. However, the principle of conceding railways to private partners 
was the hardest to digest for the Catholic MPs. The governments of the last two decades 
had followed the policy to gradually nationalize private railway networks. This new 
electric railway would go against that principle. Therefore, the Chamber of 
Representatives refused to approve the project in May 1900.49 
The Empain group was not at all discouraged by the voting down of the first proposal 
of the Société Générale. The early success of the Parisian Métro, which had opened with a 
lot of public attention during the World Exposition in July 1900, was an excellent 
frontispiece for projects in Belgium.50 In October, the Empain group announced its own 
version of the Brussels-Antwerp interurban.51 The Empain group proposed to finance the 
expenses of about 50 million francs, in exchange for a return of 2.5% guaranteed by the 
State, plus 40% of the net profits. Both the King, the government and most Belgian 
newspapers greeted Empain’s proposal with enthusiasm.52 There is a simple explanation 
for this receptivity. First of all, the King was favorably disposed to Empain’s businesses, 
not only in China and Congo. In addition, the King had a significant influence on several 
members of the government such as de Smet de Naeyer and de Favereau.53 Finally, the 
press’s interest had been bought.54 In any case, journalists did not miss any chance to 
write about the topic. There were even rumors that Leopold II and Empain were 
negotiating with the French government and the Chemin de fer du Nord about another 
electric railway between Brussels and Paris.55 The Empain holding Parisienne Electrique was 
said to be behind the two projects, although it seems that the Brussels-Paris railway just 
was a media stunt.56 
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Despite the defeat the interurban suffered in 1900, Empain’s proposal restored the 
central government’s hope to execute the Brussels-Antwerp project in some way. The 
government had reached a consensus on the fundamentals of Empain’s plan by October 
1901.57 Although several other entrepreneurs had submitted their application for the line, 
in the meantime, Empain remained the government’s privileged partner.58 The 
entrepreneur had developed a very good relationship with Prime Minister de Smet de 
Naeyer. In the summer of 1902, several Catholic top politicians willingly accepted the 
invitation to spend a day on the yacht of the Empain brothers to inspect the port of 
Antwerp. Among them were ministers de Smet de Naeyer, Liebaert and de Favereau, 
responsible for Finance, Public Works and Foreign Affairs respectively, as well as several 
senators and MPs such as Beernaert and Woeste.59 Albeit unofficially, this was an excellent 
opportunity to rediscuss the Empain group’s proposal. Keeping up faith in the chances of 
the electric interurban railway, de Smet de Naeyer’s Ministry of Finance kept negotiating 
with Empain about the terms of the concession at least until December 1903.60 To support 
the project, Edouard Empain, his general manager Roch Boulvin and the head of the Office 
of the Belgian Minister of Railways traveled to Berlin. There, they visited the facilities of 
the Studiengesellschaft für Elektrische Schnellbahnen in Berlin. This consortium, led by 
Deutsche Bank, Siemens, AEG and Krupp, was testing fast electric tramcars. Wilhelm von 
Siemens showed Empain around and allowed him to take a test ride reaching 185 km/h.61 
The PR trip to Berlin had to put pressure on the MPs that were opposing the principle 
of a private concession. This did not have any effect, as Parliament remained heavily 
divided. Catholic heavyweights such as former Prime Minister Auguste Beernaert could 
not accept that the current government would reverse the long-standing policy of 
railway nationalization. In addition, he and other MPs feared that the competitive 
privately operated electric line would force out the existing state-owned railway between 
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Antwerp and Brussels.62 As a result, the government could not gather a majority in favor 
of a private concession to Empain and it did not dare to officially put it to the vote.63 
Nevertheless, under the pressure of the King, the press and the government, Parliament 
was occasionally debating it in 1904 and 1905, before it entirely disappeared from the 
political agenda.64 The existing state-owned line Brussels-Antwerp was finally electrified 
in 1935.65 
4.5 Local power versus Catholics “saving the national 
industry” (1903-1904) 
The creation of ACEC, the group’s industrial flagship, occurred due to a unique 
combination of political and economic circumstances. To explain in what way it was the 
result of an unprecedented coalition of Empain and the Catholic government, it is 
necessary to discuss the state of the electric industry in Belgium at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. This is followed by an analysis of the tender for the Brussels power 
station, because the whole bidding process is crucial to understand the eventual 
establishment of ACEC. 
Between 1900 and 1903-4, the industry in Western Europe and Russia suffered from an 
economic crisis.66 The large electric engineering firms faced lower returns, leading to a 
difficult financial situation. As a result, the German electric industry consolidated: in 
1903-4, Siemens and Schuckert merged as well as AEG and UEG. The leading Belgian 
electricity firms such as Électricité et Hydraulique (E&H) and Compagnie Internationale 
d’Électricité (CIE) were struggling to survive. The need to improve and protect their 
situation was a recurring theme in political debates of that period.67 In this context, they 
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referred to Belgium’s very liberal trade policy giving foreign manufacturers privileged 
access to the Belgian market. Import tariffs for products coming from Germany and 
France had been very low for more than a decade. In 1904, the Belgian government 
concluded a new trade agreement with its German neighbor. Electrical equipment was 
part of the negotiations. Although the Belgian negotiators had tried to lower the 
considerable German import tariffs for products coming from Belgium, the fundamental 
imbalance between German protectionism and Belgian free trade remained.68 For 
instance, in 1906 Belgium levied about 2% customs tax for German electrical equipment, 
whereas Belgian manufacturers easily paid over 15% when exporting to Germany or 
France.69 
Unsurprisingly, the German electroholdings, especially UEG and AEG and to a lesser 
extent Siemens, were very active on the Belgian market. Belgium was a fairly important 
market, its small size considered.70 As a result of the technological breakthrough of 
electric utilities, many large public infrastructure projects were launched or at least 
considered in the period of 1900-1904: the Brussels-Antwerp interurban mentioned above 
and power stations in Belgium’s largest cities. In the case of Ghent, the Empain group’s 
tramway company had experienced the competition of AEG-UEG at first hand. The Ghent 
city council had searched a company to install and operate a large power station. Despite 
Empain’s very competitive ultimate offer in late 1903, the municipality had preferred to 
partner with AEG-UEG instead of the Empain group’s Tramways électriques de Gand.71 
So, after the setback of the Empain group in Ghent and while the discussion about the 
Brussels-Antwerp interurban was still going on, the city of Brussels was about to decide 
in its tender procedure for a new municipal power station. Since 1893, the capital had 
operated its own power plant (regie). At the turn of the century, the municipality realized 
that the existing power plant in the city center had reached its limits. Its capacity of 3500 
kW was insufficient to face the rising demand for electricity. In January 1903, the 
municipality invited electrical engineering firms to tender for the construction of the 
new plant.72 The municipal services would afterward take charge of the operation. It 
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received six applications reflecting the international character of the Belgian market: One 
from a Belgian consortium composed of the Cie Internationale d’Electricité and of the E&H, 
one from Switzerland and four from German firms including AEG-UEG, Siemens and W. 
Lahmeyer.73 One year later, the municipality had reduced the competition to two 
applicants: the Belgian consortium, on the one hand, and the alliance of AEG, UEG and 
their Belgian partner SGBEE on the other hand. Because of the price, the bench of 
Aldermen advocated for the proposal of AEG-UEG, but due to administrative issues, it did 
not succeed in having it voted in March 1904.74 This, of course, delayed the whole 
adjudication process. 
Meanwhile, the Belgian consortium member Electricité & Hydraulique had gotten into 
financial difficulties. After 1895, E&H had massively invested in Russian electric utilities. 
In addition, the budget spent on research and development had increased year after year. 
To finance this expansion, E&H had taken a large corporate debt. Unfortunately, an 
economic crisis struck Russia after 1900. In Belgium too, the competition of foreign, 
especially German, electrical engineering firms did not allow high profit margins.75 E&H 
struggled to avoid insolvency. At the end of 1903, the founder Julien Dulait and director 
Rolin-Jacquemyns were invited to Berlin to talk with Emil Rathenau of AEG about a 
possible takeover.76 
The rumors about E&H’s financial health affected the tender for the construction of the 
power station. E&H considered withdrawing from the competition, but was bound by 
contract to its partner CIE. This put doubt on the creditworthiness and seriousness of the 
Belgian application. Brussels preferred to deal with a financially stable partner that 
offered good terms of payment.77 Despite the city’s intention to receive various 
competitive offers via an invitation to tender, the doubt about the Belgian consortium 
made the actual competition rather limited. On top of all that, the SGBEE backed by AEG-
UEG had secretly continued to negotiate a takeover of the weakened E&H. In the beginning 
of April, the news leaked to the press.78 By buying the company’s two factories in 
Marcinelle and Jeumont, the German group wanted to realize two goals.79 First, it could 
strengthen its position on the Belgian electricity market in general. Second, the German 
group could neutralize the application of E&H’s consortium partner Cie internationale 
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d’Electricité and improve its own position in the tender for the Brussels power station. By 
acquiring Belgian production facilities, it could take the edge of the nationalist argument 
that a choice for AEG was bad for the national industry. For future projects such as the 
long-awaited electric railway between Brussels and Antwerp too, the AEG would also place 
itself in pole position.80 
As the tender procedure arrived at an impasse, the municipality received two 
spontaneous proposals at the end of April, albeit not in accordance with the initial 
requirements. First, the Empain holding Parisienne Electrique offered an alternative to a 
mere construction project. Second, the German firm W. Lahmeyer considered the 
demarche of the Parisienne Electrique as an opportunity to reformulate its rejected 
proposal and to offer a full concession. However, this deviated too much from the 
outlined policy to stand a chance.81 
After the example of the SEP, discussed in Chapter 2, the Empain group wanted to 
construct a large, multi-purpose power plant capable of supplying the greater Brussels 
and, in the event, powering the Brussels-Antwerp electric railway. Instead of an entirely 
public service, the Parisienne Electrique proposed a “cooperation of mutual benefit.”82 As 
the planned power station’s most important client, the City of Brussels would buy 
alternating current at a high voltage. The municipality would merely control (régie) the 
distribution to the end users. Parisienne Electrique also agreed to share its surplus profits 
with the City. After ten years, the municipality could decide to take over the power station 
or continue the contract for another 40 years. Knowing that this proposal did not fit in 
the invitation to tender, the Empain group preferred to be on the safe side by coming to 
an agreement with the members of the German consortium (SGBEE-UEG-AEG). They would 
share the orders among them and Parisienne Electrique. Thanks to his connection with 
Ernest Urban, chairman of SGBEE and the Banque de Bruxelles but also of the Tramways du 
Caire, Empain could limit the competition. He was also in touch with Dannie Heineman, 
the manager of UEG’s Belgian subsidiary Union Electrique.83 The real rivals were now only 
the CIE-E&H proposal and the economically sound but politically difficult concession of 
Lahmeyer. To gain support for the Parisienne Electrique’s proposal, Empain met mayor De 
Mot. During the meeting, he also argued against the Belgian consortium.84 
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Meanwhile, by the beginning of May, negotiations between AEG and E&H about a 
possible takeover had collapsed. AEG only offered to buy and dismantle the factory. 
Instead, Julien Dulait was looking for other partners and contacted Prime Minister de 
Smet de Naeyer. After a visit of several politicians from Charleroi, asking the government 
to save the factory, de Smet de Naeyer contacted Empain. The Catholic minister was 
acquainted with Empain and asked for the financier’s support.85 Reportedly, Leopold II 
himself was directly or indirectly informed about the threatening bankruptcy of Dulait’s 
firm, whereupon the King would have called Empain to order him to take over the E&H.86 
Anyhow, the Empain group was familiar with E&H, as the manufacturer had supplied 
some of its operating companies with electrical equipment. Moreover, Empain must have 
understood the opportunity of acquiring the factories in the context of the Brussels 
power plant competition. Like the Germans, the acquisition could strengthen the 
proposal, integrate manufacturing in Belgium and destabilize the Belgian consortium. If 
Parisienne Electrique obtained the contract for the power station, it could immediately have 
the equipment constructed at the group’s new factories. Without the factories, Parisienne 
Electrique would have to place orders at E&H, CIE or more likely the German 
electroholdings. So in the first weeks of May, Empain started negotiating with E&H.87 
Although the financial situation of E&H was pressing, Empain managed to buy time until 
the end of June. He wanted to await the decision of the Brussels’ municipal council. 
The debates of the municipal council were passionate, to say the least. The most salient 
points regarded the cost of each proposal and the extent to which private industry was 
involved. In the final weeks, there were still 5 proposals in the running. Submissions A 
(AEG-UEG) and B (E&H-CIE) planned to construct the power station and leave the operation 
to the Municipality. Since the invitation to tender, socialists had demanded that the city 
services would construct the plant itself instead of a general contractor (option C). As 
mentioned before, the Parisienne Electrique offered to assure power production and to have 
the municipality control distribution and sales (option D). Finally, the Lahmeyer firm 
(option E) suggested to construct and operate the whole utility itself. 
The bench of Mayor and Aldermen was a partisan of the public-private partnership as 
proposed by the Parisienne Electrique, because the price was very advantageous. However, 
many councilors advocated for more municipal control. In the last 48 hours before the 
vote, both AEG-UEG, Lahmeyer and Parisienne Electrique improved their proposals hoping to 
gain a majority. Both AEG-UEG and Parisienne Electrique pledged to privilege the domestic 
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industry when placing orders. The Parisienne Electrique would establish a firm of which at 
least 75% of the board members are Belgian.88 In a letter delivered to the council only 
hours before the vote, AEG contended to guarantee a price of electricity equal to that 
promised by the Parisienne Electrique.89 
Finally, due to ideology and voting tactics the German consortium won the tender. It 
was a compromise between those fearing the victory of the full municipal control and 
those fearing the victory of the partnership with the Parisienne Electrique. Apparently, the 
council was equally divided on the prospect of total municipal control and the Parisienne 
Electrique proposal.90 The Catholics supported the Parisienne Electrique, but the progressive 
liberals were more in favor of municipal control.91 Although economic nationalism was 
not a decisive factor, afterward many councilors regretted that the choice for AEG implied 
the decline of the Belgian electrical industry.92 Several newspapers less in favor of 
municipal control also played this argument.93 
For the Empain group and the Parisienne Electrique in particular, the whole saga was a 
major setback, not in the least because the future of the E&H factories depended on the 
deal. Moreover, regardless of the E&H take-over, the failure was evident too. The 
Parisienne Electrique had been unable to secure a deal worth at least 3 million francs. 
Therefore, the board considered taking legal action against their former partners SGBEE 
and AEG for breach of contract.94 Finally, the Empain group preferred to put their energy 
in finding a solution for the E&H factories. The failure in Brussels jeopardized the whole 
acquisition plan. Empain needed to find other guarantees that the factories could be 
profitable. He received extra time in the negotiations with E&H in exchange for granting 
more credit to the ailing firm.95 
To Empain’s fortune, the Belgian government was willing to support the takeover. 
During the first talks with de Smet de Naeyer about saving E&H, the government leader 
had made two far-reaching promises to Empain. First, the Prime Minister would try to 
keep electrical equipment out of the ongoing trade agreement negotiations. However, 
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many Belgian export products risked a German tariff increase and de Smet de Naeyer 
eventually did not manage to exclude it from the list. Second, in the case of a takeover, 
the government agreed to make public contracts with the Empain group for the supply 
of electricity.96 At the end of June, Empain reminded the government leader of his second 
promise. 
Consequently, together with the minister of Railways Liebaert, Empain worked out a 
deal that could provide income to the successor of the E&H. The starting point was a 
slightly modified version of the project developed for the City of Brussels. As a result, 
Empain decided to take over the E&H and transform it into ACEC.97 The proposed deal had 
the intention to execute a slightly modified version of the project that the Parisienne 
Electrique had designed for the City of Brussels. The agreement stipulated that ACEC had 
to establish a subsidiary that would operate a large multipurpose power station. This 
subsidiary would be the Société bruxelloise d’électricité (SBE). Liebaert and ACEC had further 
agreed that, for the next 25 years, the government would buy minimally 600,000 kWh per 
year to light all the railway stations and harbors in a radius of 25 km around the center of 
Brussels (art. 4 of the agreement). As a consequence, Minister Liebaert planned to 
dismantle the power stations that had provided electricity to these buildings so far. The 
SBE would replace them. In return for this governmental favor, the power station had to 
procure all its electrical equipment “from Belgian factories owned by Belgians” (art. 1), 
i.e. ACEC.98 
The convention between ACEC and the Ministry of Railways gives cause to two 
observations about the stance of the Belgian government towards the electric industry in 
the country. First, the convention proves that the Empain group continued to enjoy the 
support of a considerable part of the Catholic government. Without even inviting other 
firms to tender, the government unambiguously supported Empain’s efforts to revitalize 
and take the lead of the Belgian electrical industry. The support was a fundamental 
political choice for two reasons. On the one hand, the conservative Catholics were 
traditionally non-interventionist. Now, in contrast, they decided to save an ailing firm 
and conserve 500 jobs. However, when the emerging Antwerp electrical industry went 
bankrupt in 1902, albeit due to mismanagement and illegal practices, the same 
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government did not intervene.99 On the other hand, the government chose to remove the 
well-functioning state-owned power production units and rely on private supply, i.e. 
electricity from the SBE, in the future. 
Second, the central government used the convention to intervene in local politics. The 
conservative Catholics were jealous of the success of the municipal electric utilities in the 
cities, dominated by progressive liberals. Cities such as Brussels relied on the income of 
municipal services and therefore the liberal mayor De Mot defended them fiercely. By 
enabling the Empain group to construct a power station in the greater Brussels, the 
government compensated for the policy of the Brussels municipality, that chose a 
municipal power station constructed by AEG-UEG. Even more, the SBE could directly 
compete with and undermine the success of the municipal power station. Competition of 
SBE would put pressure on the plant’s income and would force the city to raise taxes. 
However, the political credit of liberals was based on low taxes.100 The government had a 
political interest in the SBE developing into a prosperous business. Article 13 of the 
convention should be read in this regard. It referred to the contracts that the municipal 
power station of Brussels had concluded with the State in the past to supply all its 
buildings in the capital. As soon as the existing contracts expired, these State buildings 
could be powered by SBE.101 If the State opted for the SBE, the latter received the right to 
use the national roads (grande voirie) to develop a distribution system to these buildings. 
In addition, these distribution cables could then also be used to supply other private 
clients. This possibility obviously frustrated the city of Brussels, who was hoping to 
supply electricity to private clients other than its inhabitants. In general, the large power 
station of SBE could effectively hurt the municipal power station. For instance, it 
outclassed the municipal plant in the tender of 1906 for the electricity supply to Brussels 
SNCV lines.102 
To sum up the case on the creation of ACEC, nationality mattered in Belgian industrial 
policy. The Empain group had effectively positioned itself as a Belgian business in the 
ideological debate about the ‘national electrical industry’. It shows that nationalism was 
a factor in Belgian politics, to a certain extent. Whereas the protectionist argument was 
not powerful enough to influence the decision of the Brussels municipal council, it was 
central to the discourse of the national government. To the cabinet the matter was 
urgent, for German firms were choking the national industry; a claim which was not even 
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false. Protectionism was necessary, because otherwise “we would have become a German 
province concerning the electric industry,” according to Catholic MP Jules Renkin.103 
Liebaert stressed his patriotic motivation: They had to save an infant industry from 
German domination. In this respect, the government justified the deal with Empain for 
the lighting of State buildings, because receiving electricity from a German-built 
municipal power station would not have helped the national industry.104 Empain was 
perfectly cast as the only Belgian entrepreneur capable of preventing the sector from 
falling into foreign hands. Ignoring the progressive attacks claiming that the Parisienne 
Electrique was French, perhaps cosmopolitan but certainly not Belgian, the Catholic 
majority framed Empain as a responsible Belgian captain of industry. Woeste hailed 
Empain as “one of our most meritorious fellow citizens.”105 
Distinguishing rhetoric from facts is difficult, but the rhetoric had real consequences 
in any case. The Empain group profited from its home country status to take a significant 
share of the electricity market. One can only guess at the real motivation of Empain to 
save ACEC. Was it patriotism or did he just want to please Leopold II and strike a good 
deal? His leniency towards France in other projects suggests the latter.106 What is beyond 
doubt is that Empain skillfully made use of the nationalist tendency and his excellent 
relations to make a flying start in the Belgian electric industry. The ACEC case also proves 
that strong political support had been vital. Without the government backing in the 
crucial weeks after the failure in Brussels, Empain would probably not have been able to 
jump-start ACEC. 
4.6 An uncontested leader in business and society (1904-1914) 
After the success of ACEC, Empain became a linchpin in the electrical industry. Empain 
continued to invest in Belgian electric utilities and at the same time he strengthened his 
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personal reputation and network. In the following paragraphs, I discuss his prominent 
position in business, politics and society. His influence manifested itself in at least three 
areas.107 
Firstly, it was apparent in the electrical industry itself. Throughout the years, the 
government support for Empain’s electric utilities continued. Two events in 1911 
demonstrated this. On the one hand, the Brussels municipality wanted to supply to the 
neighboring municipality Ixelles. The competitor SBE protested and gained legal advice 
from the Catholic party leader Charles Woeste. Woeste’s negative advice and the Empain 
group’s pressure stimulated the central government to cancel the contract between 
Brussels and Ixelles. The SBE had successfully defended its competitive position.108 On the 
other hand, the government invited Empain to be a member of an advisory board. The 
context was the lobbying of self-producing industrialists wanting to completely liberalize 
the electricity market. In the event, these self-producers could start competing with the 
producers-distributors by supplying electricity, power in particular, to each other’s 
factories as well as to individual customers. As a reaction, Carlo Cicogna of the SGBEE had 
founded the Union des Exploitations Électriques en Belgique (UEEB) to unite all producers-
distributors. Cicogna presided the association and invited the Empain group to provide 
the vice-president.109 The rights of the producers-distributors such as the Empain group 
were endangered. They might lose their monopoly for distribution in the municipalities. 
Additionally, the industrial self-producers threatened to poach other industrial clients, 
that used to be the largest customers of the Empain group and other distributors.110 
In that setting, the government asked Edouard Empain, Léon Janssen of the Société 
Générale and Émile Uytborck of the UEEB among others for advice. They formed a 
committee to draft a bill that reorganized the electricity distribution in Belgium. The 
committee represented the private producers and municipalities, but excluded the 
industrial self-producers. Unsurprisingly, their draft of 1913 only enabled competition in 
very limited cases and secured the rights of the existing concession holders. The war 
hindered any further discussion on the reform and the Belgian power sector only 
received a new legal framework in 1925.111 
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Secondly, Empain’s status as head of one of the largest Belgian businesses gave him a 
prominent voice outside the industry. His influence reached into society and politics at 
large. This had everything to do with his powerful network. As demonstrated above, 
Empain received the full support of leading Catholics, also from those of a new generation 
such as Charles de Broqueville.112 Edouard Empain became friends with the influential 
Catholic family Carton de Wiart too.113 Henry Carton de Wiart was an important MP, his 
brother Edmond was the personal secretary (1901-1909) of Leopold II and his cousin Léon 
was a famous lawyer in Cairo. One of Empain’s business lawyers, Jules Renkin, also joined 
the government in 1907. He was a director of the CFL (see below), but resigned to become 
the first Minister of Colonies after the transfer of Congo to the Belgian State. 
Additionally, Empain increased his influence on society in other ways. For instance, he 
never stopped donating to charity.114 Arguably, Empain was one of the great 
philanthropists of that time, at least after the turn of the century. As Tilman has pointed 
out, only then Empain became part of the “honorary committees of prestigious 
associations alongside the big names of the Belgian industry.”115 What counted was the 
high visibility of the donations. Like all the extremely wealthy entrepreneurs such as 
Carnegie and Rockefeller, Empain used these philanthropic investments to gain social, 
cultural and eventually economic capital.116 
Empain supported many initiatives, especially those that showed his loyalty to the 
Catholic, national and royal cause.117 King Leopold II wanted to have a gigantic basilica 
constructed in Koekelberg on the occasion for the 75th anniversary of the Belgian State in 
1905. The Sacré-Coeur of Montmartre in Paris served as a source of inspiration. Lacking 
support from the Belgian Parliament or Church, he raised the money among the financial 
elite of the country. Edouard Empain immediately became one of the most important 
benefactors, right after the King himself. Empain was also part of the financial committee 
that had to supervise the project.118 The entrepreneur supported the initiatives of Prince 
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Albert too. Before Leopold’s nephew acceded to the throne in 1909, Empain already 
sponsored the Ibis School in Ostend. Prince Albert himself had taken the initiative for this 
charity and followed its organization closely.119 
It should be noted, though, that Edouard Empain only sponsored charities of the right 
ideology. In 1908, he refused to overtly donate to the Athénée du Centre, a middle school 
founded by Raoul Warocqué and other socialist and liberal members of the local elite. 
Empain apologized to his friend Warocqué that his Catholic identity prevented him from 
supporting an anticlerical charitable deed, although he appreciated it, at least 
unofficially.120 
Thirdly and finally, the Empain brothers actively shaped Belgian politics too. On the 
eve of the First World War, they were not content anymore with a role behind the scenes. 
Through his marriage in 1912 with Ghislaine Descantons de Montblanc, from a Belgian-
French noble family, François Empain had achieved a high social status.121 A few months 
later, François presented himself at the elections for the Senate as the first successor and 
eventually became a senator in January 1913. Although François was a member of several 
committees, his work for the business group prevented him from actively participating 
in the political debates. In Parliament, he was more than once absent because of his 
business trips. As a result, he did not present himself a second time at the elections of May 
1914.122 
The close connection with the Belgian royals even held out the prospect of a career as 
a minister. In fact, the Empain brothers were also on friendly terms with Leopold’s 
successor. According to his biographer Thielemans, Albert frequently had conversations 
with Empain after the foundation of the Ibis School.123 Another sign of the good 
relationship with the new King was the unofficial royal visit to Heliopolis five years later. 
The King accompanied the Queen to Egypt, who needed to recover from a serious illness. 
During their stay of several weeks, Queen Elisabeth laid the foundation stone of the 
 
                                                     
119 Empain delegated one of his managers, E. De Cuyper, to chair the board of directors of the charity. 
“Weezenschool voor Visschers,” Het Laatste Nieuws, 10 Jul 1906; Jan Velaers, Albert I: Koning in tijden van oorlog en 
crisis (1900-1934) (Tielt: Lannoo, 2009), 75. 
120 Ed. Empain to Raoul Warocqué, 14 Nov 1908, Archives de la famille Warocqué, MRM. 
121 Suzor, Empain en France, 246. 
122 “Uitslagen der verkiezingen,” Het Laatste Nieuws, 5 Jun 1912; “F. Empain in Senaat,” Het Volk, 25 Jan 1913; 
Belgian Senate, Session de 1912-1913: Commissions, Feb 1913. For his parliamentary work, see Belgian Senate: 
Annales parlementaires from January 1913 until May 1914. 
123 Marie Rose Thielemans and Emile Vandewoude, Le roi Albert au travers de ses lettres inédites (1882-1916) suivi de 
l’édition intégrale des lettres du Roi (Brussels: Office international de librairie, 1982), 44-45+324. 
Securing investments 
214 
Basilica of Heliopolis, commissioned by Edouard Empain.124 Finally, Albert I also ennobled 
François Empain in 1913.125 The circumstances were, of course, exceptional, but Edouard 
Empain could have been a member of the Belgian government during the First World War. 
First, he was appointed colonel in charge of the purchasing committee of the Belgian 
Army. Because of his good relationship with the Catholic head of government Charles de 
Broqueville as well as with King Albert I, the latter approached Empain to become the 
Minister of Armaments and Munitions in 1917. However, the socialist Emile Vandervelde 
vetoed this decision, arguing that he did not want to have a shameless capitalist as a 
colleague.126 Perhaps by way of compensation, King Albert made Empain general-major 
and honorary aide-de-camp later that year.127 
4.7 Congo: The interdependence of the King and Empain 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Empain made one very sizeable investment in the 
Belgian colony before the First World War. This allows us to compare the dynamics of 
investments in the metropolitan space with those in the imperial space. This section 
therefore analyzes the differences in the political context and how this affected business. 
Can we speak of a ‘home advantage’ for Belgian entrepreneurs and Empain in particular? 
Was their competition with Belgian or foreign competitors at all? To answer these 
questions, we need to find out in what way the opportunities created and conditioned by 
the imperial setting differed from those in the Belgian market. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Leopold still struggled to attract entrepreneurs 
ready to do business in his colony. To many investors, the economic conditions were too 
risky to venture into the CFS. The Société Générale reluctantly financed part of the CFS loan, 
rather out of loyalism to King and Fatherland than out of financial calculation.128 The bulk 
of the investing firms were Antwerp-based trading companies of primary resources. They 
were attracted to the colony on the basis of large land concessions. A small group of 
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entrepreneurs frequently intervened in the establishment of firms in the CFS. The most 
important financiers were de Brown de Tiège and Thys as well as Grisar, Bunge and Balser, 
of German descent. Bound to its liberal trade policy, the CFS also accepted foreign 
investments. Nevertheless, 86% of the invested capital between 1886 and 1908 was of 
Belgian origin.129 
To open up the vast territory and develop an efficient extractive economy, the colony 
needed a good network of navigable watercourses and railroads. Without a proper 
transportation system, the resources could not be brought to the coastal harbors for 
shipment to Europe. Once the long-awaited Matadi-Kinshasa railroad had been finished 
in 1898, ten years after the first construction work, Leopold concentrated on another 
possible exit road, this time in the Northeast. Via a railroad, the Congo Basin could be 
connected with the northern African Great Lakes. The Congo River was navigable until 
Stanley Falls, but to continue upstream into the inner regions of the colony, railroads 
were necessary to circumvent major cataracts. Therefore the Belgian King sent colonial 
engineer Auguste Adam on a mission in 1898 to study two lines connecting Kisangani 
(Stanleyville) with Lake Albert in the Northeast and with lake Tanganyika in the 
Southeast.130 The projected line had strategic importance, for it could strengthen 
Leopold’s claim on the Kivu area. The Germans in East Africa disputed the territory as the 
Belgians did not actively colonize it. In addition, by connecting the Congo River to the 
Great Lakes, Leopold II wanted to accomplish the great “Transafrican Railroad” from 
Eastern Africa to the Atlantic, as well as be part of the British scheme to connect the Cape 
to Cairo via the Nile.131 
In the late spring of 1901, Leopold II approached Empain, to see if the Belgian banker 
was interested to finance the first Congolese railway project since 1887, estimated at 150 
million francs in total.132 So far, Empain had shown only limited interest in the CFS. 
Rubber, mineral resources and other colonial goods were not Empain’s specialty, but 
railroads were. By choosing Empain, Leopold II could rely on his expertise as a railway 
entrepreneur as well as avoid dependence on the usual clan of colonial bankers. The 
Empain group was actually the first large established financial group to make such a large 
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commitment in the Congolese colony.133 In addition, Empain’s network in Paris could 
open up the French financial market to find the initial capital of 25 million francs. Empain 
had to form a company with Belgian and French investors that could carry the financial 
burden and operate the railroad, whereas the Congo Free State would carry out the 
construction work. Empain believed that he could mobilize the investors behind the Métro 
such as the banks Paribas and Bénard&Jarislowsky.134 In comparison with the average 
businessman in Congo, this is remarkable. Vellut has demonstrated that colonial 
entrepreneurs reused their networks to exploit opportunities in other parts of the world 
afterward. On the contrary, Empain had recourse to the partners which he knew from 
previous business in France.135 
Table 10 Shareholders of the CFL at incorporation (1902)136 
Investors Nationality Share 
Empain group (brothers, Réunis, Voie étroite, Parisienne Electrique) BE/FR 67% 
Thys group (Banque d’Outremer, CCCI) BE 7% 
Other Belgian BE 2% 
Bénard&Jarislowsky FR 10% 
Rouvier group (Banque française pour le commerce et l’industrie) FR 8% 
Paribas FR 5% 
Other French FR 1% 
TOTAL  100% 
Empain succeeded in attracting French investors, as shown in Table 10. The Empain group 
had largely invested in the company (67%), but had also gathered the support of Thys, 
Bénard&Jarislowsky, Paribas, Maurice Rouvier as well as other wealthy Belgians and 
Frenchmen. In total, Belgium and France had divided the shares according to a 60/40 
ratio. The board of directors reflected the power relations within the company. It clearly 
showed that Empain and the CFS were in this together.137 Leopold II appointed his loyal 
counselor Edmond van Eetvelde as chairman. Other members with ties to the CFS and its 
Sovereign were entrepreneurs Albert Thys, Louis Cousin and Henri Simont and politicians 
Jules Renkin and Auguste Delbeke. Edouard and François Empain and the engineers 
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Legouëz, Doniol and Stoecklin (of the Parisienne Electrique) represented the Empain group, 
but the latter three also served as representatives of France. 
The strong presence of French investors in the company rapidly drew the attention of 
the French government. It wanted written promises from Empain that the French 
industry could participate in the call for tenders and that part of the directors and 
personnel would be French. Otherwise, it would block the attempt to offer the shares to 
the public by means of a quotation on the Stock Exchanges of Paris and Brussels. Empain 
willingly complied with these demands. He even offered to appoint an experienced 
French engineer to lead the construction works if the King agreed.138 French engineers 
also played a decisive role in the missions that studied the route of the railroad. In sum, 
the government in Paris offered capital in exchange for French influence, embodied by 
French citizens. 
As a matter of fact, France was well aware of the CFL’s strategic importance in colonial 
Africa. When the French government asked French engineer Legouëz to justify his active 
role in a Belgian colonial company, Legouëz explained that his participation indirectly 
contributed to the containment of the German expansion in the region. The development 
of railroads in the Belgian colony was thus also in the national interest of France.139 The 
French ambassador in Berlin shared this view. He was pleased that the CFL excluded the 
German colonies from the Cape-to-Cairo railway scheme, to the great disappointment of 
German colonial decision-makers.140 German containment in Central Africa remained the 
official policy of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs until the First World War. In 1911, 
on the occasion of a capital increase, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded a 
fourth French director and the guarantee that Empain would not allow Germans to invest 
in the CFL. The Minister feared that Berlin would try to incorporate the railway in a 
German transcontinental line from Cameroon to Tanzania. To the complete satisfaction 
of the Minister, Empain vowed to increase the French influence in the firm.141 
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Figure 26 Map of the territorial concessions granted to private companies in the CFS as of 
1905142 
How can we explain that Empain and other bankers were willing to invest in a colonial 
railroad, deep in the interior of the Congo? As I have mentioned before, Empain was 
flattered by the request of the King. In addition, he appreciated the prestige associated 
with the undertaking. Yet, from an economic point of view, the business also had 
interesting characteristics. After the financial disaster of the Matadi-Kinshasa railroad, 
the CFS made far-reaching concessions to convince the investors. The CFS generously 
offered the shareholders a 99-year-long guaranteed return of 4% and the amortization of 
the shares.143 Four percent was certainly not an extraordinary return, as the long-term 
rate of French government bonds was around 3%. However, the investors probably hoped 
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for higher profits to be made by exploiting the land. Indeed, as was not unusual in a 
colonial context, the CFL became a charted company. For a period of 99 years, the 
company received a concession of 40,000 km² of land alongside the Kisangani-Mahagi 
railroad. It could keep half of the profits derived from the transport service and of the 
exploitation of land resources (wood, ivory, rubber, minerals, etc.). On top of that, with 
each capital increase of at least 25 million francs, the CFL could obtain another 40,000 km² 
of land (which equals the size of the Netherlands). This enormous privilege was only 
activated once, in 1909. The map (Fig. 26) illustrates the potential territorial expansion of 
the CFL. The upper blue horizontal strip was the first concession area. The strips below 
were possible extensions. Afterward, the Belgian colonial government desperately 
negotiated the removal of this clause, in exchange for other advantages. In 1911, despite 
a third capital increase, the Belgian State and the CFL agreed to definitively limit the size 
of the concession area to 80,000 km².144 
The investors behind the CFL did not have to dirty their hands with abusing labor force 
to construct the railroad. The Congo Free State took charge of the construction, because 
it could use its Force Publique to recruit cheap forced labor. Yet, the CFL retained the 
lucrative right to supply all the building material and rolling stock. As for many other 
railroads in tropical Africa, the construction of the CFL took a severe human toll. 
Hundreds of workers died or fled. Therefore, the CFS had to import the workforce from 
West Africa. The working conditions were so terrible that the Belgian Parliament forbade 
the colonial administration any further use of forced labor for the CFL.145 
Table 11 Stages of the construction of the CFL railroad (1902-1915)146 
# Section Opened km 
1 a railroad between Kisangani (Stanleyville) and Ubundu 
(Ponthierville) to circumvent the Stanley Falls 
Sep 1906 125 
2 make the middle reaches of the Lualaba navigable between 
Ubundu and Kindu 
Jan 1906 310 
3 construct a railroad bypassing rapids between Kindu and 
Kongolo, a section nicknamed the Portes d’Enfer (Gates of Hell) 
Jan 1911 355 
4 preparing the upper reaches of the Lualaba between Kongolo 
and Bukama 
Mar 1911 640 
5 linking the Lualaba with Lake Tanganyika via a railroad between 
Kongolo and Kalemie (Albertville) 
Apr 1915 273 
 Total  1703 
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The CFL was part and parcel of Leopold’s geopolitical strategy. The initial plan was to 
construct two sections totaling 1400 km of railroads. The first one starting from Kisangani 
to Mahagi (Lake Albert), roughly 775 km. The second one going from Luango (Kindu) to 
Albertville (Lake Tanganyika) via Kasongo, equaling 625 km. However, at the beginning 
of 1902 the mineral resources of Katanga gained increasing attention. The exploitation of 
the enormous wealth of the Kantanganese soil (including copper, tin, gold, …) became the 
top priority for the colonial administration and private enterprise. Therefore the CFL’s 
priorities were redefined. Instead of the connection with the Great Lakes, the CFL had to 
go south and link the Lualaba (upper reaches of the Congo river) with Katanga. The 
preparatory works for the railroad to Lake Albert had to be ceased. Instead, the company 
undertook other construction works, as listed in Table 11. To give an idea, until 1915 the 
rail- and waterway roughly followed the left and lower boundaries of the blue concession 
zone and the reserved area in Figure 26. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to examine the supposed home country advantage and 
consequently provide a point of comparison for the following chapters. The analysis of 
key evolutions in the history of the Empain group in Belgium has demonstrated that the 
public utility industry in Belgium was perhaps as political as in an international context. 
So, a local entrepreneur such as Empain indeed enjoyed a home advantage, but not 
unconditionally. First and foremost, he needed to move in the highest circles to further 
his business interests. Before 1900, the Empain brothers quietly expanded their business 
group while gradually joining the economic elite. This social mobility was remarkable for 
its rarity. As one of the few, the Empains made their way to the top by combining business, 
philanthropy and networking. As a result, the Empains became able to approach leading 
Catholic politicians. This offered plenty of opportunities in Belgian business. Moreover, 
their ventures abroad enlarged their prestige at home and attracted the attention of the 
Royal Palace. Edouard Empain’s friendship and complicity with his Majesty offered 
perspectives in Belgium and beyond. In the cases of the interurban and ACEC, Leopold and 
Empain rallied the support of the royalist and business-friendly ministers. Both cases 
show the possible impact of the connections with the ruling Catholic elite. However, there 
were limits. The grand schemes of the interurban and the Brussels power station ran 
aground on the dominant vision in local and national politics. Both the Brussels municipal 
council and the Parliament favored the prosperity of the state-owned public utilities 
above private initiative. 
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In the hyperliberal Belgian State, protectionism and other forms of economic 
nationalism were indeed rarely a factor. However, in the few cases that nationality did 
matter, Belgian entrepreneurs had a home advantage. Any locally embedded 
entrepreneur could try to develop an influential network, but of course only Belgians 
could use their nationality as an asset. During the discussions about the Brussels power 
station, protectionist concerns were only lingering in the background. We can merely 
speculate whether the Parisienne Electrique would have won the tender if it had been a 
Belgian firm. But the nationalist rhetoric dominated the debates about ACEC. Empain 
perfectly presented himself as a patriot and capitalized on the latent nationalism to 
legitimate his actions. In Belgium, he was cast as the ‘savior of the national industry’. 
The dynamics that contributed to a home advantage in the domestic setting were 
fundamentally different in the Belgian colony. As it was Leopold’s private territory, the 
Congo Free State was not a competitive market. Instead of the Empain group applying for 
a concession and competing with Belgian and foreign players, Leopold II had to request 
Empain for financial assistance. Empain was in a much stronger negotiating position. At 
the same time, Leopold determined the concession policy of the colony. So both parties 
depended on each other. Nationality was only of secondary importance, although 
Empain’s participation in the larger patriotic effort of colonization of course gave him 
prestige. In sum, because of the different political constellation, one might rather speak 
of a personal imperial advantage, derived from Empain’s peculiar relationship with the 
Sovereign King. 
From a global perspective, the association of the Empain group with Belgium and the 
national elite raises many questions to be answered in the next chapters. First of all, if 
Empain presented himself as a Belgian at home, what was the impact of this nationality 
on his businesses in nationalist France? I have shown that a strong network was vital to 
make use of the home country advantage. Could Empain effectively pursue the same 
strategies in France? If so, how? Secondly, the intimate relationship of the Empain group 
with the Belgian government is apparent. Could this be an advantage when investing 
abroad? Thirdly and similarly, the friendship of Empain and Leopold II was a public secret 
in the whole of Europe. Did his cooperation with the imperialist King hazard the success 
of foreign investments? 
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Chapter 5 France and its empire: From psychic 
distance paradox to assimilation 
5.1 Introduction 
Edouard Empain was born in Beloeil in the Belgian province of Hainaut. He moved to the 
capital Brussels, where he started his career. This simple fact determined both Empain’s 
nationality and the home country of the multinational business group. However, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Empain founded his first railroad business across the French 
border in Valenciennes, at only 25 km from his birthplace, as the crow flies. Eventually, 
half of the group’s investments went to France. So if Belgium was the home country, then 
France was the core market. 
These basic events form the basis of the present chapter. Seemingly with the greatest 
of ease, Empain started doing business in France. But were there not any differences 
between investing in Belgium and in the first host country? If Empain strongly identified 
with Belgium for domestic businesses, did he not have difficulties to be perceived locally 
in France? Or did nationality not matter? Even in the home country, business success 
depended on the right connections. How could he, as a foreigner, do business without an 
influential network? Or did he just rely on the loyal support of the diplomatic services of 
the Belgian government? Finally, Empain had managed to obtain a concession in colonial 
Congo. We know that the Empain group had eventually been able to invest massively in 
France. Consequently, the Empains must have been capable of expanding to the French 
empire. If not, then why did it fail? 
The main thesis of this chapter is based on the concept of the ‘psychic distance 
paradox’. First of all, ‘psychic distance’ refers to the tendency of multinational enterprise 
to prefer expansion to psychically near countries before investing in psychically distant 
countries. Because markets are geographically close and/or culturally and linguistically 
similar to the home country, entrepreneurs have the idea that doing business in that 
country will be similar to doing business at home. However, O’Grady and Lane have 
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convincingly argued that on many occasions this ‘psychic distance’ gives cause to a 
paradox. Entrepreneurs tend to underestimate the differences, assuming that closeness 
equals similarity. So paradoxically, ‘psychic distance’ creates challenges. Due to the 
preconceived ideas on the ease of doing business in a familiar country, foreign 
entrepreneurs are not prepared for the critical differences. This might lead to poor 
performance or even failure.1 
My hypothesis on the history of the Empain group in France is the following. Due to 
the psychic distance paradox, Empain might have underestimated at least two strong 
currents in French society and politics. These were nationalism as well as great distrust 
of the administration vis-à-vis ambitious railway entrepreneurs. I hypothesize that 
Empain only slowly developed a strategy to overcome the challenges caused by his poor 
knowledge of the market conditions. Only after the tender for the Paris Métro, the Empain 
group pursued a far-reaching assimilation. The more it could adapt to French 
expectations, the more it could mitigate political interference. 
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first section examines two trends in French 
politics and their impact on the business group of Empain: exclusive nationalism, on the 
one hand, and administrative concerns about the French railway system, on the other 
hand. The second part focuses on the Paris Métro. It investigates how Empain secured the 
concession and how the Empain group armed itself against political uncertainty. Thirdly, 
this chapter deals with the resurging nationalism in the decade before the First World 
War. It studies the deliberate priority of ‘business before nationality’ determined by the 
Empain group and its implications. Finally, the fourth section compares the CFL and the 
French colonial projects. The aim is to analyze the relative importance of nationality and 
the liability of foreignness in imperial investment contexts too. It reveals the limits of 
Empain’s intensive assimilation strategy. 
 
5.2 Foreign railway entrepreneurs welcome? 
Despite the cultural and linguistic similarities and the large influence of France on Belgian 
politics, there were substantial differences between the two markets. Two are of 
importance for the history of the Empain group. Edouard Empain started doing business 
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in France in the context of both rising nationalism and suspicion towards railway 
magnates. This setting had its origin in the economic crisis of the late 1870s and the 
contemporary crash of the Belgian railway entrepreneur Simon Philippart. Regardless of 
the deeper causes, the hostile climate towards foreign entrepreneurs in general and 
ambitious railway contractors in particular hampered Empain’s entry into the French 
market. The following two subsections detail the origins and impact of this twofold 
hostility. 
5.2.1 Economic nationalism 
From the late 1870s until the early 1890s, a long period of economic crisis provoked 
opposition to economic liberalism among French workers, farmers and industrialists.2 In 
addition, the world of banking and finance had obtained a bad reputation after the 
financial crises of 1867, 1882 and 1889. Populists criticized the immorality of cosmopolitan 
bankers, who survived all financial scandals and unscrupulous speculative behavior. 
More often than not, their proximity to the political centers of power saved their skin.3 
Moreover, due to the influx of foreign labor, especially from neighboring countries, the 
working class had the feeling that Belgians, Italians, etc. were taking their jobs when 
times were already very hard. This tension repeatedly led to violent clashes between 
Frenchmen and foreigners, e.g. with Belgian cross-border workers in the North.4 At the 
same time, the country’s defeat by Prussia in 1870-71 had led to revanchist sentiments 
about the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine. This explosive cocktail of xenophobia, 
revanchism and anti-republicanism had fostered the rise of political nationalism. 
Consecutive movements united around General Boulanger (1887-1893) and around the 
Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906) reinforced the call for an exclusive nationalism, that of “France 
for the French.”5 The waves of nationalism in the decades before the First World War were 
a sign that politics in France differed from the economic liberal consensus in Belgium. 
France had a stronger, more interventionist idea of national policy than the Belgian 
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‘minimal state’. Since the 1880s, a coalition of farmers and industrialists had redirected 
France towards protectionism to favor French national interests.6 
Although the contemporary political discourse had some anti-foreign traits, the 
importance of the nationalist movement should be put in perspective. Foreign labor and 
capital continued to enter the country. The number of Belgian entrepreneurs in France 
was increasing. Even cooperation between French and German economic interests was 
turned a blind eye to. Economic nationalism was not so dominant that the intertwining 
of interests provoked overt scandals.7 Nevertheless, every foreign investor tried to 
remain as discreet as possible, so as not to offend the nationalists. 
Indeed, nationalism already had an impact on Empain’s first concession in France. It 
irritated the French administration that the Belgian Valenciennes-Anzin company was 
operating a French light rail.8 The chief engineer Doniol and the prefect of the Département 
du Nord thought it would be better “only to grant railway concessions (…) to companies 
registered in France and subject to French law.”9 The directors of the Belgian Voie étroite 
had already set up a French counterpart, the Compagnie générale de railways à voie étroite 
française10 to do business in France, but the French administration was not convinced of 
the seriousness of this enterprise. In addition, two former partners of Empain who had 
become competitors made use of the prevailing nationalist sentiment by writing to the 
Minister of Public Works that this new company, “although French in name, was 
exclusively composed of Belgian people”11. Finally, in 1883, the Valenciennes-Anzin chose 
to become a French company with its head office in Anzin.12 However, the French 
Ministry of Public Works only hesitantly recognized the Chemins de fer économiques du Nord 
as the new concession owner. This late recognition put the Econord in a difficult position, 
as it was a necessary precondition to issue bonds. 
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The intransigence of the French public authorities started to seriously worry the 
Empain group. To their shareholders, the directors of the Voie étroite complained in 1885 
about the frosty welcome they had gotten in France: 
The experience has come to demonstrate since a couple of years that we were 
wrong to try to expand our business more in France. In this country, increasingly, 
tends to prevail a prejudice to exclude foreigners in favor of nationals. When 
previously foreign firms managed to obtain the granting of concessions from the 
government, it is no longer the case today.13 
This nationalism forced the Empain group to conceal its Belgian identity in France, 
appear more local and act more on the decision-making. Fortunately, Empain had been 
able to interest the French lawyer and politician Edmond Caze in the position of chairman 
of the new French Econord since its inception.14 Caze was an MP almost continuously from 
1876 until 1906 and afterward senator until his death in 1907.15 He had been a member of 
the government of Léon Gambetta (1881-1882), albeit for three months. As of 1885, he also 
chaired the board of directors of the Chemins de fer de l’Etat.16 His friend and colleague at 
the National Assembly Paul Devès also received directorships in three companies of the 
Empain group (Econord, Chemins de fer du Périgord and Grand Central Sud-Américain) a few 
years later.17 Thanks to their privileged position, Caze and Devès had access to the highest 
political circles and received valuable information at first hand. To obtain concessions, 
the members of parliament could use their influence to get in touch with local 
representatives at the department level, as they decided on these matters.18 
Caze was not just a straw man doing business for Empain. He also invested in the 
French enterprises of Empain and actively searched for concessions. But most of all, Caze 
immediately and frequently made use of his connections in the administration. Just two 
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examples: On the one hand, he personally lobbied the Minister of Public Works to 
accelerate the recognition procedure of the Econord.19 On the other hand, he helped 
Empain obtain a French permanent residence permit in 1887. Caze sent a personal letter 
to the Minister of Justice, a former colleague, to support the demand. This admission à 
domicile awarded Empain civil rights in France and was the first step towards 
naturalization. Although he never applied to become a French citizen, Empain came to 
Paris every week since 1876.20 For Empain, this official residence was part of the strategy 
to appear as local as possible. With his house in the Rue de Courcelles and later in the Rue 
de Lisbonne, he could always present himself as an engineer from Paris when applying 
for rail concessions. This was once more part of the strategy to become as French as 
possible. 
Casting Caze as the business group’s standard-bearer in France was an attempt to face 
the nationalist public opinion. However, in 1888, a local nationalist newspaper21 of the 
Département du Nord accused the Econord to be a threat to French national interests. 
“Everyone knows, it wrote, that Caze is a mask, an electoral wreck whose name sadly 
serves as a French flag covering foreign goods and concealing the infiltration of foreign 
capital.” The manager defended his company, arguing that it was established according 
to French law, deliberately using French materials and rolling stock as well as employing 
French workers. The newspaper in return criticized that even the rolling stock supplier 
ANF was in fact owned by a Belgian mother company (La Métallurgique).22 
In the same year, French industrialists drew up a petition against the rise of Belgian 
light rail business groups in France. The petition cited in particular the monopolistic 
Empain group and the Cie de Chemins de fer départementaux. It criticized the French 
politicians such as Caze supporting a “Belgian industrial invasion” and going as far as 
using their influence to obstruct French competition. On top of that, the petition 
expressed the fear that Belgian railway owners, in case of war, would be “totally 
subservient to Germany: they [the owners] support with all their strength the clerical and 
 
                                                     
19 Caze & Empain to Minister of Public Works (Paris), 19 Aug 1885, Tramway de Valenciennes (Nord), F/14/17341, 
FRAN; Caze’s first intervention for the Voie étroite dated from two years before: Note du Ministère des Travaux 
Publics (Paris), 3 Feb 1883, Tramway de Valenciennes (Nord), F/14/17341, FRAN. 
20 Empain, Edouard Louis Joseph: Demande d’admission à domicile, 19 Nov 1887, Naturalisations, admissions à 
domicile, ... BB/11/2007/12050/X/87, FRAN. 
21 Le Nord républicain et démocratique, created in Lille in 1886, supported the candidacy of General Boulanger, 
leader of the anti-republican and revanchist Boulangists. Marc Leleux, Aux sources de la précarité: 
L’instrumentalisation du travail dans le Nord (1848-1914) (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 
2017), 219. 
22 “Tout le monde sait que Caze est un masque, une épave électorale dont le nom sert tristement de pavillon 
français couvrant une marchandise étrangère et dissimule une infiltration de capitaux étrangers”, Le Nord 
républicain et démocratique,  as cited in Lentacker, Frontière, 165. 
France and its empire 
 229 
German-friendly government of Leopold.”23 The Belgian entrepreneurs were thus seen as 
totally hostile to France and a disgrace to French anticlericalism. 
This nationalist criticism against the Empain companies was not unique.24 In 1893 
Empain was again accused of taking control of French railways and stealing jobs from 
Frenchmen to give them to Belgians.25 The Belgian chemical firm Solvay also faced the 
complaint in the 1880s that it only hired Belgian workers. Competitors of Solvay in France 
used the argument to prove that the Belgian chemical firm was un-French and should not 
be supported. Corporate officials refuted this, asserting that the vast majority of the 
personnel working in the factory were indeed French. The top man Ernest Solvay even 
stated that he and his partners had “always acted as French industrialists” and that they 
would “carry on this way.”26 
5.2.2 The dark shadow of Philippart 
The suspicion of the French authorities towards railway magnates, and Belgians in 
particular, had its origins in recent history. In the 1870s, the Belgian railway entrepreneur 
Simon Philippart had tried to form a transnational network of light railways in Belgium, 
France and Luxembourg. By integrating separate lines into an extensive unified system 
in whole northwestern France, Philippart hoped to rationalize their operation and 
compete with the large French railway companies. However bad management and risky 
financial speculations eventually led to his bankruptcy in 1875-1877, bringing down all 
his enterprises and ruining hundreds of duped investors. In France, the six leading 
railway companies as well as part of the financial and political elite fiercely opposed 
Philippart’s ambitious projects and aggressive methods. Despite his partnership with 
prominent locals, Philippart’s failure to gain the support of the leading circles in Paris 
accelerated his fall. The crash of Philippart left a strong impression on French policy-
makers and seriously influenced legislation on railroads. It anticipated the plan Freycinet 
(1878/79), which encouraged the large railroad companies to invest in rural areas.27 The 
French government also restricted the access to credit for light rail companies, as 
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stipulated in the new law on light railways of 1880. To protect small bondholders, it set a 
limit to the number of bonds a company could issue.28 
Since the beginning, the legacy of Simon Philippart had cast a dark shadow over 
Empain’s relationship with the French national and local authorities. Not more than two 
years after the bankruptcy of Philippart, Empain started to hunt for light rail concessions 
in the North of France. According to Kurgan-van Hentenryk and Lanthier, the French 
government met Empain’s railway initiatives with suspicion, regarding him as the 
successor of Philippart. The more the Empain group expanded its network in France, the 
more the authorities investigated its businesses and financial situation.29 Due to this 
opposition, the Empain group had great difficulties to develop an economically viable and 
well-financed rail network in the first fifteen years of its existence. 
The tensions between the Empain group and the French administration came to a head 
in the late 1880s. When the Empain group considered to profoundly reorganize its railway 
businesses in France, an overt clash was inevitable. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the 
Empain group wanted to achieve a light rail network as efficient as possible by grouping 
different operational sites under a single management. In 1888, this vision encouraged 
the business group to rename the Chemins de fer de Bayonne-Biarritz as the Chemins de fer à 
voie étroite du Midi and have it apply for concessions in other southern departments. 
However, despite the protest of Caze, the central administration refused this, stating that 
“it is in the interest of the State that tramways are owned by small separated firms, and 
not by a certain number of companies that would have formed networks between the 
meshes of those of the general railways.”30 Through the refusal, the State also wanted to 
protect the department where the Bayonne-Biarritz line was situated. By keeping 
companies small, they could not add speculative investments to their portfolio. These 
might hazard the excellent profitability of the originally conceded lines. If consequently, 
the company made a loss, the department would be responsible for guaranteeing a 
minimum return. 
As the Ministry of Public Works refused to approve this expansion strategy, the Empain 
group tried a different approach. In 1890 it merged the Chemins de fer du Périgord and the 
Chemins de fer à voie étroite du Midi with the Econord. As such, the Econord could centralize 
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the operation of light rail networks in several departments all over France. Caze, in a 
letter to the Minister, explained this would create scale economies and ensure a better 
public service.31 However, the authorities were not keen to endorse the creation of a large 
operating company active in several regions in the country. 
In fact, the group’s horizontal integration of light rail networks reminded the French 
government of the practices of Simon Philippart. In 1892, a lawyer of the Conseil d’Etat 
observed: “Perhaps the senior administration will recall that similar attempts that have 
originated in the North too [i.e. Philippart], consisted in opposing a vast network of light 
rail lines to the general railway lines.”32 The Conseil d’Etat and the Ministry of Public 
Works thus maintained the view that only small separate companies could guarantee the 
interests of the investors and the local population.33 The Ministry feared the scenario that 
the Econord would interconnect all its sites of operation in a department and would 
become, like Philippart had been, a serious competitor to the large railway companies 
such as the Compagnie du Nord and the Compagnie Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée. If this 
competition put pressure on the large companies’ profits, these firms might have claimed 
subsidies from the State.34 
Time and again, the government in Paris withheld applications for concessions by the 
Empain group because the network under scrutiny was too far from the existing 
network.35 In the end, the Empain group gave up its plans to merge all railway operations 
in France. Instead, it developed several operating companies whose networks were 
regionally concentrated. As required, the business group preserved the apparent legal 
distinction of the firms, while centralizing the management and personnel in Paris. The 
group still expanded its railway activities to other departments, but frequently acquired 
existing concessions or even railroads in operation. In this way, it could partly circumvent 
the potentially discriminatory procedure and the protest against foreign 
concessionaires.36 
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The analysis so far leads to two additional observations. Firstly, the reaction of the 
Empain group to nationalism and political distrust was to appear more local by 
appointing a French politician. However, given the group’s strong ties with the Belgian 
government, it could have solicited the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to intervene. 
The diplomacy frequently offered aid to entrepreneurs having difficulties with foreign 
authorities. Yet, compared to the files on other firms in France and compared to the 
correspondence of Empain on his businesses in other parts of the world, there is nearly 
nothing in the diplomatic archives on the Empain group in France. 
Secondly, the organization of the French railway companies confirms and improves 
the insight gained from the third chapter on the business group form. The business group 
was necessary to coordinate international operations not only in different legal spaces, 
but also within a single national market such as France. The multiple acquisitions from 
the 1890s also incited the Empain group to pursue the chosen path. The Paris 
headquarters could perfectly take care of the newly acquired firms and integrate them 
into the existing administrative structure. 
5.3 The breakthrough: The Paris Métro 
For the Empain group in France, the last years of the nineteenth century were a turning 
point. For large projects outside Belgium and France (e.g. China), Empain started to rely 
more on the Parisian financial market. In Paris itself, the Empain group submitted a 
tender for what was going to be the largest and most prestigious transport business of 
the century: the Métro. In addition, the business group patiently continued to invest all 
over France. For instance, in the light rail branch, the total mileage in operation grew 
from 362 km in 1894 to 1772 km in 1904 (see Fig. 12 in Chapter 2). Empain also managed 
to make large investments in the electricity business. Empain’s public fame also increased 
rapidly after 1900. His public exposure even multiplied by five. Whereas in the first 
twenty years the newspapers barely mentioned him, afterward a Frenchman could read 
about him at least twice a week.37 
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However, what had changed compared to the first two decades? In other words, what 
caused the definitive breakthrough of the business group in France? I argue that it was 
due to a combination of external and internal factors. Externally, the external market 
conditions had improved. In 1896, the long economic crisis was definitively over. It was 
the start of a boom period, which was reflected in the light rail and electrical industry 
too. After fifteen lean years, France witnessed a boom in the concession and construction 
of light railways and tramway networks. The market grew twice as fast in the period of 
1895 to 1910 than in the period of 1880 to 1895.38 
Internally, the strategy of the Empain group changed as well. In the first two decades, 
Empain had to recover from the shock caused by the phenomenon of the psychic distance 
paradox. However, as I argue in the following two subsections, the Métro constituted a 
turning point. Empain skillfully managed to be part of the winning coalition, despite 
nationalist criticism. Moreover, he developed a strong network with influential 
politicians and high government officials. Through financial partnerships with powerful 
businessmen and with the press, Empain could secure the support that was vital to the 
success of his growing business in France.  
5.3.1 The “cosmopolitan coalition” and nationalist opposition 
After thirty years of debates and fantastic plans, the city of Paris still did not have a well-
functioning underground transportation system. In the mid-1890s, realizing that Paris 
needed it to transport the millions of visitors to the Universal Exposition of 1900, the 
Municipality managed to convince the central government of a project designed by 
councilor André Berthelot and municipal engineer Fulgence Bienvenüe.39 For the City, it 
was a political victory that it could organize an underground transportation system under 
municipal control. The City was to construct and own the infrastructure (tunnels, 
stations, bridges, …), whereas it appealed to a company to construct the superstructure 
(tracks, electrical equipment, rolling stock, station entrances, …) and operate the utility. 
Six consortia reacted to the invitation to tender in early 1897. One consortium was 
headed by the Compagnie générale de traction (CGT) and also comprised the Empain group. 
In April of that year, the municipal commission selected the application of the CGT. Only 
they accepted all the important conditions. The CGT was capable of financing the 50 
million needed for the construction, offered low prices and declared to be ready to cede 
 
                                                     
38 Wolkowitsch, “Siècle,” 289-90. 
39 For more information on the lengthy political discussions preceding the approval of the Bienvenüe project, 
see Alain Cottereau, “Les batailles pour la création du Métro: Un choix de mode de vie, un succès pour la 
démocratie locale,” Revue d’histoire du XIXe siècle 29 (2004), http://journals.openedition.org/rh19/702. 
Securing investments 
234 
the power station back to the authorities at the expiry of the concession. The other 5 
applicants were rejected for various reasons. Two did not inspire confidence at all, one 
was insufficiently financed and another one refused to operate the entire network. Only 
the submission of Mr. Lalance, supported by the Parisian electricity company Secteur de 
Clichy, the bank Paribas and the German Siemens, qualified too. However, the commission 
ranked it second because of its high price and the refusal to cede the power station.40 
So who was behind this winning consortium in reality? The CGT, a one-year-old 
tramway holding company founded in Paris by French, Belgian and British financiers, had 
partnered up with the French constructor Schneider and relied on the technology of the 
American Westinghouse. The French shareholder of the CGT was the Parisian banker 
Henrotte (Banque international de Paris, Banque française de l’Afrique du Sud). The Belgian 
component existed of the Banque Nagelmackers and the Empain group (via the RELSE), 
whereas British bankers and mining companies such as the Exploration Company also 
joined the CGT. However, the capital of 17.5 million of the CGT was widely insufficient to 
finance the operation of the Paris Métro. Therefore, the French businessman Henri 
Gènevois organized a partnership between Empain and the private bank 
Bénard&Jarislowsky.41 As mentioned in Chapter 3, they had plenty of experience in the 
electricity business. 
The convention between the City and the CGT led to a law voted in Parliament in March 
1898 that ordered the CGT to cede the operation of the Métro to a subsidiary with a capital 
of 25 million francs, being the Compagnie du Chemin de fer métropolitain de Paris (CMP). 
Empain and Bénard&Jarislowsky each provided 24% of the capital, whereas the Banque 
Internationale de Paris (24%), the CGT (24%) and Schneider et Cie (4%) provided the 
remainder. However, Empain quickly became the largest shareholder. In the following 
years, all founding partners except for Empain had gradually sold the bulk of their shares. 
The CGT was forced to liquidate its interests in 1901, for it stood on the edge of 
bankruptcy. Pleased with the capital gains on their shares, the Banque Internationale and 
Bénard&Jarislowsky sold too, keeping an interest of about 2%. Finally, Schneider et Cie had 
to do the same because it could not finish the Métro’s power station in time. By that time, 
via the holding companies, the Empain group had increased its share to 27%. This dropped 
to 15-20% over the next ten years, but Empain still preserved a fair degree of control.42 
In 1897, some newspapers and municipal councilors were forced to accept that the 
majority had awarded the concession to a consortium dominated by foreign investors. 
The Journal des Transports called it the “Anglo-Belgian Métro” and would have preferred the 
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exclusively French Coignet & Grosselin as a winner. Lalance, who received support from 
German Siemens was not to be trusted. Similarly, even if Schneider was an irreproachable 
company, it was unacceptable that the jewel of the City of Paris ended up in the hands of 
Belgian and British financiers, including Empain.43 To counter this criticism, the 
agreement between the City and the CGT included a clause on the French origin of the 
board members, material, rolling stock and personnel of the operating company (art. 3). 
The nationality of board members had already been a condition in previous projects for 
the Parisian subway, but it certainly pointed to a nationalist sensitivity.44 For some 
councilors this was not enough. They fundamentally disagreed with the choice of the CGT. 
Mr. Clairin warned for the “danger for the City to put itself in the hands of a company 
that operates with the support of foreign capital.”45 Councilor Gay demanded additional 
measures to control the origin of the material. ANF, the French subsidiary of the Belgian 
La Métallurgique, supplied the rolling stock. He suspected ANF of importing Belgian parts 
and merely assemble them in France to give them a French label. Above all, the councilor 
wanted to “protect the interests of the French industry against the importation of foreign 
manufactured goods into France.”46 Although these remarks of the opposition did not 
hazard the future of the Métro project, it was a symptom of the strong tendency towards 
protectionism in French politics. Ultimately, the protectionist restrictions in the 
conventions of the Métro and other public utilities as well as the high French import 
tariffs incited the Empain group to open production plants at the French side of the 
border. As explained in Chapter 2, the Empain group split off ACENE (established in 1906 
in Jeumont) from the Belgian ACEC and founded the rolling stock manufacturer la 
Longueville in 1913. 
In terms of governance, the nationality restrictions caused a problem for the Empain 
group. If Empain could not be on the board of the CMP himself, who should he delegate? 
The senior executives of the Empain group were Belgian at that time, so not eligible for 
the job. The only top-ranking Frenchman was Edmond Caze, director of many other 
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transport companies. However, this time he might have thought that the conflict of 
interests was too apparent, all the more because the Métro received so much political 
attention. 
Table 12 Initial composition of the board of directors of the CMP (1898)47 
Director (FR) Representative of 
Adrien Bénard (chairman) Bénard&Jarislowsky 
Sigiswald Jarislowsky Bénard&Jarislowsky 
Henri-Louis Gènevois Bénard&Jarislowsky/independent 
Maurice Lichtenberger Schneider et Cie (Le Creusot) 
Ernest May Banque internationale de Paris 
Jacques-Frédéric Kulp Banque internationale de Paris 
Albert Olry CGT 
Firmin Rainbeaux CGT 
Alfred de Wandre Empain group 
L.-Charles de Tavernier Empain group 
Henri Maréchal Empain group 
Finally, Empain filled the three directorships he was entitled to by appointing three 
engineers: de Wandre, Maréchal and de Tavernier (see Table 12). De Wandre was the 
general manager of several French subsidiaries. Maréchal and de Tavernier had been 
engineers in the service of the City of Paris. In fact, Maréchal had only left the municipal 
administration in early 1897 to consult the CGT that was preparing its bid for the tender. 
Their knowledge of the project and of the inner workings of the city administration was 
of great value in this public-private partnership. As general manager, Bénard and Empain 
appointed Charles Roederer, with a lot of experience in managing railroads and urban 
transport systems. Roederer closely worked together with the Parisian administration in 
the persons of Fulgence Bienvenüe and André Berthelot. Public engineer Bienvenüe 
headed the construction works in charge of the City, whereas councilor Berthelot was in 
permanent contact with his colleagues of the municipal Métro commission.48 
For the rest, the initial composition of the board of directors mirrored the interests of 
the investing partners. The private bank Bénard&Jarislowsky received two directorships 
including the chairmanship. Gènevois was rewarded with a directorate for bringing the 
investing partners together. The Banque internationale de Paris and the CGT were also 
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represented twice. Only one member of the board represented Schneider et Cie. The French 
metallurgist was rather a privileged supplier/contractor than an important financier. 
In reality, the imposed French character of the board was not a significant obstacle for 
the Empain group. Even if Empain could not be a director of the CMP himself, he still 
pulled the strings behind the scenes. This quickly manifested itself in two ways. First of 
all, Empain demonstrated his dominance when he himself instead of Bénard, the French 
chairman of the board, led the visit of the Belgian King Leopold II to the Métro.49 Secondly, 
Empain had a tight grip on the board of directors. If necessary, he imposed his own view. 
Before the opening of line 1 in July 1900, general manager Roederer demanded measures 
to improve the safety of the rolling stock. Roederer had managed to convince some 
directors of the urgency of the matter, very much to the dislike of Empain. During the 
next board meeting in late June 1900, Empain asked to be heard as the largest shareholder. 
He did not tolerate the critique on the rolling stock provider ANF. Roederer saw no other 
option than to resign, while Empain demanded the replacement of the directors that had 
supported Roederer.50 Olry, May and Lichtenberger had to leave the company, which 
reflected the changing ownership. Reportedly, Empain declared in the meeting: “Most of 
you have sold their shares; and while they were selling, I was buying.”51 Therefore, 
Empain claimed three additional directorships for the Belgian investors. He appointed 
the French straw men Gustave Orens, Joseph Kermina and Gaston Leroy de Lenchères.52 
Empain’s straightforward intervention led to additional questions about the French 
character of the enterprise in the municipal council. In 1901, the nationalist councilor 
Colly pretended that foreigners were on the board of directors and that material from 
Belgium was used. He accused Empain to exert a much too large influence in the senior 
management. “We find here a cosmopolitan coalition. (…) In the board, which should only 
be composed of Frenchmen, there are very dangerous people and ready for the most 
dishonest undertakings.”53 He blamed Empain for being the cause of all problems. 
However, the Prefect replied that they had systematically verified the nationality of all 
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the board members. Directors de Wandre and Jarislowsky were born respectively Belgian 
and Polish, but naturalized in a distant past.54 
In short, Empain had managed to be part of an international consortium that obtained 
the Métro concession. During the bidding process, the municipal Métro commission 
eventually was not susceptible to nationalist criticism. However, the recurring 
discussions in the municipal council indicated a weakness of the CMP, common to all 
public utility companies of the Empain group. The success of the enterprise depended on 
a good relationship with the conceding authorities. The City administration and the CMP 
had to work closely together, but this collaboration was sometimes taxed, for instance 
after the Couronnes Disaster in 1903.55 To put it differently, securing the concession was 
merely the first step. Much more important for the prosperity of the highly politicized 
Métro was an influential personal network. 
5.3.2 Building a local network for resilience 
The Métro marked a juncture. Until the tender in 1897, the Empain group in France 
basically was a Belgian business group with a simple French cover. It had only one 
important French executive: Edmond Caze. Empain realized that he needed more of the 
kind of alliances he had with Caze. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Empain consequently 
mobilized French capital through partnerships with Parisian bankers such as Bénard. The 
offensive to overcome the mistrust of the administration culminated in the establishment 
of the French holding Parisienne Electrique. This allowed him to secure the support of high-
profile French directors. This strategy of Frenchification succeeded. The shift in the ratio 
of Belgian and French directors of group affiliates in France is telling. Whereas in 1897 
60% of the directors were Belgian, by 1903 Frenchmen held 66% of the positions.56 The 
following paragraphs discuss the impact of this improved French network. 
Empain offered directorships and management positions to influential figures of the 
Paris elite. Most of them have been briefly mentioned in Chapter 3. Auguste Stoecklin and 
Auguste Doniol became directors of the Parisienne Electrique from its establishment in 
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1900. Stoecklin had been the vice-president of the Conseil Général des Ponts et des 
Chaussées, the highest position a civil engineer could get in the administration, whereas 
Doniol had been a member of the Conseil d’Etat and of the Conseil Général des Ponts et 
des Chaussées.57 One year later, the Parisienne Electrique hired Raynald Legouëz. He had 
been the right hand of Fulgence Bienvenüe until Legouëz had to leave the city 
administration in December 1898.58 Together, they had designed and executed the 
construction of the Métro. Stoecklin, Doniol and Legouëz perfectly knew the central and 
municipal administration from within and had excellent technical expertise. 
Without a doubt Empain’s most valuable relationship was with André Berthelot.59 This 
socialist had played an essential role in getting the Métro project voted in the municipal 
council. In 1898, Berthelot moved from the municipal council to the French Parliament. 
Meanwhile, via his friend Henri Gènevois, Berthelot invested almost all his money in 
shares of the CMP. Probably via Gènevois as well, he had become friends with Edouard 
Empain by 1901. After Berthelot had inspected the Tramways du Caire and the Chemins de 
fer de la Basse-Egypte during a trip to Egypt, Empain offered him an important position in 
his business group. In June 1902, only weeks after he had not been reelected as MP, 
Berthelot became chairman-managing director of the Parisienne Electrique as well as 
managing director of the CMP.60 In that capacity, he frequently had to negotiate with the 
Métro commission of the municipal council. Towards his former colleagues, he was a 
fervent defender of the interests of the CMP. 
With regard to other businesses in Paris, Berthelot’s connections were of great help to 
the Empain group as well. Looking back in 1922, Berthelot declared himself that his 
“knowledge of the Parisian municipal circles provided hope to obtain the large 
concessions for electricity, gas and omnibuses that expired from 1906 to 1910.”61 Indeed, 
in the decade before the First World War, the Empain group was able to become the 
privileged partner in public transport and the production and distribution of electricity 
in the French capital. By 1912, the SEP was the most important supplier of the CMP and of 
Paris in general. Berthelot was a board member of SEP and of the Compagnie Parisienne de 
 
                                                     
57 Willi Hager, Hydraulicians in Europe (1800-2000), vol. 2 (CRC Press, 2009), 1022; Henry Carnoy, ed. Dictionnaire 
biographique international des écrivains, vol. 9 (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1987 [1907]), 25-27. 
58 Bienvenüe and Legouëz had written a politically sensitive report and Legouëz was forced to resign. Legouëz 
went to Algeria ‘to be forgotten’ until 1901. Suzor, Empain en France, 239; see also: Legouëz Raynald Louis Henri,  
Légion d’Honneur (Base Léonore), 19800035/269/36019, FRAN. 
59 His father was the former minister of Foreign Affairs (1895-1896) and respected scientist Marcellin Berthelot. 
For more information on the political and business career of A. Berthelot, see Kurgan-van Hentenryk, “Clio.” 
60 Meeting of 7 Jun 1902, Parisienne Électrique, Minutes of the Board of directors, SPIE. 
61 “Ma connaissance du milieu municipal parisien permettait d’espérer recueillir les grandes concessions de 
l’Electricité, du Gaz, des Omnibus qui expiraient de 1906 à 1910.” as cited in: Kurgan-van Hentenryk, “Clio,” 478. 
Securing investments 
240 
Distribution d'Electricité (est. 1907).62 In addition, Berthelot represented the Empain group 
in the TPDS, the second most important tramway company of Paris after a merger in 1910. 
Moreover, the Empain group recruited a great asset to the business in Paris in 1913. The 
incumbent president of the Parisian municipal council Félix Roussel resigned in 1912 to 
become director of the Parisienne Electrique and the Econord. Like Berthelot, Roussel had 
closely followed the development of the Métro and the electrification of the capital.63 
Except for politicians and top officials, others aided Empain too. Empain’s friendship 
with the entrepreneurs Maurice Bunau-Varilla and Henry Poidatz simplified business in 
France. They helped him to promote the companies of the business group and expedite 
certain procedures.64 In this respect, the press was a very useful instrument, as we have 
already seen in the Belgian case. Bunau-Varilla, a business relation of Empain since 1894 
at the latest, owned the newspaper Le Matin with Henry Poidatz. Poidatz possessed the 
majority of the shares and was the editor since 1897. Via Bunau-Varilla, Empain acquired 
a relatively large block of shares of Le Matin in 1899. Poidatz, Bunau-Varilla and Empain 
also received the support of Bénard&Jarislowsky. In turn, Henry Poidatz became a 
shareholder of the Parisienne Electrique and the Compagnie générale de chemins de fer et de 
tramways en Chine. Therefore, it is no surprise that Le Matin is a loyal supporter of the 
Métropolitain. In 1900, Poidatz and Bunau-Varilla decided to dedicate a special illustrated 
issue to the Paris Métro, that was about to open.65 Empain was, of course, delighted with 
this ‘free’ advertisement.66 The Empain brothers also kept in contact with editors such as 
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Bunau-Varilla and Jules Madeline to suggest them interesting articles related to 
businesses of the Empain group including the CFL67 and the SEP68. 
 
Figure 27 Map (drawing) of the network of the CMP and Nord-Sud (lines 12-13) as of 191469 
Empain’s large and diverse network of French prominent figures certainly contributed 
to the success of the business group after 1900. Its power should, however, not be 
exaggerated. The following case shows that the strategy of Empain was quickly put to the 
test, but eventually it did not pose an existential threat to the CMP. The case concerns the 
arrival of a competitor in the underground transport in Paris. Preventing this was beyond 
the power of the Empain group. The competitor could settle in Paris because the Métro 
was a profoundly political idea that emerged out of an autonomist vision of the French 
capital. Alain Cottereau has convincingly shown how right-wing councilors had always 
opposed the municipalist, almost socialist, project of a subway constructed by and for the 
City. In the municipal elections of May 1900, in the midst of the Dreyfus affair, the 
Nationalists triumphed over the political majority that had voted the development of the 
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Métro. For the first time in history, conservatives and nationalists could form a 
coalition.70 Their victory in 1900 gave them the opportunity to fight the bad example of 
the Métro, which even favored foreign investors such as Empain, by giving a new lease of 
life to a genuinely French and private initiative. The new majority granted a concession 
to Jean-Baptiste Berlier and Xavier Janicot, who had been advocating similar plans since 
the 1890s. They were allowed to construct at their own expenses an underground railway 
between Montparnasse and Montmartre, connecting different large railway stations and 
in competition with the projected line 4 of the CMP (see Fig. 27). 
Not only the then political opposition, but also the losers of the tender in 1897 felt 
betrayed by the municipality and the winning bid of CGT-Empain. As opposed to the other 
transport and electricity companies, Empain had accepted to largely follow the course 
the municipal council had set. Contrary to the expectations, the Métro had become 
extremely popular and a tremendous financial success.71 Therefore, Thomson-Houston, the 
Comptoir d’Escompte, Paribas and the Société française de Constructions Mécaniques were keen 
to take revenge and finance the Société du chemin de fer électrique souterrain du Nord-Sud de 
Paris (est. 1902). The project had to demonstrate the superiority and efficiency of private 
enterprise. However, Berlier and his partners repeatedly had to scale down their high 
ambitions, because the construction costs turned out to be much higher than estimated 
(it exceeded the costs for the CMP by 40%). In addition, the political groups in support of 
the concession had lost their majority again in 1904. As a result, only after long delays 
and a lot of bribes, the first sections of the line opened in 1910. Of course, the CMP had 
done everything possible to prevent the arrival of the Nord-Sud, a potentially fierce 
competitor. Both companies maintained strained relations. In the beginning, the CMP 
refused to cooperate with the Nord-Sud. The CMP did not intend to allow passengers 
coming from the Nord-Sud to use the Métro free of charge. Finally, the Parliament and the 
Municipality pressurized the company to accept this, in exchange for financial 
compensation. Moreover, the CMP accused the Nord-Sud of being responsible for the 
damage of the 1910 Great Flood. Probably the CMP had hoped that the Nord-Sud was so 
unprofitable that the CMP could immediately take over its competitor.72 In general, the 
two subways and many tramway companies continuously tried to expand their network, 
leading to competition harmful for all. The Empain group favored intensive coordination 
or even concentration of the different transport systems, but the Municipality did not 
share its view. Finally, the Empain group was proved right about the poor performance. 
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In 1930, the Nord-Sud went down after two decades of disappointing financial results. With 
the permission of the Municipality, the CMP acquired its competitor.73 
5.4 Accepting French influence to face pre-war nationalism 
On the eve of the First World War, Empain’s interests in France had attained a critical size 
that made him a crucial figure in the French economy. Decorated as Officer of the Légion 
d’honneur since 1900, Empain had accumulated a lot of economic, social and political 
capital. In the light of the political struggles surrounding public utilities, the Empain 
group had started to assimilate to France. However, in the following I argue that this 
dynamic of assimilation and lenience accelerated to cope with the resurgence of 
nationalism after the first (1905-1906) and certainly the Second (1911) Moroccan crisis.74 
Politicians, economists and writers adhered to this financial and economic nationalism 
and wanted to protect France from German and other foreign investments and imports. 
Within the government, the vision prevailed that any concession to a foreign company 
(e.g. opening of the French financial market) had to be compensated with commercial or 
political advantages.75 To be successful, Empain had to abide by this anti-German and 
‘France First’ policy. Three cases illustrate the French nationalism while at the same time 
showing Empain’s willingness to yield to French demands. 
First, there were the continuous attempts of the Empain group to have Belgian 
companies listed on the official Paris Stock Exchange. At the beginning of the century, 
the Empain group could have shares of the Russe-française listed, although the entire 
board was Belgian. Some minor lobbying by French collaborators sufficed. To justify the 
demand, Empain simply referred to his important position as the owner of various 
companies in France.76 Ten years later, this relaxed attitude of the French government 
had made way for a ‘quid pro quo’ philosophy. The fact that the French diplomacy was 
favorably disposed towards Empain did not change a thing about the new maxim.77 In 
 
                                                     
73 Lanthier, “Constructions,” 197. 
74 Almanach national : annuaire officiel de la République française, 1900, 571. 
75 Poidevin, Relations, 413-38+546-49+727-31. 
76 Minister of FA (Brussels) to Belgian Minister (Paris), 11 Apr 1901, France: Divers, 2850, BMFA; de Wandre to Ed. 
Empain, Apr 1901, France: Divers, 2850, BMFA. 
77 Note about ACEC of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris), 7 Jul 1913, Belgique: Banques-Bourses II (1909-13), 
142CPCOM/27, MAEF. 
Securing investments 
244 
exchange for access to the French capital market, the government now wanted direct 
influence in the board of directors. 
For the first time, Empain had to accept the presence of French directors in Belgian 
holding and operating companies. During the negotiations for the Réunis, the 
Railways&Electricité and ACEC in 1913, Empain promised the nomination of one or two 
French members in each board to André Luquet, member of the Conseil d’Etat and 
director of the Mouvement general des Fonds.78 The Mouvement general was the office in the 
Department of Finance responsible for the stock exchange. As the replacement of the late 
Paul de Smet de Naeyer, Empain proposed the Frenchman Pierre Marraud.79 This was once 
more a top state official, a colleague of Luquet in the Conseil d’Etat and in the Ministry of 
Finance. Empain probably met him at the Ghent World Expo of 1913. Marraud was the 
general commissioner for France, whereas Empain co-organized the section dedicated to 
electricity.80 Empain fitted the entry of Marraud in five Empain companies (Réunis, 
Railways&Electricité, ACEC, CFL and SIER) in with the general French-Belgian 
rapprochement after the 1913 Exhibition. In the rhetoric of Empain, Belgium was moving 
away from Germany and desired a “more intimate mutual cooperation” with France, “in 
a great sense of trust.” For his part, Marraud was flattered and accepted the directorships 
in order to further the influence of France in the Belgian economy.81 
Secondly, anti-German rumors nearly sabotaged the expansion plan of the Empain 
group in the North. In late June 1911, German newspapers spread the rumor that the steel 
giant Krupp had planned to set up a subsidiary in northern France. Dozens of newspapers 
all over France sounded the alarm, speaking of a German invasion and a threat to national 
security. The most virulent already imagined how German workers would quickly seize 
the vital defensive structures in the neighborhood and occupy important railways to 
transport German troops in case of a war.82 
For Empain, this media panic was a disaster, for he was the real buyer of the forests in 
Feignies, next to La Longueville. The business group planned to construct large 
workshops there. As always, Edouard Empain had preferred to keep as discreet as possible 
in doing business. However, to refute the rumor, Empain for once had to extensively brief 
the public. He immediately contacted his friends at Le Matin and gave an interview. 
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Empain stressed that he did not represent the German Krupp, but rather headed “a group 
of French capitalists.” The article also stressed his Francophile feelings.83 Nationalist 
newspapers, however, kept asking why the government had allowed foreigners to cut the 
strategically important forest at the border.84 
Just to be sure, Empain also paid a visit to the French Minister in Brussels to reassure 
the government in Paris. The entrepreneur blamed Krupp of having spread the rumor to 
discredit a competitor and obstruct Empain’s expansion plans. The Minister did not doubt 
Empain’s good intentions, as his previous initiatives had been generally favorable for 
France.85 
Thirdly and similarly, the cooperation set up in Belgium between the Empain group 
and the CMT threatened to collapse in 1913/14 due to nationalist criticism in France. The 
Empain group and the CMT jointly controlled the Belgian holding company Cie Auxiliaire 
d’Electricité de Nantes (CAEN), which in turn owned the Société nantaise d'éclairage et de force 
par l'électricité (SNE). Consequently, the board of directors was composed of 
representatives of both business groups. In December 1913, as a result of a shift in 
ownership, Charles Cicogna, Dannie Heineman and Josse Allard among others joined the 
board. They represented the Belgian-German electroholdings SGBEE and Sofina. The 
Italian Cicogna was said to be an ardent defender of German interests. André Berthelot 
could not reconcile his chairmanship with the presence of directors with strong ties to 
Germany. That is why he decided to resign one month later. However, Empain convinced 
Berthelot to reclaim his position in the board. Empain promised him to liquidate the 
CAEN, as to reinforce the French share ownership of the SNE. This could also remove the 
suspicion of the public authorities. The negotiations of the SNE with them encountered 
difficulties, because the SNE was so openly controlled by the CAEN, a foreign company. 
However, the outbreak of the war hindered the execution of the reorganization plans.86 
In sum, all three cases demonstrate that Empain was increasingly prepared to be 
lenient towards French political sensitivities. However, the analysis of the projects in the 
French empire will show that leniency did not suffice in the colonial context. 
 
                                                     
83 “Les bois de Lanières n’appartiennent pas à la Société Krupp,” Le Matin, 4 Jul 1911. 
84 “Notes sociales,” Le Gaulois, 11 Jul 1911; “L’affaire du Bois de Lanières,” La Libre Parole, 5 Jul 1911. 
85 French Minister (Brussels) to Minister of FA (Paris), 4 Jul 1911, Belgique: Industrie (1911-18), 142CPCOM/42, MAEF. 
86 During the war, M. Schwob, a public figure of Nantes and director since 1911, resigned. He he could no longer 
stand the dominant influence of the AEG, since the appointment of “Germanophiles” in the board in 1913. In 
addition, the authorities refused to SNE to build a high tension cable in the Nantes area, because German capital 
is involved in the business. After the Armistice, the French government even asked to reserve the ownership to 
French investors. Suzor, Empain en France, 194-98+289-92. 
Securing investments 
246 
5.5 Contrasting colonial contexts: Ivory Coast, Ethiopia and 
Congo 
As mentioned in the first chapter, the establishment of the Parisienne Electrique added a 
French perspective to the entrepreneurial mental maps. As it widened the geographical 
range of investments, the French colonial territories became a possible sphere of action, 
albeit a politically sensitive one. This happened before the Empain group took a serious 
interest in the Congo. That is, at the moment when King Leopold II contacted Empain to 
finance the CFL, Empain was already negotiating with the French Minister of Colonies 
Albert Decrais about the construction of railroads in French Africa. As early as February 
1901, the Parisienne Electrique and other holdings of the group were considering the 
establishment of a company of 25 million francs to finance the operations.87 Soon after 
the preliminary negotiations with Decrais and around the time Empain had seriously 
started negotiating about the CFL with Leopold II, the Parisienne Electrique submitted an 
official application for a railroad concession in the Ivory Coast. Côte d’Ivoire had been made 
an independent French colony in 1893, but in reality the French only controlled the 
coastal strip. They laid a claim on the rest of the territory, but it took decades to occupy 
the entire colony. In the meantime, local kingdoms rebelled against the French military 
presence.88 The administration realized that they needed a railroad to efficiently colonize 
the territory. After a period of study (Houdaille mission), the French Ministry of Colonies 
finally found a solid financier in Edouard Empain.89 
The proposed project was very similar to the concession Empain later acquired in 
Congo as it involved the joint financing of a railroad in exchange for large land claims. 
The colonial government had to construct the infrastructure and the Parisienne Electrique 
the superstructure. The Parisienne Electrique would finance its own construction work and 
lend the government money to finance its part, approx. 7 million francs. The Public Works 
Committee of the Ministry of Colonies was quite pleased, as it would finally have a 
railroad in the Ivory Coast at only half of the cost.90 The railroad of 200 km would run 
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from the Comoë River at the coast in Bingerville to an inland region up north in the 
direction of Kong, thus connecting the natural resources with the Ocean. Empain was 
ready to invest millions, because Decrais also granted him valuable rights to prospect 
mineral resources alongside the railroad for two years. The area covered a territory of 
40,000 km² (i.e. larger than Belgium) between the Comoë River and the meridian running 
through Jacqueville, of which 6000 km² would become the Empain group’s exclusive 
property. The recent discoveries of many precious ores such as gold made this offer very 
promising.91 
In return, the Minister of Colonies asked Empain for financial and technical assistance 
in another French sphere of influence: Djibouti (French Somaliland). Since 1896, the 
French-owned Compagnie impériale des Chemins de fer Éthiopiens (Cie impériale) had been 
building a railroad to connect the port of Djibouti with the Ethiopian hinterland. Ethiopia 
was an independent kingdom, but also a subject of colonial rivalry. Both Germany, France, 
Italy and Great Britain wanted to incorporate the area into their sphere of influence. Even 
Leopold II had made an attempt in the mid-1890s. He dreamt of a united kingdom of Congo 
and Abyssinia. This failed due to the resistance of the Great Powers, but Leopold II kept 
trying to enlarge his influence via Belgian investments in Ethiopian firms and via foreign 
agents. Like Mozambique, Ethiopia was of strategic interest because it was one of the 
possible stages in the Cape-to-Cairo railway and one of the many possible export routes 
for Congolese goods. It was hardly surprising that some shareholders in the Cie impériale 
had traces to Leopold II.92 By 1901, the Cie impériale had proved to be underfinanced and 
British capitalists had taken over. Recurring financial difficulties had restrained the 
company from finishing its railroad between Djibouti and Dire Dawa (close to Harar). 
Instead, the British planned to connect the railroad to the port of Zeila in British 
Somaliland.93 To prevent this loss of French influence in Ethiopia, the French government 
considered an intervention to increase the French share in the business. However, despite 
a campaign of the colonial lobby group Comité de l’Afrique française, no French financial 
institution was ready to help. Therefore, Minister Decrais set up an interministerial 
committee with representatives from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Finance to 
find a comprehensive solution. The committee agreed on a scheme ordering the Parisienne 
Electrique to finish the section to Harar at the company’s expenses. The French holding 
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company sent a study mission to Ethiopia, which estimated the construction costs at 7.5 
million francs.94 
Decrais wanted to kick out the British by asking the Parisienne Electrique for help. This 
shows the large credit that the Belgian financier enjoyed with some members of the 
French government including Decrais, Prime Minister Waldeck-Rousseau, Minister of 
Commerce Millerand, Minister of Finance Caillaux and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Delcassé.95 The French government would have approved the concession, if the news had 
not leaked to the nationalist newspaper La Libre Parole, provoking animosity among local 
colonists, merchants and colonial politicians.96 
French colonial entrepreneurs could not believe that their government was 
considering granting vast and exclusive mining concessions to a Belgian investor, who 
was even close to King Leopold.97 In addition, they themselves had been looking for gold 
and other mineral resources for years and were keen to exploit them in the near future. 
However, the government had temporarily frozen all permissions to prospect the Ivory 
Coast for gold because of the concession to Empain. Above all, the Ivorian-Ethiopian 
combination of Decrais upset the colonists. The Ivory Coast did not want to be the victim 
of financial problems in another French colony. Then there was the nationalist 
argument98: Why save the Djibouti-Harar railroad from the British to give it to a Belgian 
capitalist afterward?99 In fact, within the Cie impériale both the French founder and British 
shareholders were themselves unhappy with the proposed arrangement. They discretely 
wanted to get rid of all interests linked to Leopold II and they regarded Empain as yet 
another representative of the Belgian King. However, no documents can prove that 
Empain acted on behalf of the King in this matter.100 
In the public sphere, the Union coloniale101 led the resistance. Secretary General Joseph 
Chailly-Bert, a very influential colonial lobbyist and editor-in-chief of the Quinzaine 
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Coloniale102, organized a meeting in October 1901 with discontented colonial 
entrepreneurs. The general manager of the Parisienne Electrique Raynald Legouëz tried to 
appease them, but the Union coloniale decided to send a delegation to personally express 
its griefs to the Minister of Colonies.103 This delegation included Chailly-Bert himself and 
Julien Le Cesne of the Compagnie française de l’Afrique Occidentale (CFAO).104 Afterward, the 
colonial entrepreneurs continued their campaign and rallied the support of the general 
governor of the Ivory Coast and of several high officials within the Ministry of Colonies.105 
Also, already in June 1901, the Empain group had pushed up its price for helping out the 
French government beyond the acceptable. Empain desired extensions of the railroad 
into other colonial territories, demanding a much longer line than was conceded. It looks 
like Empain had slightly overplayed his hand. However, when the tide was totally turning, 
in November 1901, Empain had already lost his initial interest in the Ethiopian-Ivorian 
combination, because he had definitively secured the enormous CFL deal by then.106 
Nevertheless, fearing that Empain’s chance had gone by, MP André Berthelot 
published an article on the front page of Le Matin, the befriended newspaper. Referring to 
the Belgians in Congo (CFL) and the British and Germans in their colonies, Berthelot urged 
the French government to take immediate action and invest in colonial railways. There 
were excellent opportunities in Guinee, Dahomey (Benin), the Ivory Coast and Ethiopia.107 
The open call was, however, too little too late. Due to the very effective opposition of the 
Union coloniale and the CFAO, Decrais had abandoned the Ivory Coast-Ethiopia plan 
altogether.108 Finally, the French government decided to finance both the Ethiopian 
(1902-1915) and Ivorian (1904-1912) railroads from the colonial budget.109 
As announced above, the analysis of the political dimensions of the CFL and the French 
colonial projects is best done comparatively. In particular, the comparison of the projects 
in Leopoldian Congo and the French empire reveals a lot about the place of (foreign) 
entrepreneurs, Empain in particular, in the colonial political system of both worlds. It 
might explain why Empain succeeded in Congo and failed in the Ivory Coast and French 
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Somaliland. On the surface, there were many similarities. The Empain group was very 
active in the Belgian and French markets. It had invested millions there and had built up 
a solid reputation. At the turn of the century, Empain’s relationship with the relevant 
decision-makers was excellent. Empain kept in close touch with Leopold II and with 
important French ministers. However, more fundamentally, the negotiating position of 
Empain differed on three crucial points. 
First of all, in the Congolese case, King Leopold himself was desperately looking for 
funds for a second railroad. In contrast, Empain took the initiative in France. He filed an 
application with the French Ministry of Colonies for a railroad in the Ivory Coast. To be 
sure, the colonial administration already had plans in that direction and had received 
spontaneous applications before. However, only the linking of the Ivorian railroad to 
another pressing issue had convinced the French government. The beneficial 
combination incited the French government to circumvent the official procedure and 
directly grant the Parisienne Electrique the concession. 
This intention clashed with a second fundamental difference. The French colonial 
system totally differed from the autocratic rule in the Congo Free State. King Leopold 
ruled the CFS as his personal possession, supported by a relatively small administration 
and a few loyal financiers. His powers were only limited by the sporadic resistance of the 
CFS’ State Secretaries and by his difficult relationship with Belgian public opinion. If 
Leopold II wanted to grant Empain a concession of the size of the Netherlands, nobody 
could really stop him.110 The French empire functioned differently. The Ivory Coast and 
French Somaliland depended on the Ministry of Colonies. They were administered by 
colonial governors. The democratically elected Assemblée nationale held the executive 
power accountable. Decision power therefore was divided over ministers, governors and 
parliament. In addition, compared to the Belgian lack of interest for the CFS, French 
colonists and entrepreneurs were keen to do business in the French colonies. Influential 
pressing groups actively guarded French interests and had a ramified network within the 
colonial administration.111 As a result, a similar concession in the Ivory Coast did clash 
with the vested interests of relatively powerful colonists, whereas the CFS had virtually 
no colonists and the Congolese had no voice. 
Thirdly, Empain’s nationality complicated his investments in these strategic regions. 
In Congo, his Belgianness was an advantage, although the CFS was more open to foreign 
capital than the French colonies.112 As opposed to the ‘independent’ Congo, the Ivory 
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Coast and Somaliland were the outposts of French influence in the world. Many wanted 
to reserve these colonies for French investors. Despite the use of the French Parisienne 
Electrique, Empain’s maneuvers were denounced as a foreign interference or, even worse, 
machinations of Leopold II. 
In sum, the comparison shows that the Empain group had had high hopes in the French 
colonies. The railway in the Ivory Coast even was Empain’s first idea. Because of the anti-
foreign colonial opposition, the slow decision-making as well as the imperialist rivalry in 
the Horn of Africa, Empain decided to withdraw to the politically protected environment 
of the CFS.113 There, Empain did not encounter serious opposition to the CFL project. On 
the contrary, he could repeat the proven recipe by involving French capital, with the 
approval of Leopold II. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Looking back, the psychic distance paradox certainly applied to the Empain group’s 
first years in France. Empain and his Belgian partners wanted to do business in Belgium 
just like in their home country. As a Belgian, he directly negotiated with the local 
authorities and did hardly appeal to the Belgian diplomacy for help. However, unlike in 
his native country, his Belgian nationality impeded the development of the business 
group. The top executives soon admitted that they had underestimated the political 
resistance against foreign railway entrepreneurs. Whereas the small bursts of 
nationalism in Belgium generally were in favor of Empain, he did not ‘play a home game’ 
in France. At least nationalist discourse was strongly present. A foreign business group 
such as the Empain group had to try its best to avoid giving cause to nationalist criticism. 
This chapter on France is thus the first piece of evidence supporting the thesis that 
nationality mattered in international business before the First World War. It also 
demonstrates that foreign business groups were able to develop strategies to control 
political uncertainty. In the case of the Empain group in France, it reads like a history of 
adaptation. The group’s strategy was threefold. The first concerned Empain’s personal 
network. The founder forged valuable relationships with members of the French elite. 
Initially, he only recruited Caze, but after 1897 he directly recruited loyal directors and 
managers from the executive and legislative branches of government (Legouëz, 
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Berthelot, Stoecklin) and bankers (Bénard). Secondly, Empain invested in public relations. 
He used his close ties with Le Matin to give the business group good press. 
Thirdly, Empain was willing to accommodate the corporate governance to French 
political sensitivities. The more the Empain group invested in France, the more its 
leaders, firms, networks assimilated to France. It set up an entire French branch with local 
holding companies, manufacturers and managers. Yet, Empain kept pulling the strings. 
On the eve of the First World War, the business group had to adapt itself once more to the 
growing nationalist sensitivity. Empain went to great lengths to please the French 
government and public opinion. He even accepted French directors in Belgian (holding) 
companies, because he had too much to lose to be a stubborn Belgian patriot. 
From a broader perspective, the history of the Empain group shows that it could 
emphasize its Belgian nationality at home, while trying to mold a French identity at the 
same time. By stripping the firms in France of their foreign elements as much as possible, 
the group could positively influence local perception. Ultimately, the aim was to make 
France its second home country, albeit with great difficulty. Although as far as the period 
before 1914 is concerned, the significance of Belgium and France was different. Despite 
the binational foundations of the business group akin to a DLC, both countries were not 
placed on an equal footing. Only on the eve of the First World War, France started to have 
a decisive impact on the business group. 
The new French status was precarious and conditional, as both the case of the CMP 
versus the Nord-Sud and the projects in the Ivory Coast and French Somaliland extensively 
demonstrate. First of all, a voluntarist political coalition less sensitive to nationalism had 
granted the jewel of French public transport to a French-foreign firm. However, the 
creation of the nationalist Nord-Sud has shown that corporate success still depended on 
political goodwill. In the second case, the result was less positive. The comparison of the 
projects in Leopoldian Congo and French Ivory Coast ultimately proves that the 
assumption of a French identity had its limits. Merely having political friends did not 
suffice, in contrast to the situation of the CFL. While the Belgian colony was a politically 
protected environment, a mighty public opinion defended local economic interests in the 
French colonies. Additionally, in the imperialist struggle for foreign spheres of influence, 
national origin mattered even more than at home. Building on the discussion in the 
general introduction, this leads to the crucial insight that a specific nationality could be 
an asset in one imperial context but a liability in another. In short, what was beneficial in 
the Belgian Congo, was bad in French Africa. In a similar vein, the association with a ruler, 
whose imperialism and unscrupulous methods were criticized, could be positive as well 
as negative. The personal relationship with Leopold II yielded a fortune in the Congo. 
However, it backfired on Empain’s projects in the French colonies. 
To be sure, the hypothesis of France as a second home country needs to be further 
explored. To successfully make this claim, it should become clear that Empain could count 
on France as a home country when investing in a third country. So was the dual footing 
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the basis for further expansion abroad? This chapter has demonstrated that Empain 
never applied for French citizenship, although he was domiciled in Paris. Accordingly, the 
French government appreciated everything that he had done for France, but did it 
consider Empain as a Frenchman deserving diplomatic support? 
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Chapter 6 Venezuela: Failing forward? 
6.1 Introduction 
After investments in France and Belgium, the business group expanded overseas in 1888. 
Empain took a leap in the dark by starting to operate in Venezuela, the first host country 
beyond the immediate surroundings of Belgium. The focus on Venezuela connects with 
the research objectives of this dissertation in different ways. Apart from the fact that the 
Caracas waterworks was the first unrelated diversification of the Empain group, the case 
raises interesting questions about business-government relations and the management 
of political risk. Venezuela turned out to be an unstable business environment. Due to 
civil war, political unrest and financial instability, both the railroad construction and 
waterworks resulted in a fiasco. 
Therefore, it is an excellent case to test the early strategies of the Empain group 
concerning political uncertainty. Why precisely did it fail? How did Empain assess the risk 
of doing business with the Venezuelan government? As it was the first time that the group 
had to manage an overseas investment, what precautions did it take? Moreover, 
Venezuela was an independent republic. Due to the vicinity of the US and the British 
informal empire in Latin America, it had a strong nationalist current. Therefore, the 
question is: In this international political background, what were the options for an MNE 
from a small neutral country? How did the business group handle the conflict with the 
Venezuelan government? Did it receive the protection of the Belgian diplomacy? 
However, what was Belgium capable of in an international conflict? Finally, looking to the 
other regional cases, we should ask what the Empain group could have done and whether 
it learned from its first experience overseas. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section puts Empain’s investment in the 
Caracas waterworks in the context of European FDI in Latin America. It particularly 
explains how the Empain group ended up in Venezuela in the first place. It can also be 
regarded as a prelude to the political problems the Empain group faced later. The second 
section elucidates the motivations and the organization that underlie the investment in 
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the waterworks. Thirdly, this chapter deals with the political risks that finally led to the 
nationalization of the concession in 1895. The section tries to understand how the Empain 
group assessed the risk and why it ultimately failed. The final section studies the role of 
the Belgian Eaux de Caracas in the financial dispute between Venezuela and several 
European powers. It focuses on the limited agency of Belgium, despite the far-reaching 
cooperation between the company and the Belgian government. 
6.2 Prelude: General contracting of a Venezuelan railway 
To understand why Empain invested in the Caracas waterworks, we need to study the 
entire trajectory of the Empain group in Venezuela and put it in the broader context. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, in the 1880s Latin American countries witnessed a growing 
demand for their primary resources in Western industrialized societies. At the same time, 
many cities in Latin America were bursting at the seams. These two phenomena forced 
the local governments to develop transport and urban facilities. This need for modern 
infrastructure met with European capital looking for higher returns. Whereas large 
capital exporters such as Great Britain, France and Germany mainly invested in the 
successful economies of Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, Belgian capital also looked for 
niches with less foreign competition: Venezuela and remote areas in Argentina and 
Brazil. Unlike in Amsterdam and London, Venezuelan securities were not particularly in 
vogue at the Brussels Stock Exchange. Empain was actually the first one to introduce 
Venezuelan securities in Brussels. The bonds of the Carenero Railway Company were the 
first ever to be officially listed there.1 In addition, the trade between Belgium and 
Venezuela was inexistent.2 In other words, Venezuela had so far been unknown ground 
for Belgian entrepreneurs, including Empain. 
The very beginning of Empain’s activities in Latin America can be situated in 1888. 
Apart from its venture with Otlet in Argentina (see Chapter 1), the Empain group started 
doing business in Venezuela. In the winter of 1888, the holding company Voie étroite 
accepted the general contracting of a Venezuelan railroad for a British company. General 
contracting was one of the Voie étroite’s core businesses. However, in the past it had only 
constructed railways that belonged to the Empain group. Now, the Voie étroite signed a 
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contract with the London-based Carenero Railway and Navigation Company Limited, 
established a few months earlier. 
The Empain group disembarked in Venezuela during the reign of General Antonio 
Guzmán Blanco (1829-1899). In the 1880s it was a relatively peaceful, economically 
prosperous and stable country. Guzmán Blanco invested a lot in the modernization of the 
federal republic. He planned the development of an extensive railway network and other 
means of communication to boost agricultural exports. Thanks to a very liberal policy 
towards FDI, consisting of dozens of railway concessions and high state guarantees (up to 
7%), the government of Guzmán Blanco had already attracted British, German and French 
investors.3 With the increased revenues from coffee production, Guzmán Blanco could 
promote public works in different Venezuelan cities and appease protests in the states. 
However, regionalist opposition frequently united against the federal government. In 
1888, while Guzmán Blanco was making one of his long trips to Paris, one of these anti-
Guzmán revolts forced him to resign. The civilian Rojas Paul (1826-1905) succeeded him 
as president, but he was soon replaced by the civilian Raimundo Andueza Palacio in 1890. 
Andueza Palacio’s attempts to change the constitution caused political turmoil across 
Venezuela. “Under the banner of the Revolución Legalista (Legalist Revolution), former 
president Joaquín Crespo marched on Caracas in June 1892 and took control of the 
government until 1898.”4 
The Carenero railway perfectly fitted in this bigger picture of attractive railroad 
concessions to increase exports. The first part of the light railroad between San Jose de 
Rio Chico and Carenero (34 km), indicated in Figure 28, had been constructed in 1885 by 
the Compañía Anónima de Navegación y Ferrocarril de Barlovento. The aim was to transport 
cacao and other agricultural products from the fertile inland to the port of Carenero. In 
July 1888, Guzmán Blanco had conceded a new line from Altagracia de Orituco to the coast 
to a local entrepreneur. Both this concession and the existing line between Carenero and 
Rio Chico were quickly bought by the Carenero Company. With the two concessions, the 
British company also acquired the right to establish a shipping service between Carenero 
and the larger port of La Guayra.5 
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The British Carenero Company was probably attracted by the interesting financial 
conditions. The Venezuelan government had guaranteed a minimal return on investment 
of 7% for 99 years.6 This state guarantee must also have reassured subcontractor Voie 
étroite. The Carenero Railway and Navigation Company entrusted her with the construction 
of the extension (80 km) through the hills to Altagracia. The Voie étroite was also expected 
to supply a couple of steamers for the shipping line and all the material necessary to 
operate the railway.7 This last obligation explains why the befriended company La 
Métallurgique had delivered 3 locomotives in 1889.8 As part of the deal with the Carenero 
Company, the Voie étroite took control over the existing line and had to operate it during 
the time of construction of the extension.9 It was also financially involved since it was 
responsible for the servicing of a slice of the corporate bonds issued in 1889.10 
 
Figure 28 Carenero railway (Carenero-San José) and extension (San José-El Guapo-Altagracia 
de Orituco), 1886-189111 
 
                                                     
6 “Emission Carenero,” MIM, 24 Mar 1889. 
7 Wiener to Minister of FA (Brussels), 12 Jan 1892, Vénézuéla. Chemins de fer 1886-1910, 2926, BMFA; “Carenero R’way 
and Navigation Comp.,” Algemeen Handelsblad, 13 Jan 1891. 
8 Luc Delporte, “Ferrocarril Carenero-El Guapo - Patrimoine Industriel de Tubize,”  
http://www.museedelaporte.be/patrimoine/?p=1908. 
9 “Carenero-Company,” De Maasbode, 8 Jan 1892. 
10 “Financieele Mededeelingen,” Leeuwarder courant, 27 Jun 1889. 
11 Designed by the author 
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The Voie étroite sent some engineers to Venezuela to study the line and make construction 
plans. However, in the winter of 1889 floods ruined the railroad in operation between 
Carenero and San Jose. The floods also restrained the engineers from prospecting the 
extension. In addition, the old line had to be repaired. Therefore, the Carenero Company 
signed another contract with the Voie étroite to repair and broaden the old line. These 
reparations, including the reconstruction of a 40m-long bridge over the river “Tuy”, had 
priority over the extension and were completed at the end of 1890. At completion, the 
Voie étroite was to be paid in preferred shares of the Carenero Company Nonetheless, the 
Voie étroite considered it better to sell its rights. The Venezuela Public Works and Credit 
Company Ltd, a British company established in 1890 by the shareholders of the Carenero 
Company, acquired the contract for the construction of the extension and the supply of all 
the rolling stock. It had to pay the Voie étroite with Public Works shares for the work the 
Belgian company had already done.12 
However, when signing the initial contract in 1888, the Voie étroite had not adequately 
analyzed the risks. In the prospectus, the Carenero Company had largely exaggerated the 
potential of the railroad and its extension, for in practice it could not survive without the 
state guarantee. This dependency did not have to be fatal, were it not that the state 
guarantee had not been entirely secured. In the prospectus and the convention with the 
Voie étroite, the Carenero Company had falsely stated that it had obtained a concession for 
the extension to Altagracia, which was “duly ratified.”13 However, the company omitted 
that the Venezuelan Congress, the official legislative power, had not yet approved the 
extension and the accompanying subsidies. In fact, in the last years of his reign Guzmán 
Blanco had conceded over 2000 km of railroads, which the Congress had refused to 
legalize.14 This refusal was partly due to a general opposition against highly subsidized 
concessions granted by Guzmán Blanco, who had fallen into disgrace. 
The lack of Venezuelan state aid implied that the Carenero Company and its 
subcontractors were in deep financial trouble.15 As a result, neither the Public Works nor 
the Carenero Railway could pay the Voie étroite, so the Belgian holding company sued them 
in different courts. In July 1891, both the Public Works and the Carenero Company were 
condemned by the Commercial Court of Brussels.16 They had to pay back the advances 
 
                                                     
12 “Compagnie générale des Railways à voie étroite: Rapport du CA présenté à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 15 Oct 
1890; “Carenero R’way and Navigation Comp.,” Algemeen Handelsblad, 13 Jan 1891. 
13 “dûment ratifiée” Ledeganck (Caracas) to Minister of FA (Brussels), 24 Dec 1891, Vénézuéla. Chemins de fer 1886-
1910, 2926, BMFA. 
14 Blanchard de Farges, “Vénézuéla: Situation économique,” in Bulletin consulaire français : Recueil des rapports 
commerciaux adressés au Ministère des affaires étrangères (Paris: July 1890), 101-02. 
15 Ledeganck (Caracas) to Minister of FA (Brussels), 24 Dec 1891, 2926, BMFA. 
16 “Compagnie générale des Railways à voie étroite: Rapport du CA présenté à l’AGO,” Supplément MIM, 21 Oct 
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made by the Voie étroite “for the research, provided material and engineering works,” 
1,140,000 francs in total.17 The execution of the sentence was hard to enforce. First of all, 
the Carenero railroad was hardly profitable and close to bankruptcy. It even stopped 
servicing its debt. The promised government subsidies could only be granted when 
significant progress had been made with the extension, but due to the conflict between 
the British company and the Voie étroite only a few kilometers had actually been 
constructed. Secondly, the company’s case before the Venezuelan Federal Court did not 
progress. Desperately, the Voie étroite turned to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
support. The company’s lawyer Sam Wiener asked the Minister to send instructions to 
Ledeganck, the Belgian envoy in Caracas.18 Ledeganck lobbied the Venezuelan 
government but had to record that the political turmoil in Venezuela made the rule of 
law impossible. He reported that the British Carenero Company had even bribed the judges 
of the High Federal Court. The Venezuelan Minister of Public Works advised H.E. Boyer, 
the official representative of the Voie étroite, to do the same.19 Finally, after several years 
of litigation, the Voie étroite gave up its claim for compensation and had to book the losses. 
The Empain group clearly lacked detailed data on the solvability of the British 
contracting company or on the state of political affairs in Venezuela. Admittedly, the year 
1888 only marked the end of a long period of political stability under the reign of Guzmán 
Blanco. Seen from Belgium, probably few investors thought that the modest political 
unrest due to the elections would be the start of four chaotic years. In the recent past, 
reports had been rather positive about the state of affairs in Venezuela, compared to that 
of other Latin American countries.20 Still, Empain’s Belgian competitor Edouard Otlet had 
asked around about the climate for investment in Venezuela in 1888. In the absence of a 
Belgian consul21, his US colleague gave negative advice: The change of presidency could 
destabilize the country. He warned that the Venezuelan government might want to bully 
investors until they would hand the public utility over to the State.22 
 
                                                     
17 “pour études, fournitures et travaux”, Wiener to Minister of FA (Brussels), 12 Jan 1892, 2926, BMFA. 
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6.3 The Caracas waterworks: A promising public utility? 
The following paragraphs explain why and how Empain significantly expanded his 
activities in Venezuela in the early 1890s. Ever since the Voie étroite had started 
constructing and repairing the Carenero railroad, Empain and his French railway partner 
Edmond Caze had been on the lookout for other interesting business opportunities in 
Venezuela. The railway engineers of the Voie étroite in the country could gain information 
about other projects. They might enter into contact with local agents such as Arthur Le 
Mye. As one of the few Belgians living in Venezuela at that time, Le Mye worked as some 
kind of broker for interesting investment opportunities. Although he cannot be directly 
linked to the Carenero railroad, his acquaintance with Empain and Caze went back to 
1889. In that year, he had already tried to mediate between the French-Belgian duo and 
mining concession owners in Venezuela who were looking for foreign funds, as explained 
in Chapter 1. At the beginning of 1890, Le Mye had also signed a contract with the 
Venezuelan government for the extraction of gold from the Cuyuni River.23 In the same 
year, he had negotiated two concessions for water supply in the cities of Caracas and 
Maracaïbo.24 Quickly, he managed to interest Caze and Empain for the waterworks in the 
Venezuelan capital. 
Empain’s investment in the Caracas waterworks should be seen as an important part 
of the urban makeover of Venezuela’s largest city. In the 1870s and 1880s Caracas was 
transformed from a provincial town into a European-style capital. Antonio Guzmán 
Blanco initiated a long list of public works and embellishment projects. He, who often 
dwelled in the French capital, wanted to transform Caracas into “Petit Paris”. He ordered 
the construction of public squares, boulevards, museums, and theaters.25 As the city of 
Caracas grew from 55,000 inhabitants in 1881 to 72,000 inhabitants ten years later (90,000 
including the suburbs), it needed modern infrastructure.26 Electric lighting and telephone 
lines were installed. The existing waterworks also proved insufficient, for the rapidly 
growing city struggled with serious health issues such as tuberculosis and waterborne 
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diseases.27 Lacking proper water purification and management, the polluted and infected 
water even was one of the main causes of death in Caracas in the early 1890s.28 
 
Figure 29 Map of Caracas (1889)29 
Already in 1873, Guzmán Blanco had ordered the construction of an aqueduct of 45 km 
from the Macarao River to El Calvario (see Fig. 29). This had to secure a steady water 
supply to the southern part of the city, while the existing basin of the Catuche River was 
supplying the northern part. Guzmán Blanco placed the aqueduct under his direct 
authority. At that time, 2000 out of 7612 houses were supplied. In 1887, the operation of 
the water distribution was privatized. The very lucrative contract was granted to Auguste 
the Duke of Morny, the French son-in-law of the President. Most importantly, the Duke 
had to replace the aqueduct with an iron pipe. As Rojas Paúl seized power one year later, 
the government took back the waterworks and continued the modernization of the 
aqueduct.30 
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On the 11th of July 1890, the Municipal Council of Caracas decided to privatize water 
distribution once again. It contracted with the Venezuelan engineer Germán Jiménez, 
who was at the same time Congress Member and Minister of Public Works under the 
presidency of Andueza Palacio (1890-1892).31 Jiménez received a concession of 40 years to 
develop, modernize and operate both the water distribution and a sewer system. After 
that period, all assets would be returned to the Municipality without any compensation. 
The contractors were aware that this affair required much capital and already included 
the possibility of a transfer to a domestic or foreign firm. The day after the concession 
was granted, Jiménez sold the concession to the Belgian Arthur Le Mye for approximately 
625,000 francs.32 Some Venezuelan intermediaries were also promised company shares.33 
Clearly, the new buyer of the concession acted on behalf of Empain and Caze. Now in 
possession of the contract, Le Mye most likely traveled to Europe in the autumn of 1890 
and made arrangements with Edmond Caze to gather funds and establish a company. Caze 
founded the Compagnie générale des Eaux de Caracas (Eaux de Caracas) in Brussels in 
November 1890.34 Despite the name, he had designed the corporate purpose very broadly, 
according to the high ambitions of the Empain group in Venezuela. The founder took into 
account water distribution in other Venezuelan cities, such as the possible development 
of the concession in Maracaïbo. He also considered the possibility to use this water for 
power. Besides, Caze included concessions for lighting and more generally, public and 
private construction works. However, for now, the company just officially acquired the 
concession of the Caracas waterworks. 
Why did the Empain group decide to take its chances in a different sector in Venezuela, 
for the first time in the history of the business group? Obviously, the estimated revenue 
was very high (see below). That alone made diversification worthwhile. In addition, 
although it had no experience in the field, the step from railway construction to the 
development of a water system was less radical than it might seem. Both were public 
utilities conceded by the Venezuelan government that involved the confection of plans 
and execution of infrastructure works.35 The Voie étroite had been present in Venezuela 
for two years and had assembled a team of capable construction engineers. Empain could 
easily reemploy most of the building material, management, and workforce from the 
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32 García Ponce, “Compañía,” 189; Van der Heyde (Caracas) to Minister of FA (Brussels), 7 May 1901, Vénézuéla. 
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Carenero railroad for the construction of the waterworks.36 Like for the Carenero, the rest 
of the resources had to be imported from Belgium. However, creating a market for an 
industrial partner was not the purpose of the waterworks investment. Whereas the 
befriended La Métallurgique had provided rolling stock for the railroad, the business group 
had no ties with the Compagnie générale des Conduites d’Eau in Liège, where the waterworks 
company ordered its metal pipes.37 
Without the benefit of hindsight, the general economic climate and the activities of 
the Empain group in Venezuela did not cause any mistrust. First of all, the outbreak of 
the Baring Crisis in Argentina in July 1890 did not deter Empain and his partners. Their 
decision to execute the waterworks project was consistent with the broader trend on the 
financial market. The news of the debt crisis in Argentina and the crash of the Baring 
Bank shocked the City in London. From 1890 onwards, British investors strongly 
distrusted the creditworthiness of Argentina. However, they perceived Venezuelan bonds 
as less risky. This means that the general sense of the Latin American crisis only slightly 
reduced the investor’s trust in the Venezuelan state finances in the first two years. The 
Belgian financial press also remained optimistic about the country’s state in 1890-91.38 
Secondly, the Empain group could not have learned from the bad outcome of the 
Carenero Railway yet. The decision to start up the waterworks came too soon to be 
informed by the financial difficulties of the Carenero project. Only a few months later, the 
Voie étroite was already involved in several trials against the British contracting 
companies.39 At that moment at the latest, Empain or his partners could have realized 
that the climate for foreign direct investment had worsened compared to the Guzmán 
Blanco years. Especially government subsidies for foreign concessions had become very 
delicate. 
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Figure 30 Eaux de Caracas: Distribution of share ownership at creation and dissolution40 
So how did Caze and Empain organize the new Venezuelan investment? The capital of 
the Eaux de Caracas was fixed at 3.5 million francs in 7000 shares of 500 francs. The board 
was authorized to raise the capital to 7 million francs (to pay the building contractor) and 
issue up to another 12 million in corporate bonds. Figure 30 shows that Caze himself took 
a majority interest. He subscribed for a total of 4200 shares (60%), of which 1400 shares 
were a reward for the studies and efforts to set up the company. Edouard Empain was 
only the second-largest shareholder with 960 shares. However, he would receive an 
additional 7000 shares for his job as a building contractor. Other subscribers were his 
brother François and his usual business partners including Alphonse Braemt, Adrien 
d’Oultremont, Arthur du Roy de Blicquy, and Maurice Anspach. The founders appointed 
Caze, d’Oultremont, du Roy de Blicquy and Anspach to the first board of directors, but 
elected Theodore Verstraeten as chairman because of his expertise (see Table 13). This 
engineer was currently the general manager of the Belgian Compagnie générale pour 
l'éclairage et le chauffage par le gaz and had been the head of the waterworks of Brussels. He 
had written extensively about hydrology and water management.41 His chairmanship had 
to inspire confidence with external investors. 
Unlike most other companies in the Empain group, the Cie des Eaux de Caracas was a 
personal business. Edouard Empain did not invest with the help of a holding company. 
The statutes of the Voie étroite prohibited investments in any sector other than traction. 
However, the business partners behind both the holding company and the Eaux de Caracas 
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were the same. Except for Caze and Verstraeten, all investors were also at the board of 
the Voie étroite. Edmond Caze was at that time Empain’s key business partner in France 
(Econord) and also deeply involved in the Argentinian railway project of the Grand Central 
Sud-Américain (est. 1889). The only newcomer was Verstraeten. So, despite the increased 
exposure to risks due to the lack of a holding company, Empain and Caze could convince 
the same people to get involved as investors and directors. 
Table 13 Composition of the board of directors of the Cie des Eaux de Caracas (1891-1896)42 
Théodore Verstraeten Chairman 1891-1895 
Maurice Anspach Managing Director 1891-1895 
Arthur du Roy de Blicquy Director 1891-1895 
Edmond Caze Director 1891-1895 
Adrien d’Oultremont Director 1891-1895 
Edmond Terlinden Director 1893-1895 
Achille Huart-Hamoir Director; Liquidator 1893-1895; 1896-… 
Georges Ruelens Liquidator 1896-… 
Léon Van Keerberghen Liquidator 1896-… 
Managing director Maurice Anspach was entrusted with the supervision of the company 
from the headquarters in Brussels.43 He had to rely on the local manager in the Caracas 
office to execute the decisions made by the board. The communication between the 
offices in Brussels and Caracas was not always reliable. Because extensive reports were 
slow, the headquarters sent urgent messages via telegraph, very often through 
diplomatic channels. At the beginning of 1892, Anspach personally spent two months in 
1892 in Venezuela to size up the situation.44 
Although Edouard Empain was officially not in the board of directors, he still pulled 
the strings. The headquarters were not located in the buildings of the bank or the holding 
and Anspach was officially in charge of daily operations, but sources suggest that Empain 
was deeply involved. According to Le Mye, whose testimony can be biased but which is 
partly and indirectly confirmed, Empain functioned as the general contractor for all the 
construction works. In addition, his bank provided financial services and issued the 
bonds. Finally, he centralized all corporate correspondence in his offices and commented 
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on it before transferring them to the board of directors.45 So in reality, the lines between 
Empain’s private enterprise and the staff of the holding companies were blurred. 
To construct and operate the utility, Empain had recruited European engineers.46 The 
Frenchman H.E. Boyer was appointed manager ad interim of the Eaux de Caracas until 1891, 
because he was already in Venezuela to supervise the construction and operation of the 
Carenero railroad. Before he came to the country, he had been the operating manager of 
the Econord. In 1892 Boyer was sent to Caracas one last time to represent the Voie étroite 
at the Venezuelan Federal Court in the holding company’s case against its British 
contractors (Carenero).47 The Belgian engineer Norbert Paquet succeeded him to serve as 
the local manager of the Eaux de Caracas from August 1891. Paquet had previously worked 
at the Société Générale.48 Arthur Le Mye was only briefly in the service of the company, 
mainly as a reward for obtaining the concession.49 
The contract included a twofold assignment, i.e. the supply of fresh drinkable water 
and the drainage of wastewater. The latter implied the construction of a sewer system in 
the entire city. The former had to be organized by constructing a new iron cast aqueduct, 
additional water reservoirs and 60 km of water pipes. Before the Eaux de Caracas started 
operating the water service, the water had been supplied by an open sewer of over 40 km. 
Therefore, the water had to be filtered before consumption. The volumes were largely 
insufficient since only 3000 of the more than 10,000 houses could be serviced. The 
distribution infrastructure was rudimentary, not allowing to control nor measure the 
consumption by the clients.50 
In their communication towards investors, the directors were very optimistic about 
their public utility. The project could not fail, because water constituted a natural 
monopoly without competitors or substitutes. In addition, a very hot city such as Caracas 
strongly required efficient water supply. While the population would continue growing, 
revenues would increase automatically, for the government had decided to oblige every 
household to subscribe. The house owners also had to pay a street tax which was 
transferred to the company. Moreover, the government had exempted the company of 
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all tariffs and other taxes on materials and construction works. According to the 
directors, the waterworks had much potential. With the necessary rationalization and 
gains in efficiency, the directors estimated the minimum yearly gross revenue at 1.26 
million francs and 2 million francs when in full operation.51 Of course, the company also 
had to reckon with recurring costs and large investments. In exchange for the concession, 
the city of Caracas demanded an annuity of 200,000 francs in the first ten years, increasing 
up to 400,000 francs in the last decade. The municipality received 35 public fountains and 
the daily right to use 1 million liters for free.52 
Table 14 Estimated revenues and expenses of the Cie des Eaux de Caracas for 189553 vs actual 
income in 189454 
 1895 (est.) 1894 (real) 
Yearly gross income +1,454,750 +720,000 
100 frs subscription fee paid by 5000 
households 
500,000  
Sale of the exceeding 3.5 million L at 
the rate of 0.5 frs/1000L 
638,750  
Commercial service of installing 
sanitary facilities 
60,000  
Sewer tax (4 frs/m of façade) 256,000  
Yearly expenses -500,000 -330,000 
Municipal tax 200,000 200,000 
Maintenance water service 100,000 130,000 
Maintenance sewer service 200,000  
Yearly net income =954,750 =390,000 
Debt service -370,000 -370,000 
Net profit =584,750 =20,000 
Although the statement of an annual revenue of 2 million francs was unfounded, Empain 
and his partners had reasons to believe that the business could be successful in the long 
term. The company tried hard to achieve full operation as soon as possible. Its engineers 
installed new ponds and dams, iron tubes for the aqueducts, new water filters, public 
fountains, etc. By doing so, the company nearly doubled the daily water capacity from 9 
million liters to 16 million liters at the most. On completion in 1894, the water conduit 
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system measured 77 km and reached nearly 5000 houses. According to historian García 
Ponce, this coverage of 50% was not bad, knowing that in 1965 still not more than 65% of 
the houses were connected. To achieve this, the local office employed a staff of at least 50 
people.55 
After the three-year start-up period, the company claimed to have a net income of 
nearly 1 million francs in normal circumstances. As Table 14 shows, this figure was 
calculated rather optimistically to support the company’s claim before an international 
commission in 1903. With an average daily capacity of 12 million liters, of which a million 
liters was donated to the municipality and 7.5 million liters were for private subscribers 
(1500L/subscriber), the company could charge another 3.5 million liters as exceeding 
water consumption. In an ideal scenario, taking into account the early years and a total 
invested capital of 13.5 million francs to finish the infrastructure works, the company 
could hope to have written down the entire investment within 20 years. This meant that 
the last 20 years of the concession would be highly profitable. However, the engineer and 
initial concession owner Jiménez declared in 1894 that even “with a lot of economy [the 
company] would barely get what it needs to cover its capital and interests.”56 Indeed, the 
financial statements demonstrate that the company barely made any profit. In full 
operation, the gross revenue only amounted to half of the estimate. 
6.4 A controversial concession 
6.4.1 Financial and political risks 
Despite the bright future predicted by the management of the Eaux de Caracas, I argue 
that there were a number of foreseeable and unforeseeable risks. These are situated in 
the financial as well as in the political sphere. A considerable part of the financial risk was 
predictable. Apart from the external factors that will be discussed below, corporate 
choices played an important role in the precarious financial situation. The company 
incurred so much debt that any divergence from the ideal scenario (Table 14) could cause 
problems. In the five years of its existence, the Eaux de Caracas had to borrow more than 
twice its share capital.57 The paid-up capital of the company, which amounted to a 
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maximum of 2.8 million francs, could not suffice for the construction and maintenance of 
the entire waterworks. This debt put a heavy burden on the financial health of the 
company. As Jiménez had stated, the service of the corporate bonds absorbed all the 
earnings, leaving barely anything for the amortization of bonds and assets. 
Despite advertisements and good press in many newspapers, the issue of the first 
round of 13,700 bonds in February 1891 was not a success. The listing on the Brussels 
Stock Exchange in April only had a small impact. The second issue of 2000 bonds in 
December 1892 and the issue of another 1000 bonds in May 1895 were no different. For 
lack of funds, the company had to contact befriended banks such as the Caisse des 
Propriétaires, who provided loans with corporate bonds as collateral.58 
 
Figure 31 Price evolution of the Eaux de Caracas bonds (500 frs, 5%) quoted on the Brussels 
Stock Exchange, in francs (1891-1895)59 
In June 1891, Empain complained about the poor result of the first issue in his letters to 
Arthur Le Mye. Empain contended that he already had to buy 700 bonds himself. A new 
press campaign with sponsored articles did not have the desired effect. He urged Le Mye 
to make progress with the construction works, to be able to publish good results in the 
newspapers.60 Yet, at the end of the year still half of the issued bonds had not been sold. 
The following years did not bring any betterment. The quotation of the bonds reflected 
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this lack of enthusiasm (see Fig. 31). Despite their nominal value of 500 francs, the bonds 
were issued at 425 francs. The price reached a peak of 443 francs in April 1892. The bonds 
were also traded at the Paris Stock Exchange, where they quoted 457 francs at the most.61 
The restraint of small savers was perfectly understandable. For instance, two French 
financial newspapers advised their readers against the bonds of the Eaux de Caracas. 
Reportedly, the Baring crisis and the general political instability in Latin America had 
proven the high risk of similar investments. Unlike the Baring Bank, they wrote, Empain 
would not get support in case of a crisis, as he was not part of the haute banque.62  
This brings us to the political risks. The evolution of Venezuelan politics had a decisive 
impact on the prosperity of the waterworks business. (Over)anxious observers indeed 
realized that the company and its financial success were heavily dependent on the 
political opinion in Venezuela. The management must have been aware of this from the 
very beginning. Already a month after the establishment of the Cie des Eaux de Caracas, the 
Belgian consul in Caracas Ledeganck reported many legal and political problems related 
to the waterworks. In his letter to the Minister, he subtly remarked that Le Mye must have 
known these issues when he set up the company and must have consciously disregarded 
them for a good reason.63 Although being underestimated by the management, these 
issues had a lasting impact on the company’s success. The problems can be divided into 
several categories: (1) popular and political opposition, (2) corruption and (3) civil war. 
First, the opposition to the waterworks concession must be seen in the wider 
discontent about questionable lucrative concessions granted by the former president 
Guzmán Blanco. Both in the case of the Carenero Company and of the Eaux de Caracas, 
Guzmán Blanco had transacted with his son-in-law the Duke of Morny. This nepotism was 
typical of the corruption during his reign.64 Conflicting competences of different 
government levels cast doubt on the legality of the concession and the accompanying 
benefits. The legislative power felt passed over by the government who had granted the 
contract. Many politicians hostile to the ruling government and influential lobby groups 
made use of this dispute. They especially contested the legality of the obligation to 
connect all houses to the sewer and water mains and to pay a new tax for this. However, 
the company’s whole revenue model was based on this compulsory subscription.65 The 
managing director Anspach considered these concerns as a normal part of Venezuelan 
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politics and remained optimistic about the state of affairs.66 Secondly, the Belgian consul 
Ledeganck explicitly warned for the corruption among government officials and legal 
uncertainty. As mentioned for the Carenero railway, members of the government 
suggested to corporate managers that they could bribe judges. 
Third, these political issues were overshadowed by the civil war, which was of course 
not be expected. General Crespo, who revolted against President Andueza Palacio, started 
an insurrection in March 1892. Within a few months, the insurgents besieged and took 
Caracas. Despite positive messages of the management at the start of the revolution67, the 
company suffered damage. Warring parties had damaged the aqueduct and pillaged a 
water pumping station. In addition, the company lost money due to the delay of the 
construction works and to the payment of arbitrary fines, imposed by the 
revolutionaries.68 On top of that, six months of civil war caused an economic crisis that 
completely stopped business in Caracas. After peace was restored and the new 
government of General Crespo installed, a “downpour” destroyed the company’s main 
aqueduct of the Macarao. The costs to repair the damages were very high. To obtain 
additional funds and to settle relations with the new government, the company sent the 
politician Jules Carlier as a negotiator in November.69 Compared to managing director 
Anspach, who had paid a visit at the beginning of 1892, Carlier had several assets. He had 
prestige as former MP (1886-1892) and as the organizer of the Belgian section at the 
Universal Exposition in Paris. Carlier was well acquainted with Empain, as he was a 
director of La Métallurgique. During his stay in Venezuela, Carlier could combine 
negotiations for the Eaux de Caracas with some business for La Métallurgique.70 After six 
months of negotiations, Carlier managed to settle with the Venezuelan government. They 
signed a new contract at the end of February 1893 which solved all issues between the 
company and the authorities, including compensation for the war damage and natural 
disaster. 
On the one hand, the company would refrain from its rights to construct and operate 
a sewer system. As it had constructed only 2 km of sewers, this did not mean a great loss. 
The Eaux de Caracas also dropped all other financial claims against the municipality. On 
the other hand, the duration of the concession would be extended with 15 years, until 
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1946. The deal also solved the uncompensated overconsumption of water by the public 
administration. They had been a very bad payer so far, but the company obtained the 
right to deduct the expenses for the sewer system and the bills for the overconsumption 
of water from the municipal annuity. The government would also pay the reparation of 
the iron cast aqueduct of Macarao as well as the construction of a second aqueduct. The 
subsidies amounted to 1 million francs for the reparation and 3.2 million francs for the 
new pipeline. As soon as all the construction works were finished, in return, the company 
again had to provide a complimentary 1 million liters of water to the federal government 
and 2 million liters to the municipality every day.71 Overall, the additional construction 
contracts promised a better future for the company, as this would also increase the 
available water capacity. 
Unfortunately for the company, the economic and political problems did not vanish. 
In 1893-94 the economic crisis continued, which hindered the growth of the customer 
base. As soon as the company had finished repairing the cast-iron aqueduct, in April 1894, 
it believed it could start to operate the business in a normal way. However, the new 
arrangement had not yet taken its full effect, because the municipal council and the 
National Assembly hesitated to approve it. Both legislative bodies were disputing 
competence over the matter and were facing heavy internal protests. While the 
government was quite pleased with the new deal, the waterworks concession as a whole 
had increasingly provoked animosity in the press and the federal parliament. In March 
1893, both of them debated the legality of the concession and the lucrative monopoly of 
a foreign company. Newspapers such as El Tiempo, El Pregonero, El Siglo and the Diario de 
Avisos campaigned against the waterworks with a xenophobe undertone. To them, the 
Eaux de Caracas was the work of the profiteer Guzmán Blanco. In particular, they criticized 
the additional 4 million francs of subsidies awarded to a foreign enterprise. They also 
suspected the foreign company of not hiring Venezuelan workers. In the National 
Assembly, many politicians pleaded to cancel the contract of the Eaux de Caracas and 
municipalize the utility, often using nationalist arguments. Referring to a petition signed 
by 12,000 Caraqueños, one MP urged to get rid of the “yoke of a foreign company, imposed 
‘after we have so long conquered independence.’”72 Another MP overtly criticized those 
“foreign adventurers who come to speculate on the Nation.”73 The National Assembly 
decided to install a commission that had to write a report on the question. 
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Given the widespread opposition, the company sent back Jules Carlier in April 1894 to 
iron out the differences and renegotiate some details.74 It is unclear what the outcome of 
his mission was, but the company could definitely use his influence in Caracas. Many 
citizens complained about the irregularity of the water supply and the hindrance caused 
by the construction works. In addition, the municipal and federal government and 80% of 
the citizens did not pay their water bills. While the company had supplied water with a 
value of more than 1 million francs in 1894, it had only collected 485,906 francs. It even 
had to cut off the supply of 400 defaulters.75 
6.4.2 The nationalization of the Eaux de Caracas 
Due to an unexpected diplomatic incident, the government plans to work out a 
definitive arrangement for the Eaux de Caracas gained momentum. After the civil war of 
1892, Western diplomats had written a memorandum about the establishment of a joint 
international commission. Distrusting the Venezuelan legal system and the 
independence of the courts, the diplomats believed this was the best way to receive 
compensation for damages to foreign property. Ledeganck enthusiastically joined this 
maneuver, in the hope of bettering the chances of small power Belgium. In March 1895, 
the Italian government published this memorandum and it quickly found its way to the 
Venezuelan press. The Venezuelan political elite was furious: the foreign distrust of the 
Venezuelan legal system was “humiliating for the Nation.”76 The government declared 
the concerning diplomats, including the Belgian consul general Ledeganck, personae non 
gratae. They had to leave the country immediately. The domestic press particularly 
despised Ledeganck. According to El Tiempo, the manager of the Cie des Eaux de Caracas had 
instigated Ledeganck to write the memorandum, solely in the interest of the company. 
The association with the much-hated waterworks concession devastated Ledeganck’s 
reputation.77 In the opinion of Ledeganck, the incident merely fostered the hatred 
towards foreigners, always latently present in Venezuela.78 
Only two months later, the expert committee established by General Crespo at the time 
of the parliamentary debates in 1893 published its conclusions. Inspired by the claim that 
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the profits had to flow back to the municipality instead of out of the country, the 
committee advised to buy back the waterworks. Of course, the government had to 
compensate the company’s share- and bondholders for all the expenses, assets and lost 
revenue. However, the United States of Venezuela could not afford to pay this in cash, 
only in state bonds.79 A few weeks later, the government started negotiations with 
Norbert Pacquet, the local manager of the Eaux de Caracas. After five months of 
negotiating, the Federal government and Pacquet concluded at the end of October 1895. 
Most likely, Pacquet had to bribe the state officials, including the President, with a couple 
of company shares.80 The Venezuelan government only wanted to pay 4 million francs in 
cash, while the company demanded more than 7 million francs in cash for the 
construction works, the material and tools, the price paid to the initial concession owner, 
the lost revenue and various unpaid bills of the government and individual subscribers. 
Finally, they came to a sophisticated financial arrangement, which is reproduced in 
Table 15. The Cie des Eaux de Caracas renounced to the concession and asked to be paid in 
special government bonds (Deuda especial interna del 5% anual). The nominal value of the 
bonds was 10,792,199.44 francs, more than the corporate management had wished for. 
However, the market value of the bonds was only 4 million francs, for the Deuda especial 
interna quoted at 37% of the nominal value. The management had accepted this deal, only 
because it was speculating on a value increase. Indeed, a few months later the bonds were 
already sold at 80% of their nominal value.81 
Table 15 Financial arrangement between the Venezuelan government and the Eaux de 
Caracas (1895)82 
 Nominal value (frs) Market value (1895) 
Purchase price (in Venezuelan 
bonds) 
10,792,199.44 4,004,909.70 
Amount used to exchange for 
corporate bonds issued by the Eaux 
de Caracas 
8,350,000.00 3,101,235.57 
Venezuelan bonds left for 
shareholders 
2,442,199.44 976,879.78 
 
Having approved the transfer of the waterworks to the Venezuelan State, the general 
assembly of shareholders voted the company’s dissolution in February 1896.83 Despite the 
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deal with the Venezuelan State, the shareholders of the Eaux de Caracas were ruined. The 
16,700 corporate bonds had been exchanged for Venezuelan government bonds, so the 
bondholders could hope to recover their deposit entirely. In contrast, the remainder of 
the purchase price, i.e. nominally 2.5 million francs at the most but in reality closer to 1 
million francs, could hardly cover the shareholders who invested 7 million francs. 
As mentioned above, during the five years of its existence, the business made virtually 
no profits and could barely service its corporate debt. As a result, the company had no 
buffers to absorb the millions of losses. A decade after the sale of the concession, the 
accounts stated an accumulated loss of 9 million francs.84 The liquidators were clear: “It 
is certain that the assets will not be, not at all, sufficient to pay all the debts.” Therefore, 
the shareholders could not get any compensation.85 For Empain personally, who owned 
9000 shares, i.e. 4.5 million francs, and 3 million francs of the company’s debt, this was a 
financial disaster. In 1903 his lawyers estimated his loss at over 7 million francs. François 
Empain and other business partners also lost hundreds of thousands of francs.86 
Where did it go wrong for the company? Empain had reckoned on a long-term 
investment, with a high gain after a couple of years. Despite the very hostile climate, the 
company directors did not want to lose faith in the project. Again and again, they entered 
into negotiations with the Venezuelan government. They either entrusted Norbert 
Paquet with the task or sent an influential Belgian politician such as Jules Carlier. Pacquet 
also defended the merits of the company in the press. Even more, he accused El Tiempo of 
partiality in the matter. This attack of a foreign manager enticed public opinion. What 
the company really lacked was a Venezuelan business partner who could gain support 
from the local elite. This was a crucial failure, for the upper classes and politicians were 
the most radical opponents of the private waterworks. Only after the liquidation, the 
company appointed a Venezuelan representative in the person of Carlos F. Grisanti, an 
influential magistrate and professor in International Law. He had briefly been Minister of 
Foreign Affairs under the presidency of Andueza Palacio.87 
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6.5 The Empain group in the midst of an international 
conflict 
Eventually, the company’s deal with the politically and economically unstable 
Venezuelan State led to an overt crisis in international politics with a special role for the 
Eaux de Caracas. Venezuela continued to service the special Eaux de Caracas debt for two 
years. Simultaneously, the Venezuelan government searched many reasons to escape its 
obligation to pay or at least to lower the claim of 10 million francs. Its propositions were 
met with fierce opposition by the company liquidators. Overall, Belgian-Venezuelan 
contacts were difficult, as the diplomatic relationships had been ‘suspended’ and Belgium 
did not have a representative in Caracas. In the first years, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs followed the harsh French attitude towards Venezuela. France demanded material 
compensations as a precondition.88 Nevertheless, the Venezuelan government repeatedly 
tried to establish contact with Belgian officials and the company liquidators. In 
September 1896 it charged Jules Carlier to inquire in Brussels and Paris about the 
normalization of diplomatic relationships.89 At the same time, the Eaux de Caracas 
liquidators met the Venezuelan Minister of Public Works, when he came to Paris. They 
protested vividly against his proposition to buy back the bonds against 40% of their 
value.90 Empain, the main shareholder, could refuse this and future propositions only 
because his personal bank and business group provided a large financial buffer. 
Otherwise, he would already have preferred hard cash instead of risky government bonds. 
Elections, an armed uprising, a heavy smallpox epidemic, fiscal mismanagement and 
the economic crisis sparked by the fall in coffee prices – Venezuela’s key export product 
– forced the government to stop paying the interests on the Eaux de Caracas bonds after 
August 1897.91 The lack of payments and the continued maneuvering of the Venezuelan 
government urged the liquidators to seek official support. In a letter to Crespo, the 
Venezuelan president, they explained that there were bondholders in Belgium, France, 
and Germany. They threatened to appeal to these governments to ask them to “safeguard 
the interests of their nationals” that the company was unable to protect.92 The liquidators, 
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first of all, wanted the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intervene in their favor. 
Belgium could not officially protest before restoring its relationship with Venezuela. This 
put pressure on Belgium’s stance on the matter. Therefore, the Eaux de Caracas 
bondholders demanded to resume the Belgian-Venezuelan relations, supported in this by 
the Belgian financial press.93 For the Venezuelan government, this normalization was a 
precondition to negotiate the restart of the debt service. In 1898 the pressure from the 
press and Eaux de Caracas increased as no progress had been made. Though, the Belgian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs had already granted its sincere support during an audience 
with the liquidators.94 Gradually losing their faith in a Belgian solution, some financial 
newspapers lobbied to stake on the power of a neighboring country. France had a 
considerable army and corresponding political pressure: “This country has the advantage 
over ours to possess battleships of which the ‘voice’ would probably have more 
influence.”95 The Belgique financière strongly regretted that “Little Belgium” did not have 
gunboats to send to Venezuela. Because of this military weakness, Venezuela could 
largely ignore the Belgian claim.96 These statements perfectly reflected the frustration of 
Belgian investors over their country’s small power status. 
The Eaux de Caracas also contacted the French and German Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for support. Belgian diplomacy urged them to do so. However, it appeared that nearly all 
bondholders lived in Belgium, making an intervention of France or Germany very 
unlikely.97 Finally, the Belgian government stood up for the Eaux de Caracas and sent a 
diplomatic agent to Caracas in 1900.98 
The new Belgian representative Van der Heyde tried to negotiate with the new 
Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro to resume the payments, but Castro only wanted 
to speak to company officials. Van der Heyde disapprovingly reported that Castro could 
this way “claim certain personal advantages of a kind that not need to be stressed.”99 The 
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present representative Grisanti did not sufficiently qualify. At the repeated request of 
Van der Heyde and the Belgian Minister de Favereau, Huart-Hamoir and his colleagues 
delegated Ferdinand Goffart. Belgian vice-consul, to represent the company in Caracas. 
Before departure, he had discussed his mission extensively with Huart-Hamoir.100 
While Goffart was in Caracas, trying to counter the legal objections made by Venezuela, 
the Eaux de Caracas bondholders were rescued by a different event. President Castro had 
vainly tried to improve the state finances, but the debt burden was too heavy.101 The Eaux 
de Caracas loan only amounted to 5% of total public debt.102 In 1901, Venezuela finally had 
to default on all foreign debt. In particular, President Castro continued to refuse to service 
the large credits granted by Germany and Great Britain. Since 1897, German interest 
arrears amounted to 6 million francs, as compared to 3 million francs for the Eaux de 
Caracas. Not having faith in the Venezuelan courts, the German government demanded a 
mixed commission to settle the claims. Castro refused, claiming that the issue fell under 
Venezuelan jurisdiction. On the 7th of December 1902, having secured the tacit permission 
of US President Roosevelt, Germany and Britain decided to block the Venezuelan harbors. 
After Italy joined this ‘peaceful blockade’103, warships captured smaller Venezuelan 
gunboats and sank two. A few days later Castro agreed with the principle of arbitration. 
However, the three Powers only lifted the blockade two months later. They wanted to 
keep the pressure on Venezuela to sign the Protocol that arranged the arbitration. Finally, 
in Washington on the 13th of February 1903, Venezuela conceded to the blocking powers’ 
wish to dedicate a series of claims to an international commission. The country promised 
to reserve 30% of its customs receipts to pay off its debts.104 
From the start of the ‘peaceful blockade’, the Belgian vice-consul in Caracas Goffart 
asked Minister de Favereau what attitude to adopt. Goffart saw the claims of Germany 
and Britain as an invitation to file the claim of the Eaux de Caracas too. He considered it 
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best to join the Belgian claim to the German one.105 In close consultation with Empain, de 
Favereau agreed to pursue the establishment of a mixed commission. However, the 
Minister urged Goffart not to “deviate from the role imposed on Belgium.”106 In other 
words, Belgium needed to respect its imposed neutrality, which meant no involvement in 
armed conflicts with other states.107 Therefore, the Minister did not want to associate 
Belgium with Germany directly, as he feared that the blockade could lead to war. Belgium 
should rather act in parallel with the Blocking Powers and try to obtain a distinct Belgian-
Venezuelan commission. In the end, the Belgian government, and six other countries 
after her, signed protocols with Venezuela.108 
From June to August 1903, a mixed commission composed of a Belgian and a 
Venezuelan representative as well as an umpire tackled the question of whether the claim 
of the Belgian State, increased to 14 million francs because of the accumulated interest 
arrears, was justified. As the Eaux de Caracas debt accounted for the lion’s share (97%) of 
the Belgian claim, the particular interests of the company totally coincided with Belgian 
national interests. As such, the diplomatic services and the Empain brothers closely 
collaborated to prepare a solid case.109 The company’s representative Goffart acted as the 
Belgian commissioner. The Cie des Eaux de Caracas paid the expenses of an additional 
Belgian lawyer, consul Röhl. The umpire was the Dutch former vice-president of the Court 
for the Dutch Indies.110 He followed the reasoning of Goffart and decided in favor of the 
company. 
As can be seen in Table 16, the Belgian claim was the most successful of all ten. Belgium 
was not the largest claimant but obtained the largest recognized claim. Although it is 
unclear what explains the Belgian success, the fact is that countries could decide 
themselves what claims they would submit to the mixed commission.111 This means that 
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they perhaps reserved certain claims they deemed to have a better chance via diplomatic 
negotiations.112 By the way, there have been other cases of arbitration commissions that 
did not rule in favor of the company. The following case proves that even Great Power 
support was not a sufficient condition for compensation. Like the Eaux de Caracas, the 
French Chemins de fer vénézuéliens (est. 1888) was a victim of the political unrest and civil 
wars in the country. Rebels pillaged the railroad and Venezuela failed to pay the promised 
subsidies. Finally, the case was brought before an arbitration commission. The arbiter 
recognized only 0.5 million francs of a claim worth 18 million. The issue cast a cloud on 
the French-Venezuelan relations for years, but diplomatic pressure from France did not 
have the desired effect.113 
Table 16 Sums claimed and recognized by mixed Venezuelan-foreign commissions after 
the 1903 Washington Protocols114 
Creditor country Claimed amount 
(frs) 
Recognized amount 
(frs) 
Success 
rate 
Belgium 14,921,805.11 10,898,643.86 73% 
Great Britain 14,743,523.00 9,401,268.00 64% 
Italy 39,844,259.00 2,975,906.00 7% 
France 17,891,613.54 2,667,079.51 15% 
Mexico 2,944,380.48 2,577,328.10 88% 
United States 81,410,952.29 2,269,543.63 3% 
Germany 7,376,685.00 2,091,909.00 28% 
Spain 5,307,627.54 1,974,818.41 37% 
The Netherlands 1,069,552.31 544,301.47 51% 
Sweden/Norway 1,047,701.35 174,359.08 17% 
Total 186,558,099.60 35,575,157.06 19% 
Coming back to the results of the 1903 arbitration, it is important to note that several 
countries had won their case. As a result, the following question arose: Which countries 
could benefit in priority from the Venezuelan customs income? The Great Powers seized 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague to decide on the matter. In order to 
defend their claim and plead the rapid repayment by Venezuela, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had to delegate a lawyer representing the Belgian State. As the Eaux de Caracas was 
the most important interested party, the Minister of Foreign Affairs let the Empain 
 
                                                     
112 The claims filed for arbitrage formed only half of the total foreign debt and compensation claims. 
113 Recueil Financier, 1912, 925-26. 
114 García Ponce, “Compañía,” 226; McBeth, Gunboats, 93. 
Securing investments 
282 
brothers pick a lawyer.115 Edouard Empain chose Charles Woeste. As a Catholic 
conservative party leader, Minister of State and lawyer at the Court of Cassation, he was 
a political heavyweight. Before Empain sent him to The Hague, Woeste had also been one 
of the two lawyers defending Empain in a libel suit against a financial newspaper.116 The 
Eaux de Caracas paid his fee. In February 1904, the court granted Great Britain, Germany, 
and Italy preferential treatment. Despite attempts of Venezuela to contest the claim of 
the Cie des Eaux de Caracas, the bond- and shareholders maintained the right to be paid 
back.117 Finally, Venezuela started paying installments in 1907. Before the First World 
War, almost the entire Venezuelan debt was discharged.118 However, it took the 
liquidators another decade to fulfill their duty and close the accounts.119 
6.6 Conclusion 
With little foreign experience beyond France, the Empain group crossed the Atlantic. 
Venezuela drew foreign capital with generous state aid and attractive profits. Not 
discouraged by the lack of in-depth information about the political and economic 
situation, the Empain group invested in the Caracas waterworks. Eventually, this first 
adventure overseas went terribly wrong. Therefore, in the broader framework of this 
dissertation, this was the perfect case to investigate the assessment of non-market factors 
and the early strategies to mitigate the political risk. I have argued that Empain lacked 
the experience to deal with complex political regimes. In particular, it did not develop a 
strong local network and merely relied on the support of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
The Empain group underestimated the political risk of investing in Venezuela. 
Whereas a civil war was hardly foreseeable, a good assessment of the attitude of the 
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government was crucial. The previous history of the waterworks had shown that it was a 
subject of much political discussion. When buying the concession, the many political and 
legal problems had not disappeared. Le Mye and the company directors repeatedly 
downplayed the importance of this political uncertainty. Similar to railroads, a long-term 
investment of this kind entailed many fixed assets. Therefore, Empain could not rapidly 
withdraw from the market in case of a crisis. What if a government came to power that 
was less comfortable with the idea of a lucrative waterworks concession operated by 
foreigners? 
Despite this possibility, Empain and Caze did not take sufficient precautions against 
the risk of a change in policy. First of all, they invested personally. Instead, Empain could 
have founded another holding company as protection. Now they were personally exposed 
to a potential failure. Secondly, Empain did not involve a local partner, e.g. an 
experienced Venezuelan politician. A Venezuelan partner could have warned for political 
opposition, lobbied the government and bought influence in the press. His presence could 
also have neutralized the nationalist argument that all the profits of an – in essence - 
public utility were flowing to Belgian private entrepreneurs. Thirdly, the Empain group 
did not succeed in gaining the support of a Great Power. The suggestion of the Belgian 
diplomats to the directors to lobby in Paris and Berlin was in vain. The interest of French 
and German share-and bondholders was too small to provoke an intervention of their 
respective governments. Whether the pressure of a Great Power could have saved the 
Eaux de Caracas from privatization in 1895 remains an open question. Other cited company 
claims prove that Venezuela was always inclined to give in to Great Powers either. 
Instead of looking for foreign support, the Eaux de Caracas heavily relied on the services 
of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The company enjoyed diplomatic backing from 
the start. As a result, the Ministry willingly put its services at the company’s disposal. This 
manifested itself in three different ways. 
Firstly, the agents in Caracas lobbied Venezuelan ministers and maintained close 
contact with the local managers of the company. Despite their astonishment at the 
optimism of the directors, they kept supporting the cause of the company. The Belgian 
agents actively looked for solutions to problems caused by the political situation. 
Ledeganck in particular decided to partner up with the Great Powers to increase the 
impact of a claim from the small country Belgium. His personal efforts to obtain 
compensation for the Eaux de Caracas even led to a diplomatic incident freezing Belgian-
Venezuelan relations for half a decade. 
Secondly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a vital information hub for the directors 
in Brussels. For such a long-distance investment, up-to-date information was a crucial 
asset. Therefore, the Ministry shared all the information it received from the Belgian 
agent in Caracas. Conversely, the directors received permission to use diplomatic 
encrypted telegrams to communicate with their local manager in case of emergency. 
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Directors, liquidators and ultimately the Empain brothers regularly paid a visit to the 
Ministry to exchange information and discuss strategies. 
Thirdly and consequently, the interests of the Belgian State in Venezuela coincided 
with the interests of the Eaux de Caracas. Empain could effectively dominate Belgian-
Venezuelan relations between 1895 and 1914, because his personal interests were 
immense compared to the relative unimportance of Venezuela for Belgium as a whole. 
Since no other Belgian company had invested in the country, the economic interests of 
the Belgian state narrowed down to the interests of the bond- and shareholders of the 
Eaux de Caracas. In consequence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became a temporary 
extension of the services of the Empain group until Venezuela resumed interest 
payments. The Minister even let Empain choose –and pay– diplomatic representatives 
(Goffart, Röhl, Woeste). These three features already demonstrate the existence of a 
strong business-government nexus that is essential for Belgian investments abroad. 
Though valuable, this threefold support of the Belgian diplomacy was insufficient. 
Even with the ability to determine Belgian foreign policy in the matter and thus mobilize 
all the diplomatic credit Belgium had, Empain could not avoid political risk. To Empain’s 
fortune, investors from large European countries suffered from the Venezuelan default 
too. Remarkably, even the Great Powers only had their way after a military intervention, 
i.e. the ‘peaceful blockade’ of 1902-1903. In the aftermath, Belgium could capitalize on the 
power play of its European neighbors via quick diplomatic maneuvers. More generally, 
this episode in the history of European imperialism supports the thesis that the West 
could set the ‘rules of the game’ in the First Global Economy. Latin American countries 
adhered to the view that borrowing to governments had a risk, for which investors get a 
premium, i.e. interest. This followed from the Drago Doctrine, stipulating that foreign 
powers could not just send gunboats to collect debts.120 The Great Powers, on the contrary, 
were willing to interfere in this financial market mechanisms and guarantee the 
investments of their nationals at any cost. The military intervention in Venezuela was yet 
another proof that many European investors were protected against country risk. In this 
particular case, Empain and the Belgian government skillfully managed to extend this 
protection to the Eaux de Caracas. 
In conclusion, despite the excellent relations with the Belgian government, the Empain 
group could have benefited from a less antagonistic relationship with the Venezuelan 
authorities. In addition, it should have involved local investors and politicians. Finally, 
Belgium was nearly crushed between the rivaling Great Powers. The question then arises: 
did the Empain group ‘fail forward’? The comparison of the Venezuelan failure with the 
Belgian and French context suggests that the Empain group learned from the experience. 
In the early 1890s in Venezuela, the business leaders had refrained from taking into 
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account the three observations listed above. By the end of the decade, in contrast, the 
Empain group had successfully partnered up with local capitalists and politicians in 
France. However, did the business group also develop a strategy to overcome the 
weakness of Belgium in the international sphere? This will be a question addressed in the 
next chapter on China. 
  287 
Chapter 7 China: Belgian neutrality with a whiff 
of French perfume 
7.1 Introduction 
For the implications of international political relations on multinational business, China 
provides an interesting case. Many historians of imperialism regard the history of the late 
Qing Empire as a showcase for the dynamics of Western intrusion in a peripheral country. 
All Great Powers had their eye on this vast ancient land: Great Britain, France, Japan, 
Russia and Germany. These and many smaller states were dreaming of carving up the 
Chinese melon or at least get a piece of the giant market of 400 million customers. At the 
same time, the Chinese political elite urged the Qing government to adopt a more 
nationalist policy. This chapter therefore asks what strategies the Empain group did 
adopt to gain a foothold in this country under great pressure from within and without. 
What can the Chinese case reveal about the position of a business group from a small 
country vis-à-vis the Western powers? In a country subject to overt interimperialist 
rivalry, the support of Belgian diplomacy must have been insufficient. Belgian business 
undoubtedly had to find alternative ways to stand up to the international competition. 
How could Empain overcome Belgium’s political weakness while at the same time 
exploiting this as a strength? A form of collaboration was probably key. In Venezuela, 
Empain failed to cooperate with France. Could the Empain group use France as a second 
home country in the Chinese case? If so, what was the price it had to pay for that? If not, 
did Empain’s nationality foil this plan, like in the Ivory Coast? 
The history of the relations between China and the West around the turn of the 
twentieth century is a history of imperialism. According to Jürgen Osterhammel, China 
was a semi-colonial territory before 1914. In a “semi-colonial” system, “a metropolitan 
country exerts power and influence within an asymmetrical relationship, but does not 
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assume outright domination and formal sovereignty over the peripheral country.”1 Not 
one but many European powers had a semi-colonial relationship with China. It started to 
be a victim of their informal imperialism in the 1840s. Japan entered the scene half a 
century later, with its victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1895). By demanding and 
receiving large compensations (Treaty of Shimonoseki), Japan left the door wide open for 
unlimited claims of all Western states present in China. The millennia-old empire was 
unable to resist the external pressure, due to its “inability to be a modern central 
government.”2 During the “Scramble for Concessions,” European powers tightened their 
grip on Chinese infrastructure such as railways and ports and took possession of new 
territories. Japan had received Taiwan in 1895. In 1898, the German navy landed in 
Jiaozhou Bay (Shandong Province). The British forced the Qing to accept an extension of 
their Crown colony Hong Kong. France expanded its sphere of influence in Southern 
China, bordering its colonial possessions in Indochina. Russia reinforced its presence in 
Manchuria, the place of origin of the Qing (Manchu) dynasty. 
Russia, France and Germany aimed at a partition of China or at least a division in clearly 
delineated spheres of influence. In contrast, Great Britain tried to maintain a strong 
presence in different parts of the Empire. Finally, the United States successfully 
advocated its “Open Door” policy. The Great Powers allowed each other to trade in every 
part of the Chinese empire, regardless of the spheres of influence. After the Boxer Rising 
(1900), they also came to the consensus that the territorial integrity of China had to be 
protected.3 
In the remainder of this chapter, I first explore how the Empain group stood his ground 
in the ‘Scramble for Concessions.’ I focus on the political strategies to obtain a concession. 
The next section investigates what Empain had to do in a changing political context. In 
what way could he consolidate the opportunities he had created before the Boxer Rising? 
The fourth and final section studies how the Empain group could take advantage of the 
situation created by the financial imperialism of the Great Powers. In general, most 
attention will be given to the business group’s special relationship with Belgium and 
France. 
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7.2 Mixed up in the Scramble for Concessions 
In the year following the Sino-Japanese War, Leopold II and Belgian diplomacy had 
finally managed to draw the attention of national business on the investment 
opportunities in China.4 Chapter 1 has demonstrated how and why Empain and other 
investors started to be interested in the promising Chinese market. This growing interest 
coincided with Chinese plans for railroad construction. Chinese officials eager to reform 
their country after the defeat of 1895 had realized that China lacked a good transportation 
network. So far, the Qing government had been rather wary of large railroad projects. 
They perceived it as a gateway for more Western imperialism. In consequence, as of 1896, 
China had constructed only 600 km of tracks, compared to 34,000 km in Great Britain. 
Now, the perception of the use of railroads among the Chinese political elite was changing 
and some reformers designed a plan for railroad development. However, China lacked a 
modern domestic capital market to mobilize funds for the construction and had to rely 
on foreign partners. Foreign powers were increasingly putting pressure on the Qing 
government to grant them large railway concessions.5 
Chinese officials were looking for a foreign investment partner amidst of this 
imperialist power play. As introduced in Chapter 1, they realized that Belgium might be 
the lesser evil. Sheng Xuanhuai6, the Director-General of the Chinese Railway 
Administration, first intended to collaborate with the Americans, for the United States 
was a large, but peaceful power that remained independent from the Great Powers. 
However, Belgian diplomatic agents started negotiating with the Chinese government for 
railway concessions too. They tried to convince Sheng that the Americans might abuse 
their power in the future. Belgium, on the contrary, was too small to be dangerous, but 
technologically advanced. Finally, Sheng changed his mind.7 
In March 1897, the talks on the main railway between Beijing and Hankou had made 
such progress that the Belgian negotiators established the Société d’étude de Chemins de fer 
en Chine. This prospective company assembled Belgian and French entrepreneurs and 
banks under the leadership of the Société Générale and Paribas. This incited Empain to 
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organize a study mission as well. To this end, he gathered financial partners in the 
Syndicat d’études en Chine. The syndicate did not want to compete directly with the 
initiative of the Société Générale. Whereas the Société d’étude searched for large projects, 
the Syndicat focused on the core business of the Empain group: light rail and urban 
tramways. The strategy was to rapidly gain a foothold in China by obtaining a concession. 
This could be the starting point for further expansion in the area.8 
Like the Société d’étude, Empain successfully won French and Belgian banks and holding 
companies over to his plan. Among the French financiers were prominent banks such as 
the Banque Russo-Chinoise, Paribas and smaller private bankers such as Bénard&Jarislowsky 
and Goudchaux&Cie. Other sponsors were the directors and shareholders of the Banque 
Russo-Chinoise and Paribas, some of them belonging to the haute banque such as Hottinguer 
and Stern. At a later stage, people like Bunau-Varilla, Henri Poidatz, Georges Graux and 
Henri Génevois, who collaborated with Empain in the Métro, joined too. On the Belgian 
side, the Empain holding companies (the Russe-française, Réunis and Voie étroite and at a 
later stage Parisienne Electrique) and usual bankers, brokers and collaborators contributed. 
This included the business group’s partner in Egypt, the Chemins de fer économiques. The 
Banque Liégeoise, Balser&Cie, Paul Dansette and managers of the Brussels branch of Paribas 
also got in.9 
The sources do not tell why Empain turned to France and how he was able to gather 
the Parisian bankers. Of course, Empain was already well established in the Parisian 
financial world. In addition, Empain did only have to reproduce the promising alliance of 
the Société d’étude with France. Paribas was keen to be part of both projects. While the 
Banque Russo-Chinoise had been unable to join the Société d’étude because it was too busy 
organizing the Chinese section of the Transsiberian railroad, it now had more flexibility. 
Empain could get them on board for his project, but only at a considerable price: they 
would receive 10% of all profits to be made on future contracts.10 
For the first time in its fifteen years of existence, the Empain group had set up an 
international financial consortium with Belgian, French and Russian big banks. This 
seemed a deliberate strategy, for the involvement of foreign capital extremely mattered 
from a political perspective. On the one hand, the Banque Russo-Chinoise was founded in 
1895 on the initiative of the Russian government and was headquartered in Saint 
Petersburg. The Russo-Chinoise was Russia’s most important financial instrument in 
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China.11 The bank’s involvement assured the benevolence of the tsarist government. On 
the other hand, the presence of Paribas and members of the Parisian haute banque 
facilitated the access to French diplomatic services. In addition, the Quai d’Orsay often 
even regarded the Banque Russo-Chinoise as French, for French investors had provided the 
majority of its capital. 
The Syndicat d’études en Chine gathered 200,000 francs among its members to send 
Armand Rouffart to China in July 1897. Rouffart, who had to scout for interesting 
opportunities for at least one year, was one of the Empain group’s finest engineers. Since 
1891, he had been general manager of the Voie étroite, the group’s main holding company 
active in railroad development. He had also proven his competencies as managing 
director of the Tramways de Boulogne-sur-Mer during its electrification (1894-1896) and of 
the Chemins de fer de la Banlieue de Reims (1896). In addition, he had been appointed to the 
board of directors of the Russe-française holding company at its incorporation in 1896.12 
In the first months after his arrival in China, Rouffart tried to negotiate with a series 
of Chinese officials. However, he soon realized that the letters of recommendation for 
specific employees of the Russian Embassy in Beijing provided by General Annenkov13 
were not enough. Neither did the mere membership of French banks in the syndicate 
suffice to make progress. The financiers had to accept that despite Rouffart’s efficiency 
and diplomacy, “the energy and handiness of private enterprise are powerless on their 
own and can only achieve something with the support of one of the European Great 
Powers.”14 Therefore, the French-Belgian consortium sought the official support of 
France from the moment Rouffart encountered his first difficulties. The syndicate asked 
the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to mobilize its French counterparts.15 Finally, in 
May 1898, after months of lobbying, the French government agreed on the condition that 
the orders resulting from the projects would be equally shared among the French and 
Belgian industries.16 The members of the syndicate agreed and vowed to reserve possible 
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management positions to Belgian and French engineers, whenever they could appoint 
them themselves.17 
Despite the exactingness of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both France and 
Belgium were willing to support the Brussels-based company in its search for concessions. 
How to explain this? As mentioned, the simple presence of investors from both countries 
was not enough. In fact, the two governments believed that the majority of shares were 
in the hands of their compatriots.18 It is possible to verify this impression at the moment 
the syndicate turned into a public limited company in 1900. According to our calculations, 
which roughly correspond to those of Kurgan, French investors had provided 35% of the 
capital and Belgians 65%.19 The Empain group, however, willingly kept up appearances 
and did not correct the false impression of French dominance. As the Empain group partly 
consisted of French investors, it strategically contributed to the ambiguous national 
identity by having its French holding company Parisienne Electrique invest. Overall, the 
Empain group maintained a firm grip on the enterprise. The shareholders belonging to 
the Empain group together owned more than 60% of the company.20 More than ten years 
later, Empain still had, “together with befriended companies, 43% of the capital (…). The 
rest of the capital [was] very scattered across France and Belgium.”21 
The French-Belgian character of the enterprise also had to be reflected in the board of 
directors. At the suggestion of King Leopold II, Raphaël de Bauer was appointed as the 
chairman. De Bauer personified the binational alliance as he was the manager of the 
Brussels branch of the French Paribas and had the Belgian nationality. Initially, Belgian 
board members included the brothers Edouard and François Empain, Alexis du Roy de 
Blicquy and managing director Armand Rouffart. The Belgian Chemins de fer économiques 
had delegated Gustave Kumps. The French representatives were also part of the Empain 
group: banker Adrien Bénard and Auguste Doniol, who served on behalf of the Parisienne 
Electrique.22 
For Rouffart and the syndicate, the first year was very frustrating. Amidst of the 
scramble for concessions and fierce inter-imperialist rivalry, Rouffart tried to obtain 
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concessions for tramways in Beijing, Shanghai and Canton (Guangzhou) as well as light 
railways in the area of Canton and Shanghai. A breakthrough did not follow for various 
reasons. Sometimes the Chinese government refused to award the concession, sometimes 
Empain rejected projects for lack of profitability.23 Belgian diplomats in Beijing only 
hesitantly supported Rouffart’s efforts. They did not want to jeopardize the large Beijing-
Hankou project by introducing new demands to Li Hongzhang before the definitive 
contract was signed.24 Moreover, the competition among foreign powers for interesting 
concessions was very hard and the Chinese authorities were very suspicious after the 
German occupation of Jiaozhou Bay (November 1897).25 
To give an example, Great Power rivalry seriously hindered Rouffart’s actions in the 
case of the Shanghai-Nanjing railroad. Through the intercession of the Belgian minister 
in Beijing de Vinck, Li Hongzhang introduced Rouffart to Sheng, head of the Chinese 
Imperial Railways Administration, in March 1898.26 With Sheng, Rouffart discussed the 
potential of a railroad between Nanjing and Shanghai. Although the affair was promising 
a return on equity of at least 7%, Empain and the other members of the syndicate’s 
steering committee hesitated because a 350 km heavy railroad surpassed the ambitions 
that the syndicate had set itself. They encouraged Rouffart to continue negotiations, but 
without obligations.27 However, the British minister in Beijing got wind of the project and 
forced Sheng to grant the concession to the British & Chinese Corporation. According to the 
syndicate, the French government was to blame for the failure. Despite the demand of the 
French syndicate members, the Quai d’Orsay hesitated to support Rouffart in his claim 
because the syndicate was an ambiguous French-Belgian enterprise. In a note to the 
Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the syndicate lamented its impotence. 
The example of this case shows the difficulties our compatriots are facing to do 
business in China. The Chinese authorities would be happy to grant businesses to 
them rather than to nationals of the European Great Powers. They [the Chinese] do 
not conceal it, but whenever the Great Powers get wind of an important business 
opportunity they have their representatives intervene and have the business 
granted to them.28 
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After a year of fruitless negotiations on all kinds of projects, Sheng approached Rouffart 
in July 1898 with an interesting proposal.29 Sheng was considering constructing an 
embranchment of the Beijing-Hankou line along the Yellow River (Huanghe). The line 
would run from Kaifeng (Henan Province) in the East to Sinan (nowadays Xi’an, Shaanxi 
Province), some 600 km further to the West. Rouffart obtained permission from Empain 
and his fellow-syndicate members to continue negotiating. However, they considered it 
better to wait for the political situation to improve.30 The Qing dynasty was in the midst 
of a palace revolution, which destabilized the country for several months.31 
The Kaifeng-Sinanfu project made significant progress only in April 1899, when 
Rouffart met Sheng again. In the meantime, Rouffart had accompanied Li Hongzhang on 
a mission to inspect the Yellow River and investigate the possibility to protect the 
environment against floods. Empain and Leopold II had hoped that interesting 
concessions would result from it, but due to internal political struggles the mission 
failed.32 After this mission, de Vinck and Belgian consul in Hankou Emile Francqui 
reintroduced Rouffart to Sheng who repeated his plan for the Kaifeng-Sinanfu. Sheng also 
made clear that he intended to extend the line eastward at a later stage.33 With the 
permission of Empain, Rouffart signed a provisional agreement on the 30th of May and 
prepared to study the line in detail. If they did not want to arouse suspicion among the 
other Great Powers, the investigation had to remain secret. Therefore, Rouffart and the 
Belgian diplomats designed a plan to cover the actual purpose of the mission. Officially, 
Sheng sent Rouffart to study the way in which the Beijing-Hankou railroad could cross 
the Yellow River near Kaifeng.34 
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However, Sheng had approached several representatives with his proposal to 
construct the Kaifeng line, most notably Jean Jadot of the Société d’étude. When Jadot heard 
about the provisional deal of Rouffart, he felt betrayed, as he was also considering to start 
negotiations with Sheng. Jadot threatened Francqui to emphasize to Sheng that “the 
Empain company was as French if not more than ours.”35 While fearing the damage of an 
overt Belgian competition, Francqui kept supporting Rouffart and he also convinced the 
Belgian minister in Beijing Cartier de Marchienne to stay neutral. The Minister of Foreign 
Affairs de Favereau could not decide on a clear stance. In the end, the situation de-
escalated because Jadot and the Société d’étude had demanded stricter terms, so in the end 
Sheng preferred to negotiate with Rouffart who was more flexible.36 Simultaneously, 
another Belgian representative had presented to the Zongli Yamen (the Chinese Foreign 
Office) a project to connect Kaifeng with Lanzhou (Kansu) and had asked the Belgian 
diplomacy to support him. Due to the ongoing negotiations of Rouffart on the Kaifeng-
Sinanfu, Major Fivé did not receive this support. His sponsor Leopold II also warned Fivé 
to “avoid at any cost to compete with the serious initiatives undertaken by fellow 
Belgians.”37 
After Rouffart’s study mission, during which he traversed the provinces of Henan and 
Shaanxi, he transited to Beijing in September 1899. There, Rouffart met with Sheng who 
had also moved to the capital to make some arrangements. Francqui had received de 
Favereau’s exceptional permission to accompany Sheng northward, given the large 
influence he had on Sheng. Sheng wanted to close the deal in Beijing and asked a firm 
proposition from Rouffart. In addition, he asked a sum of 400,000 francs as a commission 
in advance of the loan. The personal fee had to be transferred on the day of the Imperial 
Edict. After one month of pressure by Cartier de Marchienne, Francqui and Rouffart, the 
Empain Syndicate agreed in principle to transfer the money. The financiers hesitated 
mainly because they had not yet seen the detailed study of Rouffart.38 They had only 
received a relatively positive telegram from him, summarizing the results.39 
On the verge of despair, the Belgian Minister in Beijing repeatedly stressed that the 
contract would not bind Empain financially. It was in the interest of Belgian finance to 
assemble interesting concessions and execute them as soon as the first results of the 
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Beijing-Hankou could show the financial markets that it was a profitable business. In any 
case, the contract would include a break clause.40 Empain tried to lower the advance, but 
Sheng refused. Rouffart also emphasized that the name of the company in the contract 
should conceal that another nationality than Belgian possessed an interest in the 
company.41 As Empain refused to pay the whole sum, Leopold II finally intervened and 
informed the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs he would pay half of the 400,000 francs. 
However, he tried to couple the railway to the tramways of Beijing and some mines, 
hoping to kill two birds with one stone. This proposition was firmly rejected by the 
Belgian diplomat in Beijing. Finally, the 26th of November Empain ceded to the pressure 
of the Belgian diplomacy and authorized42 the transfer of the 400,000 francs and the 
signing of the contract on behalf of the –yet to be established– Compagnie générale de 
Chemins de fer et de Tramways en Chine (Cie Générale). Sheng went to the Emperor, who 
granted him the Kaifeng-Henanfu a.k.a. Pienlo43 railway with an Imperial Edict on the 3rd 
of December 1899. If the Chinese were to plan an extension from Henanfu (Luoyang) to 
Sinan (Xi’an), the Cie Générale would have a right of preference.44 
A few days later, Rouffart and Sheng worked out the conditions of the loan contract. 
Rouffart proposed Sheng to issue a loan of 25 million francs for the construction of the 
Pienlo railway. Of course, he avoided mentioning France or the Banque Russo-Chinoise. The 
conditions were a copy of the Beijing-Hankou contract. It is important to stress that there 
were two types of contracts in China at that time. To use the categorization of 
Huenemann, you had “colonial concessions” and financial concessions.” Whereas the 
former became the full property of the foreign company and as a result formed a violation 
of the Chinese sovereignty, the latter railroads remained in Chinese ownership but were 
financed with foreign debt. The Pienlo, just like the Beijing-Hankou, belonged to the 
latter, less imperialist category.45 Yet, the business entailed more than just the floating of 
Chinese government bonds in Europe. The Cie Générale received the right to construct and 
operate the railroad for a period of 30 years. To this end, they themselves could recruit 
personnel and place orders in Europe. 
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However, Sheng explicitly demanded to include a clause about the nationality of the 
personnel. The superintendent of the construction works and the future chief of 
operations could only be Belgian. The rest of the European personnel had to be Belgian as 
much as possible. In return, the financiers received six months to study the provisional 
agreement before signing a definitive contract. Anyway, the construction works could 
only be started in three years, as soon as the Beijing-Hankou line was advanced enough 
to transport building material to the region.46 
Inevitably, the provisional contract provoked protest among competing business 
groups active in Central China. The English Peking Syndicate operated some mines in the 
region and had considered a railway concession to connect its mines to the railroad 
network. As soon as the Imperial Edict was announced, the British minister in Beijing 
MacDonald officially protested to the Zongli Yamen on behalf of the Peking Syndicate. To 
the Belgian diplomats, MacDonald proposed to drop his complaints when Rouffart could 
make a deal with the Peking Syndicate. The British diplomat also threatened to withdraw 
his support from any other Belgian project. When Leopold II was informed of the protest, 
he pushed the Empain Syndicate to come to an agreement with the Peking Syndicate. But 
in the end, the British entrepreneurs merely wanted the confirmation that the Kaifeng-
Honanfu would ask affordable rates to transport their mining products. Leopold II, 
without even asking Empain, telegraphed Beijing that this was no problem. Only a few 
days later, the 18th of January 1900, Empain officially agreed, as the mines would be 
important customers.47 
The protest of the British government solely served the interests of British capital and 
did not contest the principle of the concession per se. So far, the concession was not the 
subject of heavy political debate, as the French ownership stake had been kept secret. The 
secrecy was so complete that the French government was afraid to be pushed aside. The 
Minister of Foreign Affairs felt the need to struggle for France’s rightful share in the 
matter, just like he had to do in the Beijing-Hankou project. The French diplomacy 
especially mistrusted consul Francqui. He allegedly was aggressive and eager to limit 
French interference in what he believed was a Belgian business. When learning that the 
provisional agreement contained a clause reserving the management of the Pienlo to 
Belgians, the Quai d’Orsay was alarmed.48 France believed that the Belgian agents, 
especially Francqui, had inserted this clause, but in reality Sheng and his collaborators 
did. In fact, Empain had even tried to have the terms “on behalf of a Belgian company in 
which the French possessed half of the capital” appear on the contract, but the Cartier de 
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Marchienne preferred to merely mention Belgium to avoid Chinese unrest.49 The Belgian 
diplomat in China had reason to do so. When his French colleague threatened to officially 
protest at the Zongli Yamen, Sheng was shocked and he “informed the Belgian Legation 
that he rather abandoned the project than to have it managed by Frenchmen.”50 Only 
after a joint effort of the Belgian government and the Banque Russo-Chinoise, the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to abandon official protest because it would fatally 
ruin the project. 
To appease the opposition of the French government, Empain and Bénard promised to 
have the clause about the nationality of the personnel modified or removed from the 
contract at the moment Rouffart was returning to China to sign the definitive agreement. 
Otherwise Empain would not ratify the contract. Empain also discussed this with King 
Leopold II, who shared his view.51 Whereas Belgian diplomacy wanted to make sure that 
the Belgians had the majority in the company and thus could easily control it, for Empain 
this mattered much less.52 Empain’s biggest concern was to preserve the support of the 
French government. This is also shown by the many visits he and his partners paid to 
French government officials in Brussels and Paris.53 
In the first months of 1900, Rouffart returned to Europe. While he was in Belgium, 
Empain dissolved the syndicate and transformed it into a public limited company (see 
above). The Compagnie générale de Chemins de fer et de Tramways en Chine had a share capital 
of 1 million francs, which does not seem much compared to other railway companies of 
Empain, but this is because the Chinese government itself would finance the railway via 
a loan. The choice of the company name also reflects its transnational character and 
broad scope. Although the company was established in Brussels as a Belgian firm, the 
name did not contain any reference to a nationality. Although they had not yet obtained 
a concession by March 1900, the founders were still hoping to invest in Chinese tramways 
in the future. Finally, no later than 1905 the Cie Générale had to conclude that both its 
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efforts in Beijing and Shanghai were doomed to fail. The competition among Belgian and 
foreign tramway holdings was too harsh.54 
The deadline for the definitive contract expiring in June 1900, Rouffart quickly had to 
leave for China again. Though, prior to his departure, he paid a visit to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Paris. Accompanied by French banker Bénard, he was received by the 
Directeur des Consulats Bompard. Rouffart wanted to iron out differences before entering 
into a binding agreement with Sheng. For the French government, the issue of the 
nationality of the personnel was of utmost importance. Bompard made clear to Rouffart 
that if the final contract did not please the French government, the latter would not allow 
the loan to be listed on the Paris Stock Exchange. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Delcassé was perfectly aware that the Cie Générale could not successfully issue 25 million 
francs without access to the French capital market.55 
In April 1900, Rouffart arrived in China amid political turmoil. Due to the troubled 
political climate, Sheng informed Rouffart that it was impossible to sign any contract 
whatsoever and that it was better to indefinitely extend the option granted in December 
1899. Rouffart came back empty-handed in August.56 Indeed, while Rouffart was there, a 
popular revolt, known as the Boxer Rising, was destabilizing the country. Although 
caused by a mixture of social and political factors, the movement targeted Christian 
missionaries and symbols of Western imperialism in general. Driven into a corner, 
Empress Cixi decided to support the Boxers instead of oppressing the revolt. In June 1900, 
she waged a war against the foreign Powers present in China and besieged the Legation 
Quarter in Beijing. However, an international coalition of the Great Powers plus Italy, the 
US and Austria-Hungary crushed the Boxer Rising within months. The coalition enforced 
immense indemnities on the Chinese government, totaling twice its annual budget. As a 
result, the Great Powers de facto controlled most of the Chinese debt.57 
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7.3 After the Boxer Rising: Consolidating and giving in to 
France 
In 1901, peace was restored in China. The Qing Court was forced to sign the Boxer 
Protocol. The repressive measures it entailed fostered the nationalist feelings of the 
Chinese population even more. The high charges of the Boxer reparations left little 
financial room for the reform attempts of the Chinese government. The latter nor the 
local elite was able to finance the railway development themselves. Therefore, the Qing 
court was more inclined to accept the railway loans offered by foreign bankers. In fact, 
China was too weakened to stop the foreign powers from constructing railways in their 
respective spheres of influence. Although China officially dealt with private 
entrepreneurs, it could not ignore that these bankers were backed by the Great Powers 
or even formed extensions of foreign governments.58 
In the spring of 1901, Empain reconsidered the project, in agreement with Leopold II. 
However, he did not take concrete actions before the news reached him in March 1902 
that the Germans were applying for a concession to extend their Shandong line to 
Kaifeng, or even to Honanfu. At that time, he was not determined to pursue the Kaifeng-
Honanfu project. In reality, Empain was seriously considering transferring the contract 
to the Société d’étude. To Empain, this made sense as the Kaifeng-Honanfu was an affluent 
of the main Beijing-Hankou railroad. Leopold II followed his view. Therefore, Empain 
started to negotiate with the Société d’étude about some kind of merger. Surprisingly, the 
Cie Générale was subsequently contacted by the German investor Adolf von Hansemann, 
chairman of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, to collaborate. Minister de Favereau and Leopold 
II were willing to investigate this proposition if this meant that Germany would more 
generally support Belgian enterprise in China, but Empain and his fellow financiers did 
not jump at the offer. It is unclear why.59 
Nevertheless, the German interest in railway concessions in the area incited the Cie 
Générale to resume negotiations with Sheng in June 1902. As soon as possible, Rouffart had 
to travel back to China. Pending his arrival, the Cie Générale temporarily appointed Sir de 
Mélotte, the first director of the Banque Sino-Belge (Société Générale) in Shanghai. De 
Mélotte immediately tried to tackle the hardest question: the nationality of the 
management. Whereas the Imperial Chinese Railway Administration desired to keep the 
predominance of Belgian staff in the contract, the French shareholders, incited by the 
French government, wanted to secure a degree of control corresponding to the share they 
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owned. In an impasse, de Mélotte had to await Rouffart to continue negotiating. The 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had discussed the issue with him before his departure. 
Rouffart had promised to erase any mention of nationality from the contract.60 
Finally, one year later, the Cie Générale could sign a definitive agreement with Sheng, 
not without the necessary bribe money. On the 12th of November 1903, Rouffart 
contracted a loan of 25 million francs, with an interest of 5%, to be sold at 90% of its 
nominal value. The bonds had to be reimbursed in 30 years. With the loan, the Chinese 
government could finance the construction of the 186 km long railroad. The Cie Générale 
obtained the right to construct and operate the line and to receive 20% of the net profits. 
The contract did not contain any exclusive nationality clause, only that the concession 
had to remain in the hands of a Belgian company or person. This pleased the French 
government, but upset the Belgian diplomats. The latter feared that France would try to 
dominate the management.61 
As a part of the deal, the Cie Générale quickly had to advance 1 million francs to Sheng. 
Because their partner the Banque Russo-Chinoise was reluctant, the Cie Générale preferred 
to use the services of the Banque Sino-Belge. In addition, the company appointed Jean Jadot, 
the Belgian ingénieur-controleur of the Beijing-Hankou, to supervise the first technical 
studies. These two measures alarmed the Quai d’Orsay. The French Minister warned the 
company: If it hoped to have its loan of 25 million listed on the Paris Bourse and to retain 
French diplomatic backing, it had to abide by the following four conditions. The first two 
had already been agreed upon in 1898. Firstly, the orders for equipment had to be equally 
divided between France and Belgium. Secondly, the directors needed to respect a fair 
balance between Belgian and French personnel. Thirdly, France demanded equal 
representation in the board of directors. Fourthly, to counterbalance the Belgian 
chairman, the company had to appoint a French general manager in China. These 
demands surprised the Belgian directors, for they had only thought of the equal 
distribution of orders and personnel. However, Georges Louis, the new Directeur des 
Consulats summoned Raphaël de Bauer to Paris and emphasized all four as conditions sine 
qua non. Afraid to lose French official support, the board of directors saw no other 
solution than to accept the equal distribution of capital and directors too. Concerning the 
chief engineer in China, they did not promise anything.62 
Unfortunately for the Cie Générale, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War 
indeterminately delayed the issue of the loan.63 The deteriorated investment climate in 
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63 The Russo-Japanese War was an armed conflict fought out largely on Chinese territory between February 1904 
and June 1905. After a series of Japanese victories, Russia and Japan signed a peace treaty in September 1905. As 
Securing investments 
302 
the Far East as a result of the armed conflict made a successful issue of Chinese 
government paper very unlikely. At the end of November 1904, the chairman of the Cie 
Générale de Bauer had finally managed to have Edouard Empain accept a French chief 
engineer, provided the company then could issue the whole loan in Paris. 
By February 1905, the trust of the financial markets had largely recovered. This was 
the sign for Empain to prepare the issue of the loan.64 When he informed the Quai d’Orsay 
that they would apply for an official quotation of the loan, the Quai d’Orsay replied that 
all promised measures should be immediately executed. Therefore, the Cie Générale 
reshuffled its board of directors to achieve an equal number of Belgian and French 
members. Table 17 reproduces the new composition. 
Table 17 Composition of the board of directors, after the rearrangement of 190565 
Affiliation Belgian French 
Empain group Edouard Empain André Berthelot 
 Maurice Anspach Auguste Stoecklin 
 Arthur du Roy de Blicquy Auguste Doniol 
 Armand Rouffart  
External partner Raphaël de Bauer Adrien Bénard 
  Paul Ristelhueber 
François Empain already had to retreat in favor of André Berthelot. Auguste Stoecklin and 
Paul Ristelhueber were now also added. The French interference was so gross that the 
envoy in Brussels Gérard momentarily tried to push through another candidate for 
Ristelhueber’s position.66 Berthelot and Stoecklin were both directors of the Parisienne 
Electrique. Ristelhueber was the former French consul in Tianjin and the bank manager of 
the Banque Russo-Chinoise in Paris. The Cie Générale also recruited a French chief engineer 
among the staff of the Beijing-Hankou. Via the Belgian chief engineer of the Beijing-
Hankou and of the Pienlo Jean Jadot, they found Lenoan. Some French staff in China 
expressed the concern that the nomination of Lenoan would not really give more power 
to France. They accused Jadot to have supported Lenoan because Lenoan would not 
contest the authority of his former superior. Therefore, the French diplomacy reminded 
 
                                                     
a result, Japan tightened its grip on Manchuria and became an influential factor in the late Qing Empire. Frank 
Jacob, The Russo-Japanese War and its Shaping of the Twentieth Century (New York: Routledge, 2018). 
64 Meeting of 21 Feb 1905, Cie Générale, Minutes of the Board of directors, I 394/26, ARA2. 
65 Recueil Financier, 1906, 689. 
66 Gérard (Brussels) to Henry (Paris), 21 May 1905, Chine: Kaifong-Honan Fou (1903-06), 148CPCOM/524, MAEF. 
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Lenoan of “the duties that he, as a Frenchman, ha[d] to fulfill in a company where he 
represent[ed] [French] interests and where he carrie[d] the [French] flag.”67 
In preparation for the issue, Empain had formed an issue syndicate, composed of 
Paribas, Bénard&Jarislowsky, Réunis, Railways&Electricité and Banque E.-L.-J. Empain. On behalf 
of the Cie Générale, the syndicate members agreed to underwrite68 half of the loan, i.e. 12.5 
million francs. Paribas took charge of 50%, Bénard&Jarislowsky 25% and the Empain group 
25%.69 Finally, in August 1905 the French government authorized the listing of the bonds 
in Paris. The issue became a great success, inciting the directors to issue the second 
installment of 12.5 million rapidly afterward.70 They additionally listed the bonds on the 
Brussels Stock Exchange in October. 
The construction of the Pienlo railway started at the end of 1905 and progressed 
rapidly until June 1906. Afterward, floods heavily damaged the line and forced the 
company to redo some entire sections. The construction workers also faced serious 
problems crossing a mountainous area. These two factors required significantly higher 
expenses than had been budgeted. That is why in 1907 the company needed an extra loan 
of 16 million francs to finish the line. Rouffart had a good relationship with Jean Jadot and 
his successor Prudhomme. They were the Belgian representatives of the Société d’étude, 
responsible for the Beijing-Hankou line. Instead of appointing a separate delegate, 
Rouffart asked Prudhomme to lead the negotiations with the Chinese government to 
obtain the additional loan. The Chinese government quite easily granted permission and 
Paribas completely underwrote it in August 1907.71 
The line could open to traffic at the end of December 1908 (see Fig. 32).72 The operation 
of the railroad was a modest success, especially compared to the busy Beijing-Hankou 
line. Whereas the earnings per kilometer were as little as 2300 mex. $ (5900 francs) in 
1909, they had more than doubled to 5300 mex. $/km (13,400 francs) in 1913. On the eve 
 
                                                     
67 “les devoirs que, comme Français, il a à remplir dans une entreprise où il représente nos intérêts et où il tient 
notre drapeau”, Gérard (Brussels) to Rouvier (Paris), 29 Aug 1905, Chine: Kaifong-Honan Fou (1903-06), 
148CPCOM/524, MAEF. 
68 Underwrite in this case means without initial public offering, but a direct listing. Interested investors could 
buy it from the syndicate members. 
69 Kurgan mentioned a distribution of two-thirds for Paribas versus one-third for Bénard&Jarislowsky, but the final 
contract clearly stated the participation of the Empain firms too. Final agreement of the issue syndicate for the 
1903 loan, 15 Apr 1905, Compagnie générale de chemins de fer en Chine, I 394/285, ARA2. 
70 Meetings of 24 Aug & 26 Dec 1905, Cie Générale, Minutes of the Board of directors, I 394/26, ARA2; Kurgan-van 
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Compagnie générale de chemins de fer en Chine, I 394/289, ARA2; Kurgan-van Hentenryk, Léopold II, 757-58. 
72 Meeting of 7 Oct 1909, Cie Générale, Minutes of the Shareholders Meetings, I 394/87, ARA2. 
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of the First World War, the operating ratio73 had achieved a respectable 47% as opposed 
to 87% in 1911.74 This was good news for the Cie Générale, who by contract received 20% of 
the net earnings. 
 
Figure 32 “Kaifeng-Honanfu line: The first locomotive engine entering Central China”75 
Looking back to this first period (1897-1907), a few observations emerge. First of all, 
obtaining a railway concession in China required lengthy negotiations and the capacity 
to finance them. Nevertheless, Empain’s syndicate had obtained a preliminary contract 
for a loan of 25 million francs before the Boxer Uprising. This did not quite equal the 
achievements of their Belgian colleagues of the Beijing-Hankou, who had concluded a 
definitive contract in June 1898 and issued a loan of 112.5 million in April the next year. 
They had immediately begun the construction works. Starting from Rouffart’s first visit, 
it took the Cie Générale eight years to negotiate the deal, issue the loan and start 
constructing the railroad. After the crisis of the Boxers, Chinese officials had hardened 
their position towards foreign propositions on railroads. But the Chinese government 
continued to need foreign funds for their construction. Nevertheless, competition among 
Belgian and foreign companies truly was fierce. In the long run, apart from the Société 
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Générale, the Empain group was in fact the only Belgian investor that had managed to 
obtain and develop a railroad concession during and after the scramble for concessions. 
The success of the Société Générale’s Beijing-Hankou paved the way for Empain, but also 
made it harder in some aspects. It showed what a Belgian company was capable of 
achieving, but it also provoked jealousy and suspicion among the foreign Powers. By 
deciding to enter the Chinese stage, Empain got involved in a hornets’ nest, full of 
conflicting local, national and international interests. The decisive players were the 
Chinese official Sheng, Leopold II and the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Banque Russo-Chinoise. Sheng absolutely wanted to deal 
with Belgians and not at all with French financiers. His aim was to keep some control in 
Chinese hands and limit French interference as much as possible. The government of 
Leopold II and the Belgian diplomatic agents were all very convinced of the necessity to 
support Belgian economic expansion by all means. They wanted to finalize the deal as 
quickly as possible and maximize Belgian influence both within the company as in China 
as a whole. Empain had their unconditional support. Certainly in the early years, the 
Banque Russo-Chinoise, as an extension of Russian diplomacy, was crucial for the support 
of Russia and could effectively put pressure on China and France at decisive moments. 
The French government in its turn pursued a nationalist agenda. They realized that, 
given the hostility of Sheng towards France, the French-Belgian collaboration was the 
best they could get for the moment. However, the struggle for influence in the Société 
d’étude, where Jean Jadot privileged the Belgian element, incited the Quai d’Orsay to take 
a hard line vis-à-vis Empain. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs demanded that the 
French take part in the decision-making of the company at least on a par with the Belgian 
partners. He regarded the French board members as his subjects through which he could 
control the corporate policy. In the midst of the discussion on the composition of the 
board, the French envoy in Brussels wrote: “The presence of Mr. André Berthelot in the 
board of directors will allow us, I believe, to act with some effectiveness on the Belgian 
members and on Mr. Empain himself.”76 
The view of the Quai d’Orsay that only French nationals could defend the interests of 
France also demonstrates the vague mistrust of Empain. In this regard, it is interesting to 
compare the French attitude towards Empain and Georges Nagelmackers (see also 
Chapters 1 and 3). Both were Belgian entrepreneurs with many activities in France and 
abroad. However, Nagelmackers was highly respected by the diplomatic services in Paris. 
Nagelmackers was frequently doing business in the Ottoman Empire, which was a 
disintegrating empire and the theater of Great Power rivalry like China. The French 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought highly of Nagelmackers. An official wrote that he had 
furthered the interest of France in the Middle East. Moreover, Nagelmackers, “although 
a Belgian citizen, has the right to claim to be from France where he has his domicile and 
all his interests.” Therefore, he deserved to receive the diplomatic support a French 
citizen would get.77 In contrast, in the eyes of the Quai d’Orsay Empain always remained 
a Belgian, although he was also domiciled in Paris, as indicated in Chapter 5. 
To make any progress, Empain and Rouffart had to maneuver between the demands of 
all these important players, while keeping the business partners pleased. Like Empain, 
the latter were especially interested in the financial aspect of the project. They were wary 
of hasty and risky financial commitments. Although not indifferent to political motives, 
they above all wanted a solid business case. Therefore, Empain was willing to listen to the 
concerns of the French government to maintain its indispensable support in China and in 
France. From 1903 until the First World War, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
almost obsessed with the nationality of the chief engineer. They always suspected the 
Belgian government to conspire with the Chinese against the French interests. However, 
Empain repeatedly assured the French Ministry his sincerity: 
I have not seen the Belgian government on this matter for more than two years and 
neither did [Raphaël de] Bauer. You know by the way that no matter how good a 
patriot I am, I don’t like [the Belgian government’s] interference in my business 
when I have engagements.78 
This proves that the Cie Générale wanted to pursue an independent policy in the interest 
of the firm, not of a particular nation. In the many confrontations with the French 
government, the directors of the Cie Générale did not involve the Belgian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Moreover, while the Société d’étude and Minister de Favereau had jointly 
tried to bar French influence from the Beijing-Hankou, Empain and chairman de Bauer 
were much less ill-disposed to the French demands. Both financiers had very strong ties 
to the French financial market that withheld them from organizing resistance with the 
help of the Belgian government. Most likely, Empain’s initial opposition concerning the 
nationality of the general manager was inspired by Leopold II. As extensively discussed 
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earlier in the dissertation, the two had been closely working together since the turn of 
the century. The leniency of the Empain group disappointed the Belgian government. For 
instance, the envoy in Beijing deplored the many concessions to the French government: 
“We must not delude ourselves, the Kaifeng-Honanfu railway will be a French enterprise 
with a Belgian label.”79 
7.4 Lunghai: A tenfold extension of the Pienlo 
After 1905, the foreign control of important railroad infrastructure became a thorn in the 
flesh of Chinese nationalists. They vehemently campaigned for the nationalization of the 
most profitable parts of the network. By 1910, the Chinese government had set up a plan 
to buy out the railway companies but still had to rely on foreign funds to execute it.80 This 
problem is illustrated by the redemption of the Beijing-Hankou railway in 1908-1909. The 
Chinese successfully bought back the major arterial railroad, but had to accept a loan from 
an Anglo-French banking consortium to finance the purchase.81 After the unfortunate 
loss of the lucrative Beijing-Hankou, the Société d’étude transformed into the Société belge 
de chemins de fer en Chine (Société Belge) and had to look for a new project. Thanks to the 
good relationship between Rouffart and Jean Jadot, who had become director of the 
Société Générale in 1906, the Cie Générale and the Société Belge were considering establishing 
a partnership. In September 1908, Empain and de Bauer proposed to Jadot, director of the 
Société Belge to cooperate to obtain an extension of the Pienlo westward to Xi’an.82 
Together, they could improve their chances. Meanwhile, the Société Belge had appointed 
Jean Jadot’s brother Jules as managing director. After the death of Armand Rouffart in 
April 1909, the Cie Générale also chose him as their managing director. Jules Jadot now had 
to represent the interests of both the Société Belge and the Cie Générale. Empain charged 
him with the negotiations for the extension of the Pienlo, but in return the Société Belge 
would share for 20% in all the benefits that would result from it.83 
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Ever since the conclusion of the provisional contract in 1899, Sheng had the ambition 
to extend the railroad beyond Luoyang (Henanfu) towards Xi’an. In the contract of 1903, 
the Cie Générale received the right to obtain the extension in case the Chinese government 
was unable to finance it by itself. The Qing Court had attempted to outsource the project 
to two local provincial companies, but they had been unable to gather the capital. Hearing 
that China was attempting to sell the concession to the French Société des Batignolles and 
the Chemin de fer du Shansi, the Cie Générale decided to claim its privilege. The directors 
designed a plan that could tempt the Chinese government. Knowing that China wanted 
to take control of as many railroads as possible, they wanted to propose an early 
repayment of the 1903 loan of 5%, 41 million in total. That way, China could reclaim 
authority over the Pienlo 5 years before the deadline (1915). In return, the Cie Générale 
would receive the right to construct the extension of 600 km. The funds for the 
repayment and extension would be secured via a government loan of 100 million francs, 
issued in Europe by the Cie Générale. The contract would include better financial 
conditions for the Chinese government. For instance, the company was willing to give up 
the 20% of the profits it used to have of the Pienlo. 
In 1911, Ebray, the new chief engineer of the Cie Générale, entered into preliminary talks 
with the head of the Railways Administration Sheng. Yet, the authority of the Imperial 
Court started to be overtly contested. The subsequent fall of the Qing Dynasty and the 
institution of the Republic of China made further negotiations impossible. Only when 
quiet was restored in the capital and Sun Yat-sen had taken charge of the Chinese Railway 
Administration in September 1912, the Cie Générale could hope to resume talks. 
Meanwhile, the Société Belge had instructed its representative in Beijing, Robert Devos84, 
to support Ebray in his negotiations for the loan. Sun’s plans for the Chinese railroad 
network were even more ambitious than those of his predecessor. Devos could convince 
him of the importance of a large East-West axis of which the Pienlo was only the 
beginning. Within two weeks, Sun and Devos had agreed on a railroad of not 600 km, but 
1800 km stretching from Lanzhou (Gansu Province) in the West to a yet to be developed 
maritime port in the province of Jiangsu in the West (see the highlighted railroad line in 
Fig. 33). The Lunghai85 line would connect the Pienlo and other finished sections and 
become the horizontal axis perpendicular to the Beijing-Hankou-Canton line. To finance 
this large infrastructure project, Devos signed a loan contract of 250 million francs at 5% 
to be reimbursed in 40 years.86 
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Figure 33 Map of Central China (1913)87 
The conditions of the loan were more favorable for the issuers than the last railway 
contracts concluded by the Chinese government. The Cie Générale had full freedom to fix 
the issue price of the loan and would receive a commission of 6%. The loan was backed by 
the Chinese government and by the railway itself. Unless Chinese factories could produce 
the equipment, French and Belgian industries could receive the orders. However, once 
the construction was finished, the French and Belgian industries would not get 
preferential treatment unless their prices were equal to their foreign competitors. The 
Chinese Railway Administration was in charge of the management, but a Belgian or 
French engineer supervised the construction works. As soon as the railway was in 
operation, a European chief engineer and a chief accountant assisted the Chinese general 
manager.88 
Now the Belgian triumph only had to be accepted by the Great Powers, which was very 
problematic. In the years before the Chinese Revolution, the European financial 
institutions had united in two rivaling consortia. Both tried to create a monopoly that 
could impose its conditions on China if the country wanted to raise money on foreign 
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capital markets. To negotiate the large loan, which would reorganize the finances of the 
young Republic, the two consortia merged in 1912. The new International Financial 
Consortium was now composed of banks from France, Germany, Great Britain, United 
States, Japan and Russia. The Russian group of banks had formed an alliance with the 
Société Générale de Belgique and some British banks.89 As such, the Société Générale was the 
only bank from a small country to be part of the Consortium.90 
The Lunghai project of the Cie Générale interfered with the monopoly desired by the 
Consortium. Although it was strictly speaking an industrial loan, meant to finance the 
construction of a railroad, the governments belonging to the Consortium were still upset. 
The Chinese had negotiated an advance of 50 million francs with an interest of 6% to be 
transferred within six months after the conclusion of the contract. The Consortium 
feared that the Chinese government might try to use this advance for other purposes than 
the railway. If the money flowed into the general budget, this would undermine the 
monopolistic position of the Consortium. 
The Consortium tried to obstruct the execution of the contract, but several banks of 
member countries of the Consortium were in fact involved. Via various ways, France, 
Great Britain and Russia were compromised, in the course of Empain’s search for 
potential partners for the issue. 
First of all, Empain had obviously looked in the direction of the French capital market. 
Initially, the Cie Générale and the Société Belge had totally left the French government out 
of the talks for the extension of the Pienlo. But as soon as the contract was signed on the 
24th of September 1912, Empain informed the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
especially Philippe Berthelot, about his achievement. Philippe was the brother of André 
Berthelot, one of Empain’s closest French collaborators. Philippe Berthelot was appointed 
in diplomatic service by his father, the famous scientist and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1895-96) Marcellin Berthelot. In 1904, Philippe became the head of the China Office of 
the Ministry. Since then, he was responsible for all Chinese affairs and thus also for the 
Lunghai loan. Via André Berthelot, Empain developed a friendship with Philippe too. At 
the end of September 1912, Empain sounded Philippe Berthelot on the possibility of 
issuing the loan on the French market, which required government approval. The top 
official did not immediately oppose it. Consequently, Empain quickly approached several 
French banks: not only Paribas, his long-standing partner for China, but also the Comptoir 
national d’Escompte de Paris and the French Société Générale. He offered them a 60% share in 
the loan. The remainder would be divided as follows: Société Générale de Belgique 25% and 
the Cie Générale, Banque E.-L.-J. Empain and Bénard&Jarislowsky each 5%. In addition, the 
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French banks would receive 25% of the profits resulting from the construction and other 
financial gains. The Comptoir d’Escompte declined it because it had linked its fate to the 
Banque de l’Indo-Chine, who wanted to respect the Consortium. The other banks were more 
interested. However, the 16th of October the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Poincaré 
and the French Minister of Finance Klotz forced the French banks to defer negotiations 
as the offer went against the agreements of the Consortium.91 Even the offices of Paribas 
in Brussels ceded to the pressure of the French government.92 
Secondly, a British bank was also involved, via the Société Générale de Belgique. As 
mentioned, Robert Devos, who had negotiated the loan, was the representative of the 
Banque Sino-Belge. The Sino-Belge was supported by the Société Générale. Emile Francqui, 
now part of the environment of the Société Générale, had informed the London bank J. 
Henry Schröder & Co. about the loan.93 On the 17th of October, one day after negotiations 
with the French had been suspended, Schröder proposed to immediately issue the whole 
sum of 250 million francs in London, together with the largest banks of the City.94 This 
displeased the British Foreign Office, but it could not take action against Schröder because 
the bank was part of the Russian group of the Consortium via the Société Générale. To 
convince Empain, Schröder offered to pay the second installment of the advance of 25 
million, which was due a few days later. Moreover, the banker did care less than the 
French about the control over the construction and the operation of the railroad and the 
associated profits. Nevertheless, Empain decided to decline the very attractive offer as he 
was too closely linked to the French market to turn his back on his French partners. “I 
have formally declared to the board of directors that either the business had to be done 
with France or I would resign.”95 To gather the 25 million, Empain mobilized his business 
group in the end. The Réunis, the Banque Empain, Bénard&Jarislowsky and the Cie Générale 
contributed for at least 16.25 million.96 
With the offer of Schröder as leverage (see Chapter 3 for a similar strategy in Egypt), 
Empain reopened negotiations with the French banks and now offered even 65% of the 
loan. To convince the French government, he also offered half of the industrial 
advantages, i.e. personnel and orders. The banks could, if they wanted, bring their share 
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of the loan in the Consortium. If they did not accept, he would return to Schröder.97 The 
proposition attracted several banks, but it was met with suspicion by the Berthelot 
brothers. The nationalist Berthelot’s suspected Empain from using the British 
competition to pressure the French banks. In addition, they did not want to share the loan 
with other countries in the Consortium. André Berthelot closely watched Empain. When 
Empain went to see French Minister of Finance Klotz, André accompanied him. Behind 
Empain’s back, Berthelot “seized a private conversation with the Minister to suggest him 
diverse objections to the propositions of his associate.”98 Berthelot could not convince 
Klotz, but he succeeded in getting Poincaré on his side, who preferred not to undermine 
the strategy of the Consortium. As a result, the French banks had to definitively abandon 
the negotiations with Empain. 
Only after Poincaré had left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Charles Jonnart in 
January 1913, Empain could retry to gain the favor of the French government. Meanwhile, 
Philippe Berthelot had also increased his influence in the department. Empain now 
proposed to sell the first installment of 100 million francs on the French market without 
a public offering. Empain’s message to the French government was that, by contract, he 
was bounded to issue the loan on the 31st of March at the latest. He could not wait until 6 
months after the reorganization loan. Chinese bonds were high-priced and Empain had 
negotiated a very attractive issue price (91% of the nominal value). He did not want to let 
this opportunity slip away. 
Empain said to understand that the banks affiliated with the Consortium could not 
participate. Therefore, Empain proposed to have his private bank issue it alone. 
Afterward, once the deadline of the Consortium had passed, he could ask for an official 
listing on the Paris Bourse.99 Klotz had remained in favor of Empain’s plan. Berthelot, after 
a visit of Empain on the 24th of January, agreed too, provided that all the benefits would 
be equally divided among French and Belgian partners. Finally, Berthelot easily managed 
to convince Minister Jonnart. Consequently, France would turn a blind eye to the issue. 
Empain was very grateful for the support of the French. Therefore, with complete 
discretion, without even consulting his fellow-board members, Empain gave great leeway 
to Philippe Berthelot to draft a letter stipulating the commitments of the Cie Générale. As 
a consequence, Berthelot obtained not only that half of the orders and personnel would 
go to France, but also that the chief engineer would be French, as had been the case for 
the Pienlo.100 
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Thirdly, there was one last obstacle. The involvement of the Société Belge upset the 
Russian government. They knew that according to previous agreements, the Société Belge 
had in fact the right to issue 31% of the loan. However, the two banks behind the Société 
Belge, the Société Générale and J. Henry Schröder, were part of the Russian group within the 
Consortium. If they participated in the loan, they would go against the agreements and 
undermine the position of the Consortium. In March 1913, the Russian embassy in 
Brussels therefore protested to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn 
questioned Empain and the Société Générale. Empain personally went to the Russian 
embassy to reassure the ambassador that the loan served to finance the railroad and not 
the Chinese government. The Société Générale guaranteed that it would not sell the loan at 
its counter.101 
The Société Générale would respect the rules of the Consortium. This meant it would 
block its share of the bonds until the deadline of six months after the reorganization loan. 
Empain had not deemed it necessary to ask the Société Générale to put this verbal promise 
on paper. “This demand would have been almost offensive for her!!”, he wrote 
afterward.102 The 31st of March, the Banque E.-L.-J. Empain issued the loan in Brussels. In the 
days before, it had sold large amounts of bonds to his agents and correspondents in 
Belgium, France (Bénard & Jarislowsky), Switzerland and the Netherlands. The Cie Générale 
had spent 200,000 francs for advertisements, but “in an extremely discrete form.”103 
However, the Société Générale had been offering very attractive prices to intermediaries 
in Belgium and France and as such directly competed with the Banque Empain. Unlike its 
promise, the Société Générale spread printed flyers making it look like a public offering. 
Empain was furious and officially protested to the Cie Générale. However, the damage was 
already done. Many customers canceled or reduced their orders when they found out that 
Empain was asking higher prices than elsewhere. Whereas at first sight, the subscriptions 
would more than cover the whole sum and Empain had to refuse customers, now Empain 
was left with at least 10.5 million francs of unsold bonds.104 Although Empain only called 
it a “careless mistake” (étourderie) of Francqui, it is clear that the Société Générale had 
deliberately tried to capitalize on the favorable climate for Chinese securities. By doing 
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so, the directors of the Société Générale clearly embroiled themselves with Empain and the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.105 
Despite the incomplete issue, the promoters of the Lunghai could derive huge financial 
profits from the advances and commissions on the loan. The Banque E.-L.-J. Empain earned 
at least 6% on each bond. The Société Générale had a smaller margin of 4.8%, because of the 
discount it had given to its agents.106 For the Cie Générale, 1913 was an excellent financial 
year. It could pay a dividend of 18% and still build up a special reserve of 1.8 million. Since 
its first turnover in 1905, the ROE had been 20% on average. 
7.5 Conclusion 
With his investments in China, Empain entered one of the hardest, most competitive 
and politically explosive markets in the Belle Epoque world. Remarkably, Belgium was the 
only small state that successfully participated in the Scramble for Concessions. This 
chapter has focused on the role of the Empain group in this illuminating episode in the 
history of Belgian FDI. It shows how a combination of external factors and business 
strategies have determined the fate of Empain’s investments in China. 
First of all, the efforts of the Empain group in China were actively fostered by the 
Belgian State. The unremitting attention of Leopold II and the vigor of the Belgian 
diplomacy created opportunities. The King had the unconditional support of his Minister 
of Foreign Affairs de Favereau and thus of the diplomatic services. They all pursued a 
program to promote Belgian economic interests and to grant the country prestige. Both 
the King and the diplomats pushed Empain to invest as soon and as much as possible. 
However, the ambitions of the syndicate of 1897 lay in more modest light rail and 
tramway concessions. By accepting a deal involving a strategic railroad, Empain stepped 
into a hornets’ nest of imperialist rivalry. That made Belgian diplomatic support all the 
more necessary. 
However, after the departure of de Favereau and the decease of Leopold II, the intense 
collaboration between the government and Belgian finance vanished. From then on, 
Empain relied much more on the services of the Société d’étude/Société Belge, which hired 
former diplomats as representatives (e.g. Devos). The cooperation with the Société 
Générale was necessary, in view of the harsh competition and the size of the Lunghai 
project. However, the mighty Société Générale proved itself a difficult partner. Fortunately 
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for Empain, by 1913, the financial power of the business group had sufficiently increased. 
It was now able to handle some challenges independently, without the big banks or the 
Paris Bourse. 
Secondly, most Chinese decision-makers were open for business with investors from 
smaller countries. That is why the Belgian envoys, Rouffart and Jadot tried to paint a 
picture of Belgium as an innocent and neutral partner that could help the Chinese realize 
their railroad ambitions. To the luck of the Société Générale and Empain, this strategy 
succeeded. China absolutely wanted to deal with a neutral power such as Belgium to 
construct the Beijing-Hankou and the Pienlo. The country feared that a Great Power 
would take possession of the railway in one way or another. Although the Chinese 
government knew that French banks actually had an ownership stake in those railways, 
it guessed that France could not make a direct claim on the railroad. Nevertheless, rising 
anti-imperialism incited the Chinese to demand that the Belgian identity of the enterprise 
be guaranteed. 
Thirdly, it had been a deliberate strategy to partner up with the Great Powers. An 
independent Belgian firm had no chances to succeed amidst of imperialist envy. 
Therefore, Empain formed an alliance with France and Russia to a lesser extent. This was 
the first large foreign project in which he cooperated with the Parisian high finance and 
the French government. In a way, Empain bought off potential French and Russian 
opposition and simultaneously secured additional pressure on China. The British and 
Germans evidently criticized this Belgian-French alliance. Great Britain even created the 
myth that Belgium acted as a straw man for French-Russian interests in the region. In 
reality, the ties between Belgian and Russian interests were very loose. In the long run, 
the Banque Russo-Chinoise only played a minor role in the projects of the Empain group. 
The ties with France, however, remained very strong. Realizing that he needed both 
the diplomatic support and the depth of the financial market, Empain has defended the 
French connection throughout the whole period. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
the same French government had to approve French railway concessions and the listing 
of many other Empain companies on the Paris Stock Exchange. Therefore, Empain has 
never seriously considered putting his excellent French relations at stake. He had to go 
great lengths so as to not sever this relationship. That was the consequence of the French 
distrust of Empain. Whereas Nagelmackers was one of theirs, Empain was not. In 
consequence, France was strictly not a ‘second home country’ for Empain’s FDI. However, 
broadly speaking, Empain could get close to this domestic status by giving in to the French 
nationalist demands. This was not even an extremely high price to pay, for the Empain 
group in France had reached a critical mass. Empain could perfectly recruit French 
nationals within his business group and formally meet the requirements of the French 
government without totally relinquishing control. 
Fourthly, if the Empain group did not want to leave the fray, it had to navigate between 
the contending imperialist powers. Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia and 
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the US struggled for influence in Central China, whereas the Chinese government tried to 
limit all foreign interference. The Cie Générale was part of this struggle and took advantage 
of it by various means. For instance, in the case of the Lunghai loan, the harsh conditions 
of the International Consortium had driven China into the arms of Belgian banks. As an 
independent financier, Empain could exploit the fact that the young Republic was 
desperately looking for money. Additionally, the Empain group threatened to collaborate 
with German or British capital on some occasions. The offer of Schröder and other City 
banks for the Lunghai loan was the most concrete alternative. Of course, this was merely 
a tactics game to put pressure on France. In the end, the interests of the firm had priority 
over any national interests. So, if some European power used the Cie Générale to pursue 
national aims, this did not bother the Empain group. The business group tried to channel 
these national ambitions in a way that could benefit the Cie Générale. For that purpose, 
Empain and his top collaborators conducted high-level business diplomacy. To please 
both the Russian, French, Belgian and Chinese officials, Empain behaved more like a 
pragmatist than like a Belgian patriot. In sum, the Chinese railway business was a complex 
political game. Empain had to vary competition and cooperation with Belgian and foreign 
financial groups and their governments to make the most out of it financially. 
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General Conclusion 
Ayant placé tout le papier, je tire ma révérence à la 
nation française en emportant toutes ses économies et je 
dis : 
Métropolitain… connais pas !!! 
Russe Française… connais pas !!! 
La Parisienne… connais pas !!!1 
The cartoon on the cover of this dissertation provides an intriguing perspective on the 
actions and strategies of a global entrepreneur from Belgium in the world before the First 
World War. Moreover, it connects with many of the issues discussed in this research. The 
critical caricature was published in 1903 during one of the rare disputes between Empain 
and former business associates that were exposed to publicity. It depicts Edouard Empain, 
sitting on a train that is crossing the border from France to Belgium. With French savings 
as cargo, the entrepreneur makes a provoking gesture in the direction of France. The 
French caption of the cartoon is L’art de rouler, which means the art of rolling as well as 
the art of fooling. The anonymous author made Empain say: “Having floated all the stock, 
I bid farewell to the French nation while going off with all its savings and I say: 
Métropolitain… don’t know! Russe Française… don’t know! La Parisienne… don’t know!” 
Even if it might seem a simple cartoon, the drawing and the text raise points that are 
linked to the three main arguments in my dissertation. All of them show how the Empain 
group could expand and prosper worldwide by adapting to the challenges of the First 
Global Economy and by transforming them into opportunities. 
Firstly, the cartoon alludes to the horizontal and vertical integration of Empain’s 
multinational business empire. Given the prominent place of the steam train, Empain is 
rightly depicted as a railway entrepreneur, for steam traction laid the foundations of his 
business empire. However, Empain went beyond the technology of the First Industrial 
Revolution and embraced the benefits of electricity. Moreover, the cartoon magnifies the 
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almost ‘physical’ mobility of capital in the First Global Economy. Crossing the French-
Belgian border, it emphasizes the importance of internationalization for an MNE from a 
small open economy. In France and elsewhere, Empain could achieve economies of scale 
impossible in Belgium. 
Secondly, it illustrates the second argument of an entrepreneur moving beyond the 
boundaries of the limited liability company and of the family firm. By mentioning stocks 
and the firms CMP, Russe-française and Parisienne Electrique in Empain’s fictitious 
statement, the cartoonist refers both to the business group structure and the preference 
for the stock exchange as a source of finance. Furthermore, the image of Empain 
mobilizing French savings to finance its businesses highlights his strategic use of the 
French capital market. In contrast to Brussels, Paris was the largest financial center on 
the European continent. If he also wanted to stay independent from the large joint-stock 
banks, Empain had to attract French investors, notably via the holding companies 
mentioned in the cartoon. Finally, the author’s focus on Empain as a wealthy tycoon with 
a crowned top hat is not far from the truth, for he could control his empire thanks to the 
pyramidal organization. 
Thirdly, the cartoon hints at the political aspect of international business, which is the 
third argument of this dissertation. The political world map posed many challenges to 
Empain: the relative insignificance of the small home country, the rivalry of the Great 
Powers and the nationalism of the host countries. The cartoon particularly criticizes 
Empain’s special relationship with France and especially the use of French capital. In 
itself, it is a proof of the prevailing economic nationalism in that country. It expresses the 
view that the Belgian Empain actually had no business in France. The cartoonist suggests 
that Empain merely exploited the French public, returning to Belgium where his business 
group is based. The author clearly has no illusions whatsoever on which country Empain 
gave allegiance to. Figuratively, tirer sa révérence à la nation française also means 
unashamedly abandoning, even rejecting the French nation.2 However, to the frustration 
of the cartoonist, Empain had developed strategies to create a binational corporate 
identity. The cartoon criticizes the cloaking of the Belgian control of the above-
mentioned firms by making Empain say that he does not know them. Indeed, by hiding 
all the links to the Belgian owners, Empain could circumvent the local nationalism and 
take advantage of the political and financial power of France. 
The discussion of the cartoon illustrates how, through the lens of his transnational 
business group, this dissertation has provided insight into the functioning of the First 
Global Economy. In particular, this research has revealed the strategic interactions of 
small country MNEs with business, politics and society in a world of change. I have mainly 
shown that despite the unprecedented possibilities, Empain had to develop creative 
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strategies to take advantage of the economic, organizational and political challenges of 
the First Global Economy. In the following, I discuss these insights and show how all three 
arguments contribute to global business history. 
Moving beyond the small early-industrialized economy 
This dissertation has provided a deeper insight into the geographical and sectoral 
diversification strategy of entrepreneurs in the First Global Economy. The global 
perspective on the history of the Empain group has demonstrated that historical evidence 
significantly nuances the dominant theories on multinational enterprise. Mainly, I have 
argued that we must look not only at economic factors, but also at non-economic factors 
as an explanation for international investment. Regarding the sectoral strategy, I have 
shown how the Second Industrial Revolution transformed entire industries and had a 
deep impact on the business strategies of railway entrepreneurs. 
Concerning the economic theories on international business, I have confirmed that the 
eclectic paradigm (OLI) is insufficient to explain the internationalization of service MNEs. 
As the services of Empain were location-bound and non-tradable, they could not be 
exported. The Empain group thus was not a market seeker in the classical meaning, i.e. 
setting up activities in markets to substitute exports. Rather, the FDI was only market-
seeking in the sense that the Empain group went where the customers (governments, 
citizens, industry) were. The business group invested in utilities in regions where the 
population was growing (mostly cities) and where returns were higher than at home. 
These developing regions needed the technology and capital that e.g. Belgian 
entrepreneurs could provide. The combination of the resulting first-mover advantages in 
many of these regions, on the one hand, and the efficiency gains caused by a profound 
horizontal integration, on the other hand, created a profitable dynamic. 
This insight has a consequence for the thesis claiming that Belgian FDI, especially in 
utilities, was for a large part a way to create foreign demand for products of the domestic 
heavy industry. This research suggests that the statement is incomplete. Of course, the 
internationalization of the Empain group was initially trade-supporting, driven by a 
railway equipment manufacturer to overcome the smallness of the Belgian market. 
However, subsequently the public utility multinational created its own lucrative business 
model, independent from the alliance with the heavy industry. 
Besides, another economic theory about multinational enterprise should be nuanced. 
The expansion pattern of the Empain group shows that the Uppsala model of incremental 
internationalization is not applicable to international business in every historical period. 
The Empain group emerged as an FSC in France, before it invested in Belgium. Instead of 
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gradually widening its geographical scope, a few years later Empain directly made 
transatlantic investments in Latin America. Therefore, the Empain group rightly belongs 
to the category of the ‘born global firms.’ 
If the investment behavior of the Empain group seems unconventional from the 
viewpoint of classic MNE theory, it would also be wrong to say that the Empain group 
entered a particular market ‘just because it was possible.’ Rather, I have argued that 
purely economic motives are insufficient to explain it. Instead, we also need to look at 
personal and political factors to understand why Empain invested in specific markets and 
sectors. First of all, the individual traits of Empain sometimes instigated investments. The 
quest for prestige, the appetite for risk and perhaps a creative urge typical of the 
nineteenth-century entrepreneur played a part in many projects, less obvious from the 
viewpoint of efficiency. Empain’s involvement in some other businesses was the result of 
his wish to please his friend Leopold II. 
Secondly, the most important non-economic element influencing the 
internationalization pattern was the personal network. The many interactions with 
directors, businessmen and diplomats shaped the mental maps of the Empain group. 
These relations shared information from the press and personal insights on the latest 
business opportunities. Sometimes, the broader business environment also played a role. 
The Empain group imitated fellow Belgian or foreign entrepreneurs to ‘hot’ host 
countries (e.g. Russia, Brazil and Argentina). This relational perspective on the world 
before 1914 corroborates the recent trends in International Business studies to view the 
global business environment more as personal networks instead of markets. Firms that 
are embedded in networks internationalize more easily and successfully. 
Thirdly, power relations on a global scale also influenced the direction of Belgian 
capital flows. Like many of his Belgian counterparts, Empain diversified to the peripheral 
regions neglected by the financial groups of large Western countries. It was a strategy to 
choose the periphery of the periphery and take advantage of the crumbs left by the Great 
Powers. Often Empain had to diversify to unrelated sectors, whenever the competition 
had seized the best railroads. Because of the limited opportunities, the presence of the 
Empain group was rather superficial in these regions, which included Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, the Argentinian borderlands and parts of the Ottoman Empire. However, the 
Empain group also managed to be a Belgian forerunner in other territories, where formal 
and informal empire made the competition fierce. In Egypt and China in particular, 
Empain held his ground vis-à-vis the financial groups backed by the Great Powers. Below, 
the third argument explains why. In general, there was no clear strategy for spreading 
political risk by spreading investments over as many countries as possible. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that Empain combined focused projects in many countries with a strong 
presence in selected core markets: France, Belgium, Egypt and Congo. 
This combined strategy had everything to do with the vertical integration of the 
Empain group in the wake of the Second Industrial Revolution. This research has 
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demonstrated the impact of this phenomenon on business in the First Global Economy. 
Enterprises that wanted to be resilient had to adapt to the innovations that had the power 
to transform entire industries. Electricity, the new General Purpose Technology, slowly 
revolutionized life in the city and the way the world powered transportation and 
production. The highly innovative electric industry thus became one of the driving forces 
in several European economies, generating high profits. If Empain started in a First 
Industrial Revolution industry, he quickly jumped on the bandwagon. As such, he 
successfully made the transition from the ‘steam-transport-iron cluster’ to the ‘electric 
cluster.’ However, transition is not the right word. The Empain group did not exit the 
steam-powered railway sector before the First World War. On the contrary, this is one of 
two things that distinguished it from other electroholdings. The group continued to 
invest large sums in the sector and maintained managerial control over the operating 
companies, unlike the methods of the classic Unternehmergeschäft. The second distinction 
is that the Empain group integrated backward. The dissertation thus shows that forward 
integration (Unternehmergeschäft) as the main explanation for the spread of electric 
utilities should be nuanced. 
What also deserves additional emphasis in the literature is the regional clustering of 
these utilities. This mechanism can explain why some countries became the core markets 
of the Empain group. In France, Belgium and Egypt, the group could exploit economies of 
scope and spillover effects on a local level because it had been able to regionally integrate 
transportation, electricity production and, occasionally, the manufacturing of electrical 
equipment. This pursuit of synergies also unravels the mysterious genesis of the 
Heliopolis project. However, the unrelated diversification proves that entrepreneurs such 
as Empain never missed a good opportunity, even if it did not belong to the core branches. 
Transcending the simple family firm 
The empirical findings in this dissertation also provide a better understanding of the 
advantages of business groups. Whereas this literature has its origin in the remarkable 
omnipresence of business groups in emerging countries in the late twentieth century, the 
present research starts from a business group in the late nineteenth century. Thanks to 
this approach deeply rooted in history, I was able to make a more complete analysis of 
the beneficial aspects of this corporate form. I have mainly made four contributions in 
this respect. The first is a general remark. The inevitable evolution towards the large 
integrated corporation seems to be a teleological construct. This research supports the 
very recent turn in the historiography that regards business groups as a worthy 
alternative to the multidivisional firm. In fact, many firms with roots in the First Global 
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Economy, in Belgium in particular, have successfully used the business group form. The 
Empain group is a case in point, but its competitors (e.g. Otlet, Chemins de fer économiques, 
…) are too. 
Secondly, as the Empain case has many things in common with the family firm, I have 
linked this research to family business studies. It provides further empirical evidence for 
the claim that business groups were perfectly suited for the goals of family capitalism. 
Traditionally, family firms face a difficult choice: remain independent or attract external 
finance and relinquish control? The business group form resolves this fundamental 
dilemma. In this dissertation, I have extensively dealt with the possibilities the business 
group offered regarding finance and control. I have shown how Empain designed a 
pyramidal structure with an accumulation of companies. He always involved external 
finance just to the extent that the business could grow, while keeping an interest 
sufficient to retain control and steer the subsidiary in the right direction. Without this 
leverage, the Empain brothers, though very wealthy by 1914, could never have controlled 
one of the 50 largest enterprises in Europe. 
Moreover, they could stay in command precisely because they used the stock exchange 
as the main funding source. It preferred to disperse the stocks of its subsidiaries as widely 
as possible, instead of relying on the banks. That is why the Empain group tried to go 
public whenever possible, despite the risk to be exposed to the fluctuations of the 
financial markets. The quotation was even a source of profit for the holding companies 
and the private bank, which combined a buy-and-hold strategy with speculation. 
I have shown that thanks to the corporate structure, the family, i.e. the two brothers, 
always remained at the core of the Empain group. However, the business could not have 
prospered without the intensive collaboration of highly skilled managers. These were 
engineers, lawyers, top accountants, politicians and high government officials. This 
openness proves again that in history a partial divorce of ownership and control in large 
enterprises was also an equivalent possibility. 
Thirdly, I have argued that family business groups have other common features such 
as the spread of risk and rationalization of management structures. This was obvious in 
the case of the Empain group. By temporarily extending the chronology, I have 
demonstrated that the longevity of the business group was partly due to the 
mutualization of risk. The profits of one group affiliate could cover the losses of the other. 
Again, it is important to stress that in spite of its apparent complexity, a business group 
like Empain’s could be a highly efficient piece of machinery. It offered the flexibility to 
centralize the strategic and financial management and decentralize the daily operations. 
The top holdings could keep some subsidiaries close and loosen the control over others. 
It was also the perfect structure that flexibly allowed organic growth, acquisitions and 
joint ventures in related and unrelated sectors in different countries. Finally, the 
concentration of management in the headquarters also facilitated the circulation of 
technical expertise between the holding companies and the subsidiaries. 
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The fourth and most important advantage of the business group is the ability to tackle 
political risk, a central theme in this dissertation. In the public utility sector in particular, 
the system of legally independent companies offered the possibility to adapt to local 
regulations and political sensitivities. The group leaders could secure the right political 
support by tailoring the distribution of ownership and the composition of the board of 
directors of a specific subsidiary to the context of the host country. The Empain group 
was structured as a complex organization with holding companies both in Belgium and 
France. In contrast to the dual-listed companies such as Koninklijke/Shell, the binational 
structure of the Empain group was not the result of a merger. Rather, it was a deliberate 
strategy, because it allowed rearranging controlling interests in subsidiaries among the 
Belgian and French parent companies to limit political risk. In addition, the pyramidal 
structure permitted the involvement of local capital and directors without losing control. 
In other words, the cloaking never affected the power of the true owners. This capability 
had been so far underresearched. 
Overcoming imperialism, nationalism and the small state 
The third contribution of this dissertation is situated on the intersection of business 
history and the global history of the second half of the long nineteenth century. The aim 
was to better understand the impact of the paradox of globalization/territorialization on 
multinational enterprise. This dissertation has focused on the actions of global 
entrepreneurs and their firms, but it puts the political in the center of the debate about 
international business. I have argued that the relationship with governments was of 
utmost importance for public utility companies. Why? Because nationality mattered 
before the First World War. Public utility entrepreneurs already had to reckon with 
considerable political risk. They simply could not ignore the non-market forces such as 
nationalism and imperialism that could impact policy and encourage discrimination or 
even expropriation. The political risks were, however, not insurmountable. Empain’s 
ability to build and consolidate a global business empire proves this. The hostile 
nationalism did sometimes merely infiltrate the public discourse, but not the actions of 
the authorities. Nevertheless, public utility entrepreneurs had to develop strategies to 
mitigate the political uncertainty as much as possible. To this end, they had to maintain 
close relations with all political actors involved. 
In the classic view, FDI creates a triangular relationship between three actors: the 
multinational, the home country and the host country. Let us start with the first side of 
the triangle: the relationship between the MNE and the host country. Although most host 
countries initially have welcomed FDI, they could at a later stage discriminate against 
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foreign entrepreneurs. This happened in Venezuela and France. For public utility 
entrepreneurs, retreating from the market was unthinkable. Another possibility was that 
the host country was forced to accept the presence of foreign investors, because it lacked 
their superior technical and financial resources or because Great Powers had opened up 
the market. The host country could, however, try to discriminate based on nationality. 
China chose the lesser evil by granting concessions to countries it perceived as less 
dangerous. 
The second side of the triangle is the relationship between the MNE and the home 
country. Given the unequal power relations in the First Global Economy, the support of 
the home country was as important for the MNE as the goodwill of the host country. In 
Belgium, big business that had the right connections with the government could count 
on the state machinery for its projects at home and abroad. The most zealous diplomats 
actively promoted and protected business interests in their area. The diplomatic agents 
were often the local antennae of 'Belgium Inc.' They hinted and advised entrepreneurs 
on business opportunities as well as assisted in or even led contract negotiations. As a 
rule, the more distant the market, the more Empain relied on diplomatic services. Both 
in Venezuela and China, their action was decisive. 
Whenever the official economic diplomacy was either insufficient or unnecessary, the 
Empain group engaged in business diplomacy. As a result, the distinction between the 
private and public sphere became faint. Empain himself or his closest collaborators 
frequently contacted ministers and administrations. Conversely, politicians –in office or 
retired– and former diplomats privately lobbied governments on behalf of companies. 
The existence of a Belgian business-government nexus was the most evident in the saga 
of the Caracas waterworks. Private and state interests completely merged when the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs almost became an extension of the Empain headquarters in 
1903. The MNE-home country side of the triangle became very short, so to speak. 
The third side of the triangle connects the home and the host country. The bilateral 
relations could have a decisive impact on the fortune of the MNE in the host country. 
Foremost, this dissertation has confirmed for different political settings in a different 
timeframe the insight that corporate nationality can be an asset in one context and a 
liability in another. FDI thus was informed by the international political context. The 
most important characteristics of Belgium as a home country of FDI were its smallness 
and its neutrality in international politics. Was neutrality a blessing or a curse for Belgian 
business? I have demonstrated that this depended on the size and power of the host 
country. In countries subject to informal empire such as China, business from the small 
country Belgium had an advantage. Its reputation as an industrious, innocent nation 
reassured the Chinese elite. In Venezuela, the liabilities of foreignness and of smallness 
converged. A Belgian company did not have the power to force the nationalist 
Venezuelan authorities to act in the interest of the company. Even the Great Powers could 
not simply consider Venezuela as their informal empire. Only with gunboat diplomacy 
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could they achieve their goals. Entrepreneurs from neutral Belgium could only watch and 
try to take advantage of the Great Powers’ military intervention. Egypt was de facto a 
British colony. While British firms had a prominent position, neutrality did not provide 
an advantage to Belgian firms compared to other foreign firms. In France and Russia, the 
neutral status played neither to the advantage nor to the disadvantage of Empain. These 
were strong industrializing states that did not fear foreign interference. The smallness, 
however, was a disadvantage. The weak Belgian diplomacy could not accomplish much 
against overassertive municipalities in the Czarist empire. 
Yet, on the basis of my research I have developed the new argument that for the First 
Global Economy, the triangular view of FDI is sometimes too simple. If host countries 
preferred companies from one country over those from another, then this created 
opportunities for multinationals. I show that on a basic level MNEs took advantage of this 
discrimination by distancing themselves from their competitors from other countries. 
The Belgian industry willingly portrayed itself as a harmless investor in China. However, 
on a more complex level MNEs tried to transcend the liability of home altogether. The 
Empain group forged a multifaceted corporate national identity, using its legal entities in 
different countries. This versatile multinational identity limited political risk in two 
interrelated ways. 
First, it had shortened the MNE-host country side of the triangle. In other words, to 
maintain cordial relations with the authorities of the host country, the business group 
tried to appear as local as possible, notably through cloaking mechanisms. The 
subsidiaries of the Empain group had to be perceived as Belgian in Belgium, French in 
France, Egyptian in Egypt, and so on. The preferred method to assimilate was involving 
local investors and the local political elite. The Empain group had failed to do so in 
Venezuela, but had learned from this experience. The strong partnerships in France and 
Egypt prove this. In sum, assimilation was the best way of avoiding adverse policy-making 
or municipalization/nationalization. The failed attempt in the politically sensitive French 
colonies, however, shows the limits of this chameleonic strategy. 
Secondly, a versatile business group could also transform the FDI triangle into a 
diamond (lozenge) by adding a fourth actor. In the case of the Empain group, this diamond 
consisted of the MNE itself, the home country Belgium, the host country and, fourthly, a 
second home country. Involving a Great Power had a twofold effect for the Empain group. 
One the one hand, it added more pressure on the host country to accept and afterward 
respect the investments of the Empain group. In contrast to the limited influence of small 
nation diplomacy, this powerful state could provide political and financial support to gain 
a foothold in a particular host country. In Egypt, Empain partnered up with British 
capitalists because they were the imperial power there. In Russia, the Empain companies 
appealed to French diplomacy. In China too, the Empain group accepted French influence 
in the management in exchange for decisive support. On the other hand, by choosing a 
strong partner the Empain group eliminated the severe competition of investors from the 
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hegemonic powers. Moreover, on some occasions Empain played high. As European 
governments regarded business as the extension of national foreign policy, the Empain 
group could play off one country against another. In the case of Egypt and China, the 
Empain group put pressure on the French government to support them, threatening to 
do business with British or German capitalists instead. 
Even if the strong alliance with France was an asset in several ways, I have shown that 
‘Little Belgium’ had many advantages besides the limitations. As a result, the Empain 
group did not abandon its home base. Before the First World War, the roots of the founder 
determined the national identity of the business group. Moreover, the main headquarters 
were in Brussels. From there, Empain organized the worldwide expansion of his business 
empire. The Baron also continued to play a role in Belgian high society. Nevertheless, 
Empain spent his personal life in the French capital too. Additionally, some of the group’s 
most important firms as well as directors were French. In sum, it is too simplistic to 
pigeonhole the Empain group as an instrument of Belgian capitalism, although this is 
exactly what the cartoon tried to do. Rather, its strategic use of this ambiguity has been 
one of the salient points of this dissertation. Through its strong ties to Belgium and its 
special relationship with France, the Empain group had become a hybrid multinational 
business group, running on a Belgian-French double track. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: A note on money and currencies 
This dissertation always expresses the monetary value of assets in current prices, unless 
indicated otherwise. The First Global Economy had a relatively stable monetary system. 
Compared to 1880, there had been limited to no inflation in Belgium (see Jordà-
Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database). The country witnessed a period of deflation 
in the 1880s and 1890s, but the prices restored in the 1900s. Therefore, only few longer 
time series were adjusted for inflation. 
As far as currencies concern, the First Global Economy had fixed exchange rates. In 
France and Belgium, members of the Latin Monetary Union, the franc was worth the 
same. Unless noted otherwise, other currencies (Bolivares for Venezuela, Mexican dollars 
for China) have been converted to francs using the Federico-Tena World Trade Historical 
Database (see Bibliography). 
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Appendix 2: Structure of the personal database (MS Access) 
The database contains information on persons, firms, board membership, ownership, 
capital, stocks, locations of HQ and the geographical and temporal development of the 
railroad network in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. 
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Abstract (EN/NL) 
EN  By looking through the lens of a global entrepreneur, this dissertation provides 
insight into a crucial period in world history: the First Global Economy (1870-1914). To 
tackle the broader issue of the opportunities and limitations in a paradoxical world of 
economic globalization and political fragmentation, I take an actor-centered approach. 
The history of the business empire of the Belgian Edouard Empain (1852-1929) elucidates 
a complex era characterized by globalization and nation-state formation. By focusing on 
an entrepreneur originating from a small country but transcending boundaries, the 
possibilities and risks for international business in this period can be studied. Starting in 
1880, the business group of Edouard Empain developed into one of the largest in Belgium 
and became a global player active on four continents. The Empain group mainly invested 
in public utilities such as transportation and electricity production as well as in electrical 
engineering. Within this context, this dissertation answers the following question: What 
strategies did a multinational enterprise from a small country adopt to seize the 
opportunities and handle the risks of a world characterized by both economic integration 
and geopolitical rivalry at a global scale? I argue that, to understand the development of 
international business in the First Global Economy, we need to acknowledge the 
importance of the following three domains: the geographical and sectoral strategy, the 
corporate structure, and the business-government relations. To address these issues, this 
dissertation uses a wide array of archival sources and secondary literature. It combines a 
comprehensive approach of the more than eighty Empain companies with selected case 
studies to understand the dynamics of international business. This allows me to argue 
that Empain developed strategies in the three abovementioned domains to transform the 
global economic and political challenges into opportunities. First, his investments were 
the result of an entrepreneurial logic combined with the pursuit of economies of scale 
and scope. Secondly, the business group form had many advantages, making it an efficient 
device for investments in the First Global Economy. Thirdly, thanks to the complex 
interplay between the multinational enterprise, the home country and the host countries, 
an entrepreneur from a small country could exploit the international political frictions 
of the late nineteenth-century world to develop a global business empire.  
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NL  Kijkend door de ogen van een internationale ondernemer verschaft dit doctoraat 
inzicht in een cruciale periode in de wereldgeschiedenis: de Eerste Wereldeconomie 
(1870-1914). Dit onderzoek vertelt tegelijk de geschiedenis van het zakenimperium van 
de Belg Edouard Empain (1852-1929) en het verhaal van een complex tijdperk gekenmerkt 
door globalisering en de vorming van natiestaten. Vanuit één actor behandelt het het 
bredere vraagstuk van de kansen en beperkingen van een paradoxale wereld van 
economische integratie en politieke fragmentatie. De studie van een bloeiende 
onderneming, die haar kleine herkomstland overstijgt, maakt een analyse van de 
opportuniteiten en risico’s verbonden aan internationaal ondernemen mogelijk. Vanaf 
1880 groeide de bedrijvengroep van Edouard Empain uit tot een wereldspeler actief op 
vier continenten. De Empain groep investeerde hoofdzakelijk in nutsbedrijven zoals 
transport en elektriciteitsproductie, maar ook in de productie van elektrisch materieel. 
In dit geschetste kader, antwoordt het doctoraat op de volgende vraag: Via welke 
strategieën kon een multinational uit een klein land de kansen te grijpen en de risico’s 
beheersen, die eigen waren aan een wereld gekenmerkt door economische integratie en 
geopolitieke rivaliteit? Ik stel dat, om de ontwikkeling van multinationale 
ondernemingen in de Eerste Wereldeconomie te begrijpen, we het belang van de 
volgende drie domeinen moeten erkennen: de geografische en sectorale strategie, de 
bedrijfsstructuur en de relaties tussen bedrijven en overheden. Om deze vraagstukken te 
behandelen gebruikt dit doctoraat een brede waaier aan bronnen en literatuur. Het 
combineert een globale aanpak van de meer dan tachtig bedrijven met selecte 
casusstudies om de dynamiek van internationale investeringen te begrijpen. Dit laat toe 
te tonen hoe Empain strategieën ontwikkelde in de drie genoemde domeinen om de 
wereldwijde economische en politieke uitdagingen om te vormen in opportuniteiten. Ten 
eerste stel ik dat zijn investeringen het resultaat waren van een ondernemerslogica 
gecombineerd met een zoektocht naar schaalvoordelen. Ten tweede argumenteer ik dat 
de piramidale groepsstructuur vele voordelen had die er een efficiënt instrument voor 
investeringen in de Eerste Wereldeconomie van maakten. Ten derde, dankzij het 
complexe samenspel tussen de multinational, het thuisland en de gastlanden kon een 
ondernemer uit een kleine staat de internationale politieke strubbelingen uitbuiten om 
een wereldwijd zakenimperium uit te bouwen.
   
 
